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3-4 yrs old article but still interesting read.....
SUPPRESSION OF ENEMY AIR DEFENCES - Disrupt, disable, destroy
Martin Streetly Editor Jane's Electronic Mission Aircraft and Jane's Radar and Electronic Warfare Systems - London
While the role of suppressing enemy air defences remains key, new means of achieving the goal are on the horizon. Martin Streetly reports
* Anti-radiation missiles are the traditional weapon of choice against air-defence radars
* Unmanned combat air vehicles will form the basis of future capabilities for suppressing and destroying enemy air defences
* The use of microwave energy weapons to 'burn out' air-defence networks also holds promise
The suppression of enemy air defences (SEAD) remains a cornerstone in establishing air superiority over a battle area, though it is somewhat overshadowed by the need to defeat the threat posed by shoulder-launched, infra-red guided surface-to-air missiles (SAMs).
SEAD operations, together with the related destruction of enemy air defences (DEAD), seek to disrupt, disable and/or destroy hostile, predominantly radar-based air-defence networks to the point were they are unable to respond effectively to the application of air power.
SEAD functions may be divided into 'soft' and 'hard' kill actions, with the former seeking to attack, disrupt and even control a network's sensors, communications links and decision-making/command tools. In the hard kill sphere, the intention is to either disable or destroy key nodes within a network under attack with a heavy emphasis on sensor systems such as radars.
In the 'hard' kill arena, the traditional weapon of choice against air-defence radars (still central to successful wide-area defence against air attack) has been the anti-radiation missile, which first saw widespread use during the Southeast Asian conflicts of the 1960s and 1970s.
Anti-radiation missiles remain in widespread service around the world, with key systems, including the Raytheon AGM-88 High-speed Anti-Radiation Missile (HARM), MBDA's Air-Launched Anti-Radiation Missile (ALARM) and a series of weapons developed by Russia.
The AGM-88 takes the form of a 4.1 m-long missile that is powered by a Thiokol solid-fuel motor, is equipped with a blast/fragmentation warhead and a passive radar seeker and which has, to date, appeared in A, B and C configurations. The AGM-88A is understood to feature a fuzable-link memory and to be in service aboard Spanish EF-18 aircraft. The AGM-88B differs from its predecessor in its use of an erasable, electronically programmable, read-only memory - thereby allowing it to be reprogrammed without disassembly. It is known to be in service with the German and Italian air forces.
The AGM-88C features an enhanced guidance section, increased receiver sensitivity, a larger memory, a 68 kg warhead and enhanced software.
'Charlie' is the primary US HARM and is carried by US Air Force (USAF) F-16CJ SEAD aircraft and US Navy (USN) and US Marine Corps (USMC) EA-6B and F/A-18 platforms.
Other known HARM users include Greece (F-16C Block 50+ aircraft), South Korea (F-16C Block 52), Turkey (F-16C Block 50) and the United Arab Emirates (F-16E/F).
Emitter shutdown problems
As might be expected, HARM functions by detecting emitting radars and homing in on their signals. As such, it has a number of operating modes (designated as target-of-opportunity, pre-briefed, self-protection and range-known) and a singular weakness in its inability to handle targets that shut down.
Operational experience has demonstrated HARM's tendency to go ballistic in such a situation, with a very real potential for fratricide and/or unwanted collateral damage. Various attempts have been made to address this problem, culminating in the USN-sponsored AGM-88E and USAF interest in the Raytheon/BGT HARM Destruction of enemy air defences Attack Module (HDAM).
Developed by Alliant Techsystems, the AGM-88E (also known as the Advanced Anti- Radiation Guided Missile or AARGM) combines the existing AGM-88B/C motor, airframe and warhead with a modified control section and a multimode guidance section that incorporates an active millimetre wave seeker and a passive digital radar homing receiver. The combination of the two guidance methods allows the weapon to counter emitter shutdown and, when combined with its GPS/ inertial navigation package and weapon impact assessment transmitter, facilitates geo-specificity, netted targeting and impact assessment. Currently in its system development and demonstration phase, the AGM-88E is expected to be introduced into service from 2008-13, with up to 1,750 existing USN and USMC HARM rounds being updated to the new standard.
