Tank Ambush at Kushtia

[Sine Nomine]

@War Thunder I guess @Irfan Baloch refers to the lack of any 'evidence' in terms of the Battle itself (to quote a Pakistani member PAKISTANFOREVER , whose only contribution in a thread remains 'GENUINE, IRREFUTABLE, RELIABLE, HONEST & HARD evidence' )

On point, now that we have come here.
@Irfan Baloch

Sir.

Any inputs on the Hussainiwala part of 1971 war? I recall as a kid (was roaming in Fazilka & heard the legend from IA troops itself) that a Pakistani Lieutenant (from SSG if I recall correctly) kept up a tenacious defence in that particular region against Indian attempts (through troops ex 67 Brigade) to regain the portion of Indian DCB lost to him in the first place. And all through the war, he could not be overwhelmed.

@Joe Shearer It has been almost 3 decades since I heard the story, don't recall much. But, I do recall that he went back after the war. And he was the reason that a Major (from our side) was awarded a VrC (Posthumous) (I think), as the Major was the only one who could reach the actual location of the Lieutenant's defences and was killed by a burst from his MMG . The lieutenant, apparently, left back a note with the remains, praising the officer for his courage and leadership.

@Nilgiri @jbgt90

@Signalian Any inputs on this story? That, if you can verify, would be worth a write up at least. I was impressed and remain impressed till date. We paid a disproportionately high price for our failure in that. One can visit a memorial over our KIAs limited to that particular sub-sector to witness the price.

@MUSTAKSHAF @salarsikander

A digging up is needed.We can start by going through Pakistani Order of Battle, but as you told that guy was from SSG,only a person who was present in theatre of ops from Pakistani side would be able to pin point who the guy was?Because in case of SSG that must have been a detachment deployed along side regular unit.
PA Order of Battle(it may be incomplete)
106 Infantry Brigade
3 Punjab
41 Baluch
4 Cavalry

 

[Signalian]

PA should have given T-59 a chance in East Pakistan, after all IA used T-55's.

 

[Sine Nomine]

PA should have given T-59 a chance in East Pakistan, after all IA used T-55's.

They didn't saw it coming.

 

[Hellfire]

A digging up is needed.We can start by going through Pakistani Order of Battle, but as you told that guy was from SSG,only a person who was present in theatre of ops from Pakistani side would be able to pin point who the guy was?Because in case of SSG that must have been a detachment deployed along side regular unit.
PA Order of Battle(it may be incomplete)
106 Infantry Brigade
3 Punjab
41 Baluch
4 Cavalry

Yes. Unfortunately, such instances have got buried under the larger history of war. I was never in the sector again to really look it up.

The unit was 3 Assam as far as I can now look up on the net.

Revise that to Suleimanke and Beriwala Bridge specifically. Posting a link for reference. The young lieutenant's story was on this location.

http://www.indiandefencereview.com/spotlights/1971-war-the-battle-of-fazilka/

Interesting to note, General Sharif's brother, with 6 FF, was also in same area. I asked about this lieutenant because he was the party leader who took the specific portion of DCB from 3 Assam, and held out there, right till the end.

Another legend is there about the same lieutenant. But that needs to be re-checked in terms of the accuracy


Anyways it goes like this:

It was said that the Lieutenant was asked to withdraw/surrender in the run up to attack. He was addressed by a Senior Indian Officer over the radio set. The said Indian Officer was within a visual distance (could be seen through binoculars). And the legend holds that the Lieutenant politely addressed him, with due deference to a senior, and asked him to leave the area, and warning, that he will fire a round that will be 1 meter short of him --> he did; then he requested the officer to go as the next bullet would kill him. And the Officer withdrew and the attack was launched.

Sorry for the gaps in the precise details of what I was told. I was narrated this in 1991, and it was almost 2 decades since the war was over.

I feel that such a story, if true, needs to be found out and told. It still remains an inspiration for me!

