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Russian Air Force Is Very Effective In Ukraine

Poor operational performance and tactics - inadequate real world experience or relevant training other than very senior pilots.

Non existent cooperation with combined force elements - even coordinating within VKS has been terrible.

Lastly, the entire operational plan and execution was poor because the exercise that lead to the invasion had no resemblance to nor were coordination of an operational plan of the upcoming invasion.

Russian military commanders turned out to be yes men and nepotistic careerists than actual military tacticians or strategists.

RuAF has prevailed in air to air combat by large mostly due to superior aircraft (Su-35 vs Mig-29 and Su-27) but have been mauled by air defense systems because they lacked any cohesive OCA or SEAD campaign
I find it hard to believe a Russian Su-30 cannot breach airspace for 2 minutes & drop bombs on some target and return back

Russia never really employed the SEAD/DEAD missions

very poor targeting from advanced aircraft like Su35 and Su34

even Mig31 was poorly deployed

and this is why Russia is now withdrawing

this is exactly how you dont fight wars

Russia lost way too much
I wonder if they have SEAD capable combat aircraft
 
Maybe it was early in the war but Russia doesn't have air dominance in Ukraine.
Makes sense considering the large number of ATGMS Ukraine got from US/Nato. Most air targets are flying ducks. Russia is losing a lot of stuff pretty fast especially their helicopters. A point will come when they'll reach a saturation mark of not being able to replace the lost units and officers.
 
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Russia established “air superiority “ on day one of the operation. I think you are mistaking it with “air dominance”

Ukie airforce operates in an assymetric manner , its an extremely large country and its got non stop supply lines from nato.

If the us air force was facing a similar equation, they would have had enormous problems as well. They actually lost a significant number of aircraft to sanctioned , isolated iraq with obsolete air defenses



People need to stop watching hollywood movies
What air superiority? They prevent Ukrainian jets from flying over the battlefield? The US air force wouldn't face a similar situation because the US airforce is 100 times stronger than the joke called Russian air force. US had complete air superiority/dominance/whatever you wanna call it over Iraq, its aircraft were taking out massive amounts of Iraqi armor and other forces.
 
What air superiority? They prevent Ukrainian jets from flying over the battlefield? The US air force wouldn't face a similar situation because the US airforce is 100 times stronger than the joke called Russian air force. US had complete air superiority/dominance/whatever you wanna call it over Iraq, its aircraft were taking out massive amounts of Iraqi armor and other forces.

To add to the argument:

NATO also humbled Yugoslavian A2/AD arrangements in Operation Allied Force in 1999. Yugoslavian A2/AD arrangements were among the finest in Europe shaped by lessons drawn from Operation Desert Storm with a network of radar systems that were collectively optimized to detect Low Observable (LO) aircraft and cruise missiles. Earliest examples of IMAD setups in fact.

"Air Force and NATO aircraft faced significantly more effective air defenses than what they had recently encountered in Iraq, and pilots were initially instructed to stay above 15,000 feet to minimize risk."


NATO lost only two aircraft over Yugoslavia:

After 65 days of operations, NATO had lost to enemy fire only two aircraft–an F-117 and an F-16–with no casualties.


B-2A bomber proved its mettle in Yugoslavia:

The combat effectiveness of the B-2 was proved in Operation Allied Force, where it was responsible for destroying 33 percent of all Serbian targets in the first eight weeks, by flying nonstop to Kosovo from its home base in Missouri and back.


In its first combat test, the B-2 bomber defeated not only the Serbian air defense system but also the critics who for years had insisted it would not work as advertised or would never be risked in real war.


Russia never really employed the SEAD/DEAD missions

very poor targeting from advanced aircraft like Su35 and Su34

even Mig31 was poorly deployed

and this is why Russia is now withdrawing

this is exactly how you dont fight wars

Russia lost way too much

Russians are using Su-30SM and Su-35S for SEAD missions in Ukraine. Effectiveness is in question though.

Russians are using MiG-31BM armed with R37M air-to-air missiles to intercept Ukranian aircraft. MiG-31BM turned out to be most effective in this role.
 
Murican pussies will fight Russia to the last Ukrainian.
looks more like Russian Poontang will fight Ukrainian to the last Russian.

Russia established “air superiority “ on day one of the operation. I think you are mistaking it with “air dominance”

Ukie airforce operates in an assymetric manner , its an extremely large country and its got non stop supply lines from nato.