Most recently, JDW's sources suggest it is likely Italy will join the AMG-88E programme as a means of updating up to 250 of its existing HARMs.
For its part, HDAM is designed to provide target specificity (including operations within 'restrictive' rules of engagement and post emitter shutdown), avoid fratricide and reduce collateral damage. As such, the module, which modifies or replaces the weapon's existing control/guidance sections, integrates a GPS capability with that of a 'robust' fibre-optic gyro inertial measurement unit and utilises a control section that incorporates a GPS antenna, a navigation set assembly, carrier and flight-control boards and a power supply. From late 2004 USAF was reported to be considering a year-long HDAM demonstration that would involve up to seven test rounds.
While the AGM-88E and HDAM overcome HARM's major operational disadvantage, the weapon requires external cueing if it is to maximise its effectiveness. Here, Northrop Grumman's Emitter Location System (ELS) and AN/ALQ-99 System Integrated Receiver (SIR)/ALQ-218 systems, Raytheon's AN/ASQ-213 HARM Targeting System (HTS) and the EADS Fast ELS come into play.
Of these, the ALQ-99 SIR equips USN and USMC EA-6B Improved CAPability (ICAP) II aircraft and allows the electronic environment to be sampled and cues developed for both the platform's 'soft' and 'hard' kill capabilities. In EA-6B ICAP III and EA-18G aircraft, the ALQ-99 SIR has been replaced by the ALQ-218 receiver group that is able to cue HARM in its most effective 'range-known' operating mode.
Northrop Grumman's ELS performs a similar emitter location and HARM cueing function aboard German and Italian Tornado electronic combat and reconnaissance SEAD platforms, while the EADS Fast ELS (FELS) seeks to improve on this via the use of long- and short-line interferometer technology to enhance location accuracy and detection speed. The FELS is known to have been flight tested aboard a Tornado electronic combat and reconnaissance aircraft during early 2005 and is being offered as an upgrade for such platforms.
Raytheon's ASQ-213 HTS equips USAF's F-16CJ SEAD aircraft and takes the form of a pod-mounted system that detects, identifies and locates radars and provides the data needed to calculate appropriate targeting and launch parameters for the AGM-88 in most (if not all) of its operating modes. Using the time difference-of-arrival technique for emitter location, HTS has been the subject of a number of software upgrades, the latest of which is designated as Revision 7 (R7).
This version will allow for multi-ship emitter location and will facilitate cross-cueing between itself and an onboard electro-optic capability. Within the F-16CJ weapon system itself, this will allow the aircraft to use 'smart' munitions as well as anti-radiation missiles to attack air defence targets and, when combined with Link 16, will generate real-time targeting quality data for 'shooters' that have no inherent SEAD location capabilities. Such a migration is further expected to move USAF SEAD operations into DEAD mode.
European capabilities
Looking outside the US, MBDA's 4.3 m-long ALARM is currently Western Europe's only operational anti-radiation missile. Designed to be carried by Tornado interdiction and strike aircraft and the four-nation Eurofighter, ALARM is essentially a self-defence weapon and features a unique 'loiter' mode in which it is suspended from a parachute while it conducts an expanded emitter search regime.
Having found a target, the missile detaches itself from its parachute and performs a near vertical terminal attack. Alongside the described loiter mode, ALARM offers corridor/area suppression, direct attack, dual mode and universal modes and is in service with both the UK Royal Air Force and the Royal Saudi Air Force.
In UK service, the latest known ALARM configuration is the Mk 2, which features an Alenia Marconi Systems (subsequently Selex Sensors and Airborne Systems)-developed seeker upgrade and new EADS-LFK-supplied solid-fuel propellant (housed in EADS-LFK-refurbished motor casings). Regarding the upgraded seeker, the main thrust of the effort appears to have centred on improving the device's sensitivity and its ability to remember target locations in the event of emitter shutdown during an attack. ALARM is further understood to have a range of approximately 45 km compared with the HARM's 91 km.
Elsewhere within NATO, German contractor BGT is developing the Anti-Radiation Missile with Intelligent Guidance and Extended Range (ARMIGER) weapon as a possible replacement for HARM within the German air force and other forces worldwide.
