M. Serajul Islam
Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina's official visit to China is scheduled to start from March 17th. During her last term, she had undertaken an official visit to China within two months of taking office which was also her first official overseas visit. Whether this delay reflects any displeasure the Chinese have with Bangladesh can only be a subject of speculation. Nevertheless, under the BNP's last term of office and in the one year and a little more of the AL tenure, the Chinese have not seen much from the Bangladesh side to warm their hearts or to reflect their strategic value to Bangladesh.
The BNP led government's decision to allow Taiwan to open a trade office in Dhaka in 2005 without taking China into confidence caused a deep scar in Bangladesh-China relations. It also offended the Chinese earlier by cancelling the Di-Ammonium Phosphate (DAP 1) fertilizer project soon after coming to office. The agreement for DAP 1 fertilizer plant was signed with the Chinese and DAP 11 with the Japanese by the AL Government just before its term of office ended in 2002. Although the DAP projects were later activated by the BNP government after both the governments had made their displeasure known in no uncertain terms, to the Chinese it left a question mark about Bangladesh's dependability. This Government's unilateral decision to change the Bangladesh-China Friendship Conference Centre that was built with Chinese grant to hold the aborted NAM Summit in Dhaka has also not pleased the Chinese. During the Bangladesh-China Joint Commission held in Beijing in July last year, the Bangladesh delegation placed before the Chinese projects worth US$ 5.14 billion. The Chinese showed interest in 5 out of 28 projects amounting to US$ 1 billion. In the Beijing meeting, the Chinese expressed unhappiness over slow project implementation by Bangladesh. The outcome of the Beijing Joint Commission did not leave any doubt that the Chinese are not exactly happy with Bangladesh, an unhappiness that has developed over some time now.
China is one of those few countries that did not support Bangladesh's war of liberation. In fact, China had then backed Pakistan that was acting as the conduit in the Ping-Pong diplomacy that led to the historical thawing of relations between USA and China. After change of government in Bangladesh in August, 1975, Bangladesh and China established diplomatic relations that was built in the backdrop of cold war politics. By establishing diplomatic relations with China, Bangladesh moved into the USA-China axis and away from the Indo-Soviet axis. China was at that time not the China it is today.
In contemporary international politics, China is close to establishing itself in the position that Soviet Union lost. Between 1975 and the end of Awami League's first term, Bangladesh had extremely friendly relations with China; excellence to which the military rulers, the BNP and the AL contributed equally. One reason among many that influenced China to treat Bangladesh as a special friend was Bangladesh's access to the Bay of Bengal. Another was a feeling in Beijing that Bangladesh, following the change in August, 1975, moved away from India with which China then and still has very deep rooted bilateral problems. They are also vying with each other for regional dominance. Unfortunately just around the period China emerged as the giant in international politics and our friendship with China had withstood the test of time, the BNP for reasons that only they can explain, chose to get on its wrong side.
The AL led government has also not stemmed that tide; not yet at least. In fact, inadvertently or otherwise, this government may have given China more cause for concern. It has not really appreciated the complexity of Indo-China relations. Sino-India relations have not been progressing well; in fact over Arunachal Pradesh, Aksai Chin, and other disputed border areas, relations are tense. Sheikh Hasina's decision to choose China ahead of other countries, including India, to undertake an official visit during her last term in office was appreciated in China. In that term, Bangladesh-China relations were warm and grew overall. China offered and built the conference centre that Bangladesh needed badly to hold the NAM Summit on grant. Although Bangladesh-India relations also progressed, it was not to the extent to worry China.
