Sugarcane
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ISLAMABAD 000762
SUBJECT: STRUGGLING TOWARDS A COALITION
REF: (A) ISLAMABAD 745 (B) LAHORE 84 (C) ISLAMABAD 676 (D) ISLAMABAD 505
Classified By: Anne W. Patterson, for reasons 1.4 (b)(d)
1. (C) Summary. Pakistan Peoples Party (PPP) leader Asif Zardari is in the drivers seat as he begins a complex series of negotiations on forming a new government in Pakistan. But in Nawaz Sharif he has an influential passenger who is calculating when he can take the wheel. Zardari is trying to balance electoral math and provincial power projection goals while keeping the PPP together under his leadership. His initial insticts are based on a practical power calculus that an alliance with Nawaz is his strongest and most stable option. However, this is just the first round in what may be protracted negotiations to form a coalition government. End Summary.
The Math
2. (C) Zardari told Ambassador February 20 (Ref A) that he was considering a coalition with Nawaz Sharifs party and proposed offering the Prime Minister position to either Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz (PML-N) leader Javed Hashimi or to Awami National Party (ANP) leader Asfandyar Wali Khan. This is only the first round of what likely will be protracted negotiations to form a coalition. While it may be surprising that Zardari would consider this alliance and offer the PM post to another party, his rationale is based on sound electoral math, national/provincial power calculations and complicated party politics.
3. (U) A rough party breakdown of the election shows that the PPP has 32%, Nawazs party has 25% and Musharrafs party has 15%. The rest is split among smaller parties with the largest 7% share gong to the Muttahida Quami Movement (MQM) that controls Karachi. The Awami National Party has about 4%.
4. (C) Zardari argued that a coalition based on the PPP joining with Musharrafs party plus other smaller parties would barely give him a majority share in the National Assembly. Zardari told Ambassador, this would be a weak coalition. Zardari fears that opposition within the PPP to working with Musharrafs party after trouncing it in the election would increase the likelihood that the PPP would split into factions. There is a history of Musharraf successfully splitting the PPP to deny them power.
5. (C) One rule of Pakistani politics is that voters and politicians follow a winner, and Nawaz won big in this election. Musharrafs party was formed with many of the members of Nawazs party who left when Musharraf overthrew Nawaz in 1999. Many voters who deserted Nawaz to join Musharraf in 1999 went back to Nawaz in this election. We are seeing increasing reports that members of Musharrafs party are following suit by switching back to Nawaz. Thus the limited strength of a PPP coalition with Musharrafs party is weakening daily.
6. (C) In comparison, Nawazs numbers and strength are growing. If Zardari forms a coalition with Nawaz and some smaller parties, he could achieve a solid majority (perhaps two-thirds) in the National Assembly. Nawaz has publicly set some difficult conditions on a partnershipa commitment to restore the 1973 constitution and restoration of the judiciary. Zardari likely will agree to restoration of the 1973 Constitution because it reverses Musharraf-era amendments and returns power from the President to the Prime Minister. Zardari has indicated to us that he would prefer that the next parliament wrangle with the complicated legal issue of restoring the deposed judiciary. Again, these conditions are only the opening gambit in what may be protracted negotiations.
7. (C) Despite Zardaris optimism, Nawaz may not agree to put Javed Hashimi in the PM chair. Nawaz expects more defectors from Musharrafs party to join him and is contemplating a possible chance to form a government himself (Ref B) if the PPP rejects his conditions. If Nawaz can attract enough Musharraf party members, he could pull close to even with the PPP in terms of Assembly strength. Whether in government or in opposition, Nawaz will be a major player that Zardari cannot afford to ignore.
Provincial Calculations
8. (C) Zardari must also consider how to expand PPP influence in the four provincial assemblies and the National Assembly through power sharing deals. The PPP won a sizable victory in Bhuttos home province of Sindh and could agree to work with MQM in a ruling coalition. It has a good chance of working with the Pashtun ANP party to form a government in the Northwest Frontier Province and could even choose to work with Musharrafs party in Balochistan to govern there.
