terranMarine
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like i said Viets are superiority complex suffersViets kicked you back to China. Thís ís my answer.
South China Sea Forum
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terranMarine
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A list of 71 countries supporting China regarding the ruling
https://defence.pk/pdf/threads/who-supports-china-in-the-south-china-sea.441791/
https://defence.pk/pdf/threads/who-supports-china-in-the-south-china-sea.441791/
cochine
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terranMarine
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international law? 
samsara
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The list is meaningless. Here is rule of international law.
SUCH KANGAROO COURT was resolutely NOT recognized by China from the very beginning; thus not accepted, invalidated and NOT RELEVANT at all!
China said it very clearly to all concerned parties, any discussion on the South China Sea will never depart from this ruling!! Period.
This Kangaroo Court may rule "any thing" as long as some country is willing to pay the panel judges (last time the PHI govt under Aquino III just spent around US$30 million as the cost) but China will simply say "PISS OFF".
What do you want to do now? Crying foul aloud??? He he he
Last edited:
cochine
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Key points of arbitral tribunal’s verdict on PH-China dispute
By: Matikas Santos - NewsLab Lead / @MSantosINQ
INQUIRER.net / 05:34 PM July 12, 2016
Demonstrators, police, and media gather outside the Peace Palace in The Hague, Netherlands, on Tuesday, July 12, 2016, ahead of a ruling by the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA) on the dispute between China and the Philippines over the South China Sea. China has intensified the drumbeat of its opposition to an international tribunal’s ruling expected Tuesday that could threaten its expansive claims in the South China Sea. (AP Photo/Mike Corder)
The international Arbitral Tribunal on Tuesday issued its award on the arbitration case between Philippines and China over the West Philippine Sea (South China Sea) dispute.
BACKSTORY: Philippines wins arbitration case vs. China over South China Sea
In a 501-page award, the Tribunal decided in favor of the Philippines and said that China does not have historic rights to the South China Sea and that their “nine-dash line” claim has no legal basis.
READ: Key points of arbitral tribunal’s verdict on PH-China dispute
Below are five key points included in the summary statement released to the media
(1)Historic Rights and the ‘Nine-Dash Line’:
The Tribunal concluded that, to the extent China had historic rights to resources in the waters of the South China Sea, such rights were extinguished to the extent they were incompatible with the exclusive economic zones provided for in the Convention.
The Tribunal also noted that, although 2 Chinese navigators and fishermen, as well as those of other States, had historically made use of the islands in the South China Sea, there was no evidence that China had historically exercised exclusive control over the waters or their resources.
The Tribunal concluded that there was no legal basis for China to claim historic rights to resources within the sea areas falling within the ‘nine-dash line’.
(2)Status of Features:
The Tribunal noted that the reefs have been heavily modified by land reclamation and construction, recalled that the Convention classifies features on their natural condition, and relied on historical materials in evaluating the features.
The Tribunal found historical evidence to be more relevant and noted that the Spratly Islands were historically used by small groups of fishermen and that several Japanese fishing and guano mining enterprises were attempted.
The Tribunal concluded that such transient use does not constitute inhabitation by a stable community and that all of the historical economic activity had been extractive. Accordingly, the Tribunal concluded that none of the Spratly Islands is capable of generating extended maritime zones.
The Tribunal also held that the Spratly Islands cannot generate maritime zones collectively as a unit. Having found that none of the features claimed by China was capable of generating an exclusive economic zone, the Tribunal found that it could—without delimiting a boundary—declare that certain sea areas are within the exclusive economic zone of the Philippines, because those areas are not overlapped by any possible entitlement of China.
(3)Lawfulness of Chinese Actions:
Having found that certain areas are within the exclusive economic zone of the Philippines, the Tribunal found that China had violated the Philippines’ sovereign rights in its exclusive economic zone by (a) interfering with Philippine fishing and petroleum exploration, (b) constructing artificial islands and (c) failing to prevent Chinese fishermen from fishing in the zone.
The Tribunal also held that fishermen from the Philippines (like those from China) had traditional fishing rights at Scarborough Shoal and that China had interfered with these rights in restricting access.
The Tribunal further held that Chinese law enforcement vessels had unlawfully created a serious risk of collision when they physically obstructed Philippine vessels.
(4)Harm to Marine Environment:
The Tribunal considered the effect on the marine environment of China’s recent large-scale land reclamation and construction of artificial islands at seven features in the Spratly Islands and found that China had caused severe harm to the coral reef environment and violated its obligation to preserve and protect fragile ecosystems and the habitat of depleted, threatened, or endangered species.
The Tribunal also found that Chinese authorities were aware that Chinese fishermen have harvested endangered sea turtles, coral, and giant clams on a substantial scale in the South China Sea (using methods that inflict severe damage on the coral reef environment) and had not fulfilled their obligations to stop such activities
(5)Aggravation of Dispute:
Finally, the Tribunal considered whether China’s actions since the commencement of the arbitration had aggravated the dispute between the Parties.
The Tribunal found that it lacked jurisdiction to consider the implications of a stand-off between Philippine marines and Chinese naval and law enforcement vessels at Second Thomas Shoal, holding that this dispute involved military activities and was therefore excluded from compulsory settlement.
The Tribunal found, however, that China’s recent large-scale land reclamation and construction of artificial islands was incompatible with the obligations on a State during dispute resolution proceedings, insofar as China has inflicted irreparable harm to the marine environment, built a large artificial island in the Philippines’ exclusive economic zone, and destroyed evidence of the natural condition of features in the South China Sea that formed part of the Parties’ dispute.
BACKSTORY: #InquirerSeven FAQ about the Philippines vs. China arbitration case
The Convention
Under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) a coastal state needs to have land before they can claim rights to the sea. The international treaty has been signed and ratified by both the Philippines and China.
“You need to have land before you can have rights to the sea. It’s as simple as that.You cannot just have rights to the sea without owning land,” former Solicitor General Francis Jardeleza said in a forum at the University of the Philippines (UP) Law Center in 2014, citing the basic principle of UNCLOS.
China asserts it has “indisputable sovereignty” and “historic rights” to over two-thirds of the 3.5 million square kilometers South China Sea using its “nine-dash line” claim that overlaps with the UNCLOS-mandated 200-nautical-mile Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ).
The line, encircling an area roughly the size of Mexico, overlaps territories claimed by the Philippines, Vietnam, Malaysia, Brunei and Taiwan. China argues that its historic rights justify the line. But the Philippines insists that these rights cannot be used to define sea borders.
The Philippines says since the South China Sea is mostly sea, there is no land mass or clumps of islands and rocks there large enough to generate sea borders that will span the over 2 million square kilometers China is claiming with its nine-dash line.
