Yongpeng Sun-Tastaufen
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Russia-Ukraine War - News and Developments PART 2
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Viet
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That’s expected chinese products will flood Russia once western companies pulled out.
Samsung and Apple left Russia. China's phone brands filled the gap
It took mere months for China's top phone makers to seize the market share Apple and Samsung left behind.fortune.com
the Russians produce virtually nothing.
If they want smartphones they buy from China.
If shoes they buy from China. Garments, underwear, toilet paper, cars, machines, chips, computers.
Everything.
At the end of the day Putin, Lavrov wears, using everything chinese while condemning western imperialism.
Good for China if you ask me.
Yongpeng Sun-Tastaufen
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They do make some smartphones. But yeah, considering Russia only has 150 million people, talent pool is obviously much less than China which has 1.4 billion people. Most of their stuffs still have to imported from their Chinese masters.
Russian AYYA T1 based on Aurora OS has physical button against wiretapping | Nokiamob
Aurora OS based AYYA T1 smartphone produced by Russian Smartecosystem cpmpany has a physical button that prevents digital wiretapping.
nokiamob.net
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Viet
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This effort reminds me of Erdogan’s episode. He urges the Turks to dump iphone for domestic Turk phone. Great.They do make some smartphones. But yeah, considering Russia only has 150 million people, talent pool is obviously much less than China which has 1.4 billion people. Most of their stuffs still have to imported from their Chinese masters.
Russian AYYA T1 based on Aurora OS has physical button against wiretapping | Nokiamob
Aurora OS based AYYA T1 smartphone produced by Russian Smartecosystem cpmpany has a physical button that prevents digital wiretapping.
But how Putin wants to convince google to license android? Google says Neij since invasion. He wants to steal it?
Yongpeng Sun-Tastaufen
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Turkey obviously don't have the tech expertise Russia has. Moscow university is one of the best since the mid 1700s. Russia is traditionally a science and tech powerhouse. Sputnik vaccine is the first covid vaccine developed anywhere in the world. Cherenkov radiation holds the key to faster than light space travel.
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Yongpeng Sun-Tastaufen
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SalarHaqq
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Censorship, psychological pressures, judicial prosecution of dissident journalists and even retribution against their elderly parents, an anti-Russian propaganda campaign of Heraclean proportions, and yet the people of Germany are far from unanimously embracing the line which the regime in Berlin is seeking to impose, with sympathetic views of Russia remaining widespread. The resistance displayed by Germans is impressive.
So much so that the Austrian newspaper Wiener Zeitung, a streamlined mainstream medium, dedicated an extensive paper to it. As hinted to earlier, the propaganda machinery of NATO is exhausted. It doesn't work anymore, is no longer convincing to people the world over. Hence the increased use of coercive and violent measures by NATO regimes to discipline their own populations, as their political legitimacy is vacillating more and more.
https://www.wienerzeitung.at/nachri...479-Die-seltsame-deutsche-Russland-Liebe.html
The strange German love of Russia
Despite the Ukraine war, support for the Kremlin is high. Why? An essayistic search for clues.
from 07/30/2022, 2:30 p.m. | Update: 07/31/2022, 08:56 am
A demonstration for Russia in front of the Brandenburg Gate in Berlin. - © dpa / Gerald Matzka
Allegedly, February 24, the day the Russian army launched a frontal attack on Ukraine, changed everything. The EU, previously only rarely closed in relation to Russia, suddenly showed itself to be more united than ever. It imposed severe sanctions, took in war refugees and supplied weapons. Even Germany distanced itself from its state pacifism. Since then, the Ukrainian flag has been omnipresent, giving the impression that the West is standing shoulder to shoulder against Russian President Vladimir Putin's war policy.
A cursory glance at the internet reveals that this impression is deceptive. Governments may decide what they want, but the population is resentful. The comments section under articles about the war shows that Putin still has a sizeable following in this country after February 24. Rising inflation, the threat of gas bottlenecks and horrendous prices are reducing enthusiasm for Ukraine. It goes so far that many see Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy, not Putin, as the warmonger, the man who is preventing peace. If the former actor Zelenskyj is not immediately described as a puppet - as a puppet in the hands of the real mastermind of the war, US President Joe Biden.
It's not necessarily Russians who talk or write like that. Many of my Russian acquaintances living in Vienna - here it is appropriate to speak openly about their own experiences - were shocked by the outbreak of war. The tendency to romanticize the kleptocratic, mafia-like Putin regime, to see in it - for example - a promising conservative counterpoint to a decadent Europe is often much less pronounced among them than among some Austrians or Germans.
But where does this peculiar inclination towards Putin and Russia come from, which is particularly strong in German-speaking countries? Certainly, on the far right, Putin has scored points for years with his opposition to ultra-liberal gender politics, and with the (old) left with anti-NATO rhetoric.
