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Saudi Arabia's first nuclear reactor nearly finished, sparking fears over safeguards

Nice stuff. Thanks.

Drawback is the Brazilian turbofan is not yet in use in any product.

Missile program comes with testing which is inherently very known and public. You cannot progress in missiles without tests. This is not the case for nukes as bad.

Regarding nukes:

It is not deterrent if ennemies don’t know about it. Non deterrent nukes!

4-7 bombs will not bring deterrence especially on Pakistan soil.

The problem with following military developments of KSA is the absurd amount of secrecy.
Which naturally leads to speculation. Iran's approach when it comes to its ballistic missiles is a more open one due to it being the biggest deterrent for Iran and strongest military arm. KSA one the other hand has one of the most powerful air forces in the world instead and uses mostly that as a deterrent while its missiles and ballistic missile program is shrouded in secrecy.

I asked @The SC and other Saudi Arabian members (there does not seem to be any left on PDF) and I was told that KSA's missiles are tested abroad. I think that a lot of it (lack of open tests) is due to the political ramifications of such tests. Iran in this regard has little to lose given the already existing sanctions.

In any case both KSA and Iran are some of the last countries that are at risk of a foreign invasion (all-out invasion) given their large size, geography, firepower etc. A war between both of them (I mean KSA-Iran war) is very unlikely to occur as well as it would not be winnable for either party and it would not do anything but weaken both tremendously. Iran already has painful memoreis of the Iraq-Iran war that lasted almost 1 decade. I believe that this is also the reason why Iranian leadership (IRGC) realized that to project power outside of Iran borders, proxies would be the easiest/cheapest/safest way.

Anyway we will see what the region has in store for us in the future, I am quite sure that nuclear proliferation (regional) is inevitable and maybe that is for the better, that might stop the worst proxy wars/civil wars from occurring. After all no nuclear states have ever been at war so ironically nuclear proliferation might actually make the planet a safer place as ironic as that sounds.
 
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Saudi Arabia should go for nuclear bomb path. Nuclear Power is necessary to prevent misadventure by any adversary
 
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Saudi Arabia should go for nuclear bomb path. Nuclear Power is necessary to prevent misadventure by any adversary

See post 44.





KSA has likely been a nuclear-armed country since the day we (Pakistan) made our first nuclear tests.



It is more or less an open secret too.

Add the domestic Saudi Arabian ballistic missile program (with Chinese help), the Chinese nuclear liquid-fueled, single-stage nuclear medium-range ballistic missile DF-3A and the DF-21 that were exported to KSA over 35 years ago (!) and later updated (and kept alive since then)


+ uranium extraction within KSA (with Chinese assistance (apparently KSA holds 10% of all uranium reserves globally)


with no functioning nuclear power plants within KSA (publicly) and add the dots together.

https://www.wsj.com/articles/saudi-arabia-with-chinas-help-expands-its-nuclear-program-11596575671

KSA has had/have the money to build the bomb, all the geopolitical excuses in the world to pursue it politically and given the open secret and close Saudi Arabian involvement in the Pakistani nuclear program it is as I wrote more or less an open secret by large that KSA has access to nuclear warheads inside the country and if not inside the country with a very short notice it can get it. Most likely already the case.

Oh, I forgot the secret bases and tests sites in KSA and underground facilities or mountain facilities (not much different from the Iranian ones).

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"Ancient" photo:

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Lastly unlike Iran, KSA has never signed up to the international frameworks that seeks to ensure that atomic programs are not used to but weapons nor has it adopted rules to allow inspectors to inspect its sites to date.

Food for though, I am not 100% sure (nobody that does not know with certainty is) but if I had to guess whether KSA had or not, I would guess that they have based on all of the above and much more.
 
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Fresh news: The percentage of completion in the first nuclear reactor has reached 84%, leaving only 16% left!

The reactor will be operated safely until 2063 with an operating life of 40 years -
Saudi Arabia is likely to become the largest nuclear country in the Middle East by 2030, with about 16 nuclear reactors


Assuming nobody else does anything till 2030 it is the largest.

