S-400,NASAMS,BMD and Now THAAD !! Is India preparing to tweaks it’s Nuclear Policies?

[randomradio]

That is merely an unsubstantiated claim. You think Pakistan doesn't have IR cameras and radars to verify that our decoys look the same as actual warhead? You think we can't control the weight distribution to simulate actual warhead trajectory? Well, you can keep thinking what you like, but when you actually publish a research paper, please post a link here.

Sure you can, if you can defy physics. I think you should first read up on decoys at the minimum.

Cheers.

 

[CriticalThought]

Sure you can, if you can defy physics. I think you should first read up on decoys at the minimum.

Cheers.

Your problem, as always, is if it didn't happen in India, it can't happen anywhere else. No amount of reading will cure you of that.

 

[Hellfire]

okay.i don't think that we will use nasr.i think first we will try to defend.if things gets out of control then we might initiate something else before final and last nasr.i believe pakistan is making chemical weapons.i know india is making it too.for us,anything that can stop indian army is useful.i don't believe that we use nasr directly during the initial phase of war.indian policy is very cunning.

I am not sure about the Pakistani view on what you have claimed above, but India remains a signatory to the CWC, that is, the Chemical Warfare Convention, and has no weaponised stocks. It is a policy that both Chemical and Biological Warfare will not be undertaken by India.

Use of Chemicals in a battlefield is a different subject, hence will keep the reply purely to what you have posted.

they know last weapon is nasr so if we use,they will use nuclear weapons as well.what if pakistan can't use nasr and repel advancing indian army? i think chemical weapons can deny indian excuse of nuclear attack on it's army and hence india will not be able to nuke pakistan.the policy is simple.if you attack,indians will attack but what if other methods are use to stop?in this case,india will be left with no choice but to avoid nuclear weapons.it's the job of our army to find another solution.nasr can't be the last weapon to stop indian army.united states will put sanctions on both india and pakistan if we admit publicly that we are making chemical weapons.

Points here:

1. Nasr is not the last weapon.
2. And use of Chemical weapons will invite a potential retaliation by weapons that may be nuclear, so, a no go.

 

[The Deterrent]

But the idea behind the new doctrine was to keep the war below the nuclear threshold without being an existential threat to Pak. So, if anything, it's Pakistan that's unwilling to compromise on even the possibility of a limited war.

ANY kind of war, however limited it is intended be, has the potential to escalate out of control within 24 hours. That is why Pakistan's policy has been to develop its 'Full Spectrum Deterrence' to minimize the risk of a conflict, even if it means lowering the thresholds.

Maybe not 100%. Maybe not even 50%. Maybe only 25%. That's still 30 less nukes to worry about.

I assure you, 0% people dying around ground zeros are much better than 50% or 75%. It is not worth to risk it.

What do you think would work as countermeasures in Pakistan's case?

There's plenty that can be done and is being done. You have to realize that Pakistani nuclear delivery platforms vs. Indian missile defenses, is an 'arms race' that has Pakistan with quite a bit of a head-start. At the moment, there are zero Indian BMD systems deployed, vs. more than 100 diverse and sophisticated nuclear delivery systems deployed by Pakistan. (I know S-400 will be delivered in 2-3 years)

Majority of the counter-measures can be relatively quickly integrated, since the delivery platforms already exist. Some I have already proposed, in increasing order of implementation complexity:

1. Produce more ballistic & cruise missiles (by simply not shutting down existing production lines).
2. Develop VLO versions of existing Babur & Ra'ad cruise missiles (involves relatively minor changes).
3. Develop exo-atmospheric decoys for Shaheens & Ababeel (involves relatively minor changes).
4. "Develop" BMD-penetrating offensive weapons like CM-401/M-20 hypersonic QBMs.

5. Research & develop ADM-160 MALD -like decoy missiles to expose ABM batteries.
6. Buy J-31 for PAF to deploy in SEAD ops against ABM batteries.
7. Develop endo-atmospheric hypersonic MaRVs for existing systems (Shaheen-IA, Shaheen-II, Shaheen-III).

The first four are already being implemented. Contrary to popular belief, none of this (excluding J-31s) has the possibility to bleed Pakistan dry of financial resources. I've already mentioned before that the ENTIRE strategic program (from reactors to nukes to missiles to R&D to production to operations) takes a small fraction of the budget of the Army (excluding Navy/Air force/MoD).

We wouldn't invest in a BMD that couldn't stop a massive strike.

The assumption that Pakistani nuclear arsenal is based on Scud-derivatives is entirely your own to make. NOBODY on this planet has the capability to stop a massive strike against its enemies, not even the US (against fragile North Korean systems).

 

[TheDarkKnight]

ANY kind of war, however limited it is intended be, has the potential to escalate out of control within 24 hours. That is why Pakistan's policy has been to develop its 'Full Spectrum Deterrence' to minimize the risk of a conflict, even if it means lowering the thresholds.


I assure you, 0% people dying around ground zeros are much better than 50% or 75%. It is not worth to risk it.


