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The battle of Hussainiwala and Qaiser I Hind
I was searching oxford university press website and I came across a book named “The battle of Hussainiwala and Qaiser I Hind” by Lt col Habib Ahmad. The book is a detailed account of actions by the 106 brigade of Pakistan army in the battle of Hussainiwala in west Pakistan in 1971 when East Pakistan was slipping away from West Pakistan. Since the topic of 1971 is very close to my heart, I immediately ordered the book and when the book arrived I sat down to read the book.
The book was written decades after the battle of Hussainiwala and has firsthand account of actions taken by soldiers of 41st Baloch (under 106 Brigade) against the Indian oldest 15th Punjab (formerly 1st Patiala) regiment to capture Hussainiwala salient and qaiser I Hind tower, when the hostilities started at the western theater in 1971. Although the book was written to commemorate the bravery of soldiers of newly raised 41st Baloch (under 106 brigade) under author’s command however there is a brief commentary on Pakistan ruling elite, military high command and Bangalis.
The start of the book captures the political alienation in East Pakistan and overwhelming realization among the concerned Pakistanis that east Pakistan was slipping away. He penned down some of the pleasant memories from his stay in East Pakistan before 1971 war. He praised Bangalis for being simple, educated and loving people and blamed Pakistani ruling elite for the unrest in east Pakistan He also shows disdain towards the casual behavior of Yahya Khan towards the whole situation. In next chapter, he sheds light on raising of 41st Baloch and training. Next chapters are detailed account of operational planning, military drills and reconnaissance of the operation areas employing many tactics. The final chapters are dedicated to the minute details of actions of tenacious soldiers of 106 brigade under his command, capture of hussainiwala and surrender in east Pakistan.
The author believed that even after the civil unrest in east Pakistan there was a way for Pakistan to solve the problem politically instead of a military operation. He mentions officers of Pakistani military who resigned when asked to start a military crackdown in east Pakistan. Despite all that he believed that there was a way to avoid embarrassing surrender in 1971. When the situation reached to dangerous point of no return his consistent frustration with the high command on not to initiate attack on India is visible in his book.
If I may summarize the reasons according to the author why we lost east Pakistan, those would be,
1. Failure to transfer due political power to the people of east Pakistan after a fair and free election where Mujib won a landslide victory and a history of neglecting bangalis for their rights since 1947
2. A brutal military crackdown in east Pakistan to quell civil unrest and targeting students and intellectuals creating a sphere of fear and genocide
3. Inability of Yahya Khan, Abdul Majid Khan and his cohorts to launch pre-emptive strikes from western theater despite knowing India’s hand in sending guerrilla fighters to east Pakistan
4. Half-heartedly attacking India from west Pakistan at 3rd December while India had already invaded at 26th November
5. Despite the claim of “Defense of the east lies in defense of the west” military high command did not utilize the resources available to it in west Pakistan to mount an offensive. For example, 5 divisions or more under the command of Tikka Khan were kept out of action during the whole war
6. Inability of AK Niazi to hold the Dacca when he had ample men and weapon at his disposal
7. The frequent change of military plans during the war which led to the confusion and frustration among the commanders
8. Presence of people in armed forces who poisoned the ears of top brass against the most diligent commanders and presented wrong pictures of the pertaining situations
Some personal observation,
· While the offensive on Hussainiwala was planned months before the actual attack however author did not mention role of air force during the whole operation
· Indian airforce extensively strafed and bombed Pakistani forces while Pakistan airforce was absent from the action and ground forces were left to fend off using their automatics
· Author praised the bravery of Indian soldiers, especially machine gunners positioned at tower of Qaiser I hind citadel which never stopped fighting until one tank silenced them forever. The Sikh soldier who hid while Pakistani army was all around yet moved forward and disabled advancing Pakistani tank
· While the author did a tremendous job of achieving his goal however it seemed that he had no plan in place for the fall back if things didn’t go according to the plan
While I personally believe that Pakistan army had a thin chance to save east Pakistan from becoming a new country owning to the fact that we were outnumbered and had not aerial and land route available for logistics and supply lines, what do you think were the potential steps that could have saved us from the surrender?