Iran is planning to build 100 percent domestic light water nuclear reactors by then. No help from any other country.

Heavy water reactor and small reactors are easier for Iran and will be built way before that date
 
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Assuming nobody else does anything till 2030 it is the largest.

Iran is planning to build 100 percent domestic light water nuclear reactors by then. No help from any other country.

Heavy water reactor and small reactors are easier for Iran and will be built way before that date

Not sure what this has to do with the topic at hand? I highly doubt that there is a single country in the Middle East that has the state official policy of building as many nuclear power plants as KSA and who actually have the finances and political will to construct them.

There is a reason why UAE's Barakah is the largest nuclear power plant in the Muslim world so far, (until Turkey finalizes their Russian built one), and why there are so few nuclear power plants in the Muslim world. Pakistan is the leader so far (naturally) and the only other nuclear power plants to date (fully operational) are Bushehr and Barakah. Just says everything about the sorry state.

Iran is not fully indigenous either, since the late Shah began building Bushehr (almost 50 years ago now !) it was all by foreign hands and help and it was not until fairly late (with Russian help from what I could read) that Bushehr was even finalized, so the idea of no outside help sounds ludicrous, no offense. I am sure that that there is/has been (has been is a certainty) outside help, first Western one (Israelis even helped for a while, Germans and Americans too if I am not wrong) and Russian help/aid was confirmed. Most likely given that most missile designs of Iran are originally North Korean/USSR, North Korean/Chinese help too which would make sense from a geopolitical point, the same reason why China is helping key Saudi Arabian strategic projects such as ballistic missile program, uranium extraction, drones, laser technology, 5g network (Huawai) etc.

Lastly, I highly doubt that there is a single Muslim country (currently at least) that is capable of building a nuclear power plant without any outside help/aid while living up to international safety standards.
 
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How clean nuclear energy will put Saudi Arabia ahead of the climate-change curve​


The Israelis at it.

While Israel is focused on Iran, nuclear danger is rearing its head elsewhere​

Experts warn that if Iran achieves its nuclear goal, Israel must prepare for the possibility of Pakistan providing Saudi Arabia with atomic warheads or the knowledge and means necessary to speedily create one on its own.​

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By Tamir Morag

Published on 08-03-2022 16:15
Last modified: 08-03-2022 16:15

 
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ELECTRIC POWER | ENERGY TRANSITION | OIL | METALS | PETROCHEMICALS
12 Jan 2022 | 13:17 UTC

Saudi Arabia to develop 'huge' uranium resources in energy diversity push: minister​



HIGHLIGHTS

To fuel proposed 17 GW of domestic nuclear by 2040

Also envisages selling uranium on global market

Hydrogen pilot projects to be announced shortly


Saudi Arabia plans to develop its "huge" uranium resources with a view to supporting its nascent nuclear power program as well as selling onto the world market, energy minister Prince Abdulaziz bin Salman said Jan. 12, as the world's leading exporter of crude oil looks to diversify its power mix and economy away from hydrocarbons.

Rest of the article:

 
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South Korea turns the tables on Biden and surprises Minister Faisal bin Farhan with this decision to build Nuclear power plants..

 
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South Korea turns the tables on Biden and surprises Minister Faisal bin Farhan with this decision to build Nuclear power plants..


I hope that the upcoming and historic visit of Xi Jinping to KSA and his first foreign state visit after COVID-19 (apparently) will include the nuclear reactor and nuclear power plants element.

It would fit into the already existing strategic Saudi Arabian-Chinese projects such as the ballistic missile program, uranium extraction, drone technology, laser technology, economic trade etc.

South Korea is an old friend of KSA (reliable too) and KSA used to host millions of South Korean workers (many of the projects in KSA from the 1960's and 1970's were built jointly with South Korean hands) but South Korea is unfortunately completely under the spell/influence of the US.

Nuclear technology, energy included, is far too strategic. KSA needs a fully reliable partner that will not put strings attached to any future deals.

In other words, US cannot be trusted fully by KSA. History shows that.
 
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I hope that the upcoming and historic visit of Xi Jinping to KSA and his first foreign state visit after COVID-19 (apparently) will include the nuclear reactor and nuclear power plants element.