Nevertheless, the Russian president's approval is difficult to explain: The still living trauma from the Second World War - the expulsions, the rapes, the prisoners of war in the Gulag - do not exactly promote a close relationship with Russia. A long Cold War followed, which kept old fears of the danger from the East alive. The threat from the Soviet Union was always present. Of the two superpowers, the western one, the United States, was clearly the more popular: It offered freedom instead of communism and, with the Marshall Plan, laid the foundation for post-war prosperity. The USA also opened a window to the world and shaped the lifestyle of entire generations. Pop culture was and is English, and the cultural ties to the transatlantic superpower are very close. Moscow had and has very little to oppose the "American way of life".
Fear and fascination
Nevertheless, there has always been a sentimental inclination towards Russia, especially in Germany. The gigantic empire in the east was foreign and mysterious enough to fire the imagination and arouse an interest that was never seen in its near neighbor Poland, for example. Even his emphasis on Catholicism triggered resistance in Protestant Prussia.
Russia, on the other hand, was suitable as a projection surface for Prussian Germany - much like Germany was for Russia. The other person embodied what you missed in yourself: here the Kantian rational state of Prussia, well organized and efficient, a role model. There was the seething, indefinite, border-crossing, perhaps also revolutionary-intoxicating, also the introspection, the mystical "Russian soul", which in turn had something to give to the "German essence". A being, in turn, that was thought to be romantically backward-looking. According to a common slogan, the world should heal on him.
Which world? Presumably that bleak, rational, materialistic, meaningless, technoid world of the West, against whose precursors people in Germany rebelled as early as the Romantic period. Conversely, there was always the civilizational - sometimes racially tinged - conceit of superiority over Russia. The Eastern Europe historian Gerd Koenen, who has written a book about the German "Russia complex", speaks of a "mixture of fear and fascination, of empathetic understanding and phobic resistance", of "latent power fantasies and alliance options on the Berlin- Moscow", which could almost never be fully implemented, but still kept people busy.
In particular, a look at the interwar period shows that the relationship between Germany, which had been offended by the Versailles Treaty, and the newly formed, communist superpower in the East was by no means determined solely by resistance and fear of the "red tide" from Asia - as was known after Hitler's war of annihilation and the Cold War. Even within the nationalist German right - despite all rejection of "Bolshevism" - there were starting points for a cooperation with Russia.
Penchant for radicalism
This existed simply because both pariah states had a thirst for revenge against the West: the Treaty of Rapallo, which was concluded 100 years ago between Weimar Germany and the newly founded Soviet Union, had not only mutual recognition but also a strategic revisionist component. A secret military cooperation was agreed, which lasted until autumn 1933. They quickly got closer: During evening maneuver talks, Koenen recently wrote in a contribution, high-ranking officers of the Reichswehr and Red Army were, for example, of the same opinion "that Poland, as a bulwark of the Versailles powers in Eastern Europe, had to be wiped off the map, which would otherwise have to be cleared up on a large scale" - long before the Hitler-Stalin Pact. Even among the National Socialists there was a Russophile wing in the 1920s, which was impressed not only by the depth of the Russian soul but also by the brutal, unbourgeois radicalism of the Bolsheviks. The young Joseph Goebbels, who was initially repelled by Hitler's plans for the east, belonged to it.
Conversely, Moscow always relied on Berlin: Vladimir Ilyich Lenin still dreamed of the world revolution, for which he saw Germany as the decisive country - the Soviet revolutionary leader used the image of Germany and Russia as "two chicks under the shell of imperialism", which these were to break through together - Stalin was later concerned with bringing the old tsarist areas of the empire together with Germany back under Russian control. Which also succeeded in 1939.
Fear of "Fourth Reich"
The people who suffered from this policy were those peoples of "intermediate Europe" who had to secure their livelihood between Moscow and Berlin - such as Poland or the Baltic states. Any kind of German-Russian cronyism still reliably triggers fears of a revival of the Hitler-Stalin Pact, especially in the conservative-national Polish governing party PiS. Experts claim that Germany wants to build a "Fourth Reich" with the EU. Arguing against this is not always easy: Even after passionate debates, I probably haven't convinced my Polish mother-in-law of the harmlessness of today's Germany. Berlin will remain Berlin, and Russia will remain the "evil empire" anyway.
No wonder that the Stars & Stripes of the US flag shine brighter in Warsaw than in Germany. Being an appendage in a German-dominated Europe is anything but tempting, at least for the PiS - especially given the sharp ideological contrasts to the left-liberal dominated Union. One sees oneself more than ever as the standard-bearer of the West, the civilized world in what is believed to be the insecure East of Europe. There is little desire to question this civilization and its achievements, which is now very pronounced in the academic milieu in the West. After all, belonging to western civilization in the border area of Eastern Europe acts as a central anchor of one's own identity, which was repeatedly threatened by the neighbor to the East. Relations with western modernity and the supremacy USA are unencumbered and friendly.