There's plenty that can be done and is being done. You have to realize that Pakistani nuclear delivery platforms vs. Indian missile defenses, is an 'arms race' that has Pakistan with quite a bit of a head-start. At the moment, there are zero Indian BMD systems deployed, vs. more than 100 diverse and sophisticated nuclear delivery systems deployed by Pakistan. (I know S-400 will be delivered in 2-3 years)

Majority of the counter-measures can be relatively quickly integrated, since the delivery platforms already exist. Some I have already proposed, in increasing order of implementation complexity:

1. Produce more ballistic & cruise missiles (by simply not shutting down existing production lines).
2. Develop VLO versions of existing Babur & Ra'ad cruise missiles (involves relatively minor changes).
3. Develop exo-atmospheric decoys for Shaheens & Ababeel (involves relatively minor changes).
4. "Develop" BMD-penetrating offensive weapons like CM-401/M-20 hypersonic QBMs.

5. Research & develop ADM-160 MALD -like decoy missiles to expose ABM batteries.
6. Buy J-31 for PAF to deploy in SEAD ops against ABM batteries.
7. Develop endo-atmospheric hypersonic MaRVs for existing systems (Shaheen-IA, Shaheen-II, Shaheen-III).

The first four are already being implemented. Contrary to popular belief, none of this (excluding J-31s) has the possibility to bleed Pakistan dry of financial resources. I've already mentioned before that the ENTIRE strategic program (from reactors to nukes to missiles to R&D to production to operations) takes a small fraction of the budget of the Army (excluding Navy/Air force/MoD).


The assumption that Pakistani nuclear arsenal is based on Scud-derivatives is entirely your own to make. NOBODY on this planet has the capability to stop a massive strike against its enemies, not even the US (against fragile North Korean systems).

Is Pakistan even considering BMD in the near future? Local or even off the shelf from China?

 

[randomradio]

ANY kind of war, however limited it is intended be, has the potential to escalate out of control within 24 hours. That is why Pakistan's policy has been to develop its 'Full Spectrum Deterrence' to minimize the risk of a conflict, even if it means lowering the thresholds.

But that's how it works, you lower the threshold where we may invite an attack, then we lower the threshold to a preemptive strike. India is going to look for advantages after all and not simply hand over the initiative to Pakistan.

I assure you, 0% people dying around ground zeros are much better than 50% or 75%. It is not worth to risk it.

It depends on what our objective is. If we find absorbing 30 or more nukes is the cost to pay for taking out an enemy once and for all, then our leaders can potentially take that chance.

There's plenty that can be done and is being done. You have to realize that Pakistani nuclear delivery platforms vs. Indian missile defenses, is an 'arms race' that has Pakistan with quite a bit of a head-start. At the moment, there are zero Indian BMD systems deployed, vs. more than 100 diverse and sophisticated nuclear delivery systems deployed by Pakistan. (I know S-400 will be delivered in 2-3 years)

Yep. So our BMD is still a long ways off.

Majority of the counter-measures can be relatively quickly integrated, since the delivery platforms already exist. Some I have already proposed, in increasing order of implementation complexity:

1. Produce more ballistic & cruise missiles (by simply not shutting down existing production lines).
2. Develop VLO versions of existing Babur & Ra'ad cruise missiles (involves relatively minor changes).
3. Develop exo-atmospheric decoys for Shaheens & Ababeel (involves relatively minor changes).
4. "Develop" BMD-penetrating offensive weapons like CM-401/M-20 hypersonic QBMs.

5. Research & develop ADM-160 MALD -like decoy missiles to expose ABM batteries.
6. Buy J-31 for PAF to deploy in SEAD ops against ABM batteries.
7. Develop endo-atmospheric hypersonic MaRVs for existing systems (Shaheen-IA, Shaheen-II, Shaheen-III).

The first four are already being implemented. Contrary to popular belief, none of this (excluding J-31s) has the possibility to bleed Pakistan dry of financial resources. I've already mentioned before that the ENTIRE strategic program (from reactors to nukes to missiles to R&D to production to operations) takes a small fraction of the budget of the Army (excluding Navy/Air force/MoD).

I suppose we are developing our BMD to counter all of these. For example, the Phase 2 will see the development of interceptors that can stop targets up to mach 27. Guess whether it works or not is something only the operators of the BMD will know.

The assumption that Pakistani nuclear arsenal is based on Scud-derivatives is entirely your own to make. NOBODY on this planet has the capability to stop a massive strike against its enemies, not even the US (against fragile North Korean systems).

That's a very different case. The US faces threats from ICBMs, and there are no real defences for it yet. But it's a different story when it comes to SRBMs and MRBMs.

 

[danger007]

America's unflinching support for india serves American and British interests (the two horns of satan btw). And that is, india serves the role of a "punching bag" that (if all goes according to plan) China would be to busy fighting, to be able to unleash its full military might against any potential war against America. In other words, india would be America's first picket line, the second would be Japan and by that time America along with its "true blue" (white) Australia as ally, would finish off China. Primarily because China would be fighting wars on two fronts, india and Japan.