If the us air force was facing a similar equation, they would have had enormous problems as well. They actually lost a significant number of aircraft to sanctioned , isolated iraq with obsolete air defenses



People need to stop watching hollywood movies
Air Superiority involved Air to Air Engagement, while it is not "You Fly You Die" (Air Dominance) , Air Superiority means you can and will challenge any enemy air opposition.

This is not happening in Ukraine, Ukrainian sorties was not all challenged by VKS, and most important of all, Ukrainian Rotor Wing are allowed to fly almost anywhere in Ukraine. Which is a sign that no interception had ever made, because if Russia started challenge any air sortie, be it fix wing or rotary wing, the Ukrainian WILL ground their helicopter operation. Because you can't face off any anti-air in a chopper. That way you slow your enemy advance, because you can't chopper them in (Mean you cannot use both Air Assault and Airborne) and your ground force will operate without gunship cover.

US Airforce would have send out probably 10-30x more sortie than RuAF, it will position all the ground Anti-Air asset in Ukraine, that may not mean Ukrainian AF will be in a position if they fly they die, but they will definitely challenge all Ukrainian Traffic, whether they fly their Mi-29 is up to them, but every sorties will be challenged. That's what we did back in Iraq, we flew 101,000 sortie in the first 28 days, compare to 3600 for the First Russian AF month in Ukraine.
 
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Poor operational performance and tactics - inadequate real world experience or relevant training other than very senior pilots.

Non existent cooperation with combined force elements - even coordinating within VKS has been terrible.

Lastly, the entire operational plan and execution was poor because the exercise that lead to the invasion had no resemblance to nor were coordination of an operational plan of the upcoming invasion.

Russian military commanders turned out to be yes men and nepotistic careerists than actual military tacticians or strategists.

RuAF has prevailed in air to air combat by large mostly due to superior aircraft (Su-35 vs Mig-29 and Su-27) but have been mauled by air defense systems because they lacked any cohesive OCA or SEAD campaign
That's because Russia don't have first hand intelligence.

I was in the thunder run back in 2003, I remember Air Force guy constantly come to our barrack and look for intelligence we have about Iraqi Anti-Air deposition. They look at our sand table and look at our UAV footage.

An Ukrainian friend told me, Russia have no idea where Ukrainian AA Asset is deployed, and they only know when one of them is locking at their aircraft, you can't fight blind and given 3 seconds to react, that's why they can't penetrate Ukrainian airspace.

In the US, we will use E Dub to try and locate their AA defence, map them and then launch targeted strike, like Operation Bolo during Vietnam, and the EF-111 flight during Gulf War, in Ukraine, Russia basically launch missile on the area they think the AA Asset will be and hope they hit something, they learn the hard way when they try to capture Hostomol Airport. They lose quite a lot of air asset in there, they never done anything like that again afterward.
 
That's because Russia don't have first hand intelligence.

I was in the thunder run back in 2003, I remember Air Force guy constantly come to our barrack and look for intelligence we have about Iraqi Anti-Air deposition. They look at our sand table and look at our UAV footage.

An Ukrainian friend told me, Russia have no idea where Ukrainian AA Asset is deployed, and they only know when one of them is locking at their aircraft, you can't fight blind and given 3 seconds to react, that's why they can't penetrate Ukrainian airspace.

In the US, we will use E Dub to try and locate their AA defence, map them and then launch targeted strike, like Operation Bolo during Vietnam, and the EF-111 flight during Gulf War, in Ukraine, Russia basically launch missile on the area they think the AA Asset will be and hope they hit something, they learn the hard way when they try to capture Hostomol Airport. They lose quite a lot of air asset in there, they never done anything like that again afterward.
That is what no one understands - the United States isn’t just about fancy weapons, its deep training and cooperation between branches along with the best real world training doable.

The Russians seem to get none of that other than the few tactical units that went through rotation in Syria.
 
That is what no one understands - the United States isn’t just about fancy weapons, its deep training and cooperation between branches along with the best real world training doable.

The Russians seem to get none of that other than the few tactical units that went through rotation in Syria.

It beats me still that Russians could not advance within striking distance of Kiev
 
It beats me still that Russians could not advance within striking distance of Kiev
Is no surprise at all.


