Russia’s T-90 tank - winner or loser?

[Penguin]

First Chechen War[edit]
T-80B and T-80BV MBTs were never used in Afghanistan in the 1980s, but they were first used during the First Chechen War. This first real combat experience for T-80 MBTs was unsuccessful, as the tanks were used for capturing cities, a task for which they were not very well suited. The biggest tank losses were suffered during the ill-fated assault on the city of Grozny. The forces selected to capture Grozny were not prepared for such an operation, while the city was defended by, among others, veterans of the Soviet War in Afghanistan. The T-80 tanks used in this operation either did not have reactive armour (T-80B) or they were not fitted before the start of the operation (T-80BV), and the T-80 crews lacked sufficient training before the war.

The inexperienced crews had no knowledge of the layout of the city, while the tanks were attacked by RPG teams hidden in cellars and on top of high buildings. The anti-tank fire was directed at the least armoured points of the vehicles. Each destroyed tank received from three to six hits, and each tank was fired at by six or sevenrocket-propelled grenades. A number of vehicles exploded when the autoloader, with vertically placed rounds, was hit: in theory it should have been protected by the road wheel, but, when the tanks got hit on their side armour, the ready-to-use ammunition exploded. Out of all armored vehicles that entered Grozny, 225 were destroyed in the first month alone, representing 10.23% of all the tanks committed to the campaign.[25] The T-80 performed so poorly that General-Lieutenant A. Galkin, the head of the Armor Directorate, convinced the Minister of Defence after the conflict to never again procure tanks with gas-turbine engines.[26] After that, T-80 MBTs were never again used to capture cities, and, instead, they supported infantry squads from a safe distance. Defenders of the T-80 point out that the T-72 performed just as badly in urban fighting in Grozny as the T-80 and that there were two mitigating factors: after the breakup of the Soviet Union, poor funding meant no training for new Russian tank crews, and the tank force entering the city had no infantry support, which is considered to be suicidal by many major military strategists of armored warfare.[24]

From same page.

Russian army is replacing the obsolete T-80 with the battle proven T-72



All 4500 T-80 are in storage. None are deployed as it is a battlefield failure.

List of main battle tanks by country - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

Red indicates poor use, not poor materiel.

Perhaps they are all in storage in 2013 (which is what the ref says). But, Grozny was 1999-2000. You see no withdrawal 2000-2008. Consider less then 10% of russian T-72 are still in use today (1200 out of 10k+ according to your own ref.). By comparison, in 1985 there were 1,900 T-80 MBTs overall, 2,256 T-80 MBTs were stationed in East Germany between 1986 and 1987 and in 1991 when the Soviet Union was breaking up the Soviet Army operated 4,839 T-80 MBTs in several different models. Retaining less than 10% of that boils down to around 450 MBTs today. T-72s have NOT replaced T-80 (if anything, T-80 is replaced by T-90). There were always fewer T-80s than T-72s, which makes their presence in Russian active service in such numbers through 2008 all the more testimony.

Shifts may just as well be explained by preference for one tank factory over another, rather than by tank quality (i.e. politics), given the severe shortage of funding for many years.

 

[Etilla]

Red indicates poor use, not poor materiel.

Perhaps they are all in storage in 2013 (which is what the ref says). But, Grozny was 1999-2000. You see no withdrawal 2000-2008. Consider less then 10% of russian T-72 are still in use today (1200 out of 10k+ according to your own ref.). By comparison, in 1985 there were 1,900 T-80 MBTs overall, 2,256 T-80 MBTs were stationed in East Germany between 1986 and 1987 and in 1991 when the Soviet Union was breaking up the Soviet Army operated 4,839 T-80 MBTs in several different models. Retaining less than 10% of that boils down to around 450 MBTs today. T-72s have NOT replaced T-80 (if anything, T-80 is replaced by T-90). There were always fewer T-80s than T-72s, which makes their presence in Russian active service in such numbers through 2008 all the more testimony.

