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Seoul-Beijing Warmth + Seoul-Tokyo Chill = US Impotence - Forbes
SEOUL – American and Japanese officials may well have looked on in discomfort as Chinese President Xi Jinping and South Korean President Park Geun-hye held a summit here that is emblematic of the increasingly cozy relations between the two nations.
The personal rapport between Park – who speaks Chinese – and Xi appears particularly warm: The two have met five times since they assumed office in, respectively, February and March 2013.
There could be no greater contrast to this chummy relationship than the frost that has settled over Seoul-Tokyo ties, stemming from distrust, if not outright dislike, between Park and Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe.
These realities are likely to irk a United States that seeks to draw Seoul and Tokyo into a trilateral security alliance with itself, in order to counterbalance an expansive China and a threatening North Korea.
China and South Korean were enemies during the 1950-53 Korean War, but after establishing diplomatic relations in 1992, have drawn ever-closer. A key milestone was reached in 2004 when South Korea’s trade with China surpassed its trade with the U.S.
Today, China is South Korea’s largest destination for investment and for trade, which last year hit US$266 billion. If the two nations sign a free trade agreement (during their summit, the two leaders agreed to complete negotiations on this by the end of the year, which may be over-ambitious, but the deal is likely at some point) there will be a further spur.
Much has been made here of the fact that Xi is the first Chinese leader to visit South Korea before visiting North Korea. And indeed: Pyongyang has been busily firing missiles into the sea in recent days in what looks like a tantrum designed to draw attention and/or signal displeasure.
But speaking of snubs…
It was always customary for incoming Korean presidents to make Tokyo their second overseas stop off after Washington but Park, who assumed office in February 2013, overturned this tradition when she chose Beijing as her second destination. Since then, she has steadfastly refused to meet nationalistically minded Abe – even before his provocative visit last December to Yasukuni Shrine, where war criminals are enshrined alongside war dead.
This is odd, as previous South Korean presidents have met Japanese prime ministers with equally problematic historical or revisionist opinions as Abe. Some speculate that Park wants to distance herself from her Japanophile father, the late President Park Chung-hee, who served in Emperor Hirohito’s army, then in 1965, established diplomatic relations with Tokyo in return for colonial-era compensation which he used for economic development, rather than handing it to war- and colonial-era victims.
Abe has made no secret of his desire for a summit with the South Korean president and has tried a charm offensive, turning up unexpectedly at Park speeches and attempting to converse with her in Korean during multinational gatherings. But to no avail. The only time Park has sat down with Abe was at a trilateral summit stage-managed by U.S. President Barack Obama in March. To nobody’s surprise, Park looked far from charmed during that event.
Since then, relations have worsened.
In addition to turning a repeated cold shoulder to Abe’s diplomatic courtship, South Korea continues to criticize Japan for what it alleges is Tokyo’s lack of contrition and compensation for atrocities committed during its colonization of Korea (1910-1945), most notably during the Pacific War (1937-1945).
Abe’s administration has recently been returning fire, launching an undiplomatic investigation into a 1993 landmark Japanese governmental apology to “comfort women” – girls recruited, largely through coercion or trickery, to serve as prostitutes for Japanese wartime troops. (In the end, though, Tokyo refrained from altering the apology.)
Tokyo’s announcement this week that it is upgrading the deployability of its military – a move supported by Washington – has exacerbated the freeze and given Seoul and Beijing, who share a historical distrust of Tokyo, further common cause.
That historical controversies dating to the 1940s – in addition to an ongoing territorial dispute over a pair of Korea-occupied islets in the Sea of Japan – are chilling current political ties so icily is puzzling, given that Japan and South Korean are both democracies, sharing similar economic structures, lifestyles, cultures and values. After all; many national leaders differ over specific issues, but still meet and thrash out “big picture” issues.
Moreover, on the security front, both nations have (separate) alliances with the United States. Washington would love to formalize these into a trilateral partnership, but the Abe-Park split makes this unlikely in the near future.
Yet – ironically – while Washington studiedly avoids taking sides in the Japan-Korea squabbles, it is not Tokyo but Beijing that has been most persistently disregarding Seoul’s (non-economic) priorities.
A long-standing thorn in relations is Beijing’s policy of forcibly repatriating (to a very uncertain fate) North Korean defectors it captures on its soil, rather than handing them over to the South. And last year, Beijing stunned Seoul with its announcement of an Air Defense Identification Zone over a Yellow Sea reef whose ownership is disputed by South Korean and China.
