BoQ77
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Why you don't print this and bring it to Tiananmen Square ?
South China Sea Forum
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Why you don't print this and bring it to Tiananmen Square ?
Pangu
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Avoid Confrontaiton in the South China Sea
Tom Mockaitis - International security analyst/military historian. Prof. of History, DePaul University, teaches counter- terrorism courses around the world.
The commander of U.S. forces in the Pacific recently told the Senate Armed Services Committee that China is "militarizing the South China Sea." Coming just after the Pentagon learned that the Peoples Republic has deployed antiaircraft missiles to the disputed Parcel islands, the accusation is but the latest development in a crisis that has been unfolding over the past several years.
Unfortunately, the U.S. has few options to counter Chinese moves in the region. It must not provoke a military confrontation with Beijing. A large buildup of U.S. forces would only encourage Chinese counter measures and could lead to an expensive and futile arms race.
China has long claimed most of the South China Sea as its territorial waters, defying both international law and the claims of other littoral countries. It has clashed with Vietnam over the Parcel and Spratly Islands and had diplomatic rows with the Philippines and Malaysia. The value of the waters as a fishery and the prospect of gas and oil reserves beneath the seabed have made the dispute more important.
That an emerging super-power would assert control over its near abroad should come as no surprise. The U.S. did precisely the same thing in the Caribbean a century ago. After the Panama Canal opened in 1914, Washington viewed the Sea as an American lake. During the interwar period, the Marines intervened in Haiti, the Dominican Republic and Nicaragua.
After WWII, the U.S. supported a coup to oust the President of Guatemala, forced the Soviet Union to remove its missiles from Cuba, and backed the Salvadoran government against Communist insurgents. This history makes it difficult for Washington to be too critical of Beijing's assertiveness in the South China Sea, no matter how objectionable such action may be.
How then should the U.S. respond? The much-vaunted "re balancing" of U.S. forces to Asia has been limited by the conflict in the Middle East and the resurgence of Russia. Deploying more naval and air assets to the region would, in any case, have limited effect. The U.S. will not go to war over the South China Sea, and China knows it. That realization reduces the credibility of any American military moves.
Beijing is developing anti-ship missile with the American Navy in mind. Such a weapon could neutralize U.S. carrier battle groups. Trying to outmatch China in its own backyard will not work. Attempting to do so would merely add to rising defense costs.
The U.S. does, of course, need to reassure its allies that it will protect them against direct aggression. That reassurance requires some bolstering of its forces in the region, but Washington should tread lightly. De-escalation coupled with joint diplomatic efforts by littoral nations with American support might be the wisest course of action.
Avoid Confrontaiton in the South China Sea
Tom Mockaitis - International security analyst/military historian. Prof. of History, DePaul University, teaches counter- terrorism courses around the world.
The commander of U.S. forces in the Pacific recently told the Senate Armed Services Committee that China is "militarizing the South China Sea." Coming just after the Pentagon learned that the Peoples Republic has deployed antiaircraft missiles to the disputed Parcel islands, the accusation is but the latest development in a crisis that has been unfolding over the past several years.
Unfortunately, the U.S. has few options to counter Chinese moves in the region. It must not provoke a military confrontation with Beijing. A large buildup of U.S. forces would only encourage Chinese counter measures and could lead to an expensive and futile arms race.
China has long claimed most of the South China Sea as its territorial waters, defying both international law and the claims of other littoral countries. It has clashed with Vietnam over the Parcel and Spratly Islands and had diplomatic rows with the Philippines and Malaysia. The value of the waters as a fishery and the prospect of gas and oil reserves beneath the seabed have made the dispute more important.
That an emerging super-power would assert control over its near abroad should come as no surprise. The U.S. did precisely the same thing in the Caribbean a century ago. After the Panama Canal opened in 1914, Washington viewed the Sea as an American lake. During the interwar period, the Marines intervened in Haiti, the Dominican Republic and Nicaragua.
After WWII, the U.S. supported a coup to oust the President of Guatemala, forced the Soviet Union to remove its missiles from Cuba, and backed the Salvadoran government against Communist insurgents. This history makes it difficult for Washington to be too critical of Beijing's assertiveness in the South China Sea, no matter how objectionable such action may be.
How then should the U.S. respond? The much-vaunted "re balancing" of U.S. forces to Asia has been limited by the conflict in the Middle East and the resurgence of Russia. Deploying more naval and air assets to the region would, in any case, have limited effect. The U.S. will not go to war over the South China Sea, and China knows it. That realization reduces the credibility of any American military moves.
Beijing is developing anti-ship missile with the American Navy in mind. Such a weapon could neutralize U.S. carrier battle groups. Trying to outmatch China in its own backyard will not work. Attempting to do so would merely add to rising defense costs.
The U.S. does, of course, need to reassure its allies that it will protect them against direct aggression. That reassurance requires some bolstering of its forces in the region, but Washington should tread lightly. De-escalation coupled with joint diplomatic efforts by littoral nations with American support might be the wisest course of action.
