Rethink Countersurgency? Why? How?

[muse]

To arrive at viable solutions, it's essential to pose questions such that we may accurately understand the problem and it's possible solutions. WOT and now "counterinsurgency" now dominate space in our thinking as we seek to further our understanding of international relations and trends with that discipline - below is a piece I think may be useful as we seek to expand the ways in which we can evolve and formulate an understanding of international relations in the region and it's security paradigm: What's wrong with this picture? Vietnam was a net loss, does that mean all concepts evolved in that mission should be judged as a net loss, without merit? Are broad brushes the most useful tool when highlighting details that differentiate?


Mired in 'surge' dogma
By Gian P. Gentile

Thursday, December 4, 2008

The U.S. Army and other parts of America's defense establishment have become transfixed by the promise of counterinsurgency. Since the surge in Iraq began in February 2007, the panacea of successful counterinsurgencies has become like an all-powerful Svengali, holding hypnotic sway over the minds of many of the nation's military strategists.

The promise of counterinsurgency is to turn war into a program of social-scientific functions that will achieve victory - if performed correctly by adhering to the guidance of counterinsurgency experts. The program is simple: increase and maintain long-term American combat presence on the ground; use those combat troops to protect the local population and win their hearts and minds; and build a new nation. The program's appeal lies in its purported simplicity, perceived relative bloodlessness, and seductive ability to remove the friction from war.

The current U.S. counterinsurgency program rests on the dubious assumption that the surge in Iraq was a successful feat of arms that was the primary cause for the lowering of violence. Yet there were other reasons why violence ebbed, including the buying off of America's former Sunni insurgent enemies and a decision by the Shiite leader Moktada al-Sadr to cease attacks. Without those conditions in place, levels of violence would have remained high even in the face of a few more American combat brigades on the ground.

The recent uptick in bloodshed shows that the war is not over. The notion proposed by some pundits that the surge has "won" the war is a chimera, to say the least.

But the surge and the counterinsurgency program that purportedly lowered the violence in Iraq has become the template for action in Afghanistan. Moreover, the program has become an immutable template that must be followed when America deals with insurgencies in other ungoverned parts of the world. It is in this sense that the U.S. Army has lost its ability to think creatively.

A leading expert on counterinsurgency who is an adviser to Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, David Kilcullen, has called for the U.S. counterinsurgency program, similar to Iraq, to be applied in Afghanistan.

Many army officers and Department of Defense thinkers seem to be able to think only about how to apply the perceived counterinsurgency lessons from Iraq to Afghanistan. A recent group of colonels asked the question "how should the army execute a surge in Afghanistan," instead of the more important questions of whether the army should use the surge counterinsurgency program there. A professor from a major Department of Defense university has gone so far as to call for the surge and its counterinsurgency techniques as the model for American strategy and policy throughout the entire Middle East.

These proposals may have surface appeal, but the fact is that they are nothing but a rehashing of Vietnam era approaches to counterinsurgency and nation-building using the method of clearing, holding and building.

Kilcullen, for example, speaking in a recent interview with the New Yorker writer George Packer, cited counterinsurgency experts from the Vietnam era like David Galula of France Sir Robert Thompson of Britain, who sought to counter Maoist inspired communist revolutions of the 1950s and 1960s - a world fundamentally different from ours today.

Yet influential American counterinsurgency experts have simply co-opted the counter-Maoist model. There is no originality - or at least a serious consideration for very different alternatives - in these concepts for changes in policy, strategy, and operations in Afghanistan. Galula, Thompson and other experts of the early 1960s would have argued for exactly the same thing.

Perhaps this is the right approach, but it seems to be the only approach that we are able to come up with. Proponents of this program tell us repeatedly that the "problem" in Afghanistan is essentially one of security and protection for the Afghani people. But by defining the problem in this way, strategy and operational methods are predetermined, requiring the long-term involvement of American combat forces.

There are other ways to define the problem, or center of gravity, in Afghanistan. If the "enemy" there is defined as Al Qaeda, then perhaps other policy, strategy and operational options might be considered. In this different conceptual formulation, perhaps a substantial American combat presence on the ground might not be necessary and instead the "enemy" might be dealt with by other means of military power, rather than large numbers of conventional combat forces trying to win hearts and minds.