9. (C) The real prize is always the Punjab, where the PPP and Nawaz are competing to exploit Musharrafs losses and expand their political base. While Nawazs party won a majority in the provincial Punjab election, the PPP could consider an alliance there with Musharrafs party as a means to block Nawazs growing national influence. Regardless of whether Nawaz joins in a national coalition this time, his long game will be to expand his power in Punjab as a stepping stone to again becoming Prime Minister under his own government.
Party Politics
10. (C) By offering the Prime Minister slot to PML-N, Zardari is trying to avoid a leadership struggle within the PPP. While Zardari publicly has taken himself out of the running for PM, we suspect he will keep his options open by going forward with plans to run in a by-election for his sisters seat in Sindh. Zardari told Ambassador he continues discussions with Musharraf because Musharraf will be key to solidifying Army support for a PPP government. Zardari would also like Musharraf to extend the National Reconciliation Ordinance (NRO) that granted Zardari and others immunity from prosecution on corruption charges. Although Zardari ultimately will have to votes to extend the NRO in the next Assembly, the optics of such a move could stir up ugly Pakistani memories of Mr. Ten Percent.
11. (C) With solid party credentials and significant rank and file support (Refs C and D), PPP Vice Chairman Amin Faheem is the most likely party choice for PM. But Zardari considers Faheem to be weak and lazy. Each of the other choices is also problematic. PPP Punjab President Shah Mehmood Qureshi is a divisive figure within the party and is probably too independent for Zardari. PPP Vice Chairman Yousef Gilani is a possibility, but he too has corruption baggage and is a Punjabi and his appointment could spark Sindh-Punjab rivalries within the party. Former Defense Minister (under Bhutto) Mirani lost in the election. PPP barrister Aitzaz Ahsan remains very controversial within the PPP; he also is ineligible because he withdrew from the election.
Viability
12. (C) At this point, a PPP-Nawaz coalition looks the most solid in terms of numbers. But long-standing rivalry between the parties and their leaders may limit its effectiveness and long-term viability. The PPP is a populist party founded on socialist economics and a strong secular base. PML-N has always appealed to a religiously conservative middle-class business community. Both parties campaigned on anti-Musharraf platforms which stressed the importance of getting the military out of civilian politics, restoring the power of the Prime Minister over that of the President, the need for economic reform and increased spending on education, a continued commitment to retaining Pakistans nuclear capability, and pledges to allow political parties to operate in the tribal areas.
13. (C) Especially if Nawaz gains in strength, however, political infighting among members of a PPP-Nawaz coalition may preclude any effective governance. As Shahbaz Sharif has already noted (Ref B), the next government faces some difficult and unpopular decisions. These include weaning Pakistanis from excessive energy and food subsidies. Many have predicted that the next government may have a short shelf-life of 6-12 months.
GWOT Commitment
14. (C) While PPP is decidedly more vocal about the need to fight extremism, the platform of both parties stresses their preference for dialogue over military action in combating militancy. Nawaz at every opportunity has reminded us that he overrode his chief of staff to join the U.S. in the first Gulf War and criticized Musharraf for allowing the growth of talibanization in Pakistan.
15. (C) Nawaz returned from exile because the Saudis refused to keep him any longer and reportedly wanted a counterweight to the liberal, Shia-connected Benazir Bhutto.
The Saudis provided Nawaz with an armored car and reportedly lots of campaign cash. There is at least one poster in Lahore that features King Abdullah between pictures of Nawaz and Shahbaz. Nawazs wife reportedly is quite conservative, but so is PML President Chaudhry Shujaat Hussains wife. It is not clear that PML-Ns ties to the religious parties are any stronger or more significant than those of Musharrafs party. Both PML leaders Chaudhry Shujaat and Chaudhry Pervaiz Elahi have connections to conservative Deobandi madrassas, and Musharraf was perfectly willing (as was Bhutto) to deal with the Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam party.
16. (C) Comment: Zardaris initial instincts are to find practical solutions, and an alliance with Nawaz makes sense from a pure power calculus. But this is round one of what could be protracted negotiations.