Sheikh Hasina's recently concluded state visit to India has seen a paradigm shift in Bangladesh's posture towards India. The 56 paragraph Joint Declaration includes many issues that have brought to the surface Bangladesh's willingness to help India on issues whose resolution are not developments that China would be too happy to see. Although China have no reason to complain on these issues, it can nevertheless see in the Declaration elements to conclude that in the context of Sino-India relations, China could not count on Bangladesh as it had been accustomed to count in the past. The commitment in the JS to support India unequivocally for a permanent seat in an expanded UN Security Council was the crucial paragraph that gave Bangladesh's hand away to the Chinese. The Foreign Ministry said that in doing so, the AL led government followed the BNP that had supported Japan for a seat in the expanded UN Security Council during then Prime Minister Khaleda Zia's visit to Tokyo in 2005 in the Joint Statement issued at that time. The two cases are not similar. Japan contributes US$ 300 million a year in grants and aids to Bangladesh and the Chinese do not see the Japanese candidature the way they see the Indian one. Further, in 2005, the issue of an expanded Security Council was a major issue in international politics and Bangladesh was under pressure from Japan for support. An expanded Security Council is not an issue now and Bangladesh was therefore under no pressure to explicitly support India. It should have been well advised to support India without reflecting it so pointedly in the JS. Meanwhile, Myanmar today offers China better geo-political advantages such as access to the Bay of Bengal that was in the past a major card in Bangladesh's hand to attract China.
The forthcoming visit of the Prime Minister will therefore be one where she would need to show considerable diplomatic skills to re-kindle the warmth on Bangladesh-China relations. She would be visiting China at a time when Bangladesh has not done much to make Beijing await her visit eagerly except perhaps her role in the Copenhagen Climate Summit where she took up China's cause together with those of the USA and China and played a key role in helping adopt US/India/China document as the non-binding Copenhagen Declaration. It is to be seen how much value the Chinese give to that role. According to reliable sources, Bangladesh would seek from China primarily economic support worth US $ 3 billion and Chinese investment in Bangladesh to offset the trade imbalance between the two countries which is worse than Bangladesh's trade imbalance with India. There is good chance that some of the projects not considered at the Joint Commission meeting could find favour during the visit. It is, however, unlikely that the visit would lead to any significant rise in Chinese investment in Bangladesh. In fact, whether the Prime Minister has a successful visit to China would depend on how much she would be able to convince China that Bangladesh remains as good a friend of China as it had been in the past. That would be a very hard task no doubt.
The author is a former Ambassador to Japan and Director, Centre for Foreign Affairs Studies.
Significance of Hasina's PRC visit
Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina's official visit to China is scheduled to start from March 17th. During her last term, she had undertaken an official visit to China within two months of taking office which was also her first official overseas visit. Whether this delay reflects any displeasure the Chinese have with Bangladesh can only be a subject of speculation. Nevertheless, under the BNP's last term of office and in the one year and a little more of the AL tenure, the Chinese have not seen much from the Bangladesh side to warm their hearts or to reflect their strategic value to Bangladesh.
The BNP led government's decision to allow Taiwan to open a trade office in Dhaka in 2005 without taking China into confidence caused a deep scar in Bangladesh-China relations. It also offended the Chinese earlier by cancelling the Di-Ammonium Phosphate (DAP 1) fertilizer project soon after coming to office. The agreement for DAP 1 fertilizer plant was signed with the Chinese and DAP 11 with the Japanese by the AL Government just before its term of office ended in 2002. Although the DAP projects were later activated by the BNP government after both the governments had made their displeasure known in no uncertain terms, to the Chinese it left a question mark about Bangladesh's dependability. This Government's unilateral decision to change the Bangladesh-China Friendship Conference Centre that was built with Chinese grant to hold the aborted NAM Summit in Dhaka has also not pleased the Chinese. During the Bangladesh-China Joint Commission held in Beijing in July last year, the Bangladesh delegation placed before the Chinese projects worth US$ 5.14 billion. The Chinese showed interest in 5 out of 28 projects amounting to US$ 1 billion. In the Beijing meeting, the Chinese expressed unhappiness over slow project implementation by Bangladesh. The outcome of the Beijing Joint Commission did not leave any doubt that the Chinese are not exactly happy with Bangladesh, an unhappiness that has developed over some time now.
China is one of those few countries that did not support Bangladesh's war of liberation. In fact, China had then backed Pakistan that was acting as the conduit in the Ping-Pong diplomacy that led to the historical thawing of relations between USA and China. After change of government in Bangladesh in August, 1975, Bangladesh and China established diplomatic relations that was built in the backdrop of cold war politics. By establishing diplomatic relations with China, Bangladesh moved into the USA-China axis and away from the Indo-Soviet axis. China was at that time not the China it is today.