The use of American "soft power" might be applied in innovative ways that become decoupled from military power and long-term, militarized nation building.

But because parts of the U.S. defense establishment are intellectually dominated by the proponents of the surge counterinsurgency program, we do not seem to be able to break out of this conceptual straightjacket.

But there are other experts who are beginning to expose the dogma. The best example is that of the former army chief of staff, General John A. Wickham (retired), who argues that "the time may be right for Americans to re-examine our policy to fight insurgencies." As army chief from 1983 to 1987, Wickham helped create the so-called Army Light Divisions designed to be a principle force in the conduct of small wars and insurgencies. Wickham argues that the current approach to counterinsurgency based on population security requiring very large commitments of combat troops on the ground may in fact be counterproductive.

Wickham may be right, or he may be wrong. But at least he questions the accepted dogma and considers alternatives. The counterinsurgency proponents have us transfixed on a one-way-only approach to dealing with insurgencies throughout the world.

Perhaps under the Obama administration, the army and the greater defense establishment will embrace creativity instead of dogma and at least consider other options. If not, our way ahead has already been decided for us.

Gian P. Gentile, a colonel in the U.S. Army, served in Iraq in 2003 and 2006.

 

[S-2]

Welcome to the war- the doctrinal war.

I haven't bothered to check yet and you've provided no link but this discussion- and our protagonist, Col. Gentile- has been raging over at smallwarsjournal.com for some time. He and a number of other serious-minded students of warfare (mainly Americans such as Mansoor and Nagl but others like Kilcullen) post there regularly and, with the contributions of mid-range army/marine officers fresh off tours, provide a highly relevant if incendiary discussion template. It gets hairy, academically speaking, from time to time.

On to the point(s). Gentile postulates that we are re-inventing the wheel. Equally, that we now toss about new verbage to describe problems and solutions in the same time-honored manner as the likes of Thompson, Slim, Galula, Fall, etc. Perhaps, perhaps not.

But if so, so what? "Surge" or "clear, hold, build" misses the point and only provides a convenient sign-post for us to wrap our arms around. This includes, evidently, Gentile whose perspectives are well-documented if minority and decidedly contrarian.

Let's look at his nuanced dig-

"There are other ways to define the problem, or center of gravity, in Afghanistan. If the "enemy" there is defined as Al Qaeda, then perhaps other policy, strategy and operational options might be considered. In this different conceptual formulation, perhaps a substantial American combat presence on the ground might not be necessary and instead the "enemy" might be dealt with by other means of military power, rather than large numbers of conventional combat forces trying to win hearts and minds."

He may THINK we can re-define the issue more narrowly. You can imagine the solution, though- Go after A.Q. This was wrong, though, in Iraq and will prove wrong in Afghanistan. I say so not because I'm wedded to a dogmatic and tired process that avoids critical and creative thinking nor because I wish to maintain an active job with a live-fire overseas training base for the next decade or two. I say so because, in the end, this is NOT a counter-terror problem but a more broadly-rooted failure of statelessness and mal-governance. As such, the problem really remains a larger if diffuse counter-insurgency.

With that comes a need for more broad-based solutions. The "surge" isn't/wasn't/won't (be) successful because of a few more brigades. It employed a WIDE range of techniques that seeked to synchonize and synergize effects-both kinetic and non-kinetic to achieve a base security level.

It demanded the co-option of local sunni AND shia tribes. This entailed our development, understanding, and inculcation of tribal structures right down to our platoon leaders and senior NCOs. It demanded the accountability of tribal leaders through the gathering and construction of a bio-metric data-base so that we weren't played by those tribes duplicitously. It required the close synchronization of civil affairs projects at a visibly meaningful level to provide REAL progress instead of false facades. In some cases we divided neighborhoods. In others we linked them.

I'll stop here as I could go on for damn near forever but I'll say, bluntly, that Gentile is wrong- and you've only scratched the surface of his arguments. Each venue presents unique challenges but broad principles DO apply again and again.

If America and the west don't wish to be in Afghanistan perpetually or, conversely, find ourselves returning anytime soon, then social-cultural change MUST be effected. Given the history of graft, corruption, brutality, and ethnic/tribal enmity, that's a tall order but unavoidable given the alternatives.