In recent months, China has conducted massive land reclamation activities turning submerged reefs into artificial islands capable of hosting military equipment and structures.
Unclos, however, does not recognize artificial islands and states that these are not entitled to a 12 nautical mile territorial sea nor a 200 nm eez.
PHOTOS: China’s construction of military bases in Spratlys
Satellite image analysis South China Sea reclamation in Spratly Islands
/rga
Read more: http://globalnation.inquirer.net/14...ion-spratly-islands-scarborough#ixzz4c8TZZ1vL
Follow us: @inquirerdotnet on Twitter | inquirerdotnet on Facebook
By: Matikas Santos - NewsLab Lead / @MSantosINQ
INQUIRER.net / 05:34 PM July 12, 2016
Demonstrators, police, and media gather outside the Peace Palace in The Hague, Netherlands, on Tuesday, July 12, 2016, ahead of a ruling by the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA) on the dispute between China and the Philippines over the South China Sea. China has intensified the drumbeat of its opposition to an international tribunal’s ruling expected Tuesday that could threaten its expansive claims in the South China Sea. (AP Photo/Mike Corder)
The international Arbitral Tribunal on Tuesday issued its award on the arbitration case between Philippines and China over the West Philippine Sea (South China Sea) dispute.
BACKSTORY: Philippines wins arbitration case vs. China over South China Sea
In a 501-page award, the Tribunal decided in favor of the Philippines and said that China does not have historic rights to the South China Sea and that their “nine-dash line” claim has no legal basis.
READ: Key points of arbitral tribunal’s verdict on PH-China dispute
Below are five key points included in the summary statement released to the media
(1)Historic Rights and the ‘Nine-Dash Line’:
The Tribunal concluded that, to the extent China had historic rights to resources in the waters of the South China Sea, such rights were extinguished to the extent they were incompatible with the exclusive economic zones provided for in the Convention.
The Tribunal also noted that, although 2 Chinese navigators and fishermen, as well as those of other States, had historically made use of the islands in the South China Sea, there was no evidence that China had historically exercised exclusive control over the waters or their resources.
The Tribunal concluded that there was no legal basis for China to claim historic rights to resources within the sea areas falling within the ‘nine-dash line’.
(2)Status of Features:
The Tribunal noted that the reefs have been heavily modified by land reclamation and construction, recalled that the Convention classifies features on their natural condition, and relied on historical materials in evaluating the features.
The Tribunal found historical evidence to be more relevant and noted that the Spratly Islands were historically used by small groups of fishermen and that several Japanese fishing and guano mining enterprises were attempted.
The Tribunal concluded that such transient use does not constitute inhabitation by a stable community and that all of the historical economic activity had been extractive. Accordingly, the Tribunal concluded that none of the Spratly Islands is capable of generating extended maritime zones.
The Tribunal also held that the Spratly Islands cannot generate maritime zones collectively as a unit. Having found that none of the features claimed by China was capable of generating an exclusive economic zone, the Tribunal found that it could—without delimiting a boundary—declare that certain sea areas are within the exclusive economic zone of the Philippines, because those areas are not overlapped by any possible entitlement of China.
(3)Lawfulness of Chinese Actions:
Having found that certain areas are within the exclusive economic zone of the Philippines, the Tribunal found that China had violated the Philippines’ sovereign rights in its exclusive economic zone by (a) interfering with Philippine fishing and petroleum exploration, (b) constructing artificial islands and (c) failing to prevent Chinese fishermen from fishing in the zone.
The Tribunal also held that fishermen from the Philippines (like those from China) had traditional fishing rights at Scarborough Shoal and that China had interfered with these rights in restricting access.
The Tribunal further held that Chinese law enforcement vessels had unlawfully created a serious risk of collision when they physically obstructed Philippine vessels.
(4)Harm to Marine Environment:
The Tribunal considered the effect on the marine environment of China’s recent large-scale land reclamation and construction of artificial islands at seven features in the Spratly Islands and found that China had caused severe harm to the coral reef environment and violated its obligation to preserve and protect fragile ecosystems and the habitat of depleted, threatened, or endangered species.
The Tribunal also found that Chinese authorities were aware that Chinese fishermen have harvested endangered sea turtles, coral, and giant clams on a substantial scale in the South China Sea (using methods that inflict severe damage on the coral reef environment) and had not fulfilled their obligations to stop such activities
(5)Aggravation of Dispute:
Finally, the Tribunal considered whether China’s actions since the commencement of the arbitration had aggravated the dispute between the Parties.
The Tribunal found that it lacked jurisdiction to consider the implications of a stand-off between Philippine marines and Chinese naval and law enforcement vessels at Second Thomas Shoal, holding that this dispute involved military activities and was therefore excluded from compulsory settlement.
The Tribunal found, however, that China’s recent large-scale land reclamation and construction of artificial islands was incompatible with the obligations on a State during dispute resolution proceedings, insofar as China has inflicted irreparable harm to the marine environment, built a large artificial island in the Philippines’ exclusive economic zone, and destroyed evidence of the natural condition of features in the South China Sea that formed part of the Parties’ dispute.
BACKSTORY: #InquirerSeven FAQ about the Philippines vs. China arbitration case
The Convention
Under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) a coastal state needs to have land before they can claim rights to the sea. The international treaty has been signed and ratified by both the Philippines and China.
“You need to have land before you can have rights to the sea. It’s as simple as that.You cannot just have rights to the sea without owning land,” former Solicitor General Francis Jardeleza said in a forum at the University of the Philippines (UP) Law Center in 2014, citing the basic principle of UNCLOS.
China asserts it has “indisputable sovereignty” and “historic rights” to over two-thirds of the 3.5 million square kilometers South China Sea using its “nine-dash line” claim that overlaps with the UNCLOS-mandated 200-nautical-mile Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ).
The line, encircling an area roughly the size of Mexico, overlaps territories claimed by the Philippines, Vietnam, Malaysia, Brunei and Taiwan. China argues that its historic rights justify the line. But the Philippines insists that these rights cannot be used to define sea borders.
The Philippines says since the South China Sea is mostly sea, there is no land mass or clumps of islands and rocks there large enough to generate sea borders that will span the over 2 million square kilometers China is claiming with its nine-dash line.
In recent months, China has conducted massive land reclamation activities turning submerged reefs into artificial islands capable of hosting military equipment and structures.
Unclos, however, does not recognize artificial islands and states that these are not entitled to a 12 nautical mile territorial sea nor a 200 nm eez.
PHOTOS: China’s construction of military bases in Spratlys
Satellite image analysis South China Sea reclamation in Spratly Islands
/rga
Read more: http://globalnation.inquirer.net/14...ion-spratly-islands-scarborough#ixzz4c8TZZ1vL
Follow us: @inquirerdotnet on Twitter | inquirerdotnet on Facebook
SUCH KANGAROO COURT was resolutely NOT recognized by China from the very beginning; thus not accepted, invalidated and NOT RELEVANT at all!