In contemporary international politics, China is close to establishing itself in the position that Soviet Union lost. Between 1975 and the end of Awami League's first term, Bangladesh had extremely friendly relations with China; excellence to which the military rulers, the BNP and the AL contributed equally. One reason among many that influenced China to treat Bangladesh as a special friend was Bangladesh's access to the Bay of Bengal. Another was a feeling in Beijing that Bangladesh, following the change in August, 1975, moved away from India with which China then and still has very deep rooted bilateral problems. They are also vying with each other for regional dominance. Unfortunately just around the period China emerged as the giant in international politics and our friendship with China had withstood the test of time, the BNP for reasons that only they can explain, chose to get on its wrong side.
The AL led government has also not stemmed that tide; not yet at least. In fact, inadvertently or otherwise, this government may have given China more cause for concern. It has not really appreciated the complexity of Indo-China relations. Sino-India relations have not been progressing well; in fact over Arunachal Pradesh, Aksai Chin, and other disputed border areas, relations are tense. Sheikh Hasina's decision to choose China ahead of other countries, including India, to undertake an official visit during her last term in office was appreciated in China. In that term, Bangladesh-China relations were warm and grew overall. China offered and built the conference centre that Bangladesh needed badly to hold the NAM Summit on grant. Although Bangladesh-India relations also progressed, it was not to the extent to worry China.
Sheikh Hasina's recently concluded state visit to India has seen a paradigm shift in Bangladesh's posture towards India. The 56 paragraph Joint Declaration includes many issues that have brought to the surface Bangladesh's willingness to help India on issues whose resolution are not developments that China would be too happy to see. Although China have no reason to complain on these issues, it can nevertheless see in the Declaration elements to conclude that in the context of Sino-India relations, China could not count on Bangladesh as it had been accustomed to count in the past. The commitment in the JS to support India unequivocally for a permanent seat in an expanded UN Security Council was the crucial paragraph that gave Bangladesh's hand away to the Chinese. The Foreign Ministry said that in doing so, the AL led government followed the BNP that had supported Japan for a seat in the expanded UN Security Council during then Prime Minister Khaleda Zia's visit to Tokyo in 2005 in the Joint Statement issued at that time. The two cases are not similar. Japan contributes US$ 300 million a year in grants and aids to Bangladesh and the Chinese do not see the Japanese candidature the way they see the Indian one. Further, in 2005, the issue of an expanded Security Council was a major issue in international politics and Bangladesh was under pressure from Japan for support. An expanded Security Council is not an issue now and Bangladesh was therefore under no pressure to explicitly support India. It should have been well advised to support India without reflecting it so pointedly in the JS. Meanwhile, Myanmar today offers China better geo-political advantages such as access to the Bay of Bengal that was in the past a major card in Bangladesh's hand to attract China.
The forthcoming visit of the Prime Minister will therefore be one where she would need to show considerable diplomatic skills to re-kindle the warmth on Bangladesh-China relations. She would be visiting China at a time when Bangladesh has not done much to make Beijing await her visit eagerly except perhaps her role in the Copenhagen Climate Summit where she took up China's cause together with those of the USA and China and played a key role in helping adopt US/India/China document as the non-binding Copenhagen Declaration. It is to be seen how much value the Chinese give to that role. According to reliable sources, Bangladesh would seek from China primarily economic support worth US $ 3 billion and Chinese investment in Bangladesh to offset the trade imbalance between the two countries which is worse than Bangladesh's trade imbalance with India. There is good chance that some of the projects not considered at the Joint Commission meeting could find favour during the visit. It is, however, unlikely that the visit would lead to any significant rise in Chinese investment in Bangladesh. In fact, whether the Prime Minister has a successful visit to China would depend on how much she would be able to convince China that Bangladesh remains as good a friend of China as it had been in the past. That would be a very hard task no doubt.
The author is a former Ambassador to Japan and Director, Centre for Foreign Affairs Studies.
Significance of Hasina's PRC visit