Sorry @Signalian @Arsalan for digressing and 'trolling' the thread, but heroes need to be acknowledged as such. And this lieutenant remains one of the many who always inspired me, at least.

PA should have given T-59 a chance in East Pakistan, after all IA used T-55's.

The discrepancy in appreciation and projections. Hence my 'retort' earlier - junior leadership showed determination and grit when the senior leadership was at odds with them.

@Joe Shearer Am getting old or blame the prolonged exposure to High Altitude for failing memory (always a nice excuse). Maj Narain VrC it was. All is recorded about Gen Sharif's Brother et al and our side, but that Lieutenant remains unknown. Much like 8 Pass Charlie -- told the story to IAF youngsters (they have no clue!) and they were wondering who was that legend!

 

[War Thunder]

Will keep this running separately for a few days.

I would suggest keeping as is. The other one doesnt mention Chaffee and would be hard to be found on the internet through google when googling Pakistan and Chaffee tanks.

 

[Joe Shearer]

This little battle could be turned into a great movie!!

I read your comment with some astonishment. Ask me why.

Sorry Buddy, I only got my hands on the narrative.

This was reported, especially by General Sandhu, but tends to get overshadowed by the terrific defence put up a little further north. It was certainly not a walk-over for the Indian Army, with and without Mukti Bahini forward scouting and support. For instance, for every five stories of their serving as the eyes and ears of IA formations, there will be one like this, which was a rank intelligence failure, and a horrible example of the effect of Guderian-like hurry-up tactics by an otherwise sound commander (Teppy Raina).

we should actually start turning these little battles into movies
The Battle of Hilli
the battle of Hussainiwala etc

Damn.

You got it already.

Events like these have been drowned out by the general outcome of the war unfortunately. That's why we don't hear them so often.

Trust me, these two battles are well remembered on the Indian side. There were mistakes made, enormous mistakes. Wherever Indian formations went off the road (obviously we are talking about the infantry only) and outflanked the well-prepared Pakistani positions, the going was good. Whenever and wherever there was an attempt to push forward using the road system and using armour as a spearhead, there was trouble. Both cases where Pakistani troops put up a stiff resistance are of this sort.

In contrast, take the vertical envelopment in the east, using helicopters, that was so successful, and unhinged all the efforts of these other formations in the west.

PA should have given T-59 a chance in East Pakistan, after all IA used T-55's.

The IA made a mistake, the PA would have made a mistake. East Pakistan was not, is not tank country. I think the Bangladeshis have gone mad to buy what tanks they have already bought.

 

[Jf Thunder]

I read your comment with some astonishment. Ask me why.



This was reported, especially by General Sandhu, but tends to get overshadowed by the terrific defence put up a little further north. It was certainly not a walk-over for the Indian Army, with and without Mukti Bahini forward scouting and support. For instance, for every five stories of their serving as the eyes and ears of IA formations, there will be one like this, which was a rank intelligence failure, and a horrible example of the effect of Guderian-like hurry-up tactics by an otherwise sound commander (Teppy Raina).



Damn.

You got it already.



Trust me, these two battles are well remembered on the Indian side. There were mistakes made, enormous mistakes. Wherever Indian formations went off the road (obviously we are talking about the infantry only) and outflanked the well-prepared Pakistani positions, the going was good. Whenever and wherever there was an attempt to push forward using the road system and using armour as a spearhead, there was trouble. Both cases where Pakistani troops put up a stiff resistance are of this sort.

In contrast, take the vertical envelopment in the east, using helicopters, that was so successful, and unhinged all the efforts of these other formations in the west.



The IA made a mistake, the PA would have made a mistake. East Pakistan was not, is not tank country. I think the Bangladeshis have gone mad to buy what tanks they have already bought.

have to agree with this, specially due to monsoon season, EP would be hell for tanks
the only tankable regions are the plains of Punjab.

 

[Joe Shearer]

have to agree with this, specially due to monsoon season, EP would be hell for tanks
the only tankable regions are the plains of Punjab.