It would fit into the already existing strategic Saudi Arabian-Chinese projects such as the ballistic missile program, uranium extraction, drone technology, laser technology, economic trade etc.

South Korea is an old friend of KSA (reliable too) and KSA used to host millions of South Korean workers (many of the projects in KSA from the 1960's and 1970's were built jointly with South Korean hands) but South Korea is unfortunately completely under the spell/influence of the US.

Nuclear technology, energy included, is far too strategic. KSA needs a fully reliable partner that will not put strings attached to any future deals.

In other words, US cannot be trusted fully by KSA. History shows that.
Yes.. and if KSA has already the full nuclear cycle technology..it can have the nuclear plants built by South Korea, China and even Russia.. it wants 16 reactors.. and maybe more..
 
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Yes.. and if KSA has already the full nuclear cycle technology..it can have the nuclear plants built by South Korea, China and even Russia.. it wants 16 reactors.. and maybe more..

KSA should pursue 100% nuclear independence. Not only that KSA and Arabs should have had nuclear and thermonuclear weapons ages ago.

KSA/Arabs should not rest before this happens.

See my post 12 in this thread.
 
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2 important and telling developments in the recent weeks.

Pillsbury firm ends decade-long work for Saudi Arabia on nuclear energy​


Connect this news above to this news below.


Open secret.
 
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The Saudi path to nuclear weapons​

Posted on August 28, 2022 by beyondnuclearinternational

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Kingdom’s pursuit of nuclear power development should set off alarm bells


By Henry Sokolski

Iran’s nuclear program, oil, and human rights dominated Biden’s much-anticipated first presidential trip to the Middle East earlier this month. But there is one topic President Biden chose not to showcase during his visit with Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed Bin Salman Al Saud—the Kingdom’s most recent interest in nuclear energy—and the nuclear weapons proliferation concerns that come with it.

Only weeks before Biden’s visit, Riyadh invited South Korea, Russia, and China to bid on the construction of two large power reactors. On that bid, Korea Electric Power Company (KEPCO) is the most likely winner. KEPCO has already built four reactors for Riyadh’s neighbor, the United Arab Emirates, and is the only vendor to bring a power reactor of its own design online in the Middle East. South Korea also is the only government to provide reliable, generous financing, free of political strings—something neither Moscow nor Beijing can credibly claim.

And then, there’s this: Any Korean sale would be covered by a generous 2011 South Korean nuclear cooperative agreement with Riyadh that explicitly authorizes the Saudis to enrich any uranium it might receive from Seoul. Under the agreement, Riyadh could enrich this material by up to 20 percent, without having to secure Seoul’s prior consent.

That should set off alarm bells.

Do the Saudis want a bomb?​

In 2018, Crown Prince Mohammed Bin Salman announced that “if Iran developed a nuclear bomb, we will follow suit as soon as possible.” As if to prove the point, late in 2020, word leaked that the Saudis have been working secretly with the Chinese to mine and process Saudi uranium ore. These are steps toward enriching uranium—and a possible nuclear weapon program.

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What is the true nuclear agenda of Saudi Arabia’s Crown Prince Mohammed Bin Salman? (Photo: US Department of State/Wikimedia Commons)

Unlike the Emirates, which legally renounced enriching uranium or reprocessing spent fuel to separate plutonium, the Kingdom insists on retaining its “right” to enrich. Also, unlike most members of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), Saudi Arabia refuses to allow intrusive inspections that might help the IAEA find covert nuclear weapons-related activities, if they exist, under a nuclear inspections addendum known as the Additional Protocol.

Saudi Arabia’s enrichment program and refusal to adopt the Additional Protocol, doubled with a possible permissive South Korean reactor sale, could spell trouble. South Korea currently makes its nuclear fuel assemblies using imported uranium, which mainly comes from Australia. This ore is controlled by Australia’s uranium export policy, which requires that the uranium be monitored by the IAEA and that materials derived from it not be retransferred to a third country without first securing Australia’s consent. Yet, if Seoul decides to pass Australian uranium on to Riyadh, the Saudis are free to enrich it up to 20 percent at any time without having to secure anyone’s approval. In addition, Riyadh could proceed to enrich this material without having to agree to intrusive IAEA inspections under the Additional Protocol, making it easier for Riyadh to enrich beyond 20 percent uranium 235 without anyone knowing.