China said it very clearly to all concerned parties, any discussion on the South China Sea will never depart from this ruling!! Period.
This Kangaroo Court may rule "any thing" as long as some country is willing to pay the panel judges (last time the PHI govt under Aquino III just spent around US$30 million as the cost) but China will simply say "PISS OFF".
What do you want to do now? Crying foul aloud??? He he he
Tom99
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From: http://globalnation.inquirer.net/141125/arbitral-court-not-a-un-agency
....
The PAC is not an UN agency.
If I hire a bunch of clowns to play judge and juries and rule you of a crime under Vietnamese laws in Vietnam, it doesn't make it legal, binding, or lawful.
terranMarine
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It has been said countless of times, the United Nations refused to accept that PCA has anything to do with the UN. This clown @kecho keeps talking lies, so it comes as no surprise no other nationals are voicing their support for PH. Heck China even got the support from 71 countries and said China was correct, only 1 hand was needed to count the number of countries who were supporting PH. Funny how a liar keeps calling Chinese people liars, the irony.....
samsara
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And the army of Fake News (TM) manufacturers do associate the PCA tribunal with the United Nations.
Since they are fake, no surprise they will fabricate info to prop their Fake News.
The folks like @kecho conveniently parrot the Fake News media to prop their stance!
The Hague's Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA) tribunal is NOT appointed by UN at all.
Not related to UN or International Court of Justice (ICJ).
Permanent Court of Arbitration - Wikipedia
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Permanent_Court_of_Arbitration
Arbitral court is NOT a UN agency!
The UNITED NATIONS said on Wednesday it has nothing to do with the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA), which set up a tribunal that handled the South China Sea arbitration case the Philippines filed unilaterally in 2013.
In a post on its Sina Weibo micro blog, the UN said the PCA is a “tenant” of the Peace Palace in The Hague, “but has nothing to do with the UN”.
The UN said the International Court of Justice, its principal judicial organ set up according to the Charter of the UN, is also located in the Peace Palace.
The construction of the palace was managed by the CARNEGIE FOUNDATION, which is still the building’s owner and manager, according to the Peace Palace website.
The UN said it makes an annual donation to the foundation for using the Peace Palace.
When asked about the Arbitral Tribunal’s case’s ruling on Tuesday, Stephane Dujarric, spokesman for UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon said “The UN doesn’t have a position on the legal and procedural merits” of the South China Sea arbitration case.
...
http://globalnation.inquirer.net/141125/arbitral-court-not-a-un-agency
The ruling of this tribunal is ILLEGAL in that it should not have taken place when the other party REFUSED a tribunal process, and when it's ruling VIOLATED the very terms of the UNCLOS that it claimed to be based on.
It ignored the fact that China had made DECLARATIONS (EXCEPTIONS) when she rectified the UNCLOS. Therefore, it's rulings is illegal when it contravened directly against UNCLOS.
China's Declarations to the UNCLOS
Declaration under article 298:
The Government of the People's Republic of China does not accept any of the procedures provided for in Section 2 of Part XV of the Convention with respect to all the categories of disputes referred to in paragraph 1 (a) (b) and (c) of Article 298 of the Convention.
"Article 298. Optional exceptions to applicability of section 2
"1. When signing, ratifying or acceding to this Convention or at any time thereafter, a State may, without prejudice to the obligations arising under section 1, declare in writing that it does not accept any one or more of the procedures provided for in section 2 with respect to one or more of the following categories of disputes:
(a)
(i) disputes concerning the interpretation or application of articles 15, 74 and 83 relating to sea boundary delimitations, or those involving historic bays or titles, provided that a State having made such a declaration shall, when such a dispute arises subsequent to the entry into force of this Convention and where no agreement within a reasonable period of time is reached in negotiations between the parties, at the request of any party to the dispute, accept submission of the matter to conciliation under Annex V, section 2; and provided further that any dispute that necessarily involves the concurrent consideration of any unsettled dispute concerning sovereignty or other rights over continental or insular land territory shall be excluded form such submission;
(ii) after the conciliation commission has presented its report, which shall state the reasons on which it is based, the parties shall negotiate an agreement on the basis of that report; if these negotiations do not result in an agreement, the parties shall, by mutual consent, submit the question to one of the procedures provided for in section 2, unless the parties otherwise agree;
(iii) this subparagraph does not apply to any sea boundary dispute finally settled by an arrangement between the parties, or to any such dispute which is to be settled in accordance with a bilateral or multilateral agreement binding upon those parties;
(b) disputes concerning military activities, including military activities by government vessels and aircraft engaged in non-commercial service, and disputes concerning law enforcement activities in regard to the exercise of sovereign rights or jurisdiction excluded from the jurisdiction of a court or tribunal under article 297, paragraph 2 or 3;
(c) disputes in respect of which the Security Council of the United Nations is exercising the functions assigned to it by the Charter of the United Nations, unless the Security Council decides to remove the matter from its agenda or calls upon the parties to settle it by the means provided for in this Convention."
Declarations or Statements upon UNCLOS ratification
http://www.un.org/depts/los/convention_agreements/convention_declarations.htm
And if one really cares to understand the real South China Sea issues beyond the rabid propaganda by Empire-controlled mainstream media (MSM) along with their mouthpieces:
This is the other Filipino voice that gives a better perspective behind what happened. All for the price of two old US coast guard vessels.
Filipino Perspective
The Philippine suit: A brilliant US machination? | The Manila Times Online
http://www.manilatimes.net/the-philippine-suit-a-brilliant-us-machination/273407/
Thinking Pinoy: South China Sea #CHexit decision explained in simple Taglish
http://www.thinkingpinoy.net/2016/07/south-china-sea-chexit-decision.html#/page/1
Thinking Pinoy: The South China Sea Decision and Perfecto Yasay's Face
http://www.thinkingpinoy.net/2016/07/south-china-sea-ITLOS-UNCLOS-Yasay-Face-chexit.html#/page/1
Suika
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Well, the link posted the list of countries and the map, but there was a whole article to it. Many of the countries that supported China did not support China fully but only in some respects. Here is the article.
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The South China Sea arbitration case has elicited almost unanimous public opposition in China. Besides this, it has been reported that 66 countries worldwide have endorsed China’s position on the South China Sea. Yet that figure also caused controversy, especially in the United States.