....and the Thar.

East Pakistan, from what I have seen and heard, and borrowing from a family member's experiences in the 65 conflict when nothing happened in the East (or so people think), is quintessential light infantry country. Huge expanses of water, existing solid surfaces are marshy and boggy, mainly paddy and jute fields, not at all good for tracked, semi-tracked or wheeled vehicles (that doesn't rule out military vehicles, but only amphibious forces use what should be used in that land). ATVs, for instance, with balloon tyres and very low inflation pressures, ultra shallow draft fan-powered marsh boats, and - you guessed it - ACVs. Nobody needs heavy artillery, there is nothing to knock down, nothing to demolish, it is a fluid battle field changing daily, even hourly, and both defensive and offensive are constrained by the absolutely flat terrain. For those who haven't been there, the western borders, where Hilli and Kushtia are, are more solid than the centre or the south,and are more like the wooded east except for the huge forests in the east.

The PA had something they called 'liquid cement', and they apparently built gazillion defensive positions using that stuff. The correct answer was to get off the road and walk around these prepared but inflexible defences.

 

[Nilgiri]

PAKISTANFOREVER , whose only contribution in a thread remains 'GENUINE, IRREFUTABLE, RELIABLE, HONEST & HARD evidence'

It's all it is really in the end. Please entertain the reasonable request you conspiracy theorist loony!

 

[Dubious]

Request merge

done

 

[salarsikander]

@War Thunder I guess @Irfan Baloch refers to the lack of any 'evidence' in terms of the Battle itself (to quote a Pakistani member PAKISTANFOREVER , whose only contribution in a thread remains 'GENUINE, IRREFUTABLE, RELIABLE, HONEST & HARD evidence' )

On point, now that we have come here.
@Irfan Baloch

Sir.

Any inputs on the Hussainiwala part of 1971 war? I recall as a kid (was roaming in Fazilka & heard the legend from IA troops itself) that a Pakistani Lieutenant (from SSG if I recall correctly) kept up a tenacious defence in that particular region against Indian attempts (through troops ex 67 Brigade) to regain the portion of Indian DCB lost to him in the first place. And all through the war, he could not be overwhelmed.

@Joe Shearer It has been almost 3 decades since I heard the story, don't recall much. But, I do recall that he went back after the war. And he was the reason that a Major (from our side) was awarded a VrC (Posthumous) (I think), as the Major was the only one who could reach the actual location of the Lieutenant's defences and was killed by a burst from his MMG . The lieutenant, apparently, left back a note with the remains, praising the officer for his courage and leadership.

@Nilgiri @jbgt90

@Signalian Any inputs on this story? That, if you can verify, would be worth a write up at least. I was impressed and remain impressed till date. We paid a disproportionately high price for our failure in that. One can visit a memorial over our KIAs limited to that particular sub-sector to witness the price.

@MUSTAKSHAF @salarsikander

Hi,

What A coincidence --- I was reading about the Qair e hind battle and Had to stop in middle because of another boork,

So far i only have limited knowledge and that too sourced from https://oup.com.pk/the-battle-of-hussainiwala-and-qaiser-i-hind.html

But as I mentioned earlier i havent actually read the entire book, See if you can get it imported to India

 

[Hakikat ve Hikmet]

The Indians lost a company of soldiers (most probably Sikh) and tanks although they had very good ground intels from the local Bengali folks. After that they never tried to retake the town. They were only observing from the choppers along with scores of the Soviet officers, who were the parts and parcels of every stage of planning, logistics, directions etc...

East and West Pakistan were two very different "states", and SMR's points were entirely tilted to the people of East Pakistan.


The Pakistani rupee was dependant on combined exports and revenue from both West and East Pakistan. Had a separate currency been chosen for both, it would hamper the whole process. The same can be said of the taxation, knowing East Pakistan had a larger population, and most of Pakistan's industries were being set up there too.

