An editorial for the Daily Times of today
First, we must have the will to fight the Taliban
The Interior Advisor, Rehman Malik, says an operation by the Frontier Corps and the Pakistan Army in Lower Dir has killed 30 militants, but maintains that the operation has nothing to with the Swat deal. In the next breath he also says, If the militants do not lay down arms after the enforcement of Sharia laws in Swat, the security operation can be extended to other areas, including the valley. The presidential spokesman in Islamabad says the Swat peace agreement is still intact, which is not what the TNSM spokesman says in Swat, calling the operation a violation of the agreement. Indeed, Sufi Muhammad, leader of the TNSM which signed the peace deal, says he is not on speaking terms with the government any more because of the action in Dir.
Everybody in Pakistan, including Imran Khan of Tehreek-e Insaf, says the Taliban have violated the agreement made by TNSM and that Sufi Muhammad has overstepped his mandate by dismissing the Constitution of Pakistan. In these conditions, if the operation in Dir is not the beginning of a larger strategy of dealing with the threat of the Taliban, it is bound to fail, adding to the suffering of the people. So far, this has been the pattern. The army has moved in, pushed the Taliban back a little, then decided to parley with the terrorists, giving them time to regroup and come back at it.
This attitude is already manifest in Malakand Division. An all-parties gathering in Buner, calling itself a jirga, has pre-emptively requested the government not to deploy troops there, not because all is well with Buner after a false announcement by the Taliban that they have withdrawn from it, but because the jirga elders are scared that the army will withdraw soon, leaving the locals at the mercy of the killers. They said the Taliban in Buner were now tamed and were not a threat. They meekly asked the Taliban who were present there to return the properties they had grabbed in the area. Even as they said this, the Taliban caught hold of four youths in Buner who were listening to music in their car, gave them a thrashing and shaved off half their heads and moustaches.
The Taliban are interconnected and will send reinforcements from one area of their domination to another. They have local Taliban whom they have trained, and they have a growing population of supporters who have been converted through fear and violence. The entire network covering FATA and Malakand has sound financial backing, paying for large amounts of expensive explosives when car-bombs are used; and supplying suicide-bombers, of whom there is a reserve of hundreds of boys. When the Taliban agree to a ceasefire anywhere, they want to gain time to put in motion the logistics of reinforcement. It is not a force that you can defeat in one area and hope that they will not return.
First, our establishment must have the will to fight the Taliban. From this will flow a strategy of fighting the war against Taliban. It has to be a comprehensive engagement with all combat and psychological aspects taken into account. Too much reliance on paramilitary force will be counterproductive because of its vulnerability to local reactions to the use of intimidatory violence. The army must decide to mobilise at a scale commensurate with the force of the enemy being engaged, with the capacity to look after people who will be displaced by conflict. After a period of benign neglect of the challenge of Taliban, the national army will have to act like all armies do when faced with such internal insurgencies, and face local resistance as all such armies do in such operations; but the loyalty-shift back to Pakistan will be quick if the terrorists are given no quarter.
One hopes that all this has been taken into consideration before the operation in Dir. The kind of action required should have needed consultations at the international level in order to have a clear understanding about how risky the mobilisation against the Taliban will be in relation to the armys defence responsibilities with regard to India. This international assurance will have to come in the light of the alleged American threat that if the Pakistan Army will not sort out the mess in Swat an externally organised operation could be launched against the Taliban there. Therefore one hopes that Dir is not a routine operation with predictable results.