The devil leads the blind folded fools to their oblivion.

We are not pakistanis to do everything what US wishes..

 

[The Deterrent]

those tests were more in context of a lofted trajectory to show that these missiles can also double as anti-satellite weapons

Um, I'm gonna say no. Nice theory though.

Is Pakistan even considering BMD in the near future? Local or even off the shelf from China?

No. Unless Pakistan intends to secure only 2-3 locations (basically C3 centers), a BMD has no use to Pakistan. It is simply too easy for India to overcome it. The only alternative is to ensure MAD.

But that's how it works, you lower the threshold where we may invite an attack, then we lower the threshold to a preemptive strike. India is going to look for advantages after all and not simply hand over the initiative to Pakistan.

Yeah, thats how it works. Except that in such a scenario, the ball is going to be back in India's court.

It depends on what our objective is. If we find absorbing 30 or more nukes is the cost to pay for taking out an enemy once and for all, then our leaders can potentially take that chance.

Sure, if thats what they want, then by all means. Its just that for the guy flying out of Safdarjung, it will be a pretty difficult decision to make.

I suppose we are developing our BMD to counter all of these. For example, the Phase 2 will see the development of interceptors that can stop targets up to mach 27. Guess whether it works or not is something only the operators of the BMD will know.

India is way behind to counter what I proposed. Even Phase-I hasn't been deployed yet.

In my opinion, the best bet India has on developing a BMD that can defend against a reasonable portion of a massive first strike...is boost-phase intercept:

1. Using either Airborne Laser (like the YAL-1) or
2. Using a high-hypersonic (Mach 7-10), long-range (~300km) BVRAAM launched from an aerial platform.
Both of these solutions require complete air superiority over the region of patrolling.

That's a very different case. The US faces threats from ICBMs, and there are no real defences for it yet. But it's a different story when it comes to SRBMs and MRBMs.

Alright, how about Iran vs. Israel? Israel has one of the world's best BMDs (Arrow-2/3), and the only country which is actually keeping up with the advances of its enemies (as far as ballistic missiles are concerned). Still, Iran has the capability to simply saturate the BMD with hundreds of conventional ballistic missiles (if not taken out by a pre-emptive strike).

 

[randomradio]

Yeah, thats how it works. Except that in such a scenario, the ball is going to be back in India's court.

Escalating the war to nuclear is entirely Pakistan's responsibility. If we attack you, you have complete control over whether the war goes nuclear or not. In that sense, you could lose the war, and even lose your country, and still not use nukes. As long as you keep your nukes inert, we won't use nukes. So it's entirely your prerogative whether you use nukes or not.

In case you want to avoid such a scenario, then your only answer is conventional parity or superiority.

If you have conventional parity or superiority, then war will never happen because India won't attack an enemy that's too strong to be beaten conventionally.

Sure, if thats what they want, then by all means. Its just that for the guy flying out of Safdarjung, it will be a pretty difficult decision to make.

However a limited war can be entirely non-nuclear.

India is way behind to counter what I proposed. Even Phase-I hasn't been deployed yet.

Actually, no. Most of what you have said will be taken care of with the Phase I.

The Phase I is good enough even against MIRV. In fact, due to the way the BMD has been designed, MIRV is largely irrelevant because it still takes too long for the warheads to reenter giving the BMD enough time to react.

Here's proof for the AAD:

The AAD was launched at 0:48 and the interception happened at 1:12, that's just 24 seconds of flight time. The entire exercise actually took around 2 min for an SRBM with an apogee of around 40Km over a short distance. It's obviously taken less than 1 min for the warhead to descend, which is normal for an average reentry speed of less than 1Km/sec until its interception at an altitude of 15Km. In a more realistic scenario with greater ranges, the flight time is much longer, up to 4 or 5 min even for SRBMs, which is more than plenty of enough time for the BMD we have developed.

So MIRVs of an MRBM that are released at an apogee of 300Km will give the BMD significantly much more time to react as compared to the Prithvi test, as much as 5 minutes and more. And the higher the apogee, which is expected if you plan on firing MIRV'd Ababeels from 1000Km away from Delhi, then the more time the BMD gets to defeat the incoming warheads.

Phase I can already take care of MIRV, let alone decoys.

In my opinion, the best bet India has on developing a BMD that can defend against a reasonable portion of a massive first strike...is boost-phase intercept:

1. Using either Airborne Laser (like the YAL-1) or
2. Using a high-hypersonic (Mach 7-10), long-range (~300km) BVRAAM launched from an aerial platform.
Both of these solutions require complete air superiority over the region of patrolling.

1 is already being developed. It is part of Phase II. In fact lasers can even destroy mylar balloons and other decoys, even weaken warheads, so it's part of mid-course and terminal BMD as well, not just boost phase. Don't need air superiority, you need lots of power that can give you enough range.

2 is pointless. You have to be really close for it to work, so it's quite unrealistic. Plus the aircraft carrying the missile has to be in the air and within range of the BM. Laser's the better bet.