Avoid Confrontaiton in the South China Sea
sicsheep
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because then all the vietnamese cant see it.
sicsheep
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"We will fly, sail and operate wherever international law permits, and that includes flying over that airspace" is roughly what we hear over and over again when U.S. defense—and now President Obama—refer to American actions in the South China Sea. The challenge, of course, is that China might not care—and that’s a huge problem—and if they’re smart, they shouldn’t care. Call it the “Keep Calm, and Build on Doctrine.”
By now, at least in my humble opinion, a dangerous pattern has emerged that should have Washington and its allies quite worried when it comes to this important body of water that saw over $5 trillion of sea-borne trade pass through its shipping lanes—$1 trillion of which was U.S. goods. It goes a little something like this: the U.S. Navy conducts a FONOP or flies over newly built islands in the South China Sea in some public way, making sure it has on record that America will not stand for any attempts by China to challenge freedom of navigation in or control of international airspace above the South China Sea. However, as Dean Cheng recently pointed out, such FONOPs don’t “address the larger point that China seeks to establish new precedents, by building entire islands atop reefs and then claiming territorial sea and exclusive economic zones around them.”
Indeed, moving the above one step further, Beijing is taking advantage of a key flaw in U.S. strategy. As Washington defends the time-tested international principle of freedom of the seas and, in many respects, airspace—centuries old U.S. policy since the founding of the republic—the Obama Administration is not pushing back against China’s quest both to become the dominant power and to essentially take ownership of the South China Sea. While fighting for freedom of navigation might look like pushing back against Chinese coercion in the South China Sea to the untrained eye it is clearly not the same thing. Digging a little deeper, as Julian Ky noted earlier in the month, “the avowed legal purpose of these U.S. FONOPs is to win acquiescence for the U.S. (and majority) view of international law that innocent passage of military ships does not require prior permission,” not to directly challenge China’s goal of hegemony in the South China Sea. He goes on, correctly pointing out, “the sub silentio strategic goal of these FONOPs is to isolate China from its regional neighbors”—a worthy goal, but clearly not working if ASEAN states won’t even sign on to China being mentioned in a joint statement when President Obama hosted the group this week in California.
So, now that we have the backstory of this drama out of the way—and we know Washington is not actively trying to halt Chinese dominance in the South China Sea, just narrowly defend Freedom of Navigation—what, then, does China do when a FONOP occurs? Complain loudly. . . but carry on and build up.
And it's what is involved in that “carry on” that matters a great deal. Beijing, presses ahead with militarizing its newly built islands, testing aircraft off newly build runways, deploying more and more non-naval maritime assets, putting the finishing touches on new harbors while declaring loudly and proudly in various formats and ways that the South China Sea is Chinese territory—and its actions show it is serious about enforcing such claims. The recent deployment of the HQ-9 air-defense system is proof positive of such actions.
So what is America to do? In this case, what America should do—continue FONOP operations but quickly develop a strategy to ensure China pays a price for its coercive actions in South China—is what America will not and cannot do. Considering the challenge of ISIS, Russian moves in Syria and Ukraine, a Presidential election and now a budding war over the future of the Supreme Court there is clearly no political bandwidth left in the waning days of this administration to take on another foreign policy challenge—music to China’s ears. In fact, if Beijing was smart, the time to reinforce its claims is now, especially before a more assertive administration comes into office. In fact, that might be what we are already seeing in China’s recent behavior.
My prediction for the next few months: America keeps sailing, China keeps protesting—and Beijing builds on.
My prediction for one year from now: a Chinese Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ) in the South China Sea.
Harry Kazianis (@grecianformula) is the former Executive Editor of The National Interest. Kazianis presently serves as Senior Fellow (non-resident) for Defense Policy at theCenter for the National Interest as well as Fellow for National Security Affairs atThe Potomac Foundation. He is the editor and co-author of the Center for the National Interest reportTackling Asia’s Greatest Challenges: A U.S.-Japan-Vietnam Trilateral Report. All opinions are his own.
China's Genius Strategy in the South China Sea: Keep Calm, and Build On | The National Interest Blog
By now, at least in my humble opinion, a dangerous pattern has emerged that should have Washington and its allies quite worried when it comes to this important body of water that saw over $5 trillion of sea-borne trade pass through its shipping lanes—$1 trillion of which was U.S. goods. It goes a little something like this: the U.S. Navy conducts a FONOP or flies over newly built islands in the South China Sea in some public way, making sure it has on record that America will not stand for any attempts by China to challenge freedom of navigation in or control of international airspace above the South China Sea. However, as Dean Cheng recently pointed out, such FONOPs don’t “address the larger point that China seeks to establish new precedents, by building entire islands atop reefs and then claiming territorial sea and exclusive economic zones around them.”