Failure in the air domain has prevented [Russian forces from] securing necessary superiority, let alone supremacy, and thus they cannot provide the required support to their land forces,” Royal Air Force Air Marshal Johnny Stringer, deputy commander of NATO’s Allied Air Command, told RUSI on Nov. 3. This failure, he added, means Russian ground forces “do not have the necessary freedom of maneuver, let alone air-delivered support to prosecute the ground fight from [as] close to deep as they would wish.”​

Air defense and airpower are not the same thing, even though both are in the same milieu. Air defense is always reactive while airpower is supposed to be proactive. The keyword here is 'supposed'. It means that the wielder of airpower SHOULD be prescient enough to recognize the potential of airpower to strike anywhere and know the likelihood of certain consequences. A bridge or a road are not combatants, but each is a conduit for combatants. So if a bridge is damaged/destroyed, enemy logistics would be negatively affected. The typical 'if P then Q' reasoning. The Russian failure in the air domain meant someone in the Russian military leadership is not wise enough to understand the total capability of airpower. Ukrainian ground forces are essentially not restricted in their movements by Russian airpower, so the inevitability is that the Ukrainians are able to restrict Russian ground forces.
 
Is no surprise at all.


Failure in the air domain has prevented [Russian forces from] securing necessary superiority, let alone supremacy, and thus they cannot provide the required support to their land forces,” Royal Air Force Air Marshal Johnny Stringer, deputy commander of NATO’s Allied Air Command, told RUSI on Nov. 3. This failure, he added, means Russian ground forces “do not have the necessary freedom of maneuver, let alone air-delivered support to prosecute the ground fight from [as] close to deep as they would wish.”​

Air defense and airpower are not the same thing, even though both are in the same milieu. Air defense is always reactive while airpower is supposed to be proactive. The keyword here is 'supposed'. It means that the wielder of airpower SHOULD be prescient enough to recognize the potential of airpower to strike anywhere and know the likelihood of certain consequences. A bridge or a road are not combatants, but each is a conduit for combatants. So if a bridge is damaged/destroyed, enemy logistics would be negatively affected. The typical 'if P then Q' reasoning. The Russian failure in the air domain meant someone in the Russian military leadership is not wise enough to understand the total capability of airpower. Ukrainian ground forces are essentially not restricted in their movements by Russian airpower, so the inevitability is that the Ukrainians are able to restrict Russian ground forces.

That is the surprise. With artillery, air power and standoff weapons Russians should be able to destroy Ukrainian logistics close to the frontline
The inability to destroy makes me wonder about a lot of things
 
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That is the surprise. With artillery, air power and standoff weapons Russians should be able to destroy Ukrainian logistics close to the frontline
The inability to destroy makes me wonder about a lot of things
If all we, meaning us and the enemy, does is fight each other on the front lines, then WW I would still be going. That is where airpower come in and why air forces must be independent of ground commanders. Military historians, particularly of airpower, will not be kind to Russia once the dust settled in Ukraine. It is probably a combination of poor doctrines, logistics, manpower, training, and motivation that the VKS is such an utter failure as an independent air force.
 
If all we, meaning us and the enemy, does is fight each other on the front lines, then WW I would still be going. That is where airpower come in and why air forces must be independent of ground commanders. Military historians, particularly of airpower, will not be kind to Russia once the dust settled in Ukraine. It is probably a combination of poor doctrines, logistics, manpower, training, and motivation that the VKS is such an utter failure as an independent air force.
We understood this long ago in Israel, our air force is not simply a tool for the ground forces to use, it is the spearhead of our military.

Ground commanders don't understand anything about the air force and how it operates, that's why even the cheif of staff cannot tell the air force commander what to do.

That is the surprise. With artillery, air power and standoff weapons Russians should be able to destroy Ukrainian logistics close to the frontline
The inability to destroy makes me wonder about a lot of things
Lack of coordination through a digital battle management system, as well as lack of targeting pods and smart munitions for the air force caused Russia's air force and artillery to be ineffective. The Russian air force killchain length is over a day long. Lack of targeting pods makes the aircraft rely on unguided bombs, making the Russian aircraft flying closer to the enemy, and not being able to reliably hit a target.

That is the surprise. With artillery, air power and standoff weapons Russians should be able to destroy Ukrainian logistics close to the frontline
The inability to destroy makes me wonder about a lot of things
Lack of coordination through a digital battle management system, as well as lack of targeting pods and smart munitions for the air force caused Russia's air force and artillery to be ineffective. The Russian air force killchain length is over a day long. Lack of targeting pods makes the aircraft rely on unguided bombs, making the Russian aircraft flying closer to the enemy, and not being able to reliably hit a target.
 
No air superiority = not effective

Given the discrepancy between numbers and equipment, Russia should have dominated the skies above Ukraine and bomb Ukranian army at will.

Instead, Ukrainians are still flying ground support sorties against Russian units near the frontline.
 
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