Alright, how about Iran vs. Israel? Israel has one of the world's best BMDs (Arrow-2/3), and the only country which is actually keeping up with the advances of its enemies (as far as ballistic missiles are concerned). Still, Iran has the capability to simply saturate the BMD with hundreds of conventional ballistic missiles (if not taken out by a pre-emptive strike).

I'm unsure as to how many BMD systems the Israelis have deployed, and also how many reliable BMs the Iranians have deployed.

For all you know, the Israelis are already capable of intercepting each and every missile fired at them.

 

[HariPrasad]

Russian missile defense failed in Syria and 3 batteries of pantsir are destroyed by israel worst will happen with india if nukes are used

Provided India gives chance to her enemy to use nuke and don't destroy it in preemptive strike.

 

[The Deterrent]

Escalating the war to nuclear is entirely Pakistan's responsibility. If we attack you, you have complete control over whether the war goes nuclear or not. In that sense, you could lose the war, and even lose your country, and still not use nukes. As long as you keep your nukes inert, we won't use nukes. So it's entirely your prerogative whether you use nukes or not.

No, escalation is a shared responsibility. For example, Pakistan has some defined red lines, if anyone breaches them, the consequences are on them. Same goes for India, vice versa. Its just that decision-making gets harder and harder as we move up the escalation ladder, which I pointed out.

In case you want to avoid such a scenario, then your only answer is conventional parity or superiority.

If you have conventional parity or superiority, then war will never happen because India won't attack an enemy that's too strong to be beaten conventionally.

Nonsense, you are proposing conventional deterrence, which never worked for anybody in the past. As soon as nuclear deterrence was introduced starting in the 40s, full-scale wars (between more or less evenly armed opponents) have gone way down.

However a limited war can be entirely non-nuclear.

Sure, if the Indian IBGs don't hold any area, or if they are effectively stopped closer to the border...why not. Not sure what India will achieve with that.

Actually, no. Most of what you have said will be taken care of with the Phase I.

The Phase I is good enough even against MIRV. In fact, due to the way the BMD has been designed, MIRV is largely irrelevant because it still takes too long for the warheads to reenter giving the BMD enough time to react.

Here's proof for the AAD:

The AAD was launched at 0:48 and the interception happened at 1:12, that's just 24 seconds of flight time. The entire exercise actually took around 2 min for an SRBM with an apogee of around 40Km over a short distance. It's obviously taken less than 1 min for the warhead to descend, which is normal for an average reentry speed of less than 1Km/sec until its interception at an altitude of 15Km. In a more realistic scenario with greater ranges, the flight time is much longer, up to 4 or 5 min even for SRBMs, which is more than plenty of enough time for the BMD we have developed.

So MIRVs of an MRBM that are released at an apogee of 300Km will give the BMD significantly much more time to react as compared to the Prithvi test, as much as 5 minutes and more. And the higher the apogee, which is expected if you plan on firing MIRV'd Ababeels from 1000Km away from Delhi, then the more time the BMD gets to defeat the incoming warheads.

Phase I can already take care of MIRV, let alone decoys.

The reason why MIRVs make things difficult for BMDs is merely more numbers, nothing else. It is a misconception that MIRVs are deployed at apogee, they begin deployment as soon as the boost-phase ends, so all thats needed is more number of interceptors. So yeah, given enough interceptors, MIRVs can be taken care of.

I don't see how Phase-I will take care of exo-atmospheric decoys or hypersonic QBMs. Before you start replying again, please go through this discussion:
https://defence.pk/pdf/threads/the-...missiles-obsolete.540429/page-5#post-10195930

1 is already being developed. It is part of Phase II. In fact lasers can even destroy mylar balloons and other decoys, even weaken warheads, so it's part of mid-course and terminal BMD as well, not just boost phase. Don't need air superiority, you need lots of power that can give you enough range.

Kindly stop grabbing at straws. Weaken warheads? The ones that are designed to endure thousands of degrees of re-entry?
Read up on the Boeing YAL-1 program, and why they dropped it.

I'm unsure as to how many BMD systems the Israelis have deployed, and also how many reliable BMs the Iranians have deployed.

For all you know, the Israelis are already capable of intercepting each and every missile fired at them.

Up to 4 batteries (200-400 interceptors). Yeah, its anybody's guess what their strategy is to deal with Iranian BMs, and I'm sure they have one. Its just that Iranian systems are no Hezbollah rockets.

 

[randomradio]

No, escalation is a shared responsibility. For example, Pakistan has some defined red lines, if anyone breaches them, the consequences are on them. Same goes for India, vice versa. Its just that decision-making gets harder and harder as we move up the escalation ladder, which I pointed out.

I guess so. But we are going to do our darndest to make sure it's going to be as expensive as possible.

If we change our red lines, say, remove NFU, then how will you react and how expensive your solution to the new red lines will be, stuff like this will come into the picture.