Indeed, moving the above one step further, Beijing is taking advantage of a key flaw in U.S. strategy. As Washington defends the time-tested international principle of freedom of the seas and, in many respects, airspace—centuries old U.S. policy since the founding of the republic—the Obama Administration is not pushing back against China’s quest both to become the dominant power and to essentially take ownership of the South China Sea. While fighting for freedom of navigation might look like pushing back against Chinese coercion in the South China Sea to the untrained eye it is clearly not the same thing. Digging a little deeper, as Julian Ky noted earlier in the month, “the avowed legal purpose of these U.S. FONOPs is to win acquiescence for the U.S. (and majority) view of international law that innocent passage of military ships does not require prior permission,” not to directly challenge China’s goal of hegemony in the South China Sea. He goes on, correctly pointing out, “the sub silentio strategic goal of these FONOPs is to isolate China from its regional neighbors”—a worthy goal, but clearly not working if ASEAN states won’t even sign on to China being mentioned in a joint statement when President Obama hosted the group this week in California.
So, now that we have the backstory of this drama out of the way—and we know Washington is not actively trying to halt Chinese dominance in the South China Sea, just narrowly defend Freedom of Navigation—what, then, does China do when a FONOP occurs? Complain loudly. . . but carry on and build up.
And it's what is involved in that “carry on” that matters a great deal. Beijing, presses ahead with militarizing its newly built islands, testing aircraft off newly build runways, deploying more and more non-naval maritime assets, putting the finishing touches on new harbors while declaring loudly and proudly in various formats and ways that the South China Sea is Chinese territory—and its actions show it is serious about enforcing such claims. The recent deployment of the HQ-9 air-defense system is proof positive of such actions.
So what is America to do? In this case, what America should do—continue FONOP operations but quickly develop a strategy to ensure China pays a price for its coercive actions in South China—is what America will not and cannot do. Considering the challenge of ISIS, Russian moves in Syria and Ukraine, a Presidential election and now a budding war over the future of the Supreme Court there is clearly no political bandwidth left in the waning days of this administration to take on another foreign policy challenge—music to China’s ears. In fact, if Beijing was smart, the time to reinforce its claims is now, especially before a more assertive administration comes into office. In fact, that might be what we are already seeing in China’s recent behavior.
My prediction for the next few months: America keeps sailing, China keeps protesting—and Beijing builds on.
My prediction for one year from now: a Chinese Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ) in the South China Sea.
Harry Kazianis (@grecianformula) is the former Executive Editor of The National Interest. Kazianis presently serves as Senior Fellow (non-resident) for Defense Policy at theCenter for the National Interest as well as Fellow for National Security Affairs atThe Potomac Foundation. He is the editor and co-author of the Center for the National Interest reportTackling Asia’s Greatest Challenges: A U.S.-Japan-Vietnam Trilateral Report. All opinions are his own.
China's Genius Strategy in the South China Sea: Keep Calm, and Build On | The National Interest Blog
BoQ77
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I wish the China dash line could be defined as simple as your post "entire SCS is almost all international water"
but China still struggle to make such a definition.
dichoi
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.FEATURED | US and China are they Trapped in Thucydides? by Ipshita Bhattacharya
IndraStra Global 7/16/2015 11:06:00 AM
By Ipshita Bhattacharya
The Thucydides Trap Theory primarily talks about the fear, threats and suspicions resulting in the Peloponnesian war (431-404 B.C.) between two great empires of Athens and Peloponnesian league led by Sparta. This echo from history has a significant meaning in today’s world order too. Which says that the important components to trigger war are fear, suspicion and threat; this article will therefore critically explore the potential factors of fear, suspicion and threats between United States and China. Obstacles and opportunities plays a very important role in ruining and building relationship between two Nations, where obstacles defines the fear, suspicions, and threats and opportunities defines the confidence building measures. China and USA at present are thriving on conditional relations with lots of unresolved issues at their backyard like cyber security, South China Sea, membership friction over China’s Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank etc, along with their institutional differences. This article will focus mainly on China’s engineering prowess in the South China Sea (SCS) and the fear factor behind her actions. As the old adage goes that the best defense is a good offense pertaining to which China is projecting military power and territorial claims in SCS. Beijing’s aggressive naval policy is a strategic defence mechanism arising out of fear, suspicion and threat from Washington’s involvement in the region. Since, therefore, China is most sincerely propelling the dominating agenda of establishing its military power play in the South China Sea marginalising UNCLOS (United Nations Common Laws of The Sea).