Different in Moscow. There, the relationship to the West has been deeply divided since the reforms of Peter the Great: The West, rival and counterpart, acted as a role model, as the other, whose level people tried to reach - with enormous privations and sacrifices. The desire to be ahead on the axis of progress was rarely satisfied - for example in the Sputnik shock. Western modernity seemed ideal, but at the same time it remained something alien, unloved, grafted onto orthodox Russia from the outside. There was always resistance, defiance against it. Even today, Russia is building its identity in the tradition of the "Third Rome" as a conservative antithesis to the radical-liberal "Gayropa".
~
But there was also resistance to Western modernity in Germany, and not just in the Romantic period. Even before the First World War, there were whispers of the profound German soul and culture, which was superior to the flat, superficial, mercantile, sterile, materialistic Western civilization and could bring salvation to the world. After the war, youth movements like the Wandervogel preached a return to nature, anthroposophical circles arose, and the "noble savage" was sought as a natural counterpart to the corrupt civilization of money. From such longings it was not far to anti-Semitic conclusions. In fact, in the 1920s even a book as unsuspicious as it was brilliant like Egon Friedell's "Cultural History of the Modern Era" contained not only ideas that the bleak materialistic Western civilization could only be saved by Germany or Russia, but also anti-Jewish echoes. And this despite the fact that Friedell himself was certainly not an anti-Semite and was also of Jewish origin - and committed suicide in Vienna after the "Anschluss" in 1938.
Skeptics of the modern world
In this country, Jews were mostly perceived as standard-bearers of modernity. Characteristics such as agile, industrious and enterprising were attributed to them. Because they were considered to be better adapted to the supposedly hard, capitalist world of modernity, for centuries trade was one of the few sectors in which they were allowed to work. In the interwar period, all political camps were looking for alternatives to Western liberalism: from Spengler's "Prussian socialism" to the Marxist variant and the National Socialist community, a wide range of desires spanned. Citizens and workers felt threatened by competition and sought protection from possible isolation in Western liberalism in the community among equals.
Most of these alternative designs are now history. Nevertheless, the moving behind it has not completely seeped away in this country. For example, the resentment against the United States, which some people feel surprisingly quickly, could be a legacy of the anti-modern and anti-Western attitudes of the past. It is also noticeable that skepticism about science and modernity always finds a particularly good resonance in German-speaking countries - whether it is about opposition to nuclear and genetic engineering, biological agriculture, opposition to vaccination or alternative healing practices. The concern - in many cases probably not unjustified - that technological developments that have gotten out of hand will destroy the remaining untouched nature and make people unable to breathe is widespread. People are also more afraid of freedom here than overseas, fearing too much of a market economy.
The German Janus Head
Today's decidedly modern Germany has always been a Janus-faced country: long asleep and backward, a "late nation", the country stormed to the forefront of technical progress after unification by Prussia. At the same time, however, there was always a whole squad of critics of this development, and the technical criticism in particular reached a high level in Germany. The widespread search for a life close to nature also made some look to Russia, a country that has always seen itself as an alternative to the West. The fact that the Bolsheviks were a group in power there that wanted to drive western technological development to the extreme did not have to be a problem - the old Russia had to be slumbering somewhere, which, loosely based on Dostoyevsky, was supposed to speak the word of salvation to the world.
Despite all German western connections, the bridges to Russia have not been completely demolished even today - for example, there is a strong inclination towards Moscow within the New Right. Conversely, the controversial Russian Eurasia ideologue Alexander Dugin makes extensive use of Friedrich Nietzsche, Martin Heidegger and thinkers of the German "conservative revolution" of the 1920s. The glue that holds this coalition together today is the rejection of western modernity. However one evaluates this rejection, one thing should be clear: the humus for anti-modern attitudes is still deep in this country.
So much so that the Austrian newspaper Wiener Zeitung, a streamlined mainstream medium, dedicated an extensive paper to it. As hinted to earlier, the propaganda machinery of NATO is exhausted. It doesn't work anymore, is no longer convincing to people the world over. Hence the increased use of coercive and violent measures by NATO regimes to discipline their own populations, as their political legitimacy is vacillating more and more.
https://www.wienerzeitung.at/nachri...479-Die-seltsame-deutsche-Russland-Liebe.html
The strange German love of Russia
Despite the Ukraine war, support for the Kremlin is high. Why? An essayistic search for clues.
from 07/30/2022, 2:30 p.m. | Update: 07/31/2022, 08:56 am
A demonstration for Russia in front of the Brandenburg Gate in Berlin. - © dpa / Gerald Matzka
Allegedly, February 24, the day the Russian army launched a frontal attack on Ukraine, changed everything. The EU, previously only rarely closed in relation to Russia, suddenly showed itself to be more united than ever. It imposed severe sanctions, took in war refugees and supplied weapons. Even Germany distanced itself from its state pacifism. Since then, the Ukrainian flag has been omnipresent, giving the impression that the West is standing shoulder to shoulder against Russian President Vladimir Putin's war policy.