According to our team’s research, we have found at least 70 countries supporting China’s position on various occasions. We find that the reason for the controversy over the figure comes down to different definitions on “China’s position.” But no matter how it is defined, the psychology behind these statements is a desire to avoid taking sides between China and the United States, showing the reality of a fundamental global consensus on peace and wide-spread anxiety toward the potential for conflict in the South China Sea. Thus, we should take every opportunity to go beyond the “zero-sum game” in order to maintain peace in the South China Sea, to seek Asia-Pacific economic cooperation, and to make the “cake” bigger using economic and financial means.
How many countries support China’s South China Sea position?
There is no doubt that Chinese almost unanimously support their government’s official position on the South China Sea, shown by the firestorm of social media comments soon after the award. Moreover, China’s position is also welcomed and understood by other countries. According to the Chinese government and media, nearly 100 parties from more than 60 countries declared their support for China’s position on the South China Sea issue. China Daily counted 66 countries, as shown in the map below.
The figure, however, encountered doubts from American media and think tanks. The Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative argued that the real number was only ten. We personally also received emails expressing similar doubts.
Considering such a huge gap in the count, our research team at the international studies department of Chongyang Institute for Financial Studies, Renmin University of China (RDCY), sought to verify on our own by conducting an independent count. We explored the issue by extensively searching the internet, and then looked for original sources including media reports, official statements, diplomatic documents, and talking points. We also searched the Chinese foreign affairs database, Xinhua‘s news and multimedia database, and our news citation system with data from various sources such as Bloomberg and Reuters to verify.
Strikingly, we identified 70 countries that have expressed their support for China’s position, even more than reported by Chinese media. In addition, the League of Arab States and Shanghai Cooperation Organization are also in line with China. (We have listed the countries and sourced all of the statements, with the date of issue, in the appendix below). It is said some others privately expressed support to China according to our global network, but we only counted the countries that went on record. It is also possible that our team may have miss some countries that are supporting China.
Why is there such a big gap in the number？
One reason is quite obvious: some of these statements of support are not available in English. They are expressed and available in Chinese, French, Spanish, Arabic, Swahili, Khmer, or other languages. Therefore, some analysts in the English-speaking world may have merely failed to find them.
More importantly, though, the discrepancy has something to do with the essence of “China’s position.” Simply put, we suppose most American media and think tanks have not yet understood what “China’s position” means. In our view, China’s position on the South China Sea issue can be interpreted as below:
1. China does not participate in the arbitration, nor accept, recognize, or implement the award.
2. China will adhere to peaceful negotiations and settlements of the South China Sea dispute.
3. While disputes should be settled by the parties directly concerned in accordance with the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea (DOC), China will work with ASEAN countries to maintain peace and stability in this region.
4. The temporally-established (ad hoc) arbitral tribunal is neither a part of the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA) nor the International Court of Justice (ICJ). It does not have jurisdiction over the territorial disputes, which is the core of the arbitration. The arbitration itself is flawed in procedure. Thus, the award is not legally-binding, nor representing international law.
To directly support any of those components is to support China’s position. On the contrary, those countries that openly endorse the arbitral tribunal as affiliated to PCA and assert China should recognize and implement the award oppose China’s position.
In this regard, at least 70 countries, based on our research, endorse China’s position in various angles of the four components above, and they did so in various ways: unilaterally, bilaterally, or multilaterally. All of them welcome peaceful negotiations to settle the disputes. In addition, we should bear in mind that Philippines’ ex-parte arbitration violates its own commitment to peaceful dialogue and negotiation. Among these countries, some expressed their public and firm support for China’s stance of non-acceptance of the arbitration. Nonetheless, “non-acceptance” is only part of China’s position. American media and think tanks who use this alone for their counts misinterpreted the implication of China’s position.
Generally speaking, most countries’ attitudes toward the South China Sea issue can fall into three categories.
Counties in the first category, represented by Japan, oppose China’s position by supporting the Philippines’ stance while insisting China should recognize and implement the result of the arbitration, which is claimed to officially represent the PCA. This opinion is rare. China Daily mapped five in its report, but our team can only identify three: Japan, Australia, and the United States. Vietnam and the United Kingdom, though represented on the map, do not meet the definition of opposing China directly. In this circumstance, although Japan indeed raised the issue at the Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM) in Ulaanbaatar, it was echoed by no country except the Philippines itself, according to Japanese media such as Japan Today, The Japan Times, and The Japan News.
The second group includes countries that explicitly expressed their firm support to China on the arbitration, such as Pakistan, Cambodia, and some African countries. This group is bigger than the first one, but still limited. For example, in a public speech broadcast on TVK, Cambodia’s state-owned television network, on June 20, Prime Minister Hun Sen revealed diplomatic pressure over the South China Sea from “certain country outside the region” — widely believed to refer to Japan — and expressed his objection to the arbitration. In a press release found on the official website of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Pakistan on July 12, the Chinese neighbor reiterated its support for China on its statement of optional exception in light of Article 298 of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). Among African countries, Kenya issued a statement on June 15, also on its MFA website, declaring its respect for China’s right of optional exception under UNCLOS Article 298. Gambia, another coastal country in West Africa, has stated its support of China’s position on the arbitration by clearly saying the arbitral tribunal has no jurisdiction over delimitation in the South China Sea through the Gambia Radio and Television Service (GRTS).
Last, many countries, categorized as the third group, support China’s position in terms of resolving the disputes through consultations and negotiations while following the Declarations on the Conduct of Parties in South China Sea (DOC). Combining the second and the third groups, we have found 70 countries, with probably some still missing. Our global think tank network and foreign embassies in Beijing told us some other countries also hold similar attitudes, but have not openly expressed their position due to some “pressure.” We did not include them in our count.
Therefore, our key finding is that the claim by Chinese officials that at least 66 countries support China’s position is verified and solid; in fact, we found five more countries. Although the second and third groups as outlined above may have different stresses on China’s position, they all welcome at least one of the four components. Considering China’s official position on the peace negotiations, these two types of opinions acknowledge the path of peace talks.
Further, the fact that most countries do not show a hardline stance toward either China or the United States illustrates their anxiety about conflicts. This psychological factor is the fundamental issue behind the rally of support.
The Root Cause: Anxiety Over Conflict
In our opinion, the moderated stances of most countries can be explained by the global fundamental consensus over the South China Sea issue — a desire for peace. However, some people are worried about the possibility of an armed clash in the South China Sea and even the start of a “new Cold War” which may force countries to take sides between the United States and China. From this point of view, those who assert that only 10 countries support China not only too narrowly define “China’s position,” but also fail to fully recognize the nuance of other countries’ positions. Moreover, whether the count is 10 or 70, the real issues behind these statements are the global consensus on peace and worldwide anxieties or even fears of conflict — or worse, war.