As such, ARMIGER makes use of a dual-mode (passive radar and infra-red) seeker, an M3.0-class LFK rocket/ramjet motor, a combined GPS/inertial navigation package and a 20 kg blast and fragmentation warhead. Range would be around 150 km. The ARMIGER development programme is understood to be funded until 2006.
Russian variants
Turning to Russia, the country's Tactical Missile Corporation (TMC - formerly Zvezda-Strela) has produced a range of anti-radiation missiles that includes the Kh-25MP/MPU, Kh-27, Kh-28 and Kh-31P. Of these, the Kh-27 is thought to have been withdrawn from service while the Kh-25MP (AS-12 'Kegler') is a solid-fuel powered missile that over time has been targeted at a range of emitters, including the AN/MPQ-4 (Nike Hercules SAM), AN/MPQ-33/-34/-39 (Homing All the Way Killer, HAWK) and AN/MPQ-46/-48 (Improved HAWK). The Kh-25MP works in conjunction with the 'V'yuga' (Snowstorm) target detection/identification/designation pod and is equipped with either the PRGS-1VP or PRGS-2VP passive seeker head. For its part, the Kh-25MPU is aimed at emitters associated with the Roland and Crotale SAM systems and was being promoted as recently as 2003. Looking to the future, JDW sources suggest that the TMC is developing a new anti-radiation missile (designated as the Kh-38) as a replacement for the Kh-25 series.
The Kh-28 (AS-9 'Kyle') is described as being designed to attack both ground-based and shipborne radar emitters, with the target set including the AN/MPQ-4 (Nike Hercules) and the AN/MPQ-33/-34/-39 (HAWK - Kh-28M variant). Like the Kh-25, the Kh-28 is teamed with a target-detection/cueing system ('Filin' or 'Metel' targeting systems) and is only likely to remain in service with former Soviet Union client states.
The Kh-31P (AS-17 'Krypton'), which entered Russian service in 1991, is targeted against radars such as the shipboard AN/SPY-1 and the AN/MPQ-53, which is associated with the Patriot SAM system. Aircraft capable of operating the weapon include the MiG-25SMT/UBT, the Su-24M (where it is teamed with the pod-mounted L-080 or L-081 emitter location system), the Su-27, the Su-30KI/KM, the Su-32 and the Su-39. JDW sources suggest that Kh-31P variants are in service in Russia and China, where it forms the basis of the indigenous JY-91 ARM. The Kh-31P has a range of up to 200 km.
Outside the Tactical Missile Corporation portfolio, Russian contractor Raduga has produced the Kh-58U (AS-11'Kilter') anti-radiation missile for use against radars such as the AN/TPS-43, the AN/TPS-44 and the AN/MPQ-53. The weapon is reported as being compatible with the Su-17M3/-17M4, the Su-22M4, the Su-24M and the Su-39 aircraft types and, as of 2003, was being promoted in Kh-58UShE configuration. The missile was described as being a 'modernised' iteration of 'Kilter' that was fitted with a new wideband passive radar seeker.
Lethal drone
Alongside the described anti-radiation missiles, the continued development of the SEAD concept has produced the lethal drone, which adds persistence to the mix. Two examples of this approach are the Israel Aircraft Industries (IAI's) Harpy and Rheinmetall's Taifun, which individually illustrate radically different methods of target identification.
In the first instance, Harpy takes the form of a 2.7 m-long, delta-winged air vehicle that is designed for either ground or shipboard launch and provides an autonomous, fire-and-forget SEAD/DEAD capability at ranges of up to 500 km and with an endurance (over a 400 km radius) of up to two hours. Target detection is by means of an onboard passive radar receiver and, according to JDW sources, the weapon is equipped with a 32 kg high-explosive warhead that is detonated above its target by a proximity fuze.
The vehicle's seeker head is understood to have been upgraded to cover a wider frequency range and, from late 2001, IAI was reported to be in the process of developing a Harpy variant that was equipped with a datalink and a dual electromagnetic/electro-optic seeker head.
The thinking behind this putative upgrade was said to have included the ability to launch a Harpy 'swarm' into a target area and continuously update them on potential targets and target priorities, with the update data being generated by an associated ground station or an airborne control centre.