Nonsense, you are proposing conventional deterrence, which never worked for anybody in the past. As soon as nuclear deterrence was introduced starting in the 40s, full-scale wars (between more or less evenly armed opponents) have gone way down.

What I'm saying is you need nukes obviously, but you need conventional parity as well.

There's no point launching nukes only to have your country occupied simply because you didn't have the conventional power necessary to stop an invasion. If you go nuclear, you have to go the whole hog.

Sure, if the Indian IBGs don't hold any area, or if they are effectively stopped closer to the border...why not. Not sure what India will achieve with that.

What I'm saying is even if all IBGs succeed, it will stay comfortably below Pakistan's nuclear threshold. As military officials have pointed out, Cold Start will not threaten Pakistan's highways, so Pakistan's lifeline will remain intact. Plus the firepower of a single IBG will not be enough to destroy Pakistan's defensive formations. Cold Start does not pose an existential threat to Pakistan, hence it's very unlikely for nukes to be used.

The reason why MIRVs make things difficult for BMDs is merely more numbers, nothing else. It is a misconception that MIRVs are deployed at apogee, they begin deployment as soon as the boost-phase ends, so all thats needed is more number of interceptors. So yeah, given enough interceptors, MIRVs can be taken care of.

I didn't say that for your benefit only. There are plenty of other naysayers who have unrealistic expectations from MIRVs. And of course, the time needed for a full interception cycle.

I don't see how Phase-I will take care of exo-atmospheric decoys or hypersonic QBMs. Before you start replying again, please go through this discussion:
https://defence.pk/pdf/threads/the-...missiles-obsolete.540429/page-5#post-10195930

Even if they say exo-atmosphere, interception takes place at multiple points below the altitude limit for the interceptor. 3 PDVs will be launched for each warhead, and each of those 3 PDVs are going to engage the warhead at different altitudes. Even if the first interception fails, you can expect the decoys to have burned up by the time there's a second or third attempt. There will be other methods, but I suppose we are only going to have to wait for more information.

As for defence against hypersonic MARVs, nobody has defences against it yet. But you can expect India to develop an interceptor capable of it before Pak develops hypersonic MARVs.

Kindly stop grabbing at straws. Weaken warheads? The ones that are designed to endure thousands of degrees of re-entry?

Yes, weaken warheads. Even warheads have their tipping points. There is a limit to how effective you can make a warhead, and a laser can help break that limit. So it works in some circumstances.

If a warhead is already operating close to its red line, then it's extremely vulnerable to a laser. You point a powerful laser at the space shuttle during reentry, you will destroy it.

Read up on the Boeing YAL-1 program, and why they dropped it.

Too early for its time. The range was too short for what they were planning to achieve and there was a limit to how much onboard power they can generate on an aircraft. But in the India-Pakistan scenario, ground based systems will be the better option. We need a laser that is effective up to 400Km. This will deal with boost phase and mid course to a significant degree. This stuff is closer to the 2025-2030 period anyway.

Up to 4 batteries (200-400 interceptors). Yeah, its anybody's guess what their strategy is to deal with Iranian BMs, and I'm sure they have one. Its just that Iranian systems are no Hezbollah rockets.

Unfortunately, we are dealing with the unknown here. You can take it for granted that the Israelis will have enough interceptors to deal with the threats they believe they face. Whether it all works is a different story.

Same in the India-Pak context. Rest assured, we will have enough interceptors to deal with both Pakistan and China. If we have catered for saturation attacks even from China, you can be guaranteed we have enough for Pak's nukes. It's only logical that we will have overkill. We buy SAMs in the thousands anyway. For example, the S-400 deal, the offsets have been cancelled for now, but the Russians were going to build 6000 interceptors for India through Reliance.

https://www.ruaviation.com/news/2015/12/25/4522/
The deal also includes purchase of about 6,000 missiles from Russia.

And now there is also this chatter on the net about buying the THAAD.[/quote]

 

[The Deterrent]

I guess so. But we are going to do our darndest to make sure it's going to be as expensive as possible.

If we change our red lines, say, remove NFU, then how will you react and how expensive your solution to the new red lines will be, stuff like this will come into the picture.

It works both ways.

Pakistani strategic weapons program is already designed to easily adapt to the upcoming requirements (e.g. India disbanding NFU). Reason being, Musharraf & Kidwai structured the SFCs to be able to reasonably survive a US assault (in the event of a dismemberment effort). Therefore adapting them to survive a potential India preemptive strike is neither expensive nor difficult. The only problem is the even lowered thresholds and the resulting destabilization.

What I'm saying is you need nukes obviously, but you need conventional parity as well.

There's no point launching nukes only to have your country occupied simply because you didn't have the conventional power necessary to stop an invasion. If you go nuclear, you have to go the whole hog.

That is precisely why nuclear weapons will be employed after the conventional forces have been exhausted. For some reason everyone thinks that Nasr will be on hair-trigger alert.

