THE MiG-21s in 1965 WAR
The saga of the MiG-21 in the IAF began in 1962, with the selection of the initial batch of pilots who were short-listed to undergo training in Russia on this particular aircraft. They were the fortunate seven. Of the hundreds of pilots in the Air Force, the IAF handpicked seven pilots to fly the first MiG-21 fighters that were being acquired from Russia.
The MiG-21 was the first true supersonic aircraft acquired by the IAF, in fact it was the first fighter the IAF had that can reach Mach 2. The Hunter, Mystere and the Gnat could were flying supersonic for ages, albeit only in a dive. They were not capable of flying above the supersonic barrier in level flight.
The intricacies that led to the acquiring of the MiGs had already been recounted. The acquisition of the Starfighter by the Pakistanis and the subsequent strained relations with China led the IAF into thinking of building a supersonic interceptor force. The IAF short-listed the Mirage III, the Starfighter and the MiG-21, roughly in that order.
The high cost of the Mirage and the reluctance of the Americans to give the Starfighter coupled with the easy terms for the manufacture and buying the MiG-21s saw that the Russians got the order and ultimately the IAF flew over 700 variants of the MiG-21. The Air Force top brass of the time was dead against buying the MiG-21, but the forceful presence of the then-Defence Minister Krishna Menon, saw to it that the deal went through.
The deal for the MiGs was signed in August 1962 and two months later, the first batch of Indian pilots numbered seven, along with 15 engineers who were nominated to be trained as the ground support staff went to Russia in October 1962, when the Indo-China hostilities broke out. The pilots & engineers, were then headed by Wg. Cdr. Dilbagh Singh (Later Chief of Air Staff). And were posted at Lugovaya, a desolate air force base at Kazakhstan near Tashkent. The facilities given for housing the pilots was appalling.
The pilots were handpicked and consisted of well known names like Sqn. Ldr. M.S.D. Wollen, Sqn. Ldr. Mukherjee and Flt. Lt. S.K. Behal among others. And all were specially qualified. They were a mix of flying instructors, pilot attack instructors or day fighter leaders, with plenty of flying hours behind them. And what they faced was a shock to them. Russian instructors lacked the experience their pupils had and most of the pilots felt that they were below average. The Russians rated all the seven pilots as excellent. And the Indians were not surprised a little bit.
The pilots stayed back in Russia for five months doing their training, which included classroom instruction on the aircraft engines and systems. Flying training was scarce. Air Marshal Wollen recalls, that the average training received during the five-month period was a shatteringly low 4½ hours.
MiG-21 pilots in the 1960s wore the cumbersome one-piece full-chin space-suit type helmet as opposed to the more comfortable open face helmets of today. It gave the pilots an exaggerated sense of feeling that they were prepared more in line to fly high in the stratosphere, than jig around at treetop heights in dogfights.
On their return from Russia these pilots formed the core group of fighter leaders of the new squadron No.28 First Supersonics. The squadron was raised at Chandigarh and was equipped with six MiG-21 F-13s (Type 74) aircraft. These aircraft were first shipped to Bombay by ship, after which they were assembled and flown to Chandigarh by the pilots.
Dilbagh Singh was the squadron commander, and the working up of the squadron commenced. Having a limited number of six aircraft for training would hardly make a contribution, but the pilots made best use of what was available. The initial MiG-21Fs had no gun, only the K-13 air-to-air missile. On the insistence of the pilots an external gun-pod was fitted. But this was limited to only the Type 74.
Training was as per the schedule till one fine day in December 1963, Sqn. Ldr. Wollen took off with Sqn. Ldr. Mukherjee on a routine training mission and a miscalculation led to a collision between the two. Both Wollen and Mukherjee ejected and the aircraft were lost. Both pilots suffered spinal injuries as a result of the ejection, but recovered later. The training regimen of the squadron suffered a severe set back with the loss of the two aircraft. It had to make do with four MiG-21s till mid-1965.