As of 2005 (and apart from the Israel Defence Force), the Harpy customer base is understood to include China, India, South Korea, Spain and Turkey. The effectiveness of the concept can perhaps be gauged from the fact that Harpy was at the centre of a disagreement between the US and Israel over potential upgrading of the Chinese examples, which became so serious that it resulted in the 'retirement' of the Director General of Israel's Ministry of Defence (Amos Yaron) in August.
Fire-and-forget
For its part, the Taifun makes use of a K-band (35 MHz centre frequency) active radar seeker to acquire, identify and track moving or stationary armoured fighting vehicles, artillery pieces, radars, command posts and logistical targets at the rear of the battle area. Functionally, the device can be pre-programmed (fire-and-forget mode) or can be controlled from an associated ground station using a 2 to 12 MHz band datalink. As JDW went to press, Taifun production was expected to begin during 2006.
Discussion of Taifun's guidance system leads neatly to consideration of the ways in which SEAD is moving away from dedicated counters and towards DEAD. Traditionally, SEAD 'hard' kill has been aimed at disabling rather than destroying predominantly fixed-site radars. The emergence of highly effective, highly mobile SAM systems such as the Russian SA-10 and -12 has resulted in the need to eliminate such weapons in increasingly short time scales.
The advent of real-time data transfer, improved target geolocation and GPS weapons guidance has meant that systems such as the R7 HTS can hand off target data directly into the cockpits of 'shooters' armed with high-accuracy, GPS-guided munitions.
Other platforms, such as the 'Rivet Joint' signals intelligence or E-8 Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System (Joint STARS) aircraft have similar abilities. This capacity spreads the SEAD/DEAD task over virtually the whole of the available strike capability rather than concentrating it in a limited number of high-value, dedicated assets.
The future is unmanned
Looking further ahead, there can be little doubt that unmanned combat air vehicles (UCAVs) such as the X-45 and X-47 will form the basis of future persistent SEAD/DEAD capabilities. Their inherent stealth will allow such vehicles to get close enough to a target system to minimise the power needed to jam its associated radars or physically destroy it.
The thinking suggests that a close-in UCAV will be able to at least disable an emitter using precision delivery of a small quantity of explosive rather than having to drop a heavy weapon to ensure that the effects envelope is large enough to accommodate significant miss distances.
In the same vein, it seems likely that the Active Electronically Scanned Array (AESA) radars being developed for the F/A-22 and the F-35 will incorporate electronic attack (EA) modes, which, when combined with their inherent low observability, will allow them to seek out and blind hostile radars in support of their own operations as well as those of other platforms within the battlespace. Equally, both aircraft will have the EA capability as standard: a facility that again points towards the spreading of the SEAD/DEAD load across an ever wider spectrum of platforms.
Microwave energy weapons
Another avenue that could hold promise is the use of microwave energy weapons to 'burn out' control computers and other electronics associated with air-defence networks. Again, USAF's series of 'Suter' technology demonstrations is understood to have, at the very least, proved the viability of invading a hostile air-defence network to the extent of taking control of its computer nodes, wresting control of radars from their operators and/or introducing false target information.
While one expert suggested caution when looking at some of the more extravagant claims made for such capabilities (indeed, it could well be the case that certain 'leaks' should be considered as 'black propaganda' rather than reality), there can be no doubt that such an approach combined with other measures would render even the most sophisticated air-defence system virtually impotent.
Taking all these strands together, it is fair to say that SEAD/DEAD operations remain at the heart of the establishment of air superiority, which, in turn, remains a prerequisite for war-winning. While this centrality remains inviolate, the means of achieving the goal are expanding rapidly and are moving out of the realm of the dedicated into the world of the standard.
Key elements can be summarised as including target-grade geo-location (from multiple sources), real-time data flow across the battlespace and the availability of an expanded range of 'soft' and 'hard' kill options with which to execute attacks.
While the technologies needed to achieve the more esoteric capabilities exist, their maturation is likely to be measured in years (even decades) rather than months: a situation that points to the continued pre-eminence of the anti-radiation missile/'smart' munition/ emitter location system combination well into the foreseeable future.