What I'm saying is even if all IBGs succeed, it will stay comfortably below Pakistan's nuclear threshold. As military officials have pointed out, Cold Start will not threaten Pakistan's highways, so Pakistan's lifeline will remain intact. Plus the firepower of a single IBG will not be enough to destroy Pakistan's defensive formations. Cold Start does not pose an existential threat to Pakistan, hence it's very unlikely for nukes to be used.

Um no, doesn't works like that. Territorial occupation is one of Pakistan's red lines. Here's what a wrote about how Nasr deters Cold Start a while ago:

This question has been asked a lot of times, and I have repeatedly tried to clear the confusion here and there. So here is a sort of detailed answer.
TL;DR = You are right, Nasr is ineffective against armored columns. The rationale behind developing Nasr is not that, but its about nuking enemy strongholds on Pakistani territory.

Tactical Nukes - the basic idea:
The idea that a tactical nuke would be used only against armor formations stems from the historical deployment of tactical nukes, e.g. by NATO against the USSR. One particularly famous example is the proposed usage of tactical nukes against a Soviet Blitzkrieg at the Fulda Gap in Germany. Fulda Gap is a natural bottleneck for such an armored column, so during the Cold-War, usage of tactical nukes against insufficiently protected tanks (of the cold-war era) would be highly effective.

Ineffectiveness of TNWs against modern MBTs:
You are absolutely correct in your analysis, that in the present age of NBC-protected MBTs, the effectiveness of tactical nuclear weapons against armor formations, in a flat-terrain region like the Indo-Pakistani border, is questionably low. Assuming a formation with vehicles 50-100 meters apart, a 1-5kt tactical nuke would take out only a dozen or two MBTs by the sheer explosion (inaccurate approximation, but you get the idea).

Cold Start - The reason why Pakistan developed Nasr:
Now common sense directs that the Pakistani military is also aware of the above stated ineffectiveness. So exactly what purpose does a tactical nuke serve in the Indo/Pak region? Why does Pakistan considers Nasr as a counter to the Indian Cold-Start doctrine?

To analyse that, you have to look up how India planned to implement cold-start. In response to a possible Pakistan-sponsored terrorist strike or any other similar event, the idea was to use small Integrated Battle Groups (consisting of MBTs, IFVs, APCs, Infantry & Gunships) to swiftly (in less than 48 hours) start crossing the international border at up to 8-10 locations, anywhere up to 50kms (I'm not sure about this figure) deep inside Pakistan, and HOLD those 'slices' of Pakistani territory.....BEFORE the international community steps in for the cease-fire because of the fear of nuclear exchange. These 'slices' would be later used for post-war negotiations.
In-short, Cold Start would have given India the ability to 'punish' Pakistan, without triggering a nuclear war. In detail:


Deterring Cold Start:
Naturally, this was a dangerous prospect for Pakistan. Cold Start essentially had presented India a loop-hole in the Pakistani nuclear doctrine, so that India could damage Pakistani forces AND humiliate Pakistan before the cease-fire without violating the official 'red' line and triggering a nuclear response.

In order to deter this threat, Pakistan had to find one or all of the following solutions:
1. Prevent Indian IBGs from advancing into Pakistani territory via conventional means.
2. Prevent Indian IBGs from advancing into Pakistani territory via nuclear means.
3. Defeat the Indian strongholds inside Pakistani territory & regain it before cease-fire via conventional means.
4. Defeat the Indian strongholds inside Pakistani territory & regain it before cease-fire via nuclear means.

Let's discuss the solutions:
1. Given the sheer qualitative and quantitative conventional strength of the Indian military, and the relative weakness of Pakistani military (no SADARM-type munitions as of yet) Solution 1 is difficult to implement. It is not impossible, but there is a chance that Pakistan would be unable to do so.
2. We've already established that in the modern age, Solution 2 is largely ineffective.
3. Solution 3 is much more difficult than Solution 1 because it will also take more time, taking us close to the cease-fire.
4. This leaves us with Solution 4. That is, if the Indian IBGs invade and hold Pakistani territory, the solution is to simply nuke the military elements (camps, headquarters etc) holding those areas, hence nullifying the entire point of Cold Start, and putting the ball back in India's court. The holding military elements cannot possibly be NBC protected for lengthened duration, most of the personnel and equipment have to be out in the open to operate a stronghold. Thus, Nasr plugs-in the loop-hole by being a low-cost and effective deterrent to Cold Start.
10 points to Gryffindor!

Why a 4-missile system? It's more efficient way to cover an area using multiple low-yield warheads.
Why not use, say, a nuclear Ghaznavi instead? It's not that surgical, it has a higher TEL signature and requires slow launch preparation routines. Nasr is more accurate, looks like a simple conventional MBRL launcher (or a truck if covered up), and is more robust (shoot-and-scoot).
Some may question that how could Pakistan nuke its own land? The answer is that firstly, Cold-Start is effective only in largely uninhabited areas. Areas with higher population density would instead slow down the invasions. Secondly, nuclear weapons when detonated as air-bursts leave minimal to no fallout, and also inflict the most damage via over-pressure. So nuking enemy forces inside your own territory (which is largely uninhabited) is not a bad idea at all.

