Strategic restraint or loss of capabilities?

[Sal12]

Do you think this could change in 16-17 months when the top brass is up for a shakeup following the current COAS's departure? We had faced similar problems when another chief was given an extension. Why exactly are chiefs extended? Does it have anything to do with political leaders saving their own chair by giving extension to a chief who they know they could work with without him causing problems for them on the political front? If so, what is the solution? If extensions to army chiefs create problems and the insecurity of political leaders at the helm is the cause for those extensions, what might be the possible solutions? We have all seen that the enemy has gotten emboldened manifold during these past 5 years or so. We did not even capitalize on the situation when it was engaged with its back against the wall at the LAC. In return, it intensified its terror campaign inside Pakistan. It is neutrality in 1962 leading to the Rann of Kutch adventure (real precursor to operation Gibraltar & hence 1965 war) from the Indian side in 1965 all over again. History is a guide that whenever Indians have been given latitude by us not capitalizing on their weakness, they have made Pakistan deeply regret that in due time. On the other hand, Indians used our weakness during the 1971 civil war to their full advantage and cut Pakistan to size. Extensions have backfired on both occasions post-2007.

Raheel Shareef

It is all quite confusing. All sides playing each other. Pakistani citizens who are considering TTA victories their own are celebrating prematurely. We need to pause and see how TTA conducts itself in due time before taking any absolute positions.

Extensions are not good for the army but extension is not the only problem. The political leadership in Pak wants a docile, lame, weak minded person as army chief so that army chief wont cause issues to the Govt. The Govt does not care how much damaging this is to Pak in general and army as an institution in particular.

After Raheel Sharif, NS wanted a submissive person as army chief and he made Bajwa as chief who turned out to be a curse. IK then gave 3 years of full extension for the sake of his own Govt since next army chief could be no nonsense guy.

This also raises a question how could the people like Bajwa became Lt General that they could be considered for the post of army chief. Does it not point to the flaws in internal promotion system of army.

Justice Khosa could have his own prejudice but he was right in opposing the full 3 years extension of Bajwa.

 

[Maula Jatt]

Extensions are not good for the army but extension is not the only problem. The political leadership in Pak wants a docile, lame, weak minded person as army chief so that army chief wont cause issues to the Govt. The Govt does not care how much damaging this is to Pak in general and army as an institution in particular.

After Raheel Sharif, NS wanted a submissive person as army chief and he made Bajwa as chief who turned out to be a curse. IK then gave 3 years of full extension for the sake of his own Govt since next army chief could be no nonsense guy.

This also raises a question how could the people like Bajwa became Lt General that they could be considered for the post of army chief. Does it not point to the flaws in internal promotion system of army.

Justice Khosa could have his own prejudice but he was right in opposing the full 3 years extension of Bajwa.

This

 

[Pak Nationalist]

Extensions are not good for the army but extension is not the only problem. The political leadership in Pak wants a docile, lame, weak minded person as army chief so that army chief wont cause issues to the Govt. The Govt does not care how much damaging this is to Pak in general and army as an institution in particular.

After Raheel Sharif, NS wanted a submissive person as army chief and he made Bajwa as chief who turned out to be a curse. IK then gave 3 years of full extension for the sake of his own Govt since next army chief could be no nonsense guy.

This also raises a question how could the people like Bajwa became Lt General that they could be considered for the post of army chief. Does it not point to the flaws in internal promotion system of army.

Justice Khosa could have his own prejudice but he was right in opposing the full 3 years extension of Bajwa.

Why do political leaders feel threatened is a useful question to be asked in this case. Weeding out any interventionism in the political realm could be a solution but this is not a very relevant discussion to the subject matter of this post, so I would leave it at that.

 

[VCheng]

What are the factors that are stopping us?

Only one: It is a national trait to prefer easy to fake style over harder to achieve substance.

 

[Pak Nationalist]

Only one: It is a national trait to prefer easy to fake style over harder to achieve substance.

Wasn't like that during the '90s.