China’s Prowess in South China Sea (SCS):
US and China countries with extreme ideologies with different forms of political institutions, but they share one thing in common i.e. hectoring around with a strong arms show. This being probably the cause behind the fear, suspicion and feeling threatened by each other which may pull them in to the Thucydides Trap. China with its meteoric economic growth and mutating political interest wants to bridle Asia. The strategic territorial aggression has shown by Beijing in the South China Sea in the recent years distinctly points towards an absolute long term schedule. Apart from the territorial and jurisdictional claim dispute with Southeast Asian Nations (SEA) in the SEA region, China also shares a contentious issue of freedom of navigation with US in the region. On the other hand US want an unhindered access of navigation in the International waters of SCS on the commercial front and also looking forward for its hegemony in the region through its military ties and alliances with the SEA countries. China’s modernisation of its naval power and embarking on jurisdictional claims in the SCS apprehends clearly a defense mechanism of fear, suspicion and threat on her part. China with its growing economic and cultural relations with ASEAN fears and feels threaten by the US presence in the region. The reason behind this fear may be that China wants to play the intimidating role in the region and hence do not want any political interference of US Status and might. China’s extending outposts in the SCS for stationing ships, important airfields; building of artificial island to use them as military bases speaks about its determinant attitude to rule the waters[1]. According to IHS JaneChina has started building an airstrip on an island which is adequate to hold fighter jets and surveillance aircraft. This navigational aggression on one hand and political diplomacy on the other reveals the fine wedged strategy of China. Last year there were reports on Chinese Su-27 fighter jet intercepting US P-8 Poseidon ASW (Anti-Submarine Warfare) over the Hainan Island (SCS region) performing “Barrel Roll “ a manoeuvre to show its might and deterrence[2], Perhaps as the old byword goes the best defence is offence. This open show of military artistry might perhaps determine the hidden fear of China which she palpates by the presence of US in the region.
The latest candid operation by the Chinese in provoking the security status in the SCS is the fourth test in eighteen months of a hypersonic nuclear delivery vehicle, a hypersonic glide vehicle “WU-14”which the US called an “extreme manoeuvre,” amid rising stress between the two powers in the South China Sea. This strike weapon is exceedingly advanced and can travel at ten times the speed of sound making it extremely hard to strike down. However China has claimed it as a scheduled scientific technological test and the tests are not being targeted to any area specific specified goal.
The conflicting claims over chain of islands in the SCS by various South East Asian countries and Washington’s military alliances with these countries raises deep concern for China. There for to overcome her adrenal rush China is aggressively following her serious ambitions for SCS by making big progressive territorial reclamations and military projects, to prepare herself for a vanquish military conflicts in a given situation of war, moreover Beijing also knows that once US is done with her smart diplomacy theory of persuasion will likely to land up into some concrete closure which may be caustic for China. Consequently, China wants to speed up all her unfinished projects before the International community acts, moreover, in this way she is trying to establish her rhetoric historic claim of over 90% sovereignty over SCS regardless of overlapping claims by the various claimants. On the other part for US it won’t be easy to challenge an economically and militarily rising China. The strengthening of its navy and developing fifth generation fighter aircrafts vigorously which includes stealth fighter programme prototype J-20 by CAC (Chengdu Aircraft Corporation) China is definitely a point of concern for USA. But emphatically, the inaction of USA, giving it a broad brush attention and accommodating China on this issue will not only give China a boost to carry on with her ambitions in SCS but also make Beijing more explicit and direct. As China is all set to rise geopolitically by intimidating the small claimants in the SCS will surely not tolerate US in the waters, as Beijing realizes US as a potential threat, because of her presence and pivot in Asia since long time. No doubt new dubieties of China and US in SCS have brought tremendous uncertainties into their strategic stability theory. However, the chances of Sino-US war are definitely distant but looking into China’s military preparation explains her planning for a specific destination, as fear and threat in belly always grow insecurity which leads to expressed actions.
FEATURED | US and China are they Trapped in Thucydides? by Ipshita Bhattacharya
IndraStra Global 7/16/2015 11:06:00 AM
By Ipshita Bhattacharya
The Thucydides Trap Theory primarily talks about the fear, threats and suspicions resulting in the Peloponnesian war (431-404 B.C.) between two great empires of Athens and Peloponnesian league led by Sparta. This echo from history has a significant meaning in today’s world order too. Which says that the important components to trigger war are fear, suspicion and threat; this article will therefore critically explore the potential factors of fear, suspicion and threats between United States and China. Obstacles and opportunities plays a very important role in ruining and building relationship between two Nations, where obstacles defines the fear, suspicions, and threats and opportunities defines the confidence building measures. China and USA at present are thriving on conditional relations with lots of unresolved issues at their backyard like cyber security, South China Sea, membership friction over China’s Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank etc, along with their institutional differences. This article will focus mainly on China’s engineering prowess in the South China Sea (SCS) and the fear factor behind her actions. As the old adage goes that the best defense is a good offense pertaining to which China is projecting military power and territorial claims in SCS. Beijing’s aggressive naval policy is a strategic defence mechanism arising out of fear, suspicion and threat from Washington’s involvement in the region. Since, therefore, China is most sincerely propelling the dominating agenda of establishing its military power play in the South China Sea marginalising UNCLOS (United Nations Common Laws of The Sea).