PATTERSON
SUBJECT: STRUGGLING TOWARDS A COALITION
REF: (A) ISLAMABAD 745 (B) LAHORE 84 (C) ISLAMABAD 676 (D) ISLAMABAD 505
Classified By: Anne W. Patterson, for reasons 1.4 (b)(d)
1. (C) Summary. Pakistan Peoples Party (PPP) leader Asif Zardari is in the drivers seat as he begins a complex series of negotiations on forming a new government in Pakistan. But in Nawaz Sharif he has an influential passenger who is calculating when he can take the wheel. Zardari is trying to balance electoral math and provincial power projection goals while keeping the PPP together under his leadership. His initial insticts are based on a practical power calculus that an alliance with Nawaz is his strongest and most stable option. However, this is just the first round in what may be protracted negotiations to form a coalition government. End Summary.
The Math
2. (C) Zardari told Ambassador February 20 (Ref A) that he was considering a coalition with Nawaz Sharifs party and proposed offering the Prime Minister position to either Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz (PML-N) leader Javed Hashimi or to Awami National Party (ANP) leader Asfandyar Wali Khan. This is only the first round of what likely will be protracted negotiations to form a coalition. While it may be surprising that Zardari would consider this alliance and offer the PM post to another party, his rationale is based on sound electoral math, national/provincial power calculations and complicated party politics.
3. (U) A rough party breakdown of the election shows that the PPP has 32%, Nawazs party has 25% and Musharrafs party has 15%. The rest is split among smaller parties with the largest 7% share gong to the Muttahida Quami Movement (MQM) that controls Karachi. The Awami National Party has about 4%.
4. (C) Zardari argued that a coalition based on the PPP joining with Musharrafs party plus other smaller parties would barely give him a majority share in the National Assembly. Zardari told Ambassador, this would be a weak coalition. Zardari fears that opposition within the PPP to working with Musharrafs party after trouncing it in the election would increase the likelihood that the PPP would split into factions. There is a history of Musharraf successfully splitting the PPP to deny them power.
5. (C) One rule of Pakistani politics is that voters and politicians follow a winner, and Nawaz won big in this election. Musharrafs party was formed with many of the members of Nawazs party who left when Musharraf overthrew Nawaz in 1999. Many voters who deserted Nawaz to join Musharraf in 1999 went back to Nawaz in this election. We are seeing increasing reports that members of Musharrafs party are following suit by switching back to Nawaz. Thus the limited strength of a PPP coalition with Musharrafs party is weakening daily.
6. (C) In comparison, Nawazs numbers and strength are growing. If Zardari forms a coalition with Nawaz and some smaller parties, he could achieve a solid majority (perhaps two-thirds) in the National Assembly. Nawaz has publicly set some difficult conditions on a partnershipa commitment to restore the 1973 constitution and restoration of the judiciary. Zardari likely will agree to restoration of the 1973 Constitution because it reverses Musharraf-era amendments and returns power from the President to the Prime Minister. Zardari has indicated to us that he would prefer that the next parliament wrangle with the complicated legal issue of restoring the deposed judiciary. Again, these conditions are only the opening gambit in what may be protracted negotiations.
7. (C) Despite Zardaris optimism, Nawaz may not agree to put Javed Hashimi in the PM chair. Nawaz expects more defectors from Musharrafs party to join him and is contemplating a possible chance to form a government himself (Ref B) if the PPP rejects his conditions. If Nawaz can attract enough Musharraf party members, he could pull close to even with the PPP in terms of Assembly strength. Whether in government or in opposition, Nawaz will be a major player that Zardari cannot afford to ignore.
Provincial Calculations
8. (C) Zardari must also consider how to expand PPP influence in the four provincial assemblies and the National Assembly through power sharing deals. The PPP won a sizable victory in Bhuttos home province of Sindh and could agree to work with MQM in a ruling coalition. It has a good chance of working with the Pashtun ANP party to form a government in the Northwest Frontier Province and could even choose to work with Musharrafs party in Balochistan to govern there.