In recent years, conflicts and turbulence have risen across the world. Thus, there are great anxieties about social unrest and mass violence; there are also anxieties about the distrust between major powers, which may very likely result in a new Cold War or even hot wars if badly managed.
East Asia has long been called “The Museum of Cold War,” where long-standing geopolitical and traditional security issues have not yet been settled and even have been heating up in recent years, especially after the “pivot to Asia” was introduced.
Recently, the South China Sea has been the focal point of Sino-U.S. relations. However, when it comes to the South China Sea issue, some countries find themselves trapped into a dilemma: not only do they worry about the loss of economic support from China, but also they are worried about the loss of security support from the United States. Moreover, some may worry that the regional organization they belong to will be split by the South China Sea issue.
Besides Cambodia mentioned above, Singapore and Thailand have also stated that they will not be involved in the disputes and called for peace. Further, ASEAN as a whole did not form a unanimous view after the arbitration, which shows even ASEAN countries try to avoid taking sides between the two giants.
A great portion of China’s support comes from African and Middle Eastern states that call for diplomatic negotiations rather than unilateral actions. This is not surprising given their collective history as colonies and the deteriorating security environment in these regions.
Extremism is on the rise while the South China Sea heats up. In one of our seminars in Washington D.C. recently, Professor Amitai Etzioni of George Washington University reminded us that the United States’ active response to terrorism and extremism in the Middle East and Africa will also guarantee its credibility among allies without taking on the risk of conflict with China; meanwhile, China has many common interests with the United States on anti-terrorism issues.
Take a look at the tragedy in Nice, think about the death toll in Kabul, let alone the long-lasting bloody turbulence in the Middle East, then you will probably agree with our conclusion: it is time for China and the United States to work together to address our common threats — terrorism and extremism — instead of focusing on the current zero-sum game in the South China Sea.
Beyond the Zero-Sum Game: Seek Asia-Pacific Cooperation
When former Chinese State Councilor Dai Bingguo famously said the arbitral award is nothing but “a piece of waste paper” in the U.S.-China Dialogue on the South China Sea held by our institute (RDCY) and the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, we have almost forgotten his key point is that we need a cooling down. Indeed, no matter how the public reacts to the arbitration, the “fusing point” — July 12 — has already passed; all parties are evaluating the next step in the game and restarting the long-term setup for the region. As we mentioned above, peace, the real and fundamental global consensus, remains there. Whether parties want it or not, the disputes will be settled in peace while regional cooperation will continue.
In fact, even in the Philippines there is an effort toward peace. Rodrigo Duterte, the new president, has shown a low-key, restrained, and cooperative attitude after the arbitration. It is reported that Fidel Ramos, a former Philippine president (and also the authors’ friend), will visit China as an envoy. All these efforts show that peace and stability remain the common interests of all parties of the South China Sea in the “post-arbitration” era.
This also goes for the United States. As Jeffery Bader of the Brookings Institution wrote in his recent “framework for U.S. policy toward China,” despite the disputes over the South China Sea issue, China is still a vital stakeholder in global governance and shares a lot of common interests with the United States. In particular, China is going to hold the G20 summit in Hangzhou — a chance for China to lead the global economy recovery cooperatively with other G20 members, including the United States. So why can’t the two cooperate on the South China Sea?
There have been good signs, in fact. Admiral John Richardson, the U.S. chief of naval operations (CNO) paid a successful visit to China on July 17-20, having a fruitful talk with his counterpart Adm. Wu Shengli. We hope this visit will serve as a new starting point for Sino-U.S. military exchanges after the arbitration.
Furthermore, cooperative governance is plausible in the South China Sea. As the authors said at the U.S.-China Dialogue, the most devastating threat to the fishermen in and around the South China Sea is not from China, nor from the United States, but from typhoons. In this regard, all parties, including China and the United States, can cooperate on issues such as meteorological stations, data sharing, typhoon early warning systems, and joint research on climate change. When it comes to hard military issues, the mechanism for Sino-U.S. cooperation already exists. China has taken part in the RIMPAC exercises twice now; in fact, as we wrote this piece, one Chinese fleet was exercising together with U.S. Navy around Hawaii. It is time to freeze tensions as well as activating the existing military exchanges.
We should also bring joint development and broader economic cooperation back to table. Recently, the Duterte government has expressed its will to cooperate with China in exploiting the resources of the South China Sea. The Philippines have some maritime area in the South China Sea that are not subject to sovereignty disputes, but does not have the technology and investment to benefit from them. Here China can do something for the Philippines. This prospect recalls the suggestion to shelve differences and seek joint development put forward by former Chinese leader Deng Xiaoping when meeting with a former Philippine leader.
Finally, as we wrote in our previous article, the South China Sea issue will not stop China-ASEAN economic and financial cooperation. The 21st Century Maritime Silk Road initiative and Mekong-Lancang Mechanism initiated by China are shaping more diversified development projects, and a more flexible and open win-win situation where all ASEAN countries can obtain the investments that they urgently need, including in the sectors of manufacturing, infrastructure, and what we call the “financial infrastructure.” Moreover, the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) is a financial institution with strong compatibility and feasibility. The Philippines joined the institution as a founding member; of course, Japan and the United States are welcome to join and benefit from AIIB as well.
To conclude, to avoid a war and to maintain peace in the South China Sea and the Asia-Pacific is the real and fundamental global consensus behind the divergent views on “China’s position.” To make a difference, China, the United States, and other countries should bring joint development back and focus more on possible cooperation areas from anti-terrorism to economic and financial ties, eventually leading the global economy out of its sluggish and uneven recovery.
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http://thediplomat.com/2016/07/who-supports-china-in-the-south-china-sea-and-why/
Probably the real reason why so many countries supported China in some form or another was just to get money out of China. All those countries in Africa.. do you think they really care about the South China Sea? Venezuela? They were a recipient of Chinese investments. But even Chinese investments didn't save their country from collapsing. The US and Japan openly opposed. Just those two count multiple times more than all those Africa countries. Australia came along with the US and Japan like a good ally. Not a single major European country supported China. They remained silent, they know what is economically good.
Additionally, in December 2016, the UK said they will sail their new carriers through the South China Sea. And they will fly Typhoons through the South China Sea in support of international law.
http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/art...ted-South-China-Sea-strength-aimed-China.html
And France is slowly coming in towards actual military relations with the US, Japan, and the UK in support of international law.
http://www.reuters.com/article/us-france-navy-china-idUSKBN16O0QK
Regardless of what color India is on that map, they support Vietnam in regards to the South China Sea, and China has expressed its dislike of it.
https://thewire.in/63957/india-and-vietnam-upgrade-to-comprehensive-strategic-partnership/
Vietnam of course maintains its claims in the South China Sea and has been improving the capabilities of their features in the Spratly islands.