The same, frankly, will apply to Pakistan. As heartening as it was to see the operations in Bajaur, they represent nothing like we've conducted on the other side of the border nor in Iraq. Ultimately, I find them flawed. Still, one starts somewhere. How long before the P.A. catches a clue and begins tailoring some nuance into it's ops is unknown. Healthy dosages of hard-core kinetics play a role but it's not a one size fits all approach. Most probably understand that the P.A. can't "Loe Sam" it's way across FATAland. Equally, it must be eager to do so where applicable.

Our so-called "surge" began with McMaster's 3rd Armored Cav Regt. out in Tal Afar and did so by busting in the doors and knocking the snot out every baddie on the block. Even those who only "looked" bad. We got the key actors attention and set the ground-rules. Had it stopped there, though, it would only have been a repeat of Fallujah November 2004. Instead, McMaster had a plan to co-opt, leverage, and transition the city leadership on-board in ways so insidously compelling that it was unavoidable on their part. This in fact occurred in 2005- well before the "surge" and without the obvious benefit of those additional brigades.

We need more troops in A-stan. There's no question. The principles behind their effective use, though tailored to local conditions, ARE sound and can work if implemented with uniform vigor throughout. THAT may be the greatest issue. The avoidance of Iraq by the vast bulk of our allies made the implementation of our concepts relatively easy to execute.

Not so in Afghanistan. The British have some unique ideas of their own. So too the French, Canadians, Spanish, Dutch, and Germans. Some, sadly, have no idea at all nor care.

Finally, how dare you challenge this board with something as thought-provoking as this. It's American-based and intellectually demanding. Your sure to piss off the readership here.

Well, not all. Just the idiots. Hmmm...then again that only leaves a select few.

Oh well. Fcuk em' if they can't take a joke.

 

[muse]

S2

Thanks for the welcome but I have had a presence there, if not permanent residence, for the last few years. The piece by Col. Gentile was printed in the IHT, as was the piece I will reproduce below.

I had not intended to visit the forum again for while but your post was compelling, allow me begin with agreeing that the problem is a much larger problem than counter terror; to my thinking, we are in the midst of a international social and political/security revolution, inspired by a ideology that, to my thinking, has more in common with Marxist/Maoist ideology with does of Al-tamimi and Hasan e Sabah's murderous Hashashin, than any Islam I grew up with. Perhaps there is merit to the idea that facism and totalitarianism have avoided total defeat in migration.

And I also agree that broad principles remain valid - however; they need to be tweaked or complemented with other policies, in this particular situation, the details that differentiate should be allowed such that they do differentiate. Iraq and Afghanistan are different dynamics and I think you may not appreciate Col. Gentile's underlying point: that this is unsustainable, this projection is nearing exhaustion and beyond the hit US credibility (soft power) has taken, financial resources are also finite and ofcourse it's a different world than it was seven years ago.

Misgoverance? Sure, on an incredible scale, a ravenous kleptocratic elite? A religious establishment no longer anchored in the idea of FAITH in God? sure.

I do take your point about socio-cultural change, I too am convinced of this necessity, but how should it be effected? Looking at the ANA in uniform, I am struck that I am looking at essentially a peasant in a shalwar kamiz, that socio-cultural change, I am more persuaded, is a mentality that is different -how can the US or for that matter Pakistan, effect the mentality?

I found the piece below, and I will admit that it confirms my point of view, to be worth examining - I think if AQ/Talib or any other extremist way of thinnking is a programming, then it must be countered by de/re-progamming which examines every basic building block (in the case of Pakistan, it's politics make it a difficult sell):


Losing on the battlefield of the mind
By Christopher Boucek

Thursday, December 4, 2008

GUANTÁNAMO BAY NAVAL BASE, Cuba: When you fly to Guantánamo, the United States government insists you carry your passport, as though you're going to a foreign country. It's all part of the elaborate legal fiction that the detainees on the American military base here can be outside the jurisdiction of U.S. law without really being outside U.S. territory.

Just as Guantánamo's legal and geographic isolation from the United States denies its prisoners recourse to the American judicial system, it also denies its military administrators the benefits of the most current research on how to de-radicalize prisoners and reintegrate them into society.