Even if they say exo-atmosphere, interception takes place at multiple points below the altitude limit for the interceptor. 3 PDVs will be launched for each warhead, and each of those 3 PDVs are going to engage the warhead at different altitudes. Even if the first interception fails, you can expect the decoys to have burned up by the time there's a second or third attempt. There will be other methods, but I suppose we are only going to have to wait for more information.

As for defence against hypersonic MARVs, nobody has defences against it yet. But you can expect India to develop an interceptor capable of it before Pak develops hypersonic MARVs.

Sure, 3x PDVs per realistic decoy is the kind of math Pakistan likes.

So basically India will develop something that nobody has developed yet, before Pakistan develops something that 2 nations have already demonstrated? One of which is Pakistan's closest ally?

Yes, weaken warheads. Even warheads have their tipping points. There is a limit to how effective you can make a warhead, and a laser can help break that limit. So it works in some circumstances.

If a warhead is already operating close to its red line, then it's extremely vulnerable to a laser. You point a powerful laser at the space shuttle during reentry, you will destroy it.

What tipping points? What limits? What circumstances? Your arguments have no reasoning, stop floating random theories that sound too good just in your head. Read up on structural designs of Re-entry Vehicles.

Too early for its time. The range was too short for what they were planning to achieve and there was a limit to how much onboard power they can generate on an aircraft. But in the India-Pakistan scenario, ground based systems will be the better option. We need a laser that is effective up to 400Km. This will deal with boost phase and mid course to a significant degree. This stuff is closer to the 2025-2030 period anyway.

Besides the range, the main factor was the laser's relative ineffectiveness against solid-fueled missiles. Liquid-fueled missiles have thinner airframes so they are more vulnerable to a HP laser, but the solid-fueled missiles have thicker airframes or 'skins', since the entire solid rocket motor is designed to be the combustion chamber.

Same in the India-Pak context. Rest assured, we will have enough interceptors to deal with both Pakistan and China. If we have catered for saturation attacks even from China, you can be guaranteed we have enough for Pak's nukes. It's only logical that we will have overkill.

I wonder who's gonna pay for thousands of interceptors, given that they work against the threats, two decades into the future. Are you sure that you didn't get the whole 'make evil Pakistan spend on weapons and default' thing the other way around?

 

[randomradio]

It works both ways.

Pakistani strategic weapons program is already designed to easily adapt to the upcoming requirements (e.g. India disbanding NFU). Reason being, Musharraf & Kidwai structured the SFCs to be able to reasonably survive a US assault (in the event of a dismemberment effort). Therefore adapting them to survive a potential India preemptive strike is neither expensive nor difficult. The only problem is the even lowered thresholds and the resulting destabilization.

I am sure Pak has the ability to strike back after India's first strike. But first strike is most definitely preferable.

That is precisely why nuclear weapons will be employed after the conventional forces have been exhausted.

No, I don't think one has to wait for conventional forces to deteriorate for nukes to be used. Both can go hand-in-hand.

Um no, doesn't works like that. Territorial occupation is one of Pakistan's red lines. Here's what a wrote about how Nasr deters Cold Start a while ago:

In India, we are going by the rationale that Cold Start will stay below the red lines. Hence the announcement for calling Pak's nuclear bluff.

The idea behind Cold Start is to humiliate Pakistan. If Pakistan resorts to nukes just because India took a few dozen square kilometres of territory in multiple places, it's not going to sit well with the international community. Instant pariah regardless of whether the IA pushes forward or retreats. Hence a bluff. That's why I said Pakistan is going to have to use conventional forces only to stop the IBGs, not nukes. The cons of using nukes in such a scenario simply outweigh the pros.

Which means Cold Start is not going to cross any red lines in Pakistan regardless of the occupation of territory. Nukes come into the picture only for what comes next.

Sure, 3x PDVs per realistic decoy is the kind of math Pakistan likes.

It depends on how good your decoys are though, not to mention the number of decoys, plus the number of missiles with nuclear warheads.

It's 3 PDVs and 2 AADs for each warhead in Phase I. A city like Delhi and the surrounding regions should see the deployment of multiple batteries of such missiles. So we are most definitely talking about hundreds of missiles.

Hell, we can even have some PDVs and AADs equipped with nukes. Destroy everything in the sky and then send in the HTK PDVs and AADs to take out the stragglers, if any. The Akash already comes with that option.

So basically India will develop something that nobody has developed yet, before Pakistan develops something that 2 nations have already demonstrated? One of which is Pakistan's closest ally?

India is already working towards it. Otoh, does Pakistan even have a scramjet program?

What tipping points? What limits? What circumstances? Your arguments have no reasoning, stop floating random theories that sound too good just in your head. Read up on structural designs of Re-entry Vehicles.

The concept is rather simple. Yes, it's just a theory in someone's head, but it's a workable theory and a lot of people have this idea. A space shuttle during reentry heats up to 1700 degrees C, if your laser is powerful enough, it can heat up the shuttle's hull to much higher temperatures thereby weakening the structural integrity of the hull. And a ground based system can have relatively limitless power.