I don't understand why China felt like having a party on their airbase on Fiery Cross Reef last year. Apparently they all actually thought that they were going to get away with it.
http://www.thenational.ae/world/eas...s-singers-to-assert-claims-in-south-china-sea
When it becomes May 2017, it'll be one year since they had that party, and JS Izumo will be sailing and practicing with the US Navy in the South China Sea. Maybe the Chinese will have another party for when JS Izumo comes, I don't know. Maybe they think 20 countries from Africa will bring whatever scrapes of naval forces to the South China Sea for joint training with the PLA Navy? Again, I don't know..
cochine
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The nature od this dispute is the invasion of China in to SCS islands and claim of China to the nine dashed line is illegal. China is member of SC of UN, China signed in to UNCLOS, China has to obey rules of international laws, there is better way for China's rising.
GS Zhou
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the living conditions on China's Xisha Island have improved a lot. A most recent news article said the self-sufficient ratio of vegetables supplies of the Xisha Islands reach 30% to 70%, depending on seasons.
TaiShang
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China broadcasts marine forecasts for three Nansha reefs
(Xinhua) 09:02, March 24, 2017
The Yongshu reef in the Nansha Islands [File photo: Xinhua]
China on Thursday started broadcasting marine forecasts for three reefs in the Nansha Islands via radio to the South China Sea region.
Based on the forecasting information provided by the State Oceanic Administration (SOA), the Guangzhou coastal radio station broadcasts forecasts for waves, tides, ocean temperatures, winds and tropical cyclones on the Yongshu, Meiji and Zhubi reefs, said Bai Yiping, deputy director of the SOA South China Sea forecast center.
The radio station broadcasts on 15 frequencies via single sideband radiotelephone, very high frequency radiotelephone and narrowband printing telegraph.
Forecasts for the marine conditions of the three reefs started on Jan. 1, with related information released via online platforms, fax and mobile text messages.
With the new radio broadcast channel, vessels and reef residents in the South China Sea will receive accurate information instantly to protect the safety of people's lives and assets, said Hong Sixiong, an official for South China Sea navigation.
***
China has been relentlessly working to improve the conditions in China's South China Sea islands.
(Xinhua) 09:02, March 24, 2017
The Yongshu reef in the Nansha Islands [File photo: Xinhua]
China on Thursday started broadcasting marine forecasts for three reefs in the Nansha Islands via radio to the South China Sea region.
Based on the forecasting information provided by the State Oceanic Administration (SOA), the Guangzhou coastal radio station broadcasts forecasts for waves, tides, ocean temperatures, winds and tropical cyclones on the Yongshu, Meiji and Zhubi reefs, said Bai Yiping, deputy director of the SOA South China Sea forecast center.
The radio station broadcasts on 15 frequencies via single sideband radiotelephone, very high frequency radiotelephone and narrowband printing telegraph.
Forecasts for the marine conditions of the three reefs started on Jan. 1, with related information released via online platforms, fax and mobile text messages.
With the new radio broadcast channel, vessels and reef residents in the South China Sea will receive accurate information instantly to protect the safety of people's lives and assets, said Hong Sixiong, an official for South China Sea navigation.
***
China has been relentlessly working to improve the conditions in China's South China Sea islands.
GS Zhou
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it is not a good habit to call others islands as yours. I'll never call your house in any Vietnam city as my house.
If you strongly believe Xisha Islands belongs to Vietnam, write an email to VCP and request them to declare a war on China.
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Job offerings from China's Xisha Islands! The jobs are all relevant to infrastructures building on these Islands. And the payment is not bad!!
- Senior engineer: RMB 13,000 / month
- Middle-level engineer: RMB 11,000 / month
- Junior engineer: RMB 6,000 / month
- The above mentioned payment does NOT include the additional incentives for working on these islands.
(FYI: 1 USD = 6.9 RMB)
1.项目工程师岗薪酬：高级工程师13000元/人/月，试用期3个月，试用期间按照80%发放；中级工程师11000元/人/月，试用期3个月，试用期间按照80%发放；
2.助理工程师岗薪酬：助理工程师6000元/人/月，试用期3个月，试用期间按照80%发放；
3.项目财务岗薪酬：5000元/人/月，试用期3个月，试用期内按照80%发放；
4.驻岛补贴按照三沙市驻岛补助标准发放。
三沙市永乐管委会临时法人项目办公室招聘启示
时间：2017-02-23 来源：市新闻中心 作者： 字号：大 中
根据二届1次市政府常务会议精神及省委第四巡视组巡视整改意见，参照《海南省事业单位公开招聘人员实施办法》（琼人社发〔2011〕100号）精神，拟招聘项目办技术人员7名（编外人员），结合我市实际，制订此招聘程序。
一、工作职责
三沙市永乐群岛管理委员会项目办公室负责永乐群岛各岛礁相关项目的前期工作、施工建设、竣工验收及有关协调、文秘、财务等日常管理工作。
二、招聘原则和组织形式
招聘工作坚持德才兼备的用人标准和公开、平等、竞争、择优的原则，由用人单位具体组织实施，在用人单位上级人事部门的指导和纪检部门的全程监督下完成本次招聘工作。
三、招聘岗位人数、工作地点及服务期限
1.招聘岗位及人数：项目办技术人员需按本程序进行招聘筛选。本次招聘项目工程师岗1名、助理工程师岗4名、项目财务岗1名；
2.工作地点：三沙市永乐群岛；
3.服务期限：1年（期满考核合格可续签）
四、招聘对象和范围
面向全国招聘具有相关岗位条件要求的人员。报考者必须在报名时提供岗位要求的岗位资格证书。
五、招聘基本条件
（一）报考者应同时具备的条件
1、具有中华人民共和国国籍；