The problem is that the U.S. government looks at Guantánamo as the destination rather than as part of a process. The base's military authorities talk a lot about "the battlefield of the mind," but they seem to be doing more to provide the prisoners with distractions than to prepare the profoundly alienated men for whatever future awaits them. Geology classes, Game Boys and crayons may provide diversion, but they do not provide alternatives to Islamic extremism.

For instance, officials of Joint Task Force Guantánamo, the military unit that runs the detention center, state that the facility employs no outside religious guides for its prisoners, instead allowing them to choose religious authorities from their ranks.

Yet research from around the world demonstrates that one of the most successful ways to engage religious extremists is through religious debate and dialogue, challenging the underlying beliefs that support and encourage violence. In Saudi Arabia, Singapore and Iraq religious authorities are used to arguing against violence with security offenders.

When asked about this, JTF officials replied that the detainees are not interested in speaking with outside religious scholars. Yet detainees who have been repatriated to Saudi Arabia, for example, go through an intensive rehabilitation process incorporating large amounts of religious instruction and discussion. There are a number of knowledgeable scholars and imams, including former radicals with credibility and legitimacy who could be deployed in Guantánamo to work with the detainees.

There is a growing body of work on how to deal with offenders preparing to leave custody, and this research needs to be put to use in Guantánamo. But despite the refrain that Guantánamo is a battlefield of the mind, it seems we have all but given up in that fight, ceding victory to violent extremists.

According to officials here, there is an active Al Qaeda cell among the detainees that includes a religious authority. It is unclear what steps have been taken to isolate this leader from his followers, but present policies all but assure that the cell will continue its activities.

Separating or segregating prisoners is not enough. Any successful counter-radicalization effort must offer a positive in addition to the removal of a negative. Religiously motivated prisoners must be given a way to practice their faith in a way that includes being challenged on the premise that faith can be used to justify violence and terror.

Under the present system at Guantánamo, detainees are housed according to their behavior and perceived importance, from medium security to high security. Fifteen or so "High Value Detainees" are held separately in Camp 7. (The existence of this has been acknowledged, but its precise location remains secret.) Prisoners of different ethnic and national groups are mixed together.

Grouping detainees by risk may make sense for a normal prison, but it complicates successful deradicalization and preparation for repatriation at Guantánamo. If the government were to separate detainees first by their nations of origin, and then by their behavior, it could use more specific cultural factors to influence their behavior.

This could also facilitate greater participation by officials from a detainee's home country. In addition, the current arrangement reinforces the notion of a global jihad. Officials claim there about 40 different nationalities represented here, making separation difficult. But surely not impossible.

Officials should at least try to break down the social groups that radicalized these men and replace them with different forms of social reinforcement. To date, there have been no such efforts.

Though the exact number remains classified, there are probably about 250 detainees currently at Guantánamo. Under the solution President-elect Barack Obama is exploring, the United States would charge those who can be charged and repatriate others to their countries of origin, where they would be charged or rehabilitated.

That leaves those whom the government cannot or will not charge, but whose release is believed to pose serious risks. The goal is to make that number as small as possible, and, to that end, the government must conduct a thorough review of all the cases as soon as possible.

Closing Guantánamo will not be the end of all detentions of extremists. As long as the United States and its allies continue to detain individuals around the world in the struggle again Islamist violence, they will need a comprehensive and international approach on how to hold and process extremists. The ultimate goal should be to send these prisoners back to their home countries to be charged, housed and reintegrated.

Reliable figures are difficult to come by. The Saudi re-arrest rate is under 10 percent, and in Iraq, counter-radicalization and rehabilitation have been credited with drastic reductions in the number of detainees. There is always the risk that some of the men released from Guantánamo will resume violent activities, but these early indicators suggest positive results. And indefinite detention is simply not an option.

Christopher Boucek is an associate in the Carnegie Middle East Program where his research focuses on regional security challenges.

Of course, the next question will be, or should be, where are the Imams and why are they not a part of the effort? The preamble in the first post, about answers and asking curious questions, may be applied here as well, I think.

 

[S-2]

We can start by writing off Guantanamo. I suspect, given the assaults from various directions to which it's been subjected, that the staff are largely demoralized into a kindergarten caretakers role of an entirely temporary nature.