A cursory glance at the internet reveals that this impression is deceptive. Governments may decide what they want, but the population is resentful. The comments section under articles about the war shows that Putin still has a sizeable following in this country after February 24. Rising inflation, the threat of gas bottlenecks and horrendous prices are reducing enthusiasm for Ukraine. It goes so far that many see Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy, not Putin, as the warmonger, the man who is preventing peace. If the former actor Zelenskyj is not immediately described as a puppet - as a puppet in the hands of the real mastermind of the war, US President Joe Biden.
It's not necessarily Russians who talk or write like that. Many of my Russian acquaintances living in Vienna - here it is appropriate to speak openly about their own experiences - were shocked by the outbreak of war. The tendency to romanticize the kleptocratic, mafia-like Putin regime, to see in it - for example - a promising conservative counterpoint to a decadent Europe is often much less pronounced among them than among some Austrians or Germans.
But where does this peculiar inclination towards Putin and Russia come from, which is particularly strong in German-speaking countries? Certainly, on the far right, Putin has scored points for years with his opposition to ultra-liberal gender politics, and with the (old) left with anti-NATO rhetoric.
Nevertheless, the Russian president's approval is difficult to explain: The still living trauma from the Second World War - the expulsions, the rapes, the prisoners of war in the Gulag - do not exactly promote a close relationship with Russia. A long Cold War followed, which kept old fears of the danger from the East alive. The threat from the Soviet Union was always present. Of the two superpowers, the western one, the United States, was clearly the more popular: It offered freedom instead of communism and, with the Marshall Plan, laid the foundation for post-war prosperity. The USA also opened a window to the world and shaped the lifestyle of entire generations. Pop culture was and is English, and the cultural ties to the transatlantic superpower are very close. Moscow had and has very little to oppose the "American way of life".
Fear and fascination
Nevertheless, there has always been a sentimental inclination towards Russia, especially in Germany. The gigantic empire in the east was foreign and mysterious enough to fire the imagination and arouse an interest that was never seen in its near neighbor Poland, for example. Even his emphasis on Catholicism triggered resistance in Protestant Prussia.
Russia, on the other hand, was suitable as a projection surface for Prussian Germany - much like Germany was for Russia. The other person embodied what you missed in yourself: here the Kantian rational state of Prussia, well organized and efficient, a role model. There was the seething, indefinite, border-crossing, perhaps also revolutionary-intoxicating, also the introspection, the mystical "Russian soul", which in turn had something to give to the "German essence". A being, in turn, that was thought to be romantically backward-looking. According to a common slogan, the world should heal on him.
Which world? Presumably that bleak, rational, materialistic, meaningless, technoid world of the West, against whose precursors people in Germany rebelled as early as the Romantic period. Conversely, there was always the civilizational - sometimes racially tinged - conceit of superiority over Russia. The Eastern Europe historian Gerd Koenen, who has written a book about the German "Russia complex", speaks of a "mixture of fear and fascination, of empathetic understanding and phobic resistance", of "latent power fantasies and alliance options on the Berlin- Moscow", which could almost never be fully implemented, but still kept people busy.
In particular, a look at the interwar period shows that the relationship between Germany, which had been offended by the Versailles Treaty, and the newly formed, communist superpower in the East was by no means determined solely by resistance and fear of the "red tide" from Asia - as was known after Hitler's war of annihilation and the Cold War. Even within the nationalist German right - despite all rejection of "Bolshevism" - there were starting points for a cooperation with Russia.
Penchant for radicalism
This existed simply because both pariah states had a thirst for revenge against the West: the Treaty of Rapallo, which was concluded 100 years ago between Weimar Germany and the newly founded Soviet Union, had not only mutual recognition but also a strategic revisionist component. A secret military cooperation was agreed, which lasted until autumn 1933. They quickly got closer: During evening maneuver talks, Koenen recently wrote in a contribution, high-ranking officers of the Reichswehr and Red Army were, for example, of the same opinion "that Poland, as a bulwark of the Versailles powers in Eastern Europe, had to be wiped off the map, which would otherwise have to be cleared up on a large scale" - long before the Hitler-Stalin Pact. Even among the National Socialists there was a Russophile wing in the 1920s, which was impressed not only by the depth of the Russian soul but also by the brutal, unbourgeois radicalism of the Bolsheviks. The young Joseph Goebbels, who was initially repelled by Hitler's plans for the east, belonged to it.