9. (C) The real prize is always the Punjab, where the PPP and Nawaz are competing to exploit Musharrafs losses and expand their political base. While Nawazs party won a majority in the provincial Punjab election, the PPP could consider an alliance there with Musharrafs party as a means to block Nawazs growing national influence. Regardless of whether Nawaz joins in a national coalition this time, his long game will be to expand his power in Punjab as a stepping stone to again becoming Prime Minister under his own government.
Party Politics
10. (C) By offering the Prime Minister slot to PML-N, Zardari is trying to avoid a leadership struggle within the PPP. While Zardari publicly has taken himself out of the running for PM, we suspect he will keep his options open by going forward with plans to run in a by-election for his sisters seat in Sindh. Zardari told Ambassador he continues discussions with Musharraf because Musharraf will be key to solidifying Army support for a PPP government. Zardari would also like Musharraf to extend the National Reconciliation Ordinance (NRO) that granted Zardari and others immunity from prosecution on corruption charges. Although Zardari ultimately will have to votes to extend the NRO in the next Assembly, the optics of such a move could stir up ugly Pakistani memories of Mr. Ten Percent.
11. (C) With solid party credentials and significant rank and file support (Refs C and D), PPP Vice Chairman Amin Faheem is the most likely party choice for PM. But Zardari considers Faheem to be weak and lazy. Each of the other choices is also problematic. PPP Punjab President Shah Mehmood Qureshi is a divisive figure within the party and is probably too independent for Zardari. PPP Vice Chairman Yousef Gilani is a possibility, but he too has corruption baggage and is a Punjabi and his appointment could spark Sindh-Punjab rivalries within the party. Former Defense Minister (under Bhutto) Mirani lost in the election. PPP barrister Aitzaz Ahsan remains very controversial within the PPP; he also is ineligible because he withdrew from the election.
Viability
12. (C) At this point, a PPP-Nawaz coalition looks the most solid in terms of numbers. But long-standing rivalry between the parties and their leaders may limit its effectiveness and long-term viability. The PPP is a populist party founded on socialist economics and a strong secular base. PML-N has always appealed to a religiously conservative middle-class business community. Both parties campaigned on anti-Musharraf platforms which stressed the importance of getting the military out of civilian politics, restoring the power of the Prime Minister over that of the President, the need for economic reform and increased spending on education, a continued commitment to retaining Pakistans nuclear capability, and pledges to allow political parties to operate in the tribal areas.
13. (C) Especially if Nawaz gains in strength, however, political infighting among members of a PPP-Nawaz coalition may preclude any effective governance. As Shahbaz Sharif has already noted (Ref B), the next government faces some difficult and unpopular decisions. These include weaning Pakistanis from excessive energy and food subsidies. Many have predicted that the next government may have a short shelf-life of 6-12 months.
GWOT Commitment
14. (C) While PPP is decidedly more vocal about the need to fight extremism, the platform of both parties stresses their preference for dialogue over military action in combating militancy. Nawaz at every opportunity has reminded us that he overrode his chief of staff to join the U.S. in the first Gulf War and criticized Musharraf for allowing the growth of talibanization in Pakistan.
15. (C) Nawaz returned from exile because the Saudis refused to keep him any longer and reportedly wanted a counterweight to the liberal, Shia-connected Benazir Bhutto.
The Saudis provided Nawaz with an armored car and reportedly lots of campaign cash. There is at least one poster in Lahore that features King Abdullah between pictures of Nawaz and Shahbaz. Nawazs wife reportedly is quite conservative, but so is PML President Chaudhry Shujaat Hussains wife. It is not clear that PML-Ns ties to the religious parties are any stronger or more significant than those of Musharrafs party. Both PML leaders Chaudhry Shujaat and Chaudhry Pervaiz Elahi have connections to conservative Deobandi madrassas, and Musharraf was perfectly willing (as was Bhutto) to deal with the Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam party.
16. (C) Comment: Zardaris initial instincts are to find practical solutions, and an alliance with Nawaz makes sense from a pure power calculus. But this is round one of what could be protracted negotiations.
PATTERSON