Shifts may just as well be explained by preference for one tank factory over another, rather than by tank quality (i.e. politics), given the severe shortage of funding for many years.

Russia was replacing T-72 with T-80. In that process many T-72 would have fallen into a state of no return.
However after the 1st Chechnya war when T-80 costed hundred's of lives it became a priority to remove it from service and never develop such a tank again.

T-72 are still being brought back into service by Russian army.

 

[Penguin]

Russia was replacing T-72 with T-80. In that process many T-72 would have fallen into a state of no return.
However after the 1st Chechnya war when T-80 costed hundred's of lives it became a priority to remove it from service and never develop such a tank again.

T-72 are still being brought back into service by Russian army.

It may well be that AT PRESENT modernized T-72 are replacing T-80s. Not in the last place because more are available from storage, and standardization leads to lower costs (note T-90 is itself a T-72 development). It is important to note, however, in he context of the previous posts that T-80 remained in service in rather substantial number (relative to the total produced and inducted in the RUssian army) after Chechnya for almost a decade, which does not support the contention that it is NOW being replaced by how T-80s did in Chechnya. You're linking an effect to a source that is not the source. Early T-80 had drawbacks e.g. very short ranges (turbine engine), but not necessarily the later diesel powered ones. It simply was not more vulnerable than T-72.

By the end of 2013 at least 250 modernised T-72B3s had reportedly been delivered to the Russian Army. However total contract numbers and the extent of any 2014 deliveries remain unknown. At least two brigades in the Western Military District and one brigade in the Eastern Military District are assessed to have received this variant, though further deliveries may since have occurred. In all known cases the T-72B3 has replaced the T-80 series MBT in service. It is assessed that the remaining T-80s will also be phased out over time and replaced with T-72B3. Whilst the full extent of the T-72B3 modernisation programme is unclear beyond these replacing T-80s, it does seem to indicate a desire to standardise the Russian fleet towards the T-72 MBT family, providing a degree of proven capability as well as equipment and maintenance commonality.
A previous attempt to standardise the MBT fleet was made in the early 1990s with the T-90, an extensive further development of the T-72. The T-90 incorporated some of the advanced defensive and fire-control features of the more expensive late-production T-80, but due largely to further budget constraints T-90 series production was ultimately very limited. This type now accounts for less than 16% of Russia’s operational MBT inventory. Unlike the new-build T-90s, the delivered T-72B3s are assessed as upgrades of existing T-72s, with those first replacing fleet T-80s likely drawn from stores. Given the large numbers of T-72s available this represents a more cost-effective solution towards standardisation and capability improvement.
The T-72B3 modernisation programme is considered only an interim measure, as the next-generation Russian MBT is long overdue. The as-yet-unrevealed Armata tank is intended to become the standard Russian MBT for future decades. Armata refers to a Common Universal Platform, which will form the basis for the new MBT along with other future Armoured Fighting Vehicles (AFVs), intended to introduce a new level of standardisation and commonality across multiple service types.

Joseph Dempsey: Russia deploys latest tank variant to Ukraine border | IISS

General Grachev specifically identifiedthree areas as shortcomings of the T-80: insufficient armor protection; thegas turbine engine’s thirst for fuel; andthe automatic loading system’s diffi-culty with semi-combustible ammuni-tion cartridges. While General Grachevapparently did not criticize the T-80 asa whole, or say that it was an unsatis-factory tank, he made it clear thatchanges would have to be made

Video reports carried bynetwork news services show various T-72 MBTs, with very little evidence of T-80s. The few T-80s that are known tohave participated were photographed inGroznyy, and are in fact T-80BV PTs.This variant of the T-80 is based uponthe T-80B PT that entered Soviet Armyservice in 1978. With the adoption of first-generation reactive armor, the T-80B became the T-80BV

Cold War Armor After Chechnya - An Assessment of the Russian T-80


T-80 - Main Battle Tank - Page 2 of 2

 

[Penguin]

List of equipment of the Russian Ground Forces - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

T-72 : Active: ≈2,255 Reserve: 8,000 : 155 upgraded to T-72B2. 300 upgraded to T-72B3. Numerous T-72s brought back into service following withdrawal of Russian T-80s
T-80 : 4500 (active/reserve) : Some T-80s are to be withdrawn from active service in 2015
T-90 : 743+ (active) Production halted and funds transferred for T-99 project.