2、遵守国家法律、法规，无违法、违纪行为；
3、具有良好的品行和职业道德；
4、身体健康，不晕船，适应岛礁工作、生活，具有正常履行岗位职责的身体条件；
5、在编在岗人员，须征得工作单位同意；
6、应聘人员须签订保密协议；
（二）有下列情况之一者，不得报考
1、曾受过各类刑事处罚的；
2、曾被开除公职的；
3、有违法、违纪行为正在接受审查的；
4、尚未解除党纪、政纪处分的；
5、违反有关规定不适宜报考的。
六、岗位薪酬及待遇参考（具体根据工作能力和业绩为主）
1.项目工程师岗薪酬：高级工程师13000元/人/月，试用期3个月，试用期间按照80%发放；中级工程师11000元/人/月，试用期3个月，试用期间按照80%发放；
2.助理工程师岗薪酬：助理工程师6000元/人/月，试用期3个月，试用期间按照80%发放；
3.项目财务岗薪酬：5000元/人/月，试用期3个月，试用期内按照80%发放；
4.驻岛补贴按照三沙市驻岛补助标准发放。
七、招聘程序
事业单位公开招聘人员工作按照发布招聘信息、报名、资格审查、领取准考证、笔试、面试、考察、体检、公示、聘用等程序组织实施。
1.报名方式：采取网络报名或现场报名方式，应聘者只能选择一种报名方式，不得多头报名。一是现场报名需填写报名登记表；二是网络报名需下载报名登记表（附件1），并填写后发送邮件至邮箱gygbca@163.com。邮件标题为“应聘岗位+姓名”。
2.现场报名时间：2017年3月8日至2017年3月15日止（早上8：00-12:00、下午14:30-17:30）
现场报名地点：海口市龙华区坡巷路（黎隆假日酒店4楼407）
3.网络报名时间：2017年3月8日至12日止
网络报名邮箱：gygbca@163.com。
4.报名要求：考生需携带户口薄、第二代身份证、学历证书及相应岗位要求提供的其他证书（以上证件均要求同时提供原件和复印件,原件审核后当场退回），近期2寸免冠照片4张，到报名点领取报名表。网络报名的将以上资料上传并压缩后发送到指定报名邮箱;每位报考人员只能填报一个招聘岗位，多报无效;委培、定向、及在编在岗人员，须征得原委培、定向单位、工作单位同意，提交原单位同意报名和流动的意见书。
5.报名注意事项
资格审查工作贯穿于公开招聘的全过程，应聘者报名登记表所填写内容及提交的材料必须真实、准确，凡发现报考者与报名资格条件不符以及提供虚假材料的，随时取消考试、录用资格。报名材料不退还。
（一）组织考试
考试包括笔试和面试，笔试和面试满分均为100分。经初步筛选后，各岗位招聘人数和报名人数应达到1：3的比例方可进行笔试，未达到招聘比例的，可适当减少招聘人数。根据笔试情况和岗位报考情况，划定笔试合格分数线。通过资格审查，符合考试条件的人员凭本人居民身份证到现场报名地址领取准考证。
1、笔试时间：2017年3月16日（具体时间、地点以准考证为准）；
2、笔试内容：笔试采取闭卷方式进行,内容为公文写作和相关专业知识组成。(公文写作占笔试总成绩40%；相关专业知识占笔试总成绩的60%)。笔试成绩按照“四舍五入法”，综合成绩折算精确到小数点后两位，通过三沙市政府网公布。
3、面试：在笔试合格分数线上，各岗位按1：3的比例从高到低确定面试对象，最低不低于1：2的比例。达不到面试比例的岗位，按实际合格人数确定面试人员，并适当减少招聘人数，择优录取。面试内容为专业基础知识、综合分析、人际关系协调、语言表达能力等。面试合格分数线为60分。面试人员凭笔试使用的准考证和身份证进入考场，准时参加考试，逾期未到，视为自动放弃面试资格。面试成绩按照“四舍五入法”，综合成绩折算精确到小数点后两位。
4、面试结束后，按笔试成绩的40%和面试成绩60%综合计算考试总成绩。综合成绩在市政府网进行公布。
（二）考察、体检
根据综合成绩，按各岗位拟招聘人数1：1的比例确定考察人选，招聘工作领导小组组成考察组到原用人单位对拟录用人员在综合工作能力、思想政治表现、道德品质等方面进行综合考察。根据考察情况确定体检人选，体检标准参照公务员录用标准执行。考察、体检不合格的，取消拟聘人选资格，空缺的招聘名额，可从报考同一岗位考试成绩在合格分数线以上人员中从高分到低分依次递补。
（三）录用
根据考试、考察、体检结果确定拟录用人员，并在市政府网公示，公示时间七个工作日。公示期满，没有问题或者反映的问题不影响聘用的，确定拟聘用人员，办理聘用手续。
（四）聘用
聘用：1.应聘者报考被录用，与项目办直接签订劳务合同；试用期3个月包括在劳动合同期限内，试用期考核不合格的，解除劳动用工关系。
八、纪律要求
公开招聘工作严格执行《海南省事业单位公开招聘人员实施办法》（琼人社发〔2011〕100号）的各项纪律规定，严格执行公开招聘工作人员实施招聘；公开招聘工作接受同级人力资源和社会保障部门、纪检部门指导和监督，自觉接受群众监督。
九、其他事项
本招聘方案由永乐群岛管理委员会项目办公室负责解释。
附件1：职责岗位表
附件2：三沙市项目办公开招聘人员报名登记表
联系人：13876652998
联系电话：0898-66811961 传真：0898-66811961
三沙市纪检监督电话：66775197
Last edited:
samsara
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Why Trump Should Avoid a Showdown in the South China Sea
By Mark J. Valencia - The National Interest, March 20, 2017
There has been a spate of recent proposals for aggressive U.S. military action challenging China’s claims and actions in the South China Sea. A prime example is “Standing Up to China Is Not Extremism—It’s Smart Foreign Policy,” by James Holmes and Toshi Yoshihara.
Professor James Holmes and Professor Toshi Yoshihara, both are the former lecturers at the Naval War College (NWC)
According to Holmes and Yoshihara, the new administration “must relearn the art of deterrence, and to deter Chinese aggression the administration must accept that hazards come with the territory.” For them, such deterrence “involves fielding military power sufficient to make good on the threat, whether the requisite capabilities be nuclear or conventional. And it involves convincing the antagonist we’re resolute about making good on our threats.”
They then go on to argue that time-worn canard: that all the United States wants is to preserve the “freedom of the sea.” But China argues that it is not challenging U.S. freedom of navigation itself but U.S. abuse of this right in its exclusive economic zones. The activities of the United States’ intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance assets include active “tickling” of China’s coastal defenses to provoke and observe a response, interference with shore-to-ship and submarine communications, “preparation of the battlefield” using legal subterfuge to evade the scientific research consent regime and tracking of China’s new nuclear submarines for potential targeting as they enter and exit Yulin Naval Base. In China’s view, these are not passive intelligence-collection activities commonly undertaken and tolerated by most states, nor are they uses of the ocean for peaceful purposes, as required by United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). Instead, they are intrusive and controversial practices that China regards as a threat of use of force.
What Holmes and Yoshihara neglect to mention is that because the convention was a “package deal,” non-ratifiers like the United States cannot credibly or legitimately pick and choose which UNCLOS provisions they wish to abide by, deem them customary law and unilaterally interpret and enforce them to their benefit. This is especially true regarding the exclusive economic zones regime, which the convention introduces as sui generis and which does have some freedom-of-navigation restrictions. This includes the duty to pay “due regard” to the rights of the coastal state, including its marine scientific research consent and environmental-protection regimes. Clearly, China and the United States disagree on the meaning of key terms in UNCLOS relevant to the freedom of navigation, which are not defined in the convention. These terms include “other internationally lawful uses of the sea,” “abuse of rights,” ”due regard,” “peaceful use/purpose” and “marine scientific research.”
