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Jane's Defence Weekly
Sino-Russian union falters
While Chinese military orders kept Russian plants from closing in the 1990s, some Russian firms are now unhappy about the Chinese building their own equipment. Reuben F Johnson reports
Chinese military orders and the partnership with the country's defence industry was all that kept many Russian military plants from closing their doors in the 1990s - a period when Russia's own domestic defence procurement was almost zero.
During that time China's People's Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF) was one of the largest export customers for Sukhoi Su-27 and Su-30 fighters, all purchased from the Komsomolsk-na-Amure Aviation Production Association (KnAAPO).
The re-establishment of Russian-Chinese military-technical collaboration seemed to be the right move for both sides at the right time. Russia's defence industry was desperately in need of money - and not just a short quick infusion of cash from a few sales but long-term contracts that would provide a positive cash flow for years. Only this could save the industry as well as the scientific, research and educational infrastructure that supported it.
Chinese industry was also not without its problems. Years of trying to acquire the technology and insight into design techniques that constitute the self-awareness necessary to produce fourth- and fifth-generation weapon designs had proved to be elusive. The Tiananmen Square massacre in 1989 had cut the links of technology exchange with the US and Europe. China's fighter aircraft, tank, missile and other designs were not much better than 'warmed over' versions of weapons originally provided by the USSR before the Sino-Soviet split.
The sales from Russia that began from the early 1990s provided China with an infusion of new-age Russian-made weapons and technological advantages. The latter included an interface with Russian designers and specialists, technical education provided to Chinese industry by Russian design bureaus and research centres as well as the training of military personnel in the operation and maintenance of these new systems and technologies. All of this came - as the cash flow from these purchases was for the Russians - at an opportune moment for the Chinese. If there was ever a relationship that suggested a perfect symbiosis, this was it.
However, the last few years have seen strains in this long-term partnership that suggest Chinese industry may be taking actions that are not consistent with the obligations that are part of their initial licensed-production agreements with Russian industry. Russian firms are beginning to chafe under what they see as unethical and opportunistic actions taken by the Chinese.
In November 2004 Moscow's Vremya Novostei newspaper reported that the 1996 agreement to licence-produce 200 Su-27SK fighters (designated J-11 in Chinese service) at the Shenyang aircraft plant was being truncated at about the halfway mark. Chinese military officials quoted in the article stated that "these aeroplanes no longer satisfy the requirements of the Chinese air force".
Reports made from sources on the Russian side later stated that the Chinese concern was that aircraft being produced at Shenyang were configured solely for air-to-air missions and had no air-to-ground radar modes as part of the fire control system. The Chinese military's specific interest in having an aircraft that could fire a full range of air-to-surface/anti-ship missiles has evolved into one of the primary missions for this aircraft.
The Chinese have discussed instead a licence to produce the Su-30MKK or make direct purchases of the Su-33 carrier-capable fighter or Su-35 Super Flanker to offset the losses in Sukhoi revenues for closing down the Su-27 line at Shenyang earlier than initially agreed. However, in three years of discussions none of these purchases have been formally agreed and Russian industry is beginning to question whether China will be the reliable partner in the future that it was in the 1990s.
"They will sometimes talk about an Su-33 purchase, for example, but then they will say they want to try and build a carrier aeroplane on their own," a Russian industry representative told Jane's .
This back and forth process of the PLAAF never wanting to commit to one option or the other has some in Moscow questioning if the Chinese are simply on an information-gathering exercise and not really sincere about their interests in making major purchases. "Now that we have them started on a path towards modernity, they seem reluctant to give us another penny in order to advance any further," one official said.
The issue that has caused perhaps the most ill-will between the two sides has been the Chinese programme to build their own version of the Su-27: the J-11B/BS model fighter.
"Shenyang are building this J-11B aeroplane without KnAAPO's participation," explained one Russian official. "They are doing it independently, with materials that they have fabricated themselves and with processes that are not certified. They are using their own Chinese-designed engine, radar and other systems, which Russian specialists also have not validated.
"If they want to do this it is okay for them [the Chinese], but this later can be a big problem for us. Simply put, their inexperience is something that can reflect badly on us more than it will on them.
"Specifically, if there is an accident in one of these J-11Bs because of defects in Chinese-made materials or Chinese-developed production techniques it will be us that will get the black eye. This is because all around the world it will be reported that a Russian aeroplane crashed into some shopping mall, not a 'Chinese-made copy of a Russian aeroplane' - and no one will add the detail that 'this was a copy Sukhoi or KnAAPO did not certify'."
Privately, other Russian representatives state that the J-11B/BS is really a violation of the licence-production agreement, but there is not much they can do about it.
"If no one can stop illegal copies of CDs and DVDs that have not been approved by anyone in the government from being made in China, how can you stop a major defence industrial programme that has been approved at the highest levels of the MoD [Ministry of Defence] and state planning commissions?" said one source.
Despite these disagreements Russian officials still believe that there are many opportunities for co-operation with their Chinese partners and intend to demonstrate some of their latest products at next year's other major Chinese aviation exposition, the Air Show China in Zhuhai.
The decisive moment will be if and when Russia and China decide to co-operate on fifth-generation weapon systems, such as the PAK-FA fighter programme in Russia.
If China decides to participate in this effort, stated one Russian aerospace analyst, "then the partnership may continue as it has thus far. If they decide to go their own way to prove they can build an aeroplane without any Russian help - as they have with the J-11B - then we could see a much different future of co-operation between the two nations".