 

[VCheng]

Wasn't like that during the '90s.

It has been like this since the very first years, and not changed ever since. And not likely to change anytime soon, either.

 

[PakFactor]

Wasn't like that during the '90s.

As @VCheng stated it’s been this way since forever with this country. Don’t forget Ayub appointing his favorite Yahya Khan, etc., they feel it’s better to have a submissive individual less a strong one threatens them. Regardless what happens to the country due to that docile individual.

Its a favorite pastime sport in this country to shot ones own foot.

 

[chinasun]

More than 80% of the Chinese people support Belt and Road Initiative. Will never retreat on cpec. In the face of terrorist organizations, we should be prepared for a protracted war, and it is estimated that terrorist attacks will decrease in 10 years' time. Within six years, Belt and Road Initiative will build it in Afghanistan. Within 12 years, the Pakistani train went to Europe. I want to say that the enemy attack proves that we are doing the right thing.
Three years later, Pakistan and Bangladesh have become the fastest growing countries in Asia.

 

[Vapnope]

India wants total capitulation of Pakistani state and is not interested in any meaningful dialogue whatsoever. Their history in last 20 years stands witness to this fact that they are in an active war against Pakistan be it using terrorists or attacks on economy and all kind of propaganda tools. This isn't even a secret anymore but the painful part is that despite everything, our side thinks they can play fair and India will stop her hostile activities against Pakistan. It is time that people ask their leaders and military top brass that why Pakistan is not replying in the same token.

 

[Pak Nationalist]

India wants total capitulation of Pakistani state and is not interested in any meaningful dialogue whatsoever. Their history in last 20 years stands witness to this fact that they are in an active war against Pakistan be it using terrorists or attacks on economy and all kind of propaganda tools. This isn't even a secret anymore but the painful part is that despite everything, our side thinks they can play fair and India will stop her hostile activities against Pakistan. It is time that people ask their leaders and military top brass that why Pakistan is not replying in the same token.

That is why I keep nudging folks at PDF to begin asking the tough questions. The policy direction of pacifism is empowering New Dehli. It is emboldened by its growing economic might as it should be. The assumed (and maybe correctly so under the current dispensation) impunity arises basically from the economic disparity between both states. Indian state's confidence in its abilities stems from its economic ascent. It knows that a prosperous Pakistan would be less inclined to get in line with Indian objectives than other South Asian states. Its current actions are aimed at keeping Pakistan bogged down in security issues, so it could not attain its true economic potential. Nobody would invest in a country where bomb attacks and security forces ambushes are a routine affair. It is as simple as that. The real war India is waging is on the Pakistani economy. Attacking PSX, the strategic Dasu dam construction team should have shaken up the decision-makers, but they have an unknown threshold of patience and maybe particularly thick hides.

It has been like this since the very first years, and not changed ever since. And not likely to change anytime soon, either.

I was referring to the manner in which we bled India in Kashmir during the '90s, keeping its military engaged there.

 

[VCheng]

I was referring to the manner in which we bled India in Kashmir during the '90s, keeping its military engaged there.

And look at where it ended up for Pakistan. We have not gained anything in Kashmir, yet have lost almost all the international goodwill and political capital in that misguided strategy.

 

[Pak Nationalist]

And look at where it ended up for Pakistan. We have not gained anything in Kashmir, yet have lost almost all the international goodwill and political capital in that misguided strategy.