But as I said, the first step will be about boost phase interception, and we are already working towards that. And in the Indo-Pak context, we have it the easiest compared to countries like the US or Russia.

Besides the range, the main factor was the laser's relative ineffectiveness against solid-fueled missiles. Liquid-fueled missiles have thinner airframes so they are more vulnerable to a HP laser, but the solid-fueled missiles have thicker airframes or 'skins', since the entire solid rocket motor is designed to be the combustion chamber.

It was just a 1MW laser. You'd need 10s of MW instead.

I wonder who's gonna pay for thousands of interceptors, given that they work against the threats, two decades into the future.

But that's the way we buy this stuff. 6000 S-400 missiles would have costed a little over $6B, spread out over 10-15 years of production.

Akash orders are also for thousands of missiles with production alone at 50-60 missiles per month.
https://economictimes.indiatimes.co...ion-to-100-per-month/articleshow/51425789.cms

Are you sure that you didn't get the whole 'make evil Pakistan spend on weapons and default' thing the other way around?

I don't think the "make them spend more" thing's going to work anywhere else but the conventional domain. Unless of course, laser BMD comes into the picture. Missile defence is obviously more expensive.

 

[The Deterrent]

In India, we are going by the rationale that Cold Start will stay below the red lines. Hence the announcement for calling Pak's nuclear bluff.

The idea behind Cold Start is to humiliate Pakistan. If Pakistan resorts to nukes just because India took a few dozen square kilometres of territory in multiple places, it's not going to sit well with the international community. Instant pariah regardless of whether the IA pushes forward or retreats. Hence a bluff. That's why I said Pakistan is going to have to use conventional forces only to stop the IBGs, not nukes. The cons of using nukes in such a scenario simply outweigh the pros.

Which means Cold Start is not going to cross any red lines in Pakistan regardless of the occupation of territory. Nukes come into the picture only for what comes next.

Riiiggghhhhttt. Pakistan will NOT care what the International community thinks. Pakistan would never have developed Nasr if what you said was even remotely correct. It is your personal assumption, not even the Indian military brass thinks that way.

Yes, the consequences will be probably devastating. India would have to either not strike at all, proportionally strike (e.g. against the respective missile garrison) or unleash everything. In response, Pakistan will either proportionally strike or go all out. Its called escalation, read about it. Why do you think US is re-introducing tactical nukes for Trident warheads? Because they want a proportional response option. Regardless of what every keyboard warrior here thinks, an Indo-Pak nuclear exchange will be (relatively) gradual and proportional, providing both sides with option to cease-fire at any stage.

It depends on how good your decoys are though, not to mention the number of decoys, plus the number of missiles with nuclear warheads.

It's 3 PDVs and 2 AADs for each warhead in Phase I. A city like Delhi and the surrounding regions should see the deployment of multiple batteries of such missiles. So we are most definitely talking about hundreds of missiles.

Hell, we can even have some PDVs and AADs equipped with nukes. Destroy everything in the sky and then send in the HTK PDVs and AADs to take out the stragglers, if any. The Akash already comes with that option.

Great theories, but not feasible.

India is already working towards it. Otoh, does Pakistan even have a scramjet program?

It doesn't matters for Pakistan whether India is working on it or not.
And MaRVs are not necessarily air-breathing, both the Avangard and Starry-Sky 2 are HGVs. Similarly the US programs, except the HABV, are HGVs. Even something like DF-21's MaRV would be a game-changer in the subcontinent.

The concept is rather simple. Yes, it's just a theory in someone's head, but it's a workable theory and a lot of people have this idea. A space shuttle during reentry heats up to 1700 degrees C, if your laser is powerful enough, it can heat up the shuttle's hull to much higher temperatures thereby weakening the structural integrity of the hull. And a ground based system can have relatively limitless power.

But as I said, the first step will be about boost phase interception, and we are already working towards that. And in the Indo-Pak context, we have it the easiest compared to countries like the US or Russia.

The concept is stupid and dumb. The RVs heat in excess of 5000 degrees Celsius. Besides, the atmospheric distortion is too much for the laser to be effective. I told you to read up on the structure and composition of the RV, but noooo. There is a reason that neither of the G-5 have considered it as a feasible option.

But that's the way we buy this stuff. 6000 S-400 missiles would have costed a little over $6B, spread out over 10-15 years of production.

Akash orders are also for thousands of missiles with production alone at 50-60 missiles per month.
https://economictimes.indiatimes.co...ion-to-100-per-month/articleshow/51425789.cms

I don't think the "make them spend more" thing's going to work anywhere else but the conventional domain. Unless of course, laser BMD comes into the picture. Missile defence is obviously more expensive.

Pakistan forcing India to spend more (more than an order of magnitude) on conventional weapons and missile defenses, while keeping the strategic balance with weapons developed at a fraction of a fraction of its military budget...sounds quite okay to me. Not sure about Indians though.