China’s Prowess in South China Sea (SCS):
US and China countries with extreme ideologies with different forms of political institutions, but they share one thing in common i.e. hectoring around with a strong arms show. This being probably the cause behind the fear, suspicion and feeling threatened by each other which may pull them in to the Thucydides Trap. China with its meteoric economic growth and mutating political interest wants to bridle Asia. The strategic territorial aggression has shown by Beijing in the South China Sea in the recent years distinctly points towards an absolute long term schedule. Apart from the territorial and jurisdictional claim dispute with Southeast Asian Nations (SEA) in the SEA region, China also shares a contentious issue of freedom of navigation with US in the region. On the other hand US want an unhindered access of navigation in the International waters of SCS on the commercial front and also looking forward for its hegemony in the region through its military ties and alliances with the SEA countries. China’s modernisation of its naval power and embarking on jurisdictional claims in the SCS apprehends clearly a defense mechanism of fear, suspicion and threat on her part. China with its growing economic and cultural relations with ASEAN fears and feels threaten by the US presence in the region. The reason behind this fear may be that China wants to play the intimidating role in the region and hence do not want any political interference of US Status and might. China’s extending outposts in the SCS for stationing ships, important airfields; building of artificial island to use them as military bases speaks about its determinant attitude to rule the waters[1]. According to IHS JaneChina has started building an airstrip on an island which is adequate to hold fighter jets and surveillance aircraft. This navigational aggression on one hand and political diplomacy on the other reveals the fine wedged strategy of China. Last year there were reports on Chinese Su-27 fighter jet intercepting US P-8 Poseidon ASW (Anti-Submarine Warfare) over the Hainan Island (SCS region) performing “Barrel Roll “ a manoeuvre to show its might and deterrence[2], Perhaps as the old byword goes the best defence is offence. This open show of military artistry might perhaps determine the hidden fear of China which she palpates by the presence of US in the region.
The latest candid operation by the Chinese in provoking the security status in the SCS is the fourth test in eighteen months of a hypersonic nuclear delivery vehicle, a hypersonic glide vehicle “WU-14”which the US called an “extreme manoeuvre,” amid rising stress between the two powers in the South China Sea. This strike weapon is exceedingly advanced and can travel at ten times the speed of sound making it extremely hard to strike down. However China has claimed it as a scheduled scientific technological test and the tests are not being targeted to any area specific specified goal.
The conflicting claims over chain of islands in the SCS by various South East Asian countries and Washington’s military alliances with these countries raises deep concern for China. There for to overcome her adrenal rush China is aggressively following her serious ambitions for SCS by making big progressive territorial reclamations and military projects, to prepare herself for a vanquish military conflicts in a given situation of war, moreover Beijing also knows that once US is done with her smart diplomacy theory of persuasion will likely to land up into some concrete closure which may be caustic for China. Consequently, China wants to speed up all her unfinished projects before the International community acts, moreover, in this way she is trying to establish her rhetoric historic claim of over 90% sovereignty over SCS regardless of overlapping claims by the various claimants. On the other part for US it won’t be easy to challenge an economically and militarily rising China. The strengthening of its navy and developing fifth generation fighter aircrafts vigorously which includes stealth fighter programme prototype J-20 by CAC (Chengdu Aircraft Corporation) China is definitely a point of concern for USA. But emphatically, the inaction of USA, giving it a broad brush attention and accommodating China on this issue will not only give China a boost to carry on with her ambitions in SCS but also make Beijing more explicit and direct. As China is all set to rise geopolitically by intimidating the small claimants in the SCS will surely not tolerate US in the waters, as Beijing realizes US as a potential threat, because of her presence and pivot in Asia since long time. No doubt new dubieties of China and US in SCS have brought tremendous uncertainties into their strategic stability theory. However, the chances of Sino-US war are definitely distant but looking into China’s military preparation explains her planning for a specific destination, as fear and threat in belly always grow insecurity which leads to expressed actions.
FEATURED | US and China are they Trapped in Thucydides? by Ipshita Bhattacharya
BoQ77
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hahaha, a guy can't even afford Toyota talking about buying BMW.
go ahead..!! use these scrap your fisherman found, see how many M16s you can get for it.
could you learn the fact that this small trader earn more than at least 400 million of Chinese people in mainland?
more, our soldiers in military service don't receive monthly salary, but keep training and self feeding himself
even in Spratly island
Last edited:
Penguin
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Fiery Cross Reef is not an island, nor a fringe reef, but a group of three reefs. In 2014, China commenced reclamation activity in the area, and it has been converted into an artificial islandof about 230ha
Fiery Cross Reef - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
UNCLOS:
Article 5 Normal baseline
Except where otherwise provided in this Convention, the normal baseline for measuring the breadth of the territorial sea is the low-water line along the coast as marked on large-scale charts officially recognized by the coastal State.
Article 6 Reefs
In the case of islands situated on atolls or of islands having fringing reefs, the baseline for measuring the breadth of the territorial sea is the seaward low-water line of the reef, as shown by the appropriate symbol on charts officially recognized by the coastal State.
Article 13
Low-tide elevations
1. A low-tide elevation is a naturally formed area of land which is surrounded by and above water at low tide but submerged at high tide. Where a low-tide elevation is situated wholly or partly at a distance not exceeding the breadth of the territorial sea from the mainland or an island, the low-water line on that elevation may be used as the baseline for measuring the breadth of the territorial sea.
