Symbol over substance.

[Kompromat]

Symbol over substance​

Rustam Shah Mohmand
Saturday, August 03, 2013

Not surprisingly, no fresh initiative has emerged from the high-profile visit of the US Secretary of State John Kerry other than a reiteration of assistance to the construction of the Bhasha Dam in northern Pakistan. The visit was, however, more symbolic than substantial because it was the first high-level contact between the new political leadership in Pakistan and the US administration.

John Kerry must have noticed the innate hypocrisy that is so deeply embedded in the way the Pakistani elite thinks. The matter of drones was raised in a manner that would have pleased the US delegation. The question of ‘utility’ of drone strikes was discussed. It was argued/suggested that drones are creating a hostile environment in Pakistan; that such strikes fuel anti-US feelings in the country; that such attacks are counterproductive etc.

But there was no emphasis on linking the end to these strikes with the broad spectrum of relations between the countries. There was no firm appeal or demand to respect this country’s sovereignty. No red lines were drawn nor any firm assurances sought. The US delegation heard hackneyed statements and that was that.

On the wider issue of Pakistan’s role in the reconciliation process in Afghanistan, familiar positions were repeated. Since Pakistan has not developed any strategy or created a vision of its own that encapsulates its own interests as well as takes into account the grim reality of a people waging a relentless war against foreign occupation, it was not expected to offer any new road map for bringing the conflict to an end. Indeed it is ironic that there is such little understanding of the dynamics of the Afghan conflict in Pakistan, which has such deep interests in Afghanistan.

Perhaps the international community expects that Pakistan would have a deeper understanding about what drives thousands of Afghans to enter a desperate war of liberation. But they would be sorely disappointed were they to discover (and by now they must have grasped this reality) that there is neither any understanding nor – and this is worse – is there any desire for such an understanding of the tangled web of forces that operate in Afghanistan.

John Kerry was not informed about the various strands of thinking in the resistance. He was not perhaps informed of the futility of the Doha talks – unless the US is prepared to consider withdrawing all troops from Afghanistan. It was not stressed that promoting an intra-Afghan dialogue prior to complete troop withdrawal might be an idea worth exploring.

The demand of both the US and Karzai’s government that the resistance accept the country’s constitution as a starting point is as hollow as it could get. If the resistance were to accept a constitution framed by US-supported rulers, why would they have fought for all these years? The stance that the resistance has consistently taken – that the Afghan parliament and constitution are unacceptable because these institutions were created when the country, in their view, was under occupation – was also not explained to the US delegation. This was an opportunity to convey to the top US leadership the objective realities of the situation in Afghanistan.

A regime that continues to require external props for its survival, a country that is plagued by grave issues of governance despite having received billions of dollars in assistance needs new leadership and new institutions. The future government of Afghanistan would have to be inclusive and reflect the aspirations of the people. Such a government will be able to bring peace to the war-ravaged country without needing external forces.

The resistance has to be mainstreamed into the political, administrative and electoral systems of the country. But on what terms? It appears Kerry was none the wiser on these issues after his meetings with Pakistani leaders in Islamabad.

His meeting with the chief of army staff was significant. The US needs the military’s support both in the tribal areas as well as in the evacuation logistics of thousands of tons of equipment, transport and machinery that is being moved from Afghanistan to the Gulf countries. Unfortunately Pakistan’s focus on resolving the conflict recedes into the background when there is so much emphasis on ‘restricting’ India’s role in that country.

This obsession with India’s role restricts Pakistan’s own understanding of the various paths that could lead to an end to hostilities and bring durable peace to the country.

Afghanistan’s institutions and its present government are realities. But the focus must be on saving the country rather than its institutions. Of what value are Afghanistan’s institutions when its parliament and all the government structures in the last 11 years, backed by the whole world, could not deliver peace to the war-weary country?

It is time for the new government in Islamabad to rethink the whole approach to the resolution of the conflict, to create its own strategy, assert civilian control over policy formulation and execution, think in terms of bringing lasting peace – based on justice, rule of law – and not be aligned with any particular faction or group.

The Americans must pay heed to the warnings writ large on the politico-military landscape of Afghanistan: more than 20 percent soldiers defecting; 95 percent of the country’s GDP coming from international assistance and foreign military spending; 40 percent unemployment; security convoys, both of the Isaf and the ANA (Afghan National Army) paying taxes to the resistance; the resistance controlling 65 percent of territory where they operate their own systems of delivery of justice etc; more than 10,000 insurgent attacks taking place in one year and so on.

These are factors that would require revisiting the whole policy – both by Pakistan and the US. Policies that are not based on an objective assessment of the situation will neither help nor deliver.

The writer is a former ambassador.

Symbol over substance - Rustam Shah Mohmand



@muse @Argus Panoptes @Developereo @ajpirzada @Emmie

 

[Developereo]

Mr. Mohmand argues that Pakistan doesn't understand the intricacies of the Afghan conflict. I would bet the house that the Pakistani security establishment knows the situation far better than Mr. Mohmand does and, dare I say, the Americans do.

He then argues that it is Pakistan's responsibility to present the Taliban's demands and viewpoint to the Americans. Why so? When did Pakistan become the spokesperson for the Taliban? If Pakistan had done as Mr. Mohmand argues, he would be the first to throw a tantrum that Pakistan was interjecting itself as the Taliban's interlocutor.

Mr. Mohmand then argues that Pakistan should formulate an Afghan strategy in a vacuum and completely ignore the motivations and actions of other players, notably India. Such a myopic strategy is silly to say the least...

Finally, Mr. Mohmand seems to think that Pakistan should work to secure Afghanistan's interests. No country -- not the US, Russia, India, Iran, Pakistan -- is there to secure Afghanistan's interests. Regardless of the rhetoric, every country is there to secure their own interests. The Afghans need to sort out their own house to secure their own interests.

Bottom line, there is nothing new or substantial in this article which, ironically, berates others for lack of substance.

 

[Argus Panoptes]

@Aeronaut The honorable former ambassador says:

A regime that continues to require external props for its survival, a country that is plagued by grave issues of governance despite having received billions of dollars in assistance needs new leadership and new institutions.

Source: http://www.defence.pk/forums/seniors-cafe/268721-symbol-over-substance.html#ixzz2awsUMAK7

Don't you think it is a bit rich of him to say that about Afghanistan but not Pakistan. That whole sentence applies to us too!

What about that? Why do we appear to be more worried about others than ourselves?

 

[Kompromat]

The writer looks like Castro.