SUPPRESSION OF ENEMY AIR DEFENCES - Disrupt, disable, destroy
Martin Streetly Editor Jane's Electronic Mission Aircraft and Jane's Radar and Electronic Warfare Systems - London
While the role of suppressing enemy air defences remains key, new means of achieving the goal are on the horizon. Martin Streetly reports
* Anti-radiation missiles are the traditional weapon of choice against air-defence radars
* Unmanned combat air vehicles will form the basis of future capabilities for suppressing and destroying enemy air defences
* The use of microwave energy weapons to 'burn out' air-defence networks also holds promise
The suppression of enemy air defences (SEAD) remains a cornerstone in establishing air superiority over a battle area, though it is somewhat overshadowed by the need to defeat the threat posed by shoulder-launched, infra-red guided surface-to-air missiles (SAMs).
SEAD operations, together with the related destruction of enemy air defences (DEAD), seek to disrupt, disable and/or destroy hostile, predominantly radar-based air-defence networks to the point were they are unable to respond effectively to the application of air power.
SEAD functions may be divided into 'soft' and 'hard' kill actions, with the former seeking to attack, disrupt and even control a network's sensors, communications links and decision-making/command tools. In the hard kill sphere, the intention is to either disable or destroy key nodes within a network under attack with a heavy emphasis on sensor systems such as radars.
In the 'hard' kill arena, the traditional weapon of choice against air-defence radars (still central to successful wide-area defence against air attack) has been the anti-radiation missile, which first saw widespread use during the Southeast Asian conflicts of the 1960s and 1970s.
Anti-radiation missiles remain in widespread service around the world, with key systems, including the Raytheon AGM-88 High-speed Anti-Radiation Missile (HARM), MBDA's Air-Launched Anti-Radiation Missile (ALARM) and a series of weapons developed by Russia.
The AGM-88 takes the form of a 4.1 m-long missile that is powered by a Thiokol solid-fuel motor, is equipped with a blast/fragmentation warhead and a passive radar seeker and which has, to date, appeared in A, B and C configurations. The AGM-88A is understood to feature a fuzable-link memory and to be in service aboard Spanish EF-18 aircraft. The AGM-88B differs from its predecessor in its use of an erasable, electronically programmable, read-only memory - thereby allowing it to be reprogrammed without disassembly. It is known to be in service with the German and Italian air forces.
The AGM-88C features an enhanced guidance section, increased receiver sensitivity, a larger memory, a 68 kg warhead and enhanced software.
'Charlie' is the primary US HARM and is carried by US Air Force (USAF) F-16CJ SEAD aircraft and US Navy (USN) and US Marine Corps (USMC) EA-6B and F/A-18 platforms.
Other known HARM users include Greece (F-16C Block 50+ aircraft), South Korea (F-16C Block 52), Turkey (F-16C Block 50) and the United Arab Emirates (F-16E/F).
Emitter shutdown problems
As might be expected, HARM functions by detecting emitting radars and homing in on their signals. As such, it has a number of operating modes (designated as target-of-opportunity, pre-briefed, self-protection and range-known) and a singular weakness in its inability to handle targets that shut down.
Operational experience has demonstrated HARM's tendency to go ballistic in such a situation, with a very real potential for fratricide and/or unwanted collateral damage. Various attempts have been made to address this problem, culminating in the USN-sponsored AGM-88E and USAF interest in the Raytheon/BGT HARM Destruction of enemy air defences Attack Module (HDAM).
Developed by Alliant Techsystems, the AGM-88E (also known as the Advanced Anti- Radiation Guided Missile or AARGM) combines the existing AGM-88B/C motor, airframe and warhead with a modified control section and a multimode guidance section that incorporates an active millimetre wave seeker and a passive digital radar homing receiver. The combination of the two guidance methods allows the weapon to counter emitter shutdown and, when combined with its GPS/ inertial navigation package and weapon impact assessment transmitter, facilitates geo-specificity, netted targeting and impact assessment. Currently in its system development and demonstration phase, the AGM-88E is expected to be introduced into service from 2008-13, with up to 1,750 existing USN and USMC HARM rounds being updated to the new standard.