2. Where a low-tide elevation is wholly situated at a distance exceeding the breadth of the territorial sea from the mainland or an island, it has no territorial sea of its own.
Article 121
Regime of islands
1. An island is a naturally formed area of land, surrounded by water, which is above water at high tide.
2. Except as provided for in paragraph 3, the territorial sea, the contiguous zone, the exclusive economic zone and the continental shelf of an island are determined in accordance with the provisions of this Convention
applicable to other land territory.
3. Rocks which cannot sustain human habitation or economic life of their own shall have no exclusive economic zone or continental shelf.
Who says I don't or would hold other nations to the same standard? Point out wherre I've suggested or stated UNCLOS doesn't also apply to other nations. Meanwhile, China is the only contry carrying out substantional militarization at high tempo and also happens to be the topic of discussion in this thread.
I am from The Netherlands. We don't have a defence relation with South Korea or Japan. I'm quite sure China has no concerns about the Netherlands. Let's make that clear, shall we?
Well, be specific then which you are talking about. AFAIK There are 37 artifical islands listed here. None of these are anywhere near non-US territory. Let alone near the coast of Latin America. All of these are inside the existing US territorial waters 12nmi zone. They are little structures used for housing (compared Dubai) or industry (compare Port of Rotterdam - Maasvlakte).
Category:Artificial islands of the United States - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
TaiShang
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All eight out of nine features mentioned in PH's Submissions fall inside China's Taiping Island's EEZ and CS. Hence, any activity on and around them are legal.
Scarborough is outside the 200NM but it still generates 12NM TS. Hence, China can do reclamation activity there, too.
Of course, China does not claim individual EEZs or CS for the islands. China has EEZ and CS for four islands groups as a whole.
What is island and what generates what entitlement is to be decided by China, not by some court. If the US can do it with Baker Island, we can to it, too. And it only takes greater national power to do so, not blessing from a kangaroo court.
Scarborough is outside the 200NM but it still generates 12NM TS. Hence, China can do reclamation activity there, too.
Of course, China does not claim individual EEZs or CS for the islands. China has EEZ and CS for four islands groups as a whole.
What is island and what generates what entitlement is to be decided by China, not by some court. If the US can do it with Baker Island, we can to it, too. And it only takes greater national power to do so, not blessing from a kangaroo court.
dichoi
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Hanoi says Beijing’s actions threaten peace, stability in East Vietnam Sea
TUOI TRE NEWS
UPDATED : 02/26/2016 14:36 GMT + 7
Vietnam has expressed concern that peace, security, and freedom and safety of navigation and aviation in the East Vietnam Sea are being compromised by China’s recent activities in the region.
Regarding Beijing’s deployment of fighter jets to Phu Lam (Woody) Island, the largest island in Vietnam’s Hoang Sa (Paracel) archipelago, and its installment of a radar system in the Southeast Asian country’s Truong Sa (Spratly) archipelago, Ministry of Foreign Affairs Spokesperson Le Hai Binh reiterated Vietnam’s indisputable sovereignty over the two archipelagoes in a press meeting on Thursday.
Despite the opposition and concern from Vietnam and the international community, China continues to infringe on Vietnamese territory, Binh said, adding that these moves promote militarization, threaten peace and stability, and endanger the freedom of navigation and aviation in the region.
“We resolutely protest China’s violation and demand the country have practical actions to contribute to the preservation of regional and global peace, stability, in accordance with international law including the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea [UNCLOS] and the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the [East Vietnam Sea] [DOC],” the spokesperson said.
He added that the matter would be addressed at the ASEAN Foreign Ministers’ Meeting scheduled for February 26 and 27 in Laos.
Answering questions from German news agency DPA, Binh said that the status quo is being destroyed, posing more concern for the possibility of militarization in the East Vietnam Sea.
China revealed its plan to turn features in the East Vietnam Sea into military outposts with strategic benefits by introducing surface-to-air missiles, radar, and fighter jets into the area, Denny Roy, senior fellow at the Hawaii-based East-West Center, told Tuoi Tre (Youth) newspaper.
Roy denied that China’s deployment of military weaponry in the sea area is similar to the U.S. introduction of such weapons to the Hawaii archipelago prior to Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi’s visit to the U.S., saying that there are certain differences in the situation in the East Vietnam Sea and that in Hawaii.
Unlike Hawaii, the East Vietnam Sea is being claimed by several nations, the senior fellow continued.
The U.S. does not state its possession of the sea area between its continent and Hawaii while China has claimed authority over most of the sea, Roy elaborated.
He warned that Beijing, following recent activities, might possibly limit the fishing operation and oil exploitation in the marine territory of other countries.
China’s introduction of weaponry to the East Vietnam Sea could increase the risk of airline accidents for the flights crossing the waterway, according to the academic.
The U.S. and Taiwan have confirmed that China has been sending surface-to-air missiles to Phu Lam.