Conversely, Moscow always relied on Berlin: Vladimir Ilyich Lenin still dreamed of the world revolution, for which he saw Germany as the decisive country - the Soviet revolutionary leader used the image of Germany and Russia as "two chicks under the shell of imperialism", which these were to break through together - Stalin was later concerned with bringing the old tsarist areas of the empire together with Germany back under Russian control. Which also succeeded in 1939.
Fear of "Fourth Reich"
The people who suffered from this policy were those peoples of "intermediate Europe" who had to secure their livelihood between Moscow and Berlin - such as Poland or the Baltic states. Any kind of German-Russian cronyism still reliably triggers fears of a revival of the Hitler-Stalin Pact, especially in the conservative-national Polish governing party PiS. Experts claim that Germany wants to build a "Fourth Reich" with the EU. Arguing against this is not always easy: Even after passionate debates, I probably haven't convinced my Polish mother-in-law of the harmlessness of today's Germany. Berlin will remain Berlin, and Russia will remain the "evil empire" anyway.
No wonder that the Stars & Stripes of the US flag shine brighter in Warsaw than in Germany. Being an appendage in a German-dominated Europe is anything but tempting, at least for the PiS - especially given the sharp ideological contrasts to the left-liberal dominated Union. One sees oneself more than ever as the standard-bearer of the West, the civilized world in what is believed to be the insecure East of Europe. There is little desire to question this civilization and its achievements, which is now very pronounced in the academic milieu in the West. After all, belonging to western civilization in the border area of Eastern Europe acts as a central anchor of one's own identity, which was repeatedly threatened by the neighbor to the East. Relations with western modernity and the supremacy USA are unencumbered and friendly.
Different in Moscow. There, the relationship to the West has been deeply divided since the reforms of Peter the Great: The West, rival and counterpart, acted as a role model, as the other, whose level people tried to reach - with enormous privations and sacrifices. The desire to be ahead on the axis of progress was rarely satisfied - for example in the Sputnik shock. Western modernity seemed ideal, but at the same time it remained something alien, unloved, grafted onto orthodox Russia from the outside. There was always resistance, defiance against it. Even today, Russia is building its identity in the tradition of the "Third Rome" as a conservative antithesis to the radical-liberal "Gayropa".
~
But there was also resistance to Western modernity in Germany, and not just in the Romantic period. Even before the First World War, there were whispers of the profound German soul and culture, which was superior to the flat, superficial, mercantile, sterile, materialistic Western civilization and could bring salvation to the world. After the war, youth movements like the Wandervogel preached a return to nature, anthroposophical circles arose, and the "noble savage" was sought as a natural counterpart to the corrupt civilization of money. From such longings it was not far to anti-Semitic conclusions. In fact, in the 1920s even a book as unsuspicious as it was brilliant like Egon Friedell's "Cultural History of the Modern Era" contained not only ideas that the bleak materialistic Western civilization could only be saved by Germany or Russia, but also anti-Jewish echoes. And this despite the fact that Friedell himself was certainly not an anti-Semite and was also of Jewish origin - and committed suicide in Vienna after the "Anschluss" in 1938.
Skeptics of the modern world
In this country, Jews were mostly perceived as standard-bearers of modernity. Characteristics such as agile, industrious and enterprising were attributed to them. Because they were considered to be better adapted to the supposedly hard, capitalist world of modernity, for centuries trade was one of the few sectors in which they were allowed to work. In the interwar period, all political camps were looking for alternatives to Western liberalism: from Spengler's "Prussian socialism" to the Marxist variant and the National Socialist community, a wide range of desires spanned. Citizens and workers felt threatened by competition and sought protection from possible isolation in Western liberalism in the community among equals.
Most of these alternative designs are now history. Nevertheless, the moving behind it has not completely seeped away in this country. For example, the resentment against the United States, which some people feel surprisingly quickly, could be a legacy of the anti-modern and anti-Western attitudes of the past. It is also noticeable that skepticism about science and modernity always finds a particularly good resonance in German-speaking countries - whether it is about opposition to nuclear and genetic engineering, biological agriculture, opposition to vaccination or alternative healing practices. The concern - in many cases probably not unjustified - that technological developments that have gotten out of hand will destroy the remaining untouched nature and make people unable to breathe is widespread. People are also more afraid of freedom here than overseas, fearing too much of a market economy.
The German Janus Head
Today's decidedly modern Germany has always been a Janus-faced country: long asleep and backward, a "late nation", the country stormed to the forefront of technical progress after unification by Prussia. At the same time, however, there was always a whole squad of critics of this development, and the technical criticism in particular reached a high level in Germany. The widespread search for a life close to nature also made some look to Russia, a country that has always seen itself as an alternative to the West. The fact that the Bolsheviks were a group in power there that wanted to drive western technological development to the extreme did not have to be a problem - the old Russia had to be slumbering somewhere, which, loosely based on Dostoyevsky, was supposed to speak the word of salvation to the world.