According to Holmes and Yoshihara, “Statesmen of yore made Moscow a believer in American power and resolve—and largely held the line against communism.” Really? Well, whether or not this assertion is valid, it certainly reveals the nostalgic mindset of the authors. The Cold War between the United States and the Soviet Union is over. We are now in the twenty-first century and experiencing the vagaries and complexities of an increasingly multipolar world in which U.S. soft and hard power have relatively declined. It seems Holmes and Yoshihara have some waking up and catching up to do.
Holmes and Yoshihara warn: “If Beijing and Washington want nonnegotiable things a lot, then the Trump administration must gird itself for a long standoff.” But the authors are not advocating a standoff. Instead, they argue for risk-taking in the form of military confrontation. Indeed, they are proposing actions that will likely lead to conflict and even war. But risk-taking—if necessary—can be in many forms and spheres, including in the economic and political/diplomatic spheres, not solely in the military sphere.
The events of the past few months have already caused serious damage to the U.S.-China relationship as well as prospects for security and stability in the region. Whatever trust existed between China and the United States has been eroded. Now, there is a lack of clarity regarding U.S. policy towards China. China’s President Xi Jinping is coming up for “reappointment” in October 2017. He is likely to be especially inflexible on these issues in order to ward off criticism from hard-liners. Already the Chinese military is calling for China to “be prepared to throw punches” regarding increasing U.S. intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance probes from the sea. Certainly, internal political developments in China “cannot form the basis of US foreign policy,” but they should be a factor in the choice of timing and tactics. In this political environment, following Holmes and Yoshihara’s advice would likely lead to political and even military disaster.
What worries me most—and should worry others about this and similar proposals—is that Holmes and Yoshihara are essentially calling for military confrontation and, if necessary, war, even nuclear war. Following their advice would not only threaten the security of the United States and Japan—but that of the entire region and beyond.
Look at some interesting educated comments posted at the article link:
http://nationalinterest.org/blog/why-trump-should-avoid-showdown-the-south-china-sea-19834?page=show
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
SEE: Authors Explore the Growing Sea Power of China (2011)
By Mark J. Valencia - The National Interest, March 20, 2017
There has been a spate of recent proposals for aggressive U.S. military action challenging China’s claims and actions in the South China Sea. A prime example is “Standing Up to China Is Not Extremism—It’s Smart Foreign Policy,” by James Holmes and Toshi Yoshihara.
Professor James Holmes and Professor Toshi Yoshihara, both are the former lecturers at the Naval War College (NWC)
According to Holmes and Yoshihara, the new administration “must relearn the art of deterrence, and to deter Chinese aggression the administration must accept that hazards come with the territory.” For them, such deterrence “involves fielding military power sufficient to make good on the threat, whether the requisite capabilities be nuclear or conventional. And it involves convincing the antagonist we’re resolute about making good on our threats.”
They then go on to argue that time-worn canard: that all the United States wants is to preserve the “freedom of the sea.” But China argues that it is not challenging U.S. freedom of navigation itself but U.S. abuse of this right in its exclusive economic zones. The activities of the United States’ intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance assets include active “tickling” of China’s coastal defenses to provoke and observe a response, interference with shore-to-ship and submarine communications, “preparation of the battlefield” using legal subterfuge to evade the scientific research consent regime and tracking of China’s new nuclear submarines for potential targeting as they enter and exit Yulin Naval Base. In China’s view, these are not passive intelligence-collection activities commonly undertaken and tolerated by most states, nor are they uses of the ocean for peaceful purposes, as required by United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). Instead, they are intrusive and controversial practices that China regards as a threat of use of force.
What Holmes and Yoshihara neglect to mention is that because the convention was a “package deal,” non-ratifiers like the United States cannot credibly or legitimately pick and choose which UNCLOS provisions they wish to abide by, deem them customary law and unilaterally interpret and enforce them to their benefit. This is especially true regarding the exclusive economic zones regime, which the convention introduces as sui generis and which does have some freedom-of-navigation restrictions. This includes the duty to pay “due regard” to the rights of the coastal state, including its marine scientific research consent and environmental-protection regimes. Clearly, China and the United States disagree on the meaning of key terms in UNCLOS relevant to the freedom of navigation, which are not defined in the convention. These terms include “other internationally lawful uses of the sea,” “abuse of rights,” ”due regard,” “peaceful use/purpose” and “marine scientific research.”
According to Holmes and Yoshihara, “Statesmen of yore made Moscow a believer in American power and resolve—and largely held the line against communism.” Really? Well, whether or not this assertion is valid, it certainly reveals the nostalgic mindset of the authors. The Cold War between the United States and the Soviet Union is over. We are now in the twenty-first century and experiencing the vagaries and complexities of an increasingly multipolar world in which U.S. soft and hard power have relatively declined. It seems Holmes and Yoshihara have some waking up and catching up to do.
Holmes and Yoshihara warn: “If Beijing and Washington want nonnegotiable things a lot, then the Trump administration must gird itself for a long standoff.” But the authors are not advocating a standoff. Instead, they argue for risk-taking in the form of military confrontation. Indeed, they are proposing actions that will likely lead to conflict and even war. But risk-taking—if necessary—can be in many forms and spheres, including in the economic and political/diplomatic spheres, not solely in the military sphere.
The events of the past few months have already caused serious damage to the U.S.-China relationship as well as prospects for security and stability in the region. Whatever trust existed between China and the United States has been eroded. Now, there is a lack of clarity regarding U.S. policy towards China. China’s President Xi Jinping is coming up for “reappointment” in October 2017. He is likely to be especially inflexible on these issues in order to ward off criticism from hard-liners. Already the Chinese military is calling for China to “be prepared to throw punches” regarding increasing U.S. intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance probes from the sea. Certainly, internal political developments in China “cannot form the basis of US foreign policy,” but they should be a factor in the choice of timing and tactics. In this political environment, following Holmes and Yoshihara’s advice would likely lead to political and even military disaster.
What worries me most—and should worry others about this and similar proposals—is that Holmes and Yoshihara are essentially calling for military confrontation and, if necessary, war, even nuclear war. Following their advice would not only threaten the security of the United States and Japan—but that of the entire region and beyond.
Look at some interesting educated comments posted at the article link:
http://nationalinterest.org/blog/why-trump-should-avoid-showdown-the-south-china-sea-19834?page=show
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SEE: Authors Explore the Growing Sea Power of China (2011)