Can Washington block the reactor export?​

In Washington, the US nuclear industry understandably is miffed that Riyadh excluded Westinghouse from bidding on the Saudi reactors. Meanwhile, State Department officials say that KEPCO can’t sell Riyadh its APR-1400 reactor because it incorporates US nuclear technology that is property of Westinghouse. KEPCO, they insist, would first need to secure US Energy Department approval under US intangible technology transfer controls (known as Part 810 authorizations). This requirement, they argue, gives Washington the leverage it needs to impose nonproliferation conditions on South Korea’s reactor export to Riyadh.

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During his recent visit to Saudi Arabia and his meeting with Crown Prince Mohammed Bin Salman, US President Biden chose not to showcase the Kingdom’s most recent interest in nuclear energy. (Photo: Gage Skidmore/Creative Commons)

This sounds fine. But there’s a catch. South Korean officials insist that its APR-1400 design, which uses a Combustion Engineering data package that Westinghouse now owns, is entirely indigenous. Focusing on the matter of technology transfer authority also begs a bigger question: Does the Republic of Korea need Washington’s blessing to begin enriching uranium itself or to transfer enrichment technology to other countries, such as Saudi Arabia?

The short answer is no.

South Korea has always been free to enrich uranium and transfer uranium enrichment technology to other countries so long as the uranium it enriched or the enrichment technology it shipped wasn’t of US origin. America’s veto over South Korean enrichment only applies to uranium that comes from the United States. As I learned from a recent interview of the two top negotiators of the 2015 US-Republic of Korea civilian nuclear cooperation agreement, Seoul has always known this. Yet, South Korea asked that Washington explicitly grant it authority to enrich uranium in the 2015 agreement—something Washington has yet to grant. According to the negotiators, South Korean officials preferred to have political permission from Washington to do so, even though they did not legally need it.

South Korea and the United States have a choice​

South Korea’s previous administration under President Moon Jae-in announced in 2021 that South Korea would not export reactors to countries that had not yet agreed to adopt the IAEA’s Additional Protocol. Is this pledge one that President Yoon Suk-yeol will uphold? Or will Yoon reverse this policy in his effort to go all out to secure the reactor sale to Riyadh?

Similarly, how committed is the Biden Administration to prevent Saudi Arabia from enriching uranium and reprocessing spent reactor fuel? Previous administrations have tried to keep Riyadh clear of such activities. Will Washington keep Seoul’s and Saudi Arabia’s feet to the fire on this or will the administration’s desire to close ranks with South Korea and Saudi Arabia push these nonproliferation concerns to the sidelines? Anyone interested in preventing the further spread of nuclear weapons in the Middle East should want to know the answers.

Henry Sokolski is the executive director of the Nonproliferation Policy Education Center in Arlington, Virginia, and author of Underestimated: Our Not So Peaceful Nuclear Future (2019). He served as deputy for nonproliferation policy in the office of the US secretary of defense during the George H.W. Bush administration.

This article was first published by The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists and is republished here with permission of the author.

The opinions expressed in articles by outside contributors and published on the Beyond Nuclear International website, are their own, and do not necessarily reflect the views or positions of Beyond Nuclear. However, we try to offer a broad variety of viewpoints and perspectives as part of our mission “to educate and activate the public about the connections between nuclear power and nuclear weapons and the need to abandon both to safeguard our future”.

Headline photo of Riyadh Ministry of the Interior building, Saudi Arabia, by IMP1/Creative Commons.


If we forget the fact that KSA already has access to nuclear weapons, such news is entertaining.


Saudi Arabia developing national capabilities in nuclear technology: Minister​


‘Saudi Arabia has commenced study to issue license for its nuclear power plant site’ – Energy Minister​


Saudi Arabia to develop 'huge' uranium resources in energy diversity push: minister​

 
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