Recent satellite imagery has also showed that China is building a helicopter base on Quang Hoa (Duncan) Island, also belonging to Hoang Sa, that could be used for anti-submarine warfare missions.
On February 19, Vietnam condemned China for carrying out these activities that violate its sovereignty and endanger regional peace and stability.
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Hanoi says Beijing’s actions threaten peace, stability in East Vietnam Sea
TUOI TRE NEWS
UPDATED : 02/26/2016 14:36 GMT + 7
Vietnam has expressed concern that peace, security, and freedom and safety of navigation and aviation in the East Vietnam Sea are being compromised by China’s recent activities in the region.
Regarding Beijing’s deployment of fighter jets to Phu Lam (Woody) Island, the largest island in Vietnam’s Hoang Sa (Paracel) archipelago, and its installment of a radar system in the Southeast Asian country’s Truong Sa (Spratly) archipelago, Ministry of Foreign Affairs Spokesperson Le Hai Binh reiterated Vietnam’s indisputable sovereignty over the two archipelagoes in a press meeting on Thursday.
Despite the opposition and concern from Vietnam and the international community, China continues to infringe on Vietnamese territory, Binh said, adding that these moves promote militarization, threaten peace and stability, and endanger the freedom of navigation and aviation in the region.
“We resolutely protest China’s violation and demand the country have practical actions to contribute to the preservation of regional and global peace, stability, in accordance with international law including the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea [UNCLOS] and the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the [East Vietnam Sea] [DOC],” the spokesperson said.
He added that the matter would be addressed at the ASEAN Foreign Ministers’ Meeting scheduled for February 26 and 27 in Laos.
Answering questions from German news agency DPA, Binh said that the status quo is being destroyed, posing more concern for the possibility of militarization in the East Vietnam Sea.
China revealed its plan to turn features in the East Vietnam Sea into military outposts with strategic benefits by introducing surface-to-air missiles, radar, and fighter jets into the area, Denny Roy, senior fellow at the Hawaii-based East-West Center, told Tuoi Tre (Youth) newspaper.
Roy denied that China’s deployment of military weaponry in the sea area is similar to the U.S. introduction of such weapons to the Hawaii archipelago prior to Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi’s visit to the U.S., saying that there are certain differences in the situation in the East Vietnam Sea and that in Hawaii.
Unlike Hawaii, the East Vietnam Sea is being claimed by several nations, the senior fellow continued.
The U.S. does not state its possession of the sea area between its continent and Hawaii while China has claimed authority over most of the sea, Roy elaborated.
He warned that Beijing, following recent activities, might possibly limit the fishing operation and oil exploitation in the marine territory of other countries.
China’s introduction of weaponry to the East Vietnam Sea could increase the risk of airline accidents for the flights crossing the waterway, according to the academic.
The U.S. and Taiwan have confirmed that China has been sending surface-to-air missiles to Phu Lam.
Recent satellite imagery has also showed that China is building a helicopter base on Quang Hoa (Duncan) Island, also belonging to Hoang Sa, that could be used for anti-submarine warfare missions.
On February 19, Vietnam condemned China for carrying out these activities that violate its sovereignty and endanger regional peace and stability.
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Penguin
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Article 3 Breadth of the territorial sea
Every State has the right to establish the breadth of its territorial sea up to a limit not exceeding 12 nautical miles, measured from baselines determined in accordance with this Convention.
Article 5 Normal baseline
Except where otherwise provided in this Convention, the normal baseline for measuring the breadth of the territorial sea is the low-water line along the coast as marked on large-scale charts officially recognized by the coastal State.
Article 6 Reefs
In the case of islands situated on atolls or of islands having fringing reefs, the baseline for measuring the breadth of the territorial sea is the seaward low-water line of the reef, as shown by the appropriate symbol on charts officially recognized by the coastal State.
Article 13 Low-tide elevations
1. A low-tide elevation is a naturally formed area of land which is surrounded by and above water at low tide but submerged at high tide. Where a low-tide elevation is situated wholly or partly at a distance not exceeding the breadth of the territorial sea from the mainland or an island, the low-water line on that elevation may be used as the baseline for measuring the breadth of the territorial sea.
2. Where a low-tide elevation is wholly situated at a distance exceeding the breadth of the territorial sea from the mainland or an island, it has no territorial sea of its own.
Article 55
Specific legal regime of the exclusive economic zone The exclusive economic zone is an area beyond and adjacent to the territorial sea, subject to the specific legal regime established in this Part, under which the rights and jurisdiction of the coastal State and the rights and freedoms of other States are governed by the relevant provisions of this Convention.
Article 56
Rights, jurisdiction and duties of the coastal State in the exclusive economic zone
1. In the exclusive economic zone, the coastal State has:
(a) sovereign rights for the purpose of exploring and exploiting, conserving and managing the natural resources, whether living or non-living, of the waters superjacent to the seabed and of the seabed and its subsoil, and with regard to other activities for the economic exploitation and exploration of the zone, such as the production of energy from the water, currents and winds;
(b) jurisdiction as provided for in the relevant provisions of this Convention with regard to:
(i) the establishment and use of artificial islands, installations and structures;
(ii) marine scientific research;
(iii) the protection and preservation of the marine
environment;
(c) other rights and duties provided for in this Convention.