Despite all German western connections, the bridges to Russia have not been completely demolished even today - for example, there is a strong inclination towards Moscow within the New Right. Conversely, the controversial Russian Eurasia ideologue Alexander Dugin makes extensive use of Friedrich Nietzsche, Martin Heidegger and thinkers of the German "conservative revolution" of the 1920s. The glue that holds this coalition together today is the rejection of western modernity. However one evaluates this rejection, one thing should be clear: the humus for anti-modern attitudes is still deep in this country.
NotSure
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You are wrong. I think this is 100% SBU, sticking to this lowlife kind of terrorism. It seems they f ucked up to kill Dugin himself, because Daria was driving his car and he decided to use an another car in the last moment. He was driving in the car behind her and saw all in front of him.
And btw. Dugin is not Putins advisor and never was. And everybody in the western intelligence community knows this. But the Ukrops are going apeshit about Dugin and think he is some kind of grey eminence in the background or so, because he has some influence in Russia. And before that they have done several more or less useless attacks, but big in the propaganda pic. This terrorattack is exactly the same kind of ukrop thinking.
And regarding lowlife kind of terrorattacks: Look, who is defending it. Here in the forum, twitter etc. All the russophobe bots are fans of al-Qaida style terror. Not surprising at all.
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Yongpeng Sun-Tastaufen
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Censorship, psychological pressures, judicial prosecution of dissident journalists and even retribution against their elderly parents, an anti-Russian propaganda campaign of Heraclean proportions, and yet the people of Germany are far from unanimously embracing the line which the regime in Berlin is seeking to impose, with sympathetic views of Russia remaining widespread. The resistance displayed by Germans is impressive.
So much so that the Austrian newspaper Wiener Zeitung, a streamlined mainstream medium, dedicated an extensive paper to it. As hinted to earlier, the propaganda machinery of NATO is exhausted. It doesn't work anymore, is no longer convincing to people the world over. Hence the increased use of coercive and violent measures by NATO regimes to discipline their own populations, as their political legitimacy is vacillating more and more.
https://www.wienerzeitung.at/nachri...479-Die-seltsame-deutsche-Russland-Liebe.html
The strange German love of Russia
Despite the Ukraine war, support for the Kremlin is high. Why? An essayistic search for clues.
from 07/30/2022, 2:30 p.m. | Update: 07/31/2022, 08:56 am
A demonstration for Russia in front of the Brandenburg Gate in Berlin. - © dpa / Gerald Matzka
Allegedly, February 24, the day the Russian army launched a frontal attack on Ukraine, changed everything. The EU, previously only rarely closed in relation to Russia, suddenly showed itself to be more united than ever. It imposed severe sanctions, took in war refugees and supplied weapons. Even Germany distanced itself from its state pacifism. Since then, the Ukrainian flag has been omnipresent, giving the impression that the West is standing shoulder to shoulder against Russian President Vladimir Putin's war policy.
A cursory glance at the internet reveals that this impression is deceptive. Governments may decide what they want, but the population is resentful. The comments section under articles about the war shows that Putin still has a sizeable following in this country after February 24. Rising inflation, the threat of gas bottlenecks and horrendous prices are reducing enthusiasm for Ukraine. It goes so far that many see Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy, not Putin, as the warmonger, the man who is preventing peace. If the former actor Zelenskyj is not immediately described as a puppet - as a puppet in the hands of the real mastermind of the war, US President Joe Biden.
It's not necessarily Russians who talk or write like that. Many of my Russian acquaintances living in Vienna - here it is appropriate to speak openly about their own experiences - were shocked by the outbreak of war. The tendency to romanticize the kleptocratic, mafia-like Putin regime, to see in it - for example - a promising conservative counterpoint to a decadent Europe is often much less pronounced among them than among some Austrians or Germans.
But where does this peculiar inclination towards Putin and Russia come from, which is particularly strong in German-speaking countries? Certainly, on the far right, Putin has scored points for years with his opposition to ultra-liberal gender politics, and with the (old) left with anti-NATO rhetoric.
Nevertheless, the Russian president's approval is difficult to explain: The still living trauma from the Second World War - the expulsions, the rapes, the prisoners of war in the Gulag - do not exactly promote a close relationship with Russia. A long Cold War followed, which kept old fears of the danger from the East alive. The threat from the Soviet Union was always present. Of the two superpowers, the western one, the United States, was clearly the more popular: It offered freedom instead of communism and, with the Marshall Plan, laid the foundation for post-war prosperity. The USA also opened a window to the world and shaped the lifestyle of entire generations. Pop culture was and is English, and the cultural ties to the transatlantic superpower are very close. Moscow had and has very little to oppose the "American way of life".