 

[HeinzG]

The t-80 and been confused with the t-90.

T-80 failed as an urban tank in Chechnya (Grozny) and in the 2nd war the T-90 proved to be remarkable.

Thats why T-80 is considered obsolete by Russian Army and is being replaced by T-72 which is on the battlefield superior to T-80 despite T-80 having superior specifications on paper.

Why is that?

 

[Penguin]

An analysis of the developments in Dagestan and Chechnya indicates that it is possible to localize seats of hostilities with immediate and strong reaction which, however, require the existence of control bodies and well-trained, fully staffed units kept in constant combat readiness. The control system should be deployed before a military grouping is formed. For instance, during the anti-terrorist operation, rocket troops and artillery were deployed simultaneously along with their control bodies which reduced the quality, reliability, swiftness and stability of command and in a number of cases required adjustments in their entire structure. In addition, the control bodies of the rocket troops and artillery had only 50-60% of properly trained staff, which obstructed effective decision-making in planning and organizing attacks and in controlling and commanding units and formations. In order to guarantee its round-the-clock operation, the fire destruction planning and coordination group with the headquarters of the federal force in the North Caucasus had to be supplemented by officers from the Rocket Troops and Artillery research center and the Military Artillery University.7
Ideally permanent readiness rocket and artillery formations should have such personnel and materiel that they can immediately fulfill combat tasks on a full scale. Out of the artillery batteries involved, however, only 48% were units of permanent readiness while others were formed out of reduced units. The hostilities in Chechnya showed that a permanent readiness artillery battery spends four to five times less on preparations for firing, has higher fire accuracy and lower injury rates than a newly formed, though trained battery.
The core of the arsenal of the federal force in the North Caucasus consisted of T-72 main battle tanks, BMP-2 AIFVs, Su-25 ground attack aircraft, Su-24 frontline bombers, Mi-24 assault helicopters and Mi-8 transport helicopters. Rocket and artillery strikes were delivered by Grad and Uragan MLRS, D-80 howitzers and Msta-S self-propelled artillery systems. Troops moved on BTR-70 and BTR-80 wheeled armored personnel carriers. All of the weapons were quite old but have gained a good reputation in local conflicts. The use of these weapons and ammunition cost virtually nothing to the Russian taxpayers because they had been manufactured in Soviet times.
The use of T-90S tanks in Dagestan deserves mention. A group of these vehicles consisting of 8 to 12 units according to different sources was supposed to be delivered to India. Following a sharp aggravation of the situation in the Caucasus, however, the tanks were transferred to Dagestan. In the Kadari zone one T-90 was hit by seven RPG anti-tank rockets8 but remained in action. This indicates that with regular equipment T-90S is the best protected Russian tank, especially if Shtora and Arena defensive protection systems are integrated in it.

Moscow Defense Brief
Note the absense of reference to T-80 ....

T-80U v T-90 protection trials.