Most recently, JDW's sources suggest it is likely Italy will join the AMG-88E programme as a means of updating up to 250 of its existing HARMs.
For its part, HDAM is designed to provide target specificity (including operations within 'restrictive' rules of engagement and post emitter shutdown), avoid fratricide and reduce collateral damage. As such, the module, which modifies or replaces the weapon's existing control/guidance sections, integrates a GPS capability with that of a 'robust' fibre-optic gyro inertial measurement unit and utilises a control section that incorporates a GPS antenna, a navigation set assembly, carrier and flight-control boards and a power supply. From late 2004 USAF was reported to be considering a year-long HDAM demonstration that would involve up to seven test rounds.
While the AGM-88E and HDAM overcome HARM's major operational disadvantage, the weapon requires external cueing if it is to maximise its effectiveness. Here, Northrop Grumman's Emitter Location System (ELS) and AN/ALQ-99 System Integrated Receiver (SIR)/ALQ-218 systems, Raytheon's AN/ASQ-213 HARM Targeting System (HTS) and the EADS Fast ELS come into play.
Of these, the ALQ-99 SIR equips USN and USMC EA-6B Improved CAPability (ICAP) II aircraft and allows the electronic environment to be sampled and cues developed for both the platform's 'soft' and 'hard' kill capabilities. In EA-6B ICAP III and EA-18G aircraft, the ALQ-99 SIR has been replaced by the ALQ-218 receiver group that is able to cue HARM in its most effective 'range-known' operating mode.
Northrop Grumman's ELS performs a similar emitter location and HARM cueing function aboard German and Italian Tornado electronic combat and reconnaissance SEAD platforms, while the EADS Fast ELS (FELS) seeks to improve on this via the use of long- and short-line interferometer technology to enhance location accuracy and detection speed. The FELS is known to have been flight tested aboard a Tornado electronic combat and reconnaissance aircraft during early 2005 and is being offered as an upgrade for such platforms.
Raytheon's ASQ-213 HTS equips USAF's F-16CJ SEAD aircraft and takes the form of a pod-mounted system that detects, identifies and locates radars and provides the data needed to calculate appropriate targeting and launch parameters for the AGM-88 in most (if not all) of its operating modes. Using the time difference-of-arrival technique for emitter location, HTS has been the subject of a number of software upgrades, the latest of which is designated as Revision 7 (R7).
This version will allow for multi-ship emitter location and will facilitate cross-cueing between itself and an onboard electro-optic capability. Within the F-16CJ weapon system itself, this will allow the aircraft to use 'smart' munitions as well as anti-radiation missiles to attack air defence targets and, when combined with Link 16, will generate real-time targeting quality data for 'shooters' that have no inherent SEAD location capabilities. Such a migration is further expected to move USAF SEAD operations into DEAD mode.
European capabilities
Looking outside the US, MBDA's 4.3 m-long ALARM is currently Western Europe's only operational anti-radiation missile. Designed to be carried by Tornado interdiction and strike aircraft and the four-nation Eurofighter, ALARM is essentially a self-defence weapon and features a unique 'loiter' mode in which it is suspended from a parachute while it conducts an expanded emitter search regime.
Having found a target, the missile detaches itself from its parachute and performs a near vertical terminal attack. Alongside the described loiter mode, ALARM offers corridor/area suppression, direct attack, dual mode and universal modes and is in service with both the UK Royal Air Force and the Royal Saudi Air Force.
In UK service, the latest known ALARM configuration is the Mk 2, which features an Alenia Marconi Systems (subsequently Selex Sensors and Airborne Systems)-developed seeker upgrade and new EADS-LFK-supplied solid-fuel propellant (housed in EADS-LFK-refurbished motor casings). Regarding the upgraded seeker, the main thrust of the effort appears to have centred on improving the device's sensitivity and its ability to remember target locations in the event of emitter shutdown during an attack. ALARM is further understood to have a range of approximately 45 km compared with the HARM's 91 km.
Elsewhere within NATO, German contractor BGT is developing the Anti-Radiation Missile with Intelligent Guidance and Extended Range (ARMIGER) weapon as a possible replacement for HARM within the German air force and other forces worldwide.