Secondly, had a seperate army been made fore East Pakistan and with the funds there were, it would mean that less forces would be placed on West Pakistan, which was more prone to Indian hostilities and a threat of being overrun was very viable.

Lastly as WAJsal stated:



It was a tactic used by SMR to appease the larger East Pakistani population and keep them on top of the Western "state". We saw the amount of support such policies got in E.Pakistan, and knowing they had a larger population they would've drained West Pakistan.


Bhutto was also a majority leader.
Read my earlier post, people have a habit of wildly thumping their chests.

You failed for you didn't know how to deal with the BD folks!! India knows (by turning them into Termites), so she is successful....

 

[Signalian]

The IA made a mistake, the PA would have made a mistake. East Pakistan was not, is not tank country. I think the Bangladeshis have gone mad to buy what tanks they have already bought.

The reinforcements pouring from West Pakistan into East Pakistan had left most of the heavy equipment behind;Artillery, MBT's etc. The infantry numbers sharply rose up in East Pakistan. The need of the hour were aviation and amphibious assets; not just aircraft and boats but Gunships, transport helicopters as well as amphibious AFV's or IFV's, which Pakistan did not possess or didnot move from West Pakistan e.g. M-113 or its derivatives.

Tanks operating in any terrain whether plains, desert, hills, mountains, jungles, marshes etc give a psychological advantage to infantry. They are the main offensive force even in a restricted terrain. They force the enemy to use his best tactics, knowledge, strategy and forces to bring an attack for achieving success. Pakistan did not have gunships or helis in large numbers, not even an air assault infantry formation apart from SSG, who were also few in numbers. Pakistan did not have an amphibious tank like India did, however what Pakistan did have was T-59. This MBT could travel on roads if not marshes, it could hold out defence for much longer than an average infantry platoon or company by giving them a extra firepower which was much needed in East Pakistan. It could not only take on PT-76 arriving from different directions but also counter attack enemy with speed. The terrain where it could not operate, Army engineers would have come handy in the need of the hour and even if terrain was impossible to be passed, these MBT's could stopped the advance of IA T-55 who were just confronted by Pakistani infantry armed with bazookas sometimes.

I am not seeking a Guederian styled blitzkrieg by these T-59 in East Pakistan but there are numerous ways to employ tanks in different terrain. Vietnam war was also an example and so is Korean war. You might say that BA have gone mad with T-69's and MBT-2000 acquisition, i say not, every weapon plays its part when utilized properly. Every weapon has its short comings and liabilities, its the wit of the commander how he uses the variety of assets at his disposal to bring out favorable results.

 

[bluesky]

I am not seeking a Guederian styled blitzkrieg by these T-59 in East Pakistan but there are numerous ways to employ tanks in different terrain. Vietnam war was also an example and so is Korean war. You might say that BA have gone mad with T-69's and MBT-2000 acquisition, i say not, every weapon plays its part when utilized properly. Every weapon has its short comings and liabilities, its the wit of the commander how he uses the variety of assets at his disposal to bring out favorable results.

Even the Indian light tanks were stuck in the muddy terrain in the east. So, it is useless to entertain the prospect of using tanks in the field except for a few areas that surround the military garrisons. Rods are not supposed to be a platform for moving the tanks. But, below the roads, it is all almost marshlands in the east even near Jessore/Kushtia.

BA is acquiring tanks to deploy in the borderlands with hard soil. Note, the north of BD is on higher ground and it is all hard land when you cross the border near Siligury.

 

[Joe Shearer]

Even the Indian light tanks were stuck in the muddy terrain in the east. So, it is useless to entertain the prospect of using tanks in the field except for a few areas that surround the military garrisons. Roads are not supposed to be a platform for moving the tanks. But, below the roads, it is all almost marshlands in the east even near Jessore/Kushtia.

BA is acquiring tanks to deploy in the borderlands with hard soil. Note, the north of BD is on higher ground and it is all hard land when you cross the border near Siligury.

@Signalian

I'm afraid he is right.