On October 20, 1999 extensive trials of T-80U and T-90 protection from various types of threats were conducted at TsNIIO 643a Testing Grounds. The tests involved firing large amounts of ordnance (including several versions of RPG ATGL, light and heavy ATGMs, and APFSDS rounds) at frontal projections of T-80U and T-90 MBTs both protected with Kontakt-V ERA and stripped of it.
...
The following weapons were used:

• Infantry ATGLs (fired at a distance of 40m)
  • RPG-7 (using advanced 105mm grenade PG-7VR with a tandem warhead, pen. 650mm RHA)
  • RPG-26 (disposable launcher, pen. >500mm RHA)
  • RPG-29 (advanced 105mm launcher, pen. 750mm RHA)
• ATGMs (fired at a distance of 600m)
  • Malyutka-2 (pen. >600mm RHA)
  • Metis (pen. 460mm RHA)
  • Konkurs (pen. 650mm RHA)
  • Kornet (pen. >850mm RHA)
• APFSDS (fired from T-80U MBT at a distance of 1,500m, the most likely round is 3BM42)

Each weapon was fired 5 times at each target, for a total of 20 shots per weapon. The total number of shots fired during the trials thus exceeded 150.The trials yielded the following outcome:

• ATGLs
  • T-90: RPG-29 produced a total of 3 penetrations.
    No other RPG rounds could penetrate even the stripped target.
  • T-80U: RPG-29 penetrated 3 times with ERA, all 5 times without ERA.
    Of all other grenades, one PG-7VR penetrated the stripped target.
• ATGMs
  • T-90: No ATGMs could penetrate the ERA-equipped target. One Kornet ATGM penetrated the stripped target.
  • T-80U: 2 Kornet ATGMs penetrated the ERA-equipped target, all 5 penetrated the stripped target.
    No other ATGMs could penetrate.
• APFSDS
  • T-90: ERA-equipped target could not be penetrated. Furthermore, after firing the crew entered the vehicle, activated it and was able to execute the firing sequence.
    Without ERA, one round penetrated.
  • T-80U (data available only for stripped target): One round almost penetrated (3mm hole in the inner lining, no visible equipment damage); two penetrated to 1/2 thickness; one missed the target completely; one hit the gun.

T-80U and T-90 Trials 20.10.99
So, T-90 is somewhat better protected than T-80. But that does not mean older T-72s are.

Accepted in 1985 and mass-produced since 1988, the T-72B(M) MBT (Ob.187) has protection level comparative to that of the contemporary T-80U, but has a noticably poorer FCS and vision aids and is underpowered. It is the last model of the (in)famous T-72 line, because the T-72BU MBT, successor to T-72B(M), received a new designation, T-90. However, T-72B(M) tanks and older T-72s upgraded to T-72B(M) standard are the most numerous tanks fielded with the Russian military. With the current financial problems, it will likely remain in wide-spread use well into the 21st century.

T-72B(M) Main Battle Tank

The T-80 (Ob.219sp2) was the first Russian MBT to use a gas-turbine engine, similar in some ways to that of the American M1 Abrams. The original 1,000 hp GTD-1000T, although significantly more powerful than the conventional diesel engines, was much criticized for its noise level, low reliability (especially in conditions of excess heat, dust and so on), much larger fuel consumption (resulting in a smaller operating range) and greater thermal signature. This is one of the reasons (barring the competition between plants) why the T-90 MBT uses the uprated diesel instead of the gas-turbine. However, the reliability problem is being solved; the new 1250 hp GTD-1250 is far more reliable. The large fuel consumption is compensated somewhat by an auxiliary GTA-18 18 kW powerpack. There were also variants of T-80 MBT using a diesel engine, for example T-80UD (Ob.478B) with 1,000 hp 6TD diesel.

T-80U/UK/U(M) Main Battle Tank

The T-90 (Ob.188) MBT is the most modern tank currently in service with the Russian Army. It is a direct descendant of the T-72 MBT (in fact, a renaming of T-72BU) although every single system including the main gun has received a major upgrade.
...
The T-90 MBT, though the best armored and equipped of all Russian tanks, was only meant to be a stop-gap measure in conditions where the acceptance of a brand-new Nizhny Tagil MBT was delayed due to lack of funding. It looks increasingly likely however that, different upgrades notwithstanding, it will remain the most modern Russian tank for at least another decade.

T-90 Main Battle Tank