Fear and fascination
Nevertheless, there has always been a sentimental inclination towards Russia, especially in Germany. The gigantic empire in the east was foreign and mysterious enough to fire the imagination and arouse an interest that was never seen in its near neighbor Poland, for example. Even his emphasis on Catholicism triggered resistance in Protestant Prussia.
Russia, on the other hand, was suitable as a projection surface for Prussian Germany - much like Germany was for Russia. The other person embodied what you missed in yourself: here the Kantian rational state of Prussia, well organized and efficient, a role model. There was the seething, indefinite, border-crossing, perhaps also revolutionary-intoxicating, also the introspection, the mystical "Russian soul", which in turn had something to give to the "German essence". A being, in turn, that was thought to be romantically backward-looking. According to a common slogan, the world should heal on him.
Which world? Presumably that bleak, rational, materialistic, meaningless, technoid world of the West, against whose precursors people in Germany rebelled as early as the Romantic period. Conversely, there was always the civilizational - sometimes racially tinged - conceit of superiority over Russia. The Eastern Europe historian Gerd Koenen, who has written a book about the German "Russia complex", speaks of a "mixture of fear and fascination, of empathetic understanding and phobic resistance", of "latent power fantasies and alliance options on the Berlin- Moscow", which could almost never be fully implemented, but still kept people busy.
In particular, a look at the interwar period shows that the relationship between Germany, which had been offended by the Versailles Treaty, and the newly formed, communist superpower in the East was by no means determined solely by resistance and fear of the "red tide" from Asia - as was known after Hitler's war of annihilation and the Cold War. Even within the nationalist German right - despite all rejection of "Bolshevism" - there were starting points for a cooperation with Russia.
Penchant for radicalism
This existed simply because both pariah states had a thirst for revenge against the West: the Treaty of Rapallo, which was concluded 100 years ago between Weimar Germany and the newly founded Soviet Union, had not only mutual recognition but also a strategic revisionist component. A secret military cooperation was agreed, which lasted until autumn 1933. They quickly got closer: During evening maneuver talks, Koenen recently wrote in a contribution, high-ranking officers of the Reichswehr and Red Army were, for example, of the same opinion "that Poland, as a bulwark of the Versailles powers in Eastern Europe, had to be wiped off the map, which would otherwise have to be cleared up on a large scale" - long before the Hitler-Stalin Pact. Even among the National Socialists there was a Russophile wing in the 1920s, which was impressed not only by the depth of the Russian soul but also by the brutal, unbourgeois radicalism of the Bolsheviks. The young Joseph Goebbels, who was initially repelled by Hitler's plans for the east, belonged to it.
Conversely, Moscow always relied on Berlin: Vladimir Ilyich Lenin still dreamed of the world revolution, for which he saw Germany as the decisive country - the Soviet revolutionary leader used the image of Germany and Russia as "two chicks under the shell of imperialism", which these were to break through together - Stalin was later concerned with bringing the old tsarist areas of the empire together with Germany back under Russian control. Which also succeeded in 1939.
Fear of "Fourth Reich"
The people who suffered from this policy were those peoples of "intermediate Europe" who had to secure their livelihood between Moscow and Berlin - such as Poland or the Baltic states. Any kind of German-Russian cronyism still reliably triggers fears of a revival of the Hitler-Stalin Pact, especially in the conservative-national Polish governing party PiS. Experts claim that Germany wants to build a "Fourth Reich" with the EU. Arguing against this is not always easy: Even after passionate debates, I probably haven't convinced my Polish mother-in-law of the harmlessness of today's Germany. Berlin will remain Berlin, and Russia will remain the "evil empire" anyway.
No wonder that the Stars & Stripes of the US flag shine brighter in Warsaw than in Germany. Being an appendage in a German-dominated Europe is anything but tempting, at least for the PiS - especially given the sharp ideological contrasts to the left-liberal dominated Union. One sees oneself more than ever as the standard-bearer of the West, the civilized world in what is believed to be the insecure East of Europe. There is little desire to question this civilization and its achievements, which is now very pronounced in the academic milieu in the West. After all, belonging to western civilization in the border area of Eastern Europe acts as a central anchor of one's own identity, which was repeatedly threatened by the neighbor to the East. Relations with western modernity and the supremacy USA are unencumbered and friendly.
Different in Moscow. There, the relationship to the West has been deeply divided since the reforms of Peter the Great: The West, rival and counterpart, acted as a role model, as the other, whose level people tried to reach - with enormous privations and sacrifices. The desire to be ahead on the axis of progress was rarely satisfied - for example in the Sputnik shock. Western modernity seemed ideal, but at the same time it remained something alien, unloved, grafted onto orthodox Russia from the outside. There was always resistance, defiance against it. Even today, Russia is building its identity in the tradition of the "Third Rome" as a conservative antithesis to the radical-liberal "Gayropa".