The latter issue may be clarified, post-summit, as Park and Xi agreed to discuss their Exclusive Economic Zones. But – perhaps in order to keep things diplomatic – it is unclear if the former issue was even raised.
Above all, many South Koreans share Washington’s frustration with Beijing, which consistently and predictably pays lip service to Pyongyang’s denuclearization, but applies no leverage – such as halting fuel supplies or trade – to that end. Instead, after their summit, Park and Xi urged a restart of the Beijing-sponsored Six-party Talks. These tortuous negotiations, attended by China, Japan, the two Koreas, Russia and the United States, were held multiple times between 2003 and 2008, but failed to halt Pyongyang’s nuclear programs.
Meanwhile, Pyongyang is a rare – albeit pesky and embarrassing – regional ally for Beijing, one that routinely gives Washington the finger. Moreover, it provides a strategic buffer between democratic South Korea and its own hinterland. That buffer was guaranteed when Mao Zedong’s intervention turned the tide of the Korean War, succored Kim Il-sung (grandfather of current North Korean leader Kim Jong-un) and overturned the de facto reunification of the peninsula by South Korea and its free-world allies in winter 1950.
China’s mastery of Northeast Asia’s diplomatic board leaves the United States and South Korea in different quandaries.
A frustrated Washington can’t frog-march a resisting Seoul into an alliance with itself and Tokyo.
Yet while Seoul basks in pleasantries from Beijing in return for its economic engagement, it seems unable to parlay the good-will into strategic or diplomatic gains. So, as South Korean businesses profit from their ongoing engagement in, and with, the fast-rising economic superpower, troubling strategic questions loom on the horizon.
Japan’s move to take a firmer military stance than at any time since 1945, combined with strategic regional competition between the United States and China, suggest that Washington may start leaning closer to Tokyo than to Seoul on military-security issues.
In similar fashion, Seoul may find itself out of step with other regional nations, notably the ASEAN bloc, which are wary of China’s maritime ambitions.
Of course, Seoul does not need to make an “either-or” choice between Beijing and Washington. But the contradictions implicit in an economic-focused China policy and a strategic-focused US policy confront its diplomats with an increasingly slippery regional tight-rope to traverse.
Contributor
Andrew Salmon
Seoul-based reporter covering the Koreas.
SEOUL – American and Japanese officials may well have looked on in discomfort as Chinese President Xi Jinping and South Korean President Park Geun-hye held a summit here that is emblematic of the increasingly cozy relations between the two nations.
The personal rapport between Park – who speaks Chinese – and Xi appears particularly warm: The two have met five times since they assumed office in, respectively, February and March 2013.
There could be no greater contrast to this chummy relationship than the frost that has settled over Seoul-Tokyo ties, stemming from distrust, if not outright dislike, between Park and Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe.
These realities are likely to irk a United States that seeks to draw Seoul and Tokyo into a trilateral security alliance with itself, in order to counterbalance an expansive China and a threatening North Korea.
China and South Korean were enemies during the 1950-53 Korean War, but after establishing diplomatic relations in 1992, have drawn ever-closer. A key milestone was reached in 2004 when South Korea’s trade with China surpassed its trade with the U.S.
Today, China is South Korea’s largest destination for investment and for trade, which last year hit US$266 billion. If the two nations sign a free trade agreement (during their summit, the two leaders agreed to complete negotiations on this by the end of the year, which may be over-ambitious, but the deal is likely at some point) there will be a further spur.
Much has been made here of the fact that Xi is the first Chinese leader to visit South Korea before visiting North Korea. And indeed: Pyongyang has been busily firing missiles into the sea in recent days in what looks like a tantrum designed to draw attention and/or signal displeasure.
But speaking of snubs…
It was always customary for incoming Korean presidents to make Tokyo their second overseas stop off after Washington but Park, who assumed office in February 2013, overturned this tradition when she chose Beijing as her second destination. Since then, she has steadfastly refused to meet nationalistically minded Abe – even before his provocative visit last December to Yasukuni Shrine, where war criminals are enshrined alongside war dead.
This is odd, as previous South Korean presidents have met Japanese prime ministers with equally problematic historical or revisionist opinions as Abe. Some speculate that Park wants to distance herself from her Japanophile father, the late President Park Chung-hee, who served in Emperor Hirohito’s army, then in 1965, established diplomatic relations with Tokyo in return for colonial-era compensation which he used for economic development, rather than handing it to war- and colonial-era victims.