As such, ARMIGER makes use of a dual-mode (passive radar and infra-red) seeker, an M3.0-class LFK rocket/ramjet motor, a combined GPS/inertial navigation package and a 20 kg blast and fragmentation warhead. Range would be around 150 km. The ARMIGER development programme is understood to be funded until 2006.
Russian variants
Turning to Russia, the country's Tactical Missile Corporation (TMC - formerly Zvezda-Strela) has produced a range of anti-radiation missiles that includes the Kh-25MP/MPU, Kh-27, Kh-28 and Kh-31P. Of these, the Kh-27 is thought to have been withdrawn from service while the Kh-25MP (AS-12 'Kegler') is a solid-fuel powered missile that over time has been targeted at a range of emitters, including the AN/MPQ-4 (Nike Hercules SAM), AN/MPQ-33/-34/-39 (Homing All the Way Killer, HAWK) and AN/MPQ-46/-48 (Improved HAWK). The Kh-25MP works in conjunction with the 'V'yuga' (Snowstorm) target detection/identification/designation pod and is equipped with either the PRGS-1VP or PRGS-2VP passive seeker head. For its part, the Kh-25MPU is aimed at emitters associated with the Roland and Crotale SAM systems and was being promoted as recently as 2003. Looking to the future, JDW sources suggest that the TMC is developing a new anti-radiation missile (designated as the Kh-38) as a replacement for the Kh-25 series.
The Kh-28 (AS-9 'Kyle') is described as being designed to attack both ground-based and shipborne radar emitters, with the target set including the AN/MPQ-4 (Nike Hercules) and the AN/MPQ-33/-34/-39 (HAWK - Kh-28M variant). Like the Kh-25, the Kh-28 is teamed with a target-detection/cueing system ('Filin' or 'Metel' targeting systems) and is only likely to remain in service with former Soviet Union client states.
The Kh-31P (AS-17 'Krypton'), which entered Russian service in 1991, is targeted against radars such as the shipboard AN/SPY-1 and the AN/MPQ-53, which is associated with the Patriot SAM system. Aircraft capable of operating the weapon include the MiG-25SMT/UBT, the Su-24M (where it is teamed with the pod-mounted L-080 or L-081 emitter location system), the Su-27, the Su-30KI/KM, the Su-32 and the Su-39. JDW sources suggest that Kh-31P variants are in service in Russia and China, where it forms the basis of the indigenous JY-91 ARM. The Kh-31P has a range of up to 200 km.
Outside the Tactical Missile Corporation portfolio, Russian contractor Raduga has produced the Kh-58U (AS-11'Kilter') anti-radiation missile for use against radars such as the AN/TPS-43, the AN/TPS-44 and the AN/MPQ-53. The weapon is reported as being compatible with the Su-17M3/-17M4, the Su-22M4, the Su-24M and the Su-39 aircraft types and, as of 2003, was being promoted in Kh-58UShE configuration. The missile was described as being a 'modernised' iteration of 'Kilter' that was fitted with a new wideband passive radar seeker.
Lethal drone
Alongside the described anti-radiation missiles, the continued development of the SEAD concept has produced the lethal drone, which adds persistence to the mix. Two examples of this approach are the Israel Aircraft Industries (IAI's) Harpy and Rheinmetall's Taifun, which individually illustrate radically different methods of target identification.
In the first instance, Harpy takes the form of a 2.7 m-long, delta-winged air vehicle that is designed for either ground or shipboard launch and provides an autonomous, fire-and-forget SEAD/DEAD capability at ranges of up to 500 km and with an endurance (over a 400 km radius) of up to two hours. Target detection is by means of an onboard passive radar receiver and, according to JDW sources, the weapon is equipped with a 32 kg high-explosive warhead that is detonated above its target by a proximity fuze.
The vehicle's seeker head is understood to have been upgraded to cover a wider frequency range and, from late 2001, IAI was reported to be in the process of developing a Harpy variant that was equipped with a datalink and a dual electromagnetic/electro-optic seeker head.
The thinking behind this putative upgrade was said to have included the ability to launch a Harpy 'swarm' into a target area and continuously update them on potential targets and target priorities, with the update data being generated by an associated ground station or an airborne control centre.