2. In exercising its rights and performing its duties under this Convention in the exclusive economic zone, the coastal State shall have due regard to the rights and duties of other States and shall act in a manner compatible with the provisions of this Convention.
3. The rights set out in this article with respect to the seabed and subsoil shall be exercised in accordance with Part VI.
Article 57 Breadth of the exclusive economic zone
The exclusive economic zone shall not extend beyond 200 nautical miles from the baselines from which the breadth of the territorial sea is measured.
Article 59 Basis for the resolution of conflicts
regarding the attribution of rights and jurisdiction in the exclusive economic zone In cases where this Convention does not attribute rights or jurisdiction to the coastal State or to other States within the exclusive economic zone, and a conflict arises between the interests of the coastal State and any other State or States, the conflict should be resolved on the basis of equity and in the light of all the relevant circumstances, taking into account the respective importance of the interests involved to the parties as well as to the international community as a whole.
Article 60
Artificial islands, installations and structures
in the exclusive economic zone
1. In the exclusive economic zone, the coastal State shall have the exclusive right to construct and to authorize and regulate the construction, operation and use of:
(a) artificial islands;
(b) installations and structures for the purposes provided for in article 56 and other economic purposes;
(c) installations and structures which may interfere with the exercise of the rights of the coastal State in the zone.
2. The coastal State shall have exclusive jurisdiction over such artificial islands, installations and structures, including jurisdiction with regard to customs, fiscal, health, safety and immigration laws and regulations.
3. Due notice must be given of the construction of such artificial
islands, installations or structures, and permanent means for giving warning of their presence must be maintained. Any installations or structures which are abandoned or disused shall be removed to ensure safety of navigation, taking into account any generally accepted international standards established in this regard by the competent international organization. Such removal shall also have due regard to fishing, the protection of the marine environment and the rights and duties of other States. Appropriate publicity shall be given to the depth, position and dimensions of any installations or structures not entirely removed.
4. The coastal State may, where necessary, establish reasonable safety zones around such artificial islands, installations and structures in which it may take appropriate measures to ensure the safety both of navigation and of the artificial islands, installations and structures.
5. The breadth of the safety zones shall be determined by the coastal State, taking into account applicable international standards. Such zones shall be designed to ensure that they are reasonably related to the nature and function of the artificial islands, installations or structures, and shall not exceed a distance of 500 metres around them, measured from each point of their outer edge, except as authorized by generally accepted international standards or as recommended by the competent international organization. Due notice shall be given of the extent of safety zones.
6. All ships must respect these safety zones and shall comply with generally accepted international standards regarding navigation in the vicinity of artificial islands, installations, structures and safety zones.
7. Artificial islands, installations and structures and the safety zones around them may not be established where interference may be caused to the use of recognized sea lanes essential to international navigation.
8. Artificial islands, installations and structures do not possess the status of islands. They have no territorial sea of their own, and their presence does not affect the delimitation of the territorial sea, the exclusive economic zone or the continental shelf.
PART VIII
REGIME OF ISLANDS
Article 121
Regime of islands
1. An island is a naturally formed area of land, surrounded by water, which is above water at high tide.
2. Except as provided for in paragraph 3, the territorial sea, the contiguous zone, the exclusive economic zone and the continental shelf of an island are determined in accordance with the provisions of this Convention applicable to other land territory.
3. Rocks which cannot sustain human habitation or economic life of their own shall have no exclusive economic zone or continental shelf.
sicsheep
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Exactly, you should tell that to Vietnam and Philippines,
PRC controls the largest of all NATURAL formed island in Parcel, Yong Xing Island
Woody Island, also known as Yongxing Island (simplified Chinese: 永兴岛; traditional Chinese:永興島; pinyin: Yǒngxīng Dǎo; literally: "Eternal Prosperity Island") and Phu Lam Island(Vietnamese: Đảo Phú Lâm), is the largest of the Paracel Islands in the South China Sea.
ROC controls the largest of all NATURAL formed island in Spratly, TaiPing Island
Taiping Island, also known as Itu Aba Island and by various other names, is the largest of the naturally occurring[1]Spratly Islands in the South China Sea
Woody Island (South China Sea) - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
Taiping Island - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
Penguin
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The treaty applies to all signatory, naturally.
Fiery cross reef .... ? This artificial island is now larger than any of the naturally formed islands in the Spratleys. I'm sure I can find a few more.
Woody Island > sovereignty disputed.
See several other thread which recently discussed this (not going over that again)
Fiery cross reef .... ? This artificial island is now larger than any of the naturally formed islands in the Spratleys. I'm sure I can find a few more.
Woody Island > sovereignty disputed.
See several other thread which recently discussed this (not going over that again)