Abe has made no secret of his desire for a summit with the South Korean president and has tried a charm offensive, turning up unexpectedly at Park speeches and attempting to converse with her in Korean during multinational gatherings. But to no avail. The only time Park has sat down with Abe was at a trilateral summit stage-managed by U.S. President Barack Obama in March. To nobody’s surprise, Park looked far from charmed during that event.
Since then, relations have worsened.
In addition to turning a repeated cold shoulder to Abe’s diplomatic courtship, South Korea continues to criticize Japan for what it alleges is Tokyo’s lack of contrition and compensation for atrocities committed during its colonization of Korea (1910-1945), most notably during the Pacific War (1937-1945).
Abe’s administration has recently been returning fire, launching an undiplomatic investigation into a 1993 landmark Japanese governmental apology to “comfort women” – girls recruited, largely through coercion or trickery, to serve as prostitutes for Japanese wartime troops. (In the end, though, Tokyo refrained from altering the apology.)
Tokyo’s announcement this week that it is upgrading the deployability of its military – a move supported by Washington – has exacerbated the freeze and given Seoul and Beijing, who share a historical distrust of Tokyo, further common cause.
That historical controversies dating to the 1940s – in addition to an ongoing territorial dispute over a pair of Korea-occupied islets in the Sea of Japan – are chilling current political ties so icily is puzzling, given that Japan and South Korean are both democracies, sharing similar economic structures, lifestyles, cultures and values. After all; many national leaders differ over specific issues, but still meet and thrash out “big picture” issues.
Moreover, on the security front, both nations have (separate) alliances with the United States. Washington would love to formalize these into a trilateral partnership, but the Abe-Park split makes this unlikely in the near future.
Yet – ironically – while Washington studiedly avoids taking sides in the Japan-Korea squabbles, it is not Tokyo but Beijing that has been most persistently disregarding Seoul’s (non-economic) priorities.
A long-standing thorn in relations is Beijing’s policy of forcibly repatriating (to a very uncertain fate) North Korean defectors it captures on its soil, rather than handing them over to the South. And last year, Beijing stunned Seoul with its announcement of an Air Defense Identification Zone over a Yellow Sea reef whose ownership is disputed by South Korean and China.
The latter issue may be clarified, post-summit, as Park and Xi agreed to discuss their Exclusive Economic Zones. But – perhaps in order to keep things diplomatic – it is unclear if the former issue was even raised.
Above all, many South Koreans share Washington’s frustration with Beijing, which consistently and predictably pays lip service to Pyongyang’s denuclearization, but applies no leverage – such as halting fuel supplies or trade – to that end. Instead, after their summit, Park and Xi urged a restart of the Beijing-sponsored Six-party Talks. These tortuous negotiations, attended by China, Japan, the two Koreas, Russia and the United States, were held multiple times between 2003 and 2008, but failed to halt Pyongyang’s nuclear programs.
Meanwhile, Pyongyang is a rare – albeit pesky and embarrassing – regional ally for Beijing, one that routinely gives Washington the finger. Moreover, it provides a strategic buffer between democratic South Korea and its own hinterland. That buffer was guaranteed when Mao Zedong’s intervention turned the tide of the Korean War, succored Kim Il-sung (grandfather of current North Korean leader Kim Jong-un) and overturned the de facto reunification of the peninsula by South Korea and its free-world allies in winter 1950.
China’s mastery of Northeast Asia’s diplomatic board leaves the United States and South Korea in different quandaries.
A frustrated Washington can’t frog-march a resisting Seoul into an alliance with itself and Tokyo.
Yet while Seoul basks in pleasantries from Beijing in return for its economic engagement, it seems unable to parlay the good-will into strategic or diplomatic gains. So, as South Korean businesses profit from their ongoing engagement in, and with, the fast-rising economic superpower, troubling strategic questions loom on the horizon.
Japan’s move to take a firmer military stance than at any time since 1945, combined with strategic regional competition between the United States and China, suggest that Washington may start leaning closer to Tokyo than to Seoul on military-security issues.
In similar fashion, Seoul may find itself out of step with other regional nations, notably the ASEAN bloc, which are wary of China’s maritime ambitions.
Of course, Seoul does not need to make an “either-or” choice between Beijing and Washington. But the contradictions implicit in an economic-focused China policy and a strategic-focused US policy confront its diplomats with an increasingly slippery regional tight-rope to traverse.
Contributor
Andrew Salmon
Seoul-based reporter covering the Koreas.