As of 2005 (and apart from the Israel Defence Force), the Harpy customer base is understood to include China, India, South Korea, Spain and Turkey. The effectiveness of the concept can perhaps be gauged from the fact that Harpy was at the centre of a disagreement between the US and Israel over potential upgrading of the Chinese examples, which became so serious that it resulted in the 'retirement' of the Director General of Israel's Ministry of Defence (Amos Yaron) in August.
Fire-and-forget
For its part, the Taifun makes use of a K-band (35 MHz centre frequency) active radar seeker to acquire, identify and track moving or stationary armoured fighting vehicles, artillery pieces, radars, command posts and logistical targets at the rear of the battle area. Functionally, the device can be pre-programmed (fire-and-forget mode) or can be controlled from an associated ground station using a 2 to 12 MHz band datalink. As JDW went to press, Taifun production was expected to begin during 2006.
Discussion of Taifun's guidance system leads neatly to consideration of the ways in which SEAD is moving away from dedicated counters and towards DEAD. Traditionally, SEAD 'hard' kill has been aimed at disabling rather than destroying predominantly fixed-site radars. The emergence of highly effective, highly mobile SAM systems such as the Russian SA-10 and -12 has resulted in the need to eliminate such weapons in increasingly short time scales.
The advent of real-time data transfer, improved target geolocation and GPS weapons guidance has meant that systems such as the R7 HTS can hand off target data directly into the cockpits of 'shooters' armed with high-accuracy, GPS-guided munitions.
Other platforms, such as the 'Rivet Joint' signals intelligence or E-8 Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System (Joint STARS) aircraft have similar abilities. This capacity spreads the SEAD/DEAD task over virtually the whole of the available strike capability rather than concentrating it in a limited number of high-value, dedicated assets.
The future is unmanned
Looking further ahead, there can be little doubt that unmanned combat air vehicles (UCAVs) such as the X-45 and X-47 will form the basis of future persistent SEAD/DEAD capabilities. Their inherent stealth will allow such vehicles to get close enough to a target system to minimise the power needed to jam its associated radars or physically destroy it.
The thinking suggests that a close-in UCAV will be able to at least disable an emitter using precision delivery of a small quantity of explosive rather than having to drop a heavy weapon to ensure that the effects envelope is large enough to accommodate significant miss distances.
In the same vein, it seems likely that the Active Electronically Scanned Array (AESA) radars being developed for the F/A-22 and the F-35 will incorporate electronic attack (EA) modes, which, when combined with their inherent low observability, will allow them to seek out and blind hostile radars in support of their own operations as well as those of other platforms within the battlespace. Equally, both aircraft will have the EA capability as standard: a facility that again points towards the spreading of the SEAD/DEAD load across an ever wider spectrum of platforms.
Microwave energy weapons
Another avenue that could hold promise is the use of microwave energy weapons to 'burn out' control computers and other electronics associated with air-defence networks. Again, USAF's series of 'Suter' technology demonstrations is understood to have, at the very least, proved the viability of invading a hostile air-defence network to the extent of taking control of its computer nodes, wresting control of radars from their operators and/or introducing false target information.
While one expert suggested caution when looking at some of the more extravagant claims made for such capabilities (indeed, it could well be the case that certain 'leaks' should be considered as 'black propaganda' rather than reality), there can be no doubt that such an approach combined with other measures would render even the most sophisticated air-defence system virtually impotent.
Taking all these strands together, it is fair to say that SEAD/DEAD operations remain at the heart of the establishment of air superiority, which, in turn, remains a prerequisite for war-winning. While this centrality remains inviolate, the means of achieving the goal are expanding rapidly and are moving out of the realm of the dedicated into the world of the standard.
Key elements can be summarised as including target-grade geo-location (from multiple sources), real-time data flow across the battlespace and the availability of an expanded range of 'soft' and 'hard' kill options with which to execute attacks.
While the technologies needed to achieve the more esoteric capabilities exist, their maturation is likely to be measured in years (even decades) rather than months: a situation that points to the continued pre-eminence of the anti-radiation missile/'smart' munition/ emitter location system combination well into the foreseeable future.