Wg. Cdr. Dilbagh Singh left for a staff job in March 1965 and Sqn. Ldr. Wollen succeeded him as the Commanding Officer. About this time another MiG-21 was written off in an accident at Chandigarh AFB by Flt. Lt. Musquati. Only three, of the original six MiG-21Fs survived the initial days.
In March 1965, the squadron received six MiG-21FL (Type 76) aircraft. This aircraft was more pleasant to fly than the MiG-21F because of its roll-stabilization system. It was equipped with an airborne intercept radar (RIL), the first such radar in any IAF aircraft. Inwards of 20 km, the pilot could locate and intercept a target, with this radar.
Perhaps more important being that the MiG could fly twice the speed of the sound, allowing it to match its nearest rival with the PAF, the F-104 Starfighter. Wg. Cdr. C.R. Malhotra, a MiG-21 pilot who flew Hunters with No.27 Sqn and the MiG-21, describes the feeling of flying supersonic.
"Flying Supersonic is not as interesting as people think, Oh Wow, you are going so fast, it must be fun. Believe me, its no fun. There is nothing interesting in going supersonic. To me a fighter pilot, the enjoyment in flying is in the turns and the aerobatics.
This you could do in the Hunter, but going supersonic in the MiG-21, you could fly only level and straight. The slight attempt you do to maneuver at faster than the speed of the sound, it will pitch up in the airflow and the engine would surge as the airflow is cut off and you have a flame out in your hands"
As war clouds started brewing towards the end of August 1965, No.28 was scheduled to move to Palam to implement night flying training. Chandigarh AFB did not possess a runway lighting system. The Sqn had type trainers available at that time. When war broke out the day prior to the move, most of the pilots in the squadron were unsure of what their role was going to be. Command HQ's operations instruction did not include a role for No.28 squadron. They had practiced set piece NATO-style high altitude bomber interception but not the close combat tactics that were to see the light of the day.
Air Commodore K. Gocal was the Senior Air Staff Officer at HQ Western Air Command. He was the keenest of pilots, operationally oriented and highly respected. He cleared the squadron for ORP duties (platform readiness for air defence), at a front-line base (Adampur), and a detachment of aircraft flew to this airfield on the afternoon of 1 September 1965.
Earlier that morning, Vampire aircraft had been shot down by Sabres, whilst providing offensive air support in the Chamb sector. PAF F-104 supersonic fighters were reported in the area. The next day four MIG-21FL aircraft flew from Adampur to Pathankot to fly top cover missions to Mystere IV A aircraft carrying out strike and close air support missions, closely escorted by Gnats. Air Marshal Wollen tells about the first encounter.
On the afternoon of September 4th, Sqn. Ldr. Mukherjee and I flew a top cover mission to the Mysteres attacking advanced columns of the Pakistani Army. The Mysteres were intercepted by Sabres, probably from combat air patrol (CAP). Escorting Gnats tangled with the Sabres.
The R/T chatter was exhilarating, particularly the calls from a Gnat pilot (Flt. Lt. V.S. Pathania) reporting a Sabre destroyed. The aircraft engaged in combat were below us, but the GCI station, under whose direction we operated, had 'no pick-up' on their radar screen.
I decided to enter the 'arena' and dived earthwards. In a few seconds, we spotted some aircraft engaged in turning-combat, about 10,000 ft below us. Coming down, I closed in on a pair of aircraft turning hard left. When the range decreased to around 1.5 km, we had recognized the aircraft as our Mysteres.
As we eased Our turn, two Sabres, flying almost abreast of each other, crossed from left to right, below and in front of us. I wrenched my aircraft to the starboard (right) calling out to Mukherjee.
I picked up the Sabres heading northwest, very low and 1 o'clock to me. I went after the slightly lagging Sabre on the right. I later learnt that Mukherjee lost sight of me in the violent turn I had executed. The beastly pressure helmet/face piece is a bad thing to wear when dog-fighting.
With a good overtake speed, in a slight dive, I released a missile at around 1200 m, sighting through the 'fixed-ring and bead'; the radar cannot provide information so close to the ground. The missile sped towards the Sabre and exploded below it; perhaps ahead and on the ground.