I have a contrary view to that. 9/11 turned it for Pakistan, not supporting militancy in IoK during the '90s.9/11 changed global opinion against Islamist militancy. We should have reoriented our proxies and fashioned them in less religious and more nationalist colors, we did not get the message, the Indian parliament attack in 2002 happened and India successfully dovetailed its stance on Islamist militancy into the larger global push against Islamist militancy. We had to put everything on deep freeze and now our capabilities have atrophied. Indian capacity has grown, so has its economy and consequently its confidence; PS. LoC was allowed to be fenced by GeneralMusharraf, effectively giving up on Kashmir. Supporting militancy was never supposed to be an end in itself, it was a means towards an end. That end was rising costs for the Indian military so India considers a negotiated settlement the only option in a nuclearised environment. Moreover, the Kargil operation also led to a big loss to the credibility of the PAKISTANI STATE with the international community as a nuclear weapons state. That loss of credibility eased the Indian objective of projecting Pakistan-sponsored resistance in the occupied valley as part of the larger Islamist militant movements in the Muslim world with established anti-western bias. Let us be nuanced. Militancy was never going to deliver you Kashmir. This was no East Pakistan, we were no India (4 times larger country). PS. the global mood in which our strategy failed must be understood. It went successfully during the '90s, but we could not evolve post 9/11 due to a lack of appreciation of the global trends.
I believe that even today, we could have openings if we follow the Turkish, (Arab militias) Iranian (Zenabyoun, Hezbollah, Hashd al Shabi, Fatimyoun) and Russian (Wagner group, Chechens, etc.) models to hit back at our Eastern neighbor in the sub-conventional domain without using/radicalizing our own public. Kashmiri resistance could be rebranded more on nationalist lines than religious ones. There is space for such covert operations in today's environment. We have seen players like Turkey and Russia successfully operate in that space to further their interests.

 

[VCheng]

I have a contrary view to that. 9/11 turned it for Pakistan, not supporting militancy in IoK during the '90s.9/11 changed global opinion against Islamist militancy. We should have reoriented our proxies and fashioned them in less religious and more nationalist colors, we did not get the message, the Indian parliament attack in 2002 happened and India successfully dovetailed its stance on Islamist militancy into the larger global push against Islamist militancy. We had to put everything on deep freeze and now our capabilities have atrophied. Indian capacity has grown, so has its economy and consequently its confidence; PS. LoC was allowed to be fenced by GeneralMusharraf, effectively giving up on Kashmir. Supporting militancy was never supposed to be an end in itself, it was a means towards an end. That end was rising costs for the Indian military so India considers a negotiated settlement the only option in a nuclearised environment. Moreover, the Kargil operation also led to a big loss to the credibility of the PAKISTANI STATE with the international community as a nuclear weapons state. That loss of credibility eased the Indian objective of projecting Pakistan-sponsored resistance in the occupied valley as part of the larger Islamist militant movements in the Muslim world with established anti-western bias. Let us be nuanced. Militancy was never going to deliver you Kashmir. This was no East Pakistan, we were no India (4 times larger country). PS. the global mood in which our strategy failed must be understood. It went successfully during the '90s, but we could not evolve post 9/11 due to a lack of appreciation of the global trends.
I believe that even today, we could have openings if we follow the Turkish, (Arab militias) Iranian (Zenabyoun, Hezbollah, Hashd al Shabi, Fatimyoun) and Russian (Wagner group, Chechens, etc.) models to hit back at our Eastern neighbor in the sub-conventional domain without using/radicalizing our own public. Kashmiri resistance could be rebranded more on nationalist lines than religious ones. There is space for such covert operations in today's environment. We have seen players like Turkey and Russia successfully operate in that space to further their interests.

The bottom line remains that Pakistan have overplayed their hand for far too long, and are now only beginning to pay the price. They are in the proverbial corner and there is no evident way out for the time being. The same mindset that landed them in this predicament in the first place are the same ones charting the same disastrous course forwards too. The end result is entirely predictable, however long it may take.

 

[Pak Nationalist]

The bottom line remains that Pakistan have overplayed their hand for far too long, and are now only beginning to pay the price. They are in the proverbial corner and there is no evident way out for the time being. The same mindset that landed them in this predicament in the first place are the same ones charting the same disastrous course forwards too. The end result is entirely predictable, however long it may take.

I am sorry, I don't quite understand which mindset you are referring to.

 

[VCheng]

I am sorry, I don't quite understand which mindset you are referring to.

The mindset that creates, sets and maintains Pakistan's defense and foreign policies, as well as its internal milieu.