JanjaWeed
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In principle the civil-military leadership of Pakistan has decided to re-engage with America by restoring the NATO pipeline and attending the Afghanistan moot in Chicago.
The "terms of re-engagement" should be finalised soon. President Asif Zardari will attend Chicago even as the foreign and information ministers have set the ball rolling by spelling out the guiding principles for negotiating with the US. These are matters of "Pakistani national interest" and concerns of Pakistan's "national sovereignty". The former has been popularly explained as a demand for monies legitimately due on various accounts (about $1 billion in Coalition Support funds, $1.5 billion a year in Kerry-Lugar assistance, tens of millions of dollars worth of military equipment and spares on order, etc, and IMF leniency in bailing out the failing economy) from the US while the latter is related to US cross-border actions like the unilateral raid to kill Osama Bin Laden in Abbottabad that belittled the Pak military and the Salala attack that led to the death of 24 Pakistani soldiers. Two issues of public importance are "on the table" - which means a compromise of sorts - the continued use of drones and an "apology" from the US for Salala.
It is extraordinary how the recent public debate in Pakistan has revolved around questions like "what's in it for us monetarily?" and "drones must stop because they violate our sovereignty". Neither position was taken by the media and public during the seven years of the US-Pakistan relationship from 2001-2008 when Pakistan was ruled by the military establishment under General Musharraf or from 2008-2010 when the civilians were supposedly in charge. Indeed, the US dished out $20 billion from 2001-2011 to Pakistan, mostly to the military regime ($14 billion); and drone strikes began in 2005, increased significantly in 2007-08 and soared four times from 2009-2011. If both moolah and drones were kosher from 2001-2011, why make such a hue and cry about them now?
One major factor has changed. The Bush doctrine of "strategically partnering" Pakistan to "wage a war without end" against Al-Qaeda and the Taliban has been replaced by the Obama doctrine of swiftly degrading Al-Qaeda via drones, increasingly fighting with the Taliban by means of a refurbished "Afghan army", strengthening President Hamid Karzai and pulling out NATO from Afghanistan by 2014. The Bush doctrine "suited" Pakistan's military establishment - American money and weapons flowed in unconditionally and it's "strategic assets" in Mullah Omar and the Haqqani network weren't seriously degraded. But the Obama doctrine is threatening to derail their plans of a "friendly" Talibanised Afghanistan. Initially, the Pakistani military resisted the new Obama strategy by citing lack of resources. It also tried to explain to the international community why it wanted not just a stable and peaceful Afghanistan but also one that was "friendly" towards Pakistan - the military was worried that if the Pashtun Afghan Taliban weren't fully accommodated in Kabul, they might covet Pakistan's Pashtun areas and turn their guns on Islamabad. Indeed, its game plan seemed to echo that of the Afghan Taliban: frustrate the American plan by one means or another until time ran out in 2014, and then help the Taliban to overrun Kabul just as the Mujahideen had done with Pakistan's help in 1992 after the Soviets withdrew in 1989.
However, problems arose when the Obama White House, Pentagon and CIA jointly determined to challenge the Pakistani military's game plan in America's own "national interest". Unilateral drone strikes went up four times and eliminated 80 per cent of the Al-Qaeda fighters in FATA. Then, in October, they accused the ISI of playing a "treacherous double game" with them - Pakistani Generals' avowed best friend, Admiral Mike Mullen, said the "Haqqani network was a veritable arm of the ISI". The Salala raid a month later was in the same vein of unilateralism. Humiliated, the Pakistani military establishment decided to draw a red line by freezing the NATO pipeline. It reasoned that the Americans could not afford to allow any disruption in supplies and would soon come round to accepting the Pakistani military's point of view. The military thrust "ownership" of its besieged Afghan policy on the elected civilian parliament and anti-US Pakistani media.
Unfortunately, this tactic has backfired. Under pressure in an election year, the Obama administration has become more unyielding. This was testified initially by the upgrading of Gen David Petreaus and Leon Panetta as head of the CIA and Defense Department respectively, then a willingness to spend much more money on shifting focus to the Northern route for NATO supplies and finally the decision to go ahead without bringing Pakistan on board negotiations with the Taliban in Qatar. The last straw was a palpable threat to sanction Pakistan for hurting the US "national interest" and the unexpected signing of a "strategic alliance" agreement between the US and the Karzai regime. The transition from "strategic ally" to "frenemy" has been swifter than the Pakistani generals had bargained for.
It is still not too late for Pakistan's military establishment to cut its suit according to its cloth. It is not in anyone's interest for an undiluted Taliban government to rule from Kabul. Therefore, Pakistan's best option is to help secure a peaceful Afghanistan that is not "unfriendly" towards it. The notion of "strategic depth" against India has become timebarred. It is time to persuade the Taliban and the Haqqani network to come to the negotiating table with Kabul and Washington. Should they refuse, Pakistan's military will have to contend with a more rather than less Talibanised Pakistan in which the Afghan and Pakistani Taliban will make common cause more readily against Islamabad than against Kabul. Pakistan needs to be an integral part of the end-game in Afghanistan, not isolated and degraded like the Taliban.