In my excitement, I released the second missile when I was too close to the ground (90 m) and probably too close to the Sabre. For 0.6 seconds after release, the K-13 missile is unguided. During this time it headed downwards, started to flatten out and then struck the ground, not far ahead of me.
I engaged engine re-reheat, rapidly closed in on the Sabre, was tempted to brush against his fin and passed about 6 metres over the aircraft. Naturally, the PAF pilot was surprised/shaken. I asked Mukherjee to engage the second Sabre, but got no response. We 'rendezvoused' over Jammu airfield (above AA-gun range) and returned to Pathankot.
This was the only significant mission flown by No.28 in the early days of the war. The performance of the K-13s in their initial debut was disappointing to say the least. There is no doubt if the K-13s were not so inferior they would have succeeded in bringing down their first kills of the war. As things were, the MiGs would have to wait another Six Years before they would draw blood.
The second occasion when the MiGs had to face the Sabres was rather one-sided. It was two days later on September 6th, when the Indian Army crossed the international border on an attack on Lahore in an effort to relieve pressure off the Chamb-Jaurian sector.
No.28 Sqn had the ignominy of getting caught on the ground at Pathankot when the PAF Sabres attacked. Pathankot was home to the detachment of Gnats, Vampires and Mysteres besides the MiGs and when the Sabres attacked they were literally caught napping.
The pilots of No.28 Sqn had a grandstand view to the raid, luckily the MiGs escaped damage. Two of the MiGs was destroyed in the attack. Some of the rest suffered bullet holes but were soon patched up. Incidentally the Sabre pilots reported all the MiGs as destroyed.
For the night the pilots dispersed off the airfield and slept at individual civilian billets to reduce the risk of getting caught in one of the PAF night raids. The night-raids were a nuisance in the fact a lucky strike might wipe out a significant number of pilots. So the pilots were ordered to disperse and assemble in the morning.
Wollen and one of his men, went to a nearby club house to sleep, but soon ran into trouble, a suspicious Army man, interrogated them on fear of spies but were soon let off. No.28 was stood down for the rest of the war. The squadron flew no significant sorties. Though Pakistan kept reporting encounters with the MiGs, including one on September 11th when a F-104 Starfighter was intercepted by two MiGs. But it was more likely to be a mistake in identification as no MiG pilot reported interception that day.
It is clear had the MiG squadron had more time to train, both in air combat as well as night interception with the FLs, they would have played a significant part. They were the correct aircraft to counter the night raids by the B-57s, but with hardly 4 to 5 months allocated for training, the MiGs did not play any significant part here.
Moreover, night interception required a good radar setup and control from the ground, which was again lacking. Wg. Cdr. M.S.D. Wollen was mentioned-in-despatches for his role in the war, and after the war, led a fly past to counter the baseless claims of the Pakistani's destruction of all the MiGs.
Thus ended the small but significant role played by the MiG-21s in the 1965 War. The importance of the role is not what it contributed to India's war effort but more in what lacunae the effort helped identify in the MiG. The corrections and modifications applied as a result were to pay a rich dividend in the later 1971 conflict.
In a candid opinion of the aircraft in the aftermath of the 1965 war, Air Vice Marshal Harjinder Singh, who retired as AOC-in-C Maintenance Command, felt that the MiG-21 was "a good for nothing aircraft in combat situation." It's missiles were useless at treetop height and the only saving grace has been the fitting of a gun to enhance its defence potential.
Perhaps Harjinder Singh was speaking too soon, but the MiG-21 in 1965 was just that. Hampered in its role by the lack of time to train in specific combat profiles, Its contribution to the war-effort left much to be desired. The MiGs did not have enough opportunities to prove themselves in the 1965 conflict. The IAF on its part put much faith in this aircraft and used it to equip many of its squadrons. This faith was later upheld in the 1971 war, when the MiG-21 built up a reputation to envy about. But that, as they say, is a different story!
those planes were parked right their in BD before and after the war so what is their to donate? 
Pakistan still exists today despite huge efforts of Pakistanis. This is even a greater victory 