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But there was also resistance to Western modernity in Germany, and not just in the Romantic period. Even before the First World War, there were whispers of the profound German soul and culture, which was superior to the flat, superficial, mercantile, sterile, materialistic Western civilization and could bring salvation to the world. After the war, youth movements like the Wandervogel preached a return to nature, anthroposophical circles arose, and the "noble savage" was sought as a natural counterpart to the corrupt civilization of money. From such longings it was not far to anti-Semitic conclusions. In fact, in the 1920s even a book as unsuspicious as it was brilliant like Egon Friedell's "Cultural History of the Modern Era" contained not only ideas that the bleak materialistic Western civilization could only be saved by Germany or Russia, but also anti-Jewish echoes. And this despite the fact that Friedell himself was certainly not an anti-Semite and was also of Jewish origin - and committed suicide in Vienna after the "Anschluss" in 1938.
Skeptics of the modern world
In this country, Jews were mostly perceived as standard-bearers of modernity. Characteristics such as agile, industrious and enterprising were attributed to them. Because they were considered to be better adapted to the supposedly hard, capitalist world of modernity, for centuries trade was one of the few sectors in which they were allowed to work. In the interwar period, all political camps were looking for alternatives to Western liberalism: from Spengler's "Prussian socialism" to the Marxist variant and the National Socialist community, a wide range of desires spanned. Citizens and workers felt threatened by competition and sought protection from possible isolation in Western liberalism in the community among equals.
Most of these alternative designs are now history. Nevertheless, the moving behind it has not completely seeped away in this country. For example, the resentment against the United States, which some people feel surprisingly quickly, could be a legacy of the anti-modern and anti-Western attitudes of the past. It is also noticeable that skepticism about science and modernity always finds a particularly good resonance in German-speaking countries - whether it is about opposition to nuclear and genetic engineering, biological agriculture, opposition to vaccination or alternative healing practices. The concern - in many cases probably not unjustified - that technological developments that have gotten out of hand will destroy the remaining untouched nature and make people unable to breathe is widespread. People are also more afraid of freedom here than overseas, fearing too much of a market economy.
The German Janus Head
Today's decidedly modern Germany has always been a Janus-faced country: long asleep and backward, a "late nation", the country stormed to the forefront of technical progress after unification by Prussia. At the same time, however, there was always a whole squad of critics of this development, and the technical criticism in particular reached a high level in Germany. The widespread search for a life close to nature also made some look to Russia, a country that has always seen itself as an alternative to the West. The fact that the Bolsheviks were a group in power there that wanted to drive western technological development to the extreme did not have to be a problem - the old Russia had to be slumbering somewhere, which, loosely based on Dostoyevsky, was supposed to speak the word of salvation to the world.
Despite all German western connections, the bridges to Russia have not been completely demolished even today - for example, there is a strong inclination towards Moscow within the New Right. Conversely, the controversial Russian Eurasia ideologue Alexander Dugin makes extensive use of Friedrich Nietzsche, Martin Heidegger and thinkers of the German "conservative revolution" of the 1920s. The glue that holds this coalition together today is the rejection of western modernity. However one evaluates this rejection, one thing should be clear: the humus for anti-modern attitudes is still deep in this country.
Germany, like Russia, is a pseudo democracy. The people do not vote directly in Germany. Only deputies vote. This is the case in China. Also, Germany is former Hunnic empire. They have Asian tradition of authoritarianism and dictatorship. In terms of culture Germany is far closer to Russia than to France which is a true democracy.
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SalarHaqq
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Yup, taking it out against the relatives of political opponents - civilians at that, is usual behaviour for NATO regimes and their vassals.
No wonder, thus, that supporters of these regimes will be seen drooling and celebrating such acts (including when they take the form of a terrorist assassination), even insulting the victims.
Yongpeng Sun-Tastaufen
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Yongpeng Sun-Tastaufen
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The SC
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The Ukrainian Defense Forces will be armed with American BGM-71 TOW anti-tank missile systems, and these weapons will help the Ukrainians destroy Russian armored vehicles.
The Ukrainian Defense Forces will be armed with American BGM-71 TOW anti-tank missile systems, and these weapons will help the Ukrainians destroy Russian armored vehicles.
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Yongpeng Sun-Tastaufen
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TOW is a major step down from Javelin. If they are getting 1980s TOW the way Syrian rebels did it's not much use. The tripod launcher is way too heavy to be man portable. Not to mention it has bad accuracy being wire guided. In Syria TOW performed badly even against obsolete 1970s T-72. At best TOW can be compared to Konkurs but is vastly inferior to Kornet which has much better accuracy being laser guided. It does appear Americans are running low on Javelin stock.