Reuben F Johnson is a JDW Correspondent based in Beijing
Sino-Russian union falters
While Chinese military orders kept Russian plants from closing in the 1990s, some Russian firms are now unhappy about the Chinese building their own equipment. Reuben F Johnson reports
Chinese military orders and the partnership with the country's defence industry was all that kept many Russian military plants from closing their doors in the 1990s - a period when Russia's own domestic defence procurement was almost zero.
During that time China's People's Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF) was one of the largest export customers for Sukhoi Su-27 and Su-30 fighters, all purchased from the Komsomolsk-na-Amure Aviation Production Association (KnAAPO).
The re-establishment of Russian-Chinese military-technical collaboration seemed to be the right move for both sides at the right time. Russia's defence industry was desperately in need of money - and not just a short quick infusion of cash from a few sales but long-term contracts that would provide a positive cash flow for years. Only this could save the industry as well as the scientific, research and educational infrastructure that supported it.
Chinese industry was also not without its problems. Years of trying to acquire the technology and insight into design techniques that constitute the self-awareness necessary to produce fourth- and fifth-generation weapon designs had proved to be elusive. The Tiananmen Square massacre in 1989 had cut the links of technology exchange with the US and Europe. China's fighter aircraft, tank, missile and other designs were not much better than 'warmed over' versions of weapons originally provided by the USSR before the Sino-Soviet split.
The sales from Russia that began from the early 1990s provided China with an infusion of new-age Russian-made weapons and technological advantages. The latter included an interface with Russian designers and specialists, technical education provided to Chinese industry by Russian design bureaus and research centres as well as the training of military personnel in the operation and maintenance of these new systems and technologies. All of this came - as the cash flow from these purchases was for the Russians - at an opportune moment for the Chinese. If there was ever a relationship that suggested a perfect symbiosis, this was it.
However, the last few years have seen strains in this long-term partnership that suggest Chinese industry may be taking actions that are not consistent with the obligations that are part of their initial licensed-production agreements with Russian industry. Russian firms are beginning to chafe under what they see as unethical and opportunistic actions taken by the Chinese.
In November 2004 Moscow's Vremya Novostei newspaper reported that the 1996 agreement to licence-produce 200 Su-27SK fighters (designated J-11 in Chinese service) at the Shenyang aircraft plant was being truncated at about the halfway mark. Chinese military officials quoted in the article stated that "these aeroplanes no longer satisfy the requirements of the Chinese air force".
Reports made from sources on the Russian side later stated that the Chinese concern was that aircraft being produced at Shenyang were configured solely for air-to-air missions and had no air-to-ground radar modes as part of the fire control system. The Chinese military's specific interest in having an aircraft that could fire a full range of air-to-surface/anti-ship missiles has evolved into one of the primary missions for this aircraft.
The Chinese have discussed instead a licence to produce the Su-30MKK or make direct purchases of the Su-33 carrier-capable fighter or Su-35 Super Flanker to offset the losses in Sukhoi revenues for closing down the Su-27 line at Shenyang earlier than initially agreed. However, in three years of discussions none of these purchases have been formally agreed and Russian industry is beginning to question whether China will be the reliable partner in the future that it was in the 1990s.
"They will sometimes talk about an Su-33 purchase, for example, but then they will say they want to try and build a carrier aeroplane on their own," a Russian industry representative told Jane's .
This back and forth process of the PLAAF never wanting to commit to one option or the other has some in Moscow questioning if the Chinese are simply on an information-gathering exercise and not really sincere about their interests in making major purchases. "Now that we have them started on a path towards modernity, they seem reluctant to give us another penny in order to advance any further," one official said.
The issue that has caused perhaps the most ill-will between the two sides has been the Chinese programme to build their own version of the Su-27: the J-11B/BS model fighter.
"Shenyang are building this J-11B aeroplane without KnAAPO's participation," explained one Russian official. "They are doing it independently, with materials that they have fabricated themselves and with processes that are not certified. They are using their own Chinese-designed engine, radar and other systems, which Russian specialists also have not validated.
"If they want to do this it is okay for them [the Chinese], but this later can be a big problem for us. Simply put, their inexperience is something that can reflect badly on us more than it will on them.
"Specifically, if there is an accident in one of these J-11Bs because of defects in Chinese-made materials or Chinese-developed production techniques it will be us that will get the black eye. This is because all around the world it will be reported that a Russian aeroplane crashed into some shopping mall, not a 'Chinese-made copy of a Russian aeroplane' - and no one will add the detail that 'this was a copy Sukhoi or KnAAPO did not certify'."
Privately, other Russian representatives state that the J-11B/BS is really a violation of the licence-production agreement, but there is not much they can do about it.
"If no one can stop illegal copies of CDs and DVDs that have not been approved by anyone in the government from being made in China, how can you stop a major defence industrial programme that has been approved at the highest levels of the MoD [Ministry of Defence] and state planning commissions?" said one source.
Despite these disagreements Russian officials still believe that there are many opportunities for co-operation with their Chinese partners and intend to demonstrate some of their latest products at next year's other major Chinese aviation exposition, the Air Show China in Zhuhai.
The decisive moment will be if and when Russia and China decide to co-operate on fifth-generation weapon systems, such as the PAK-FA fighter programme in Russia.
If China decides to participate in this effort, stated one Russian aerospace analyst, "then the partnership may continue as it has thus far. If they decide to go their own way to prove they can build an aeroplane without any Russian help - as they have with the J-11B - then we could see a much different future of co-operation between the two nations".
Reuben F Johnson is a JDW Correspondent based in Beijing
