Windjammer
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Official announcements on the progress of the LCA cause more worry than cheer. The postponements are now routine. In December 2013 we were assured that we should have two aircraft by March 2014. What we got was one aircraft in October. That works out to half of what was promised after a delay of three hundred percent. The delay we are used to; the worry is that after sixteen machines and 2700 sorties is the programme so unsettled that it is difficult to get reasonable dates? FOC by May 2015 is doubtful. The significant overweight will not permit spinning and brake over heating problems to be resolved. At best we might have the end of factory testing and the formation of a Handling Flight. This will be followed by the raising of the first squadron with an IOC. The real troubles will begin then. As the new machines are bedded down in squadron service they require support. If the squadron was raised at AF Halwara or AF Hashimara it would have been a strong endorsement of the LCA’s serviceability. By locating it at Coimbatore, 110 n.m. from the nearest border and not a pressing air defence priority but close to Bangalore gives a message that the current in serviceability may be doubtful. The product needs support. If so why not raise the first squadron at Yehlanka?
First the bad news:
1. We have a fairly mediocre fighter somewhere between the Gnat F1 and the MiG 21 on our hands. Hence the IAF’s present reluctance with the Mk.1.
2. Both the F-16 and the FC-17 will give the LCA Mk.1 a hard time. The F-16 A will be particularly dangerous. Even against the FC-17 it would be a Mysteres vs Sabres kind of a situation. I don’t have much faith in the “great equalizer” capabilities of BVRs as of now. BVRs is not the weapon for a little LCA. Hence the FC-17 will also be a very dangerous opponent no matter how much we snigger about the Chinese aircraft.
3. As a MiG-21 bis replacement the LCA is a failure because the general rule of thumb is a 15 % increase in performance and capability. The LCA Mk1 does not measure up. The landing speed and the cockpit displays will be better than the early MiGs which will help reduce accidents but let us not fool ourselves of having developed a MiG-21 replacement particularly as an interceptor. So what do we do?
And now the good news – if you are prepared to think differently!
The good news is that the LCA Mk1 is a good replacement for the Hunters, Gnats and Mysteres and to a certain extent the Sukhoi Su-7 that we had in ’71. We had a round 23 squadrons of these and the LCA could be a replacement for these ground attack squadrons which to me was always the core of the Air force’s business. How do we go about that? The background notes are:
1. As things are going come 2020 the IAF will be forced to use the SU 30MKI or the Hawk for close support. Neither bears thinking, to my mind. The LCA, particularly given its small size will be better in this role.
2. The IAF is allergic about using transonic aircraft after having lost Hunters to MiG 19s and Mirages IIIs at Talhar and the gallant Sqn. Ldr. Mistri’s loss is still remembered. However these losses were also due to zeal which should on occasions have been restrained.
3. The IAF has to be persuaded to accept the LCA with minimal improvement confined to improving critical platform performance parameters. The LCA for close support with Su 30 MKIs as top cover could be source of envy and a model to follow for many countries.
4. To obtain that performance improvement the weight of the aircraft has to be reduced to the original target of 5500 kg. If necessary, some equipment has to be deleted. The first to go will be the Flight refueling. FR is an extremely expensive force multiplier and I cannot imagine using FR resources on a “puny” warplane such as a LCA. If the IAF is adamant in its sulk, keep only a small number of LCAs with this facility. I remember developing and producing a Soviet (very “Heath Robinson” but effective!) Arctic heating system for the T 72 (it thawed out the lubricant, fuel and the engine and used the remaining heat to warm the fighting compartment!) for the Army. They equipped only one third of their fleet and we lost a lot of business! There are no hard data on the efficacy of BVRs. The BVR issue has to be debated constructively with may be TACDE help.
Read the full article.
Prof. Prodyut Das: The ADA LCA: Beloved Aircraft or a Lemon
First the bad news:
1. We have a fairly mediocre fighter somewhere between the Gnat F1 and the MiG 21 on our hands. Hence the IAF’s present reluctance with the Mk.1.
2. Both the F-16 and the FC-17 will give the LCA Mk.1 a hard time. The F-16 A will be particularly dangerous. Even against the FC-17 it would be a Mysteres vs Sabres kind of a situation. I don’t have much faith in the “great equalizer” capabilities of BVRs as of now. BVRs is not the weapon for a little LCA. Hence the FC-17 will also be a very dangerous opponent no matter how much we snigger about the Chinese aircraft.
3. As a MiG-21 bis replacement the LCA is a failure because the general rule of thumb is a 15 % increase in performance and capability. The LCA Mk1 does not measure up. The landing speed and the cockpit displays will be better than the early MiGs which will help reduce accidents but let us not fool ourselves of having developed a MiG-21 replacement particularly as an interceptor. So what do we do?
And now the good news – if you are prepared to think differently!
The good news is that the LCA Mk1 is a good replacement for the Hunters, Gnats and Mysteres and to a certain extent the Sukhoi Su-7 that we had in ’71. We had a round 23 squadrons of these and the LCA could be a replacement for these ground attack squadrons which to me was always the core of the Air force’s business. How do we go about that? The background notes are:
1. As things are going come 2020 the IAF will be forced to use the SU 30MKI or the Hawk for close support. Neither bears thinking, to my mind. The LCA, particularly given its small size will be better in this role.
2. The IAF is allergic about using transonic aircraft after having lost Hunters to MiG 19s and Mirages IIIs at Talhar and the gallant Sqn. Ldr. Mistri’s loss is still remembered. However these losses were also due to zeal which should on occasions have been restrained.
3. The IAF has to be persuaded to accept the LCA with minimal improvement confined to improving critical platform performance parameters. The LCA for close support with Su 30 MKIs as top cover could be source of envy and a model to follow for many countries.
4. To obtain that performance improvement the weight of the aircraft has to be reduced to the original target of 5500 kg. If necessary, some equipment has to be deleted. The first to go will be the Flight refueling. FR is an extremely expensive force multiplier and I cannot imagine using FR resources on a “puny” warplane such as a LCA. If the IAF is adamant in its sulk, keep only a small number of LCAs with this facility. I remember developing and producing a Soviet (very “Heath Robinson” but effective!) Arctic heating system for the T 72 (it thawed out the lubricant, fuel and the engine and used the remaining heat to warm the fighting compartment!) for the Army. They equipped only one third of their fleet and we lost a lot of business! There are no hard data on the efficacy of BVRs. The BVR issue has to be debated constructively with may be TACDE help.
Read the full article.
Prof. Prodyut Das: The ADA LCA: Beloved Aircraft or a Lemon