I was searching oxford university press website and I came across a book named “The battle of Hussainiwala and Qaiser I Hind” by Lt col Habib Ahmad. The book is a detailed account of actions by the 106 brigade of Pakistan army in the battle of Hussainiwala in west Pakistan in 1971 when East Pakistan was slipping away from West Pakistan. Since the topic of 1971 is very close to my heart, I immediately ordered the book and when the book arrived I sat down to read the book.
The book was written decades after the battle of Hussainiwala and has firsthand account of actions taken by soldiers of 41st Baloch (under 106 Brigade) against the Indian oldest 15th Punjab (formerly 1st Patiala) regiment to capture Hussainiwala salient and qaiser I Hind tower, when the hostilities started at the western theater in 1971. Although the book was written to commemorate the bravery of soldiers of newly raised 41st Baloch (under 106 brigade) under author’s command however there is a brief commentary on Pakistan ruling elite, military high command and Bangalis.
The start of the book captures the political alienation in East Pakistan and overwhelming realization among the concerned Pakistanis that east Pakistan was slipping away. He penned down some of the pleasant memories from his stay in East Pakistan before 1971 war. He praised Bangalis for being simple, educated and loving people and blamed Pakistani ruling elite for the unrest in east Pakistan He also shows disdain towards the casual behavior of Yahya Khan towards the whole situation. In next chapter, he sheds light on raising of 41st Baloch and training. Next chapters are detailed account of operational planning, military drills and reconnaissance of the operation areas employing many tactics. The final chapters are dedicated to the minute details of actions of tenacious soldiers of 106 brigade under his command, capture of hussainiwala and surrender in east Pakistan.
The author believed that even after the civil unrest in east Pakistan there was a way for Pakistan to solve the problem politically instead of a military operation. He mentions officers of Pakistani military who resigned when asked to start a military crackdown in east Pakistan. Despite all that he believed that there was a way to avoid embarrassing surrender in 1971. When the situation reached to dangerous point of no return his consistent frustration with the high command on not to initiate attack on India is visible in his book.
If I may summarize the reasons according to the author why we lost east Pakistan, those would be,
1. Failure to transfer due political power to the people of east Pakistan after a fair and free election where Mujib won a landslide victory and a history of neglecting bangalis for their rights since 1947
2. A brutal military crackdown in east Pakistan to quell civil unrest and targeting students and intellectuals creating a sphere of fear and genocide
3. Inability of Yahya Khan, Abdul Majid Khan and his cohorts to launch pre-emptive strikes from western theater despite knowing India’s hand in sending guerrilla fighters to east Pakistan
4. Half-heartedly attacking India from west Pakistan at 3rd December while India had already invaded at 26th November
5. Despite the claim of “Defense of the east lies in defense of the west” military high command did not utilize the resources available to it in west Pakistan to mount an offensive. For example, 5 divisions or more under the command of Tikka Khan were kept out of action during the whole war
6. Inability of AK Niazi to hold the Dacca when he had ample men and weapon at his disposal
7. The frequent change of military plans during the war which led to the confusion and frustration among the commanders
8. Presence of people in armed forces who poisoned the ears of top brass against the most diligent commanders and presented wrong pictures of the pertaining situations
Some personal observation,
· While the offensive on Hussainiwala was planned months before the actual attack however author did not mention role of air force during the whole operation
· Indian airforce extensively strafed and bombed Pakistani forces while Pakistan airforce was absent from the action and ground forces were left to fend off using their automatics
· Author praised the bravery of Indian soldiers, especially machine gunners positioned at tower of Qaiser I hind citadel which never stopped fighting until one tank silenced them forever. The Sikh soldier who hid while Pakistani army was all around yet moved forward and disabled advancing Pakistani tank
· While the author did a tremendous job of achieving his goal however it seemed that he had no plan in place for the fall back if things didn’t go according to the plan
While I personally believe that Pakistan army had a thin chance to save east Pakistan from becoming a new country owning to the fact that we were outnumbered and had not aerial and land route available for logistics and supply lines, what do you think were the potential steps that could have saved us from the surrender?