Ameen.
Sir what is your assesment of the preparedness of ANA/ANP to assume charge of security - in and outside of Kabul...I mean NATION-WIDE
My observations are as follows: Within Kabul itself, security is very good, even better than Islamabad. But this is because of ISAF presence, once ISAF withdraws, you could see some gaps develop and this is to be expected. Within Kabul the ANP and ANA have excellent equipment, c2c and support.
Outside of Kabul security is deteriorating daily, the question has to be asked that the ANA and ANP have received huge foreign aid and support, this was hoped would help develop quality human resource, a sustainable military and law enforcement agencies with local ownership.
However i am sure people in Whitehall and The White house are all asking the same question, where did we go wrong?
At the strategic and tactical level, the presence of foreign advisers will continue well after the departure of foreign troops from Afghan soil, and the US knows this is one area that is of serious concern as many senior officials have suggested time and time again that their troops are not ready for a US withdrawal.
On a operational level however, outside of Kabul is another story altogether.
Let's talk about the ANA First:
The ANA is notorious for suffering from poor and corrupt leadership at the operational level and suffers from ill disciplined coupled with very high attrition rates, there have been many reports of ANA soldiers recklessly expending their supplies in the field causing joint patrols to return to resupply.
This has obvious implications for counter insurgency operations throughout the provinces, the Taliban know this and use this to their advantage.
There have also been numerous reported cases where ANA soldiers have refused to go on multiday patrols with ISAF troops and recorded cases of troops smoking hash whilst on operation, furthermore there is the obvious concern of the numbers of pro-Taliban supporters within the ANA which is a serious concern for both ISAF and the government in Kabul.
The following video provides for a good real life snapshot of the ANA at an operational level:
Fighting Alongside Stoned Afghan Soldiers - VICE - YouTube
There is also a serious issue with retention within the army, in a report published in the Washington post last month: Between January and June, more than 24,000 soldiers walked off the job, more than twice as many as in the same period last year, according to the NATO statistics. In June alone, more than 5,000 soldiers deserted, nearly 3 percent of the 170,000-strong force.
Now the ANP:
Firstly, i would like to say that i have experience of working with and training the ANP and had the pleasure to meet some amazing people who are dedicated to their jobs and duty to their country, nonetheless the ANP is also suffering from a lack of equipment, man power and support. In far flung regions such as Uruzgan, and there are numerous examples of an entire village having nothing more than 1 ANP constable deputed to ensure law and order in that area.
The following video provides a good overview of the problems facing the ANP:
Afghan police in uphill struggle - Hot Latest News - YouTube
Another issue that i fear will hamper peace in Afghanistan once the US leaves is the ALP or Afghan Local police, the brainchild of General David Patreaus. The ALP is effectively local militias that are recruited by a local commander who is then supplied arms and equipment by the US military, in a bid to help secure the more remote and far flung outposts.
Here is a video overview of the ALP:
U.S. aids anti-Taliban tribal militia - YouTube
Obviously self governing and without regulation, disarming and disbanding these mini private armies will become a serious headache for the ANP and ANA once the NATO leaves Afghanistan.
And this fear is fast becoming a reality with the likes of Mohammad Ismail Khan (Minister for Energy, forming and arming a massive private army in his province (funnily enough this man is an infamous former mujahid commander). And despite calls for his resignation, he stil acts in a ministerial capacity.
Add to this the sectarian, ethnic and socioeconomic situation in the country and you have one big mess.
In the end, Afghanistan will need a very long time to heal... And that is just the problem, there is still so much to do and not enough time.
Just my two cents.