Stable Kabul the only way out for Pakistan : Najam Sethi News - India Today
The "terms of re-engagement" should be finalised soon. President Asif Zardari will attend Chicago even as the foreign and information ministers have set the ball rolling by spelling out the guiding principles for negotiating with the US. These are matters of "Pakistani national interest" and concerns of Pakistan's "national sovereignty". The former has been popularly explained as a demand for monies legitimately due on various accounts (about $1 billion in Coalition Support funds, $1.5 billion a year in Kerry-Lugar assistance, tens of millions of dollars worth of military equipment and spares on order, etc, and IMF leniency in bailing out the failing economy) from the US while the latter is related to US cross-border actions like the unilateral raid to kill Osama Bin Laden in Abbottabad that belittled the Pak military and the Salala attack that led to the death of 24 Pakistani soldiers. Two issues of public importance are "on the table" - which means a compromise of sorts - the continued use of drones and an "apology" from the US for Salala.
It is extraordinary how the recent public debate in Pakistan has revolved around questions like "what's in it for us monetarily?" and "drones must stop because they violate our sovereignty". Neither position was taken by the media and public during the seven years of the US-Pakistan relationship from 2001-2008 when Pakistan was ruled by the military establishment under General Musharraf or from 2008-2010 when the civilians were supposedly in charge. Indeed, the US dished out $20 billion from 2001-2011 to Pakistan, mostly to the military regime ($14 billion); and drone strikes began in 2005, increased significantly in 2007-08 and soared four times from 2009-2011. If both moolah and drones were kosher from 2001-2011, why make such a hue and cry about them now?
One major factor has changed. The Bush doctrine of "strategically partnering" Pakistan to "wage a war without end" against Al-Qaeda and the Taliban has been replaced by the Obama doctrine of swiftly degrading Al-Qaeda via drones, increasingly fighting with the Taliban by means of a refurbished "Afghan army", strengthening President Hamid Karzai and pulling out NATO from Afghanistan by 2014. The Bush doctrine "suited" Pakistan's military establishment - American money and weapons flowed in unconditionally and it's "strategic assets" in Mullah Omar and the Haqqani network weren't seriously degraded. But the Obama doctrine is threatening to derail their plans of a "friendly" Talibanised Afghanistan. Initially, the Pakistani military resisted the new Obama strategy by citing lack of resources. It also tried to explain to the international community why it wanted not just a stable and peaceful Afghanistan but also one that was "friendly" towards Pakistan - the military was worried that if the Pashtun Afghan Taliban weren't fully accommodated in Kabul, they might covet Pakistan's Pashtun areas and turn their guns on Islamabad. Indeed, its game plan seemed to echo that of the Afghan Taliban: frustrate the American plan by one means or another until time ran out in 2014, and then help the Taliban to overrun Kabul just as the Mujahideen had done with Pakistan's help in 1992 after the Soviets withdrew in 1989.
However, problems arose when the Obama White House, Pentagon and CIA jointly determined to challenge the Pakistani military's game plan in America's own "national interest". Unilateral drone strikes went up four times and eliminated 80 per cent of the Al-Qaeda fighters in FATA. Then, in October, they accused the ISI of playing a "treacherous double game" with them - Pakistani Generals' avowed best friend, Admiral Mike Mullen, said the "Haqqani network was a veritable arm of the ISI". The Salala raid a month later was in the same vein of unilateralism. Humiliated, the Pakistani military establishment decided to draw a red line by freezing the NATO pipeline. It reasoned that the Americans could not afford to allow any disruption in supplies and would soon come round to accepting the Pakistani military's point of view. The military thrust "ownership" of its besieged Afghan policy on the elected civilian parliament and anti-US Pakistani media.
Unfortunately, this tactic has backfired. Under pressure in an election year, the Obama administration has become more unyielding. This was testified initially by the upgrading of Gen David Petreaus and Leon Panetta as head of the CIA and Defense Department respectively, then a willingness to spend much more money on shifting focus to the Northern route for NATO supplies and finally the decision to go ahead without bringing Pakistan on board negotiations with the Taliban in Qatar. The last straw was a palpable threat to sanction Pakistan for hurting the US "national interest" and the unexpected signing of a "strategic alliance" agreement between the US and the Karzai regime. The transition from "strategic ally" to "frenemy" has been swifter than the Pakistani generals had bargained for.
It is still not too late for Pakistan's military establishment to cut its suit according to its cloth. It is not in anyone's interest for an undiluted Taliban government to rule from Kabul. Therefore, Pakistan's best option is to help secure a peaceful Afghanistan that is not "unfriendly" towards it. The notion of "strategic depth" against India has become timebarred. It is time to persuade the Taliban and the Haqqani network to come to the negotiating table with Kabul and Washington. Should they refuse, Pakistan's military will have to contend with a more rather than less Talibanised Pakistan in which the Afghan and Pakistani Taliban will make common cause more readily against Islamabad than against Kabul. Pakistan needs to be an integral part of the end-game in Afghanistan, not isolated and degraded like the Taliban.
Stable Kabul the only way out for Pakistan : Najam Sethi News - India Today