Barack Obama won't reverse that trend thus there's little that can or will be done to re-habilitate the regimen much less the prisoners therein.

Assume them gone to the tender ministrations of our courts, the less tender processes awaiting them in their home nation, both or, occasionally, outright release and freedom. All, though, unaffected by this missed opportunity at Guantanamo.

"Perhaps there is merit to the idea that facism and totalitarianism have avoided total defeat in migration."

Of course. The guise matters less than the intent-subjugation and subordination of one's will to a higher authority backed by force of arms. Our liberal modern and western society provides the space- both for them and their reactionary enablers in KSA, Gov't of Egypt, GoP, and elsewhere. We're trapped by the temporal and expedient need to work with repressive regimes on one end and our liberal oration on the other. In-between, my enemies plow fertile fields.

"I think you may not appreciate Col. Gentile's underlying point: that this is unsustainable"

As currently configured, yes, you are correct. This is a function of rudderless management, though, not resources. At least to date. We've squandered time and resources. The search for cheap and expedient fixes manifested by Rumsfeld's conquest of Iraq on the cheap through RMA to the immediate establishment of an internationally sanctioned post 9/11 Afghan gov't have frittered away the marginal advantages held. Both Rumsfeld and the U.N. missed the picture. Reversing the picture wasn't the issue. Easily done. Securing the victory WAS the issue and, in the absence of clear plans to do so in both cases, nearly impossible then and even more so now.

Neither nation deserved the near-immediate establishment of nat'l gov'ts. Not close and, granted in any case, completely unearned. Still, what was the alternative-international occupation? Perhaps, but how to build consensus among a herd of cats? That diffusion of objectives and means still maligns our efforts in Afghanistan to this day. Clearly, by contrast, however deeply penetrated by nazism and monarchial fascism both Germany and Japan were following the end of W.W.II broad consensus of objectives by allied powers from without and an able legacy of secular education and institutional strength managed, in time, to reverse their particular afflictions.

Not so here. We surrendered our leverage nearly immediately.

Muse, we've likely lost this generation. Look here and, for sheer perverse entertainment, read the likes of waraich66, hasang20, and dabong1. They're gone and there are too, too many of similar ilk here and elsewhere. What's that bode for the next twenty years? How many imans would it take to reach not just those already incarcerated but all the others that functionally should be for their (and OUR) safety? How many imans are there that I can trust to represent the greater good and do so?

Is this poisonous momentum impossible to arrest in the near-term? If so, then I'd likely advocate punative war of the most onerous type followed by salting the barren earth left behind to start over at some undetermined date in the distant future.

I know THAT can be done and personally like the ominous warning to potential fellow-travellers derived from such. If both time and resources are at a premium then rendering much of this region to a latter-day Carthage might be what we're left. That or our own capituation stemming from moral lassitude.

I've watched your oblique approaches here for some time and understand your absences now. I can think of maybe ten here worthy of your serious engagement.

The rest draw from your vitality without giving back. It's tiresome and hardly worthwhile if momentarily instructive to the greater problem.

I look forward to your thoughts but, if not, it's been a nice chat.

 

[muse]

Muse, we've likely lost this generation.

Perhaps, but it is a cost effective method, in fact, as these cannot be held indefinitely and as incarceration and segregation provides an excellent venue to deprogram – I think, we will see movement on this in relatively short time.

The issue of there not being enough Imams is a genuine one, however; a more important one is the content of the curriculum I have some small idea of the material and what we then need is a program to train the Imams.

Yes, I know, it’s a slippery slope and I have always resisted the idea of government involvement with any religion’s structure or instruction – but I think we can make a persuasive case, that we are dealing here not with a religion, but with a ideology that seeks to subvert and recast in it’s mold, a particular religious instruction. This ideology is entirely modern (in it’s original art history and criticism sense), even as it suggests that it is related to the “companions” – it most certainly is not, it is not religion, it has nothing to do with Faith in God and is more about Certitude.

In my opinion, what is needed is a program like HTS in its scope and vision. If we can begin with formulating a curriculum, devise teams that include chaplains, interviewers, and one or two psy medical professionals and Imams trained first in the curriculum and even a number as small as 5 or 10 Imams, will be a great start.


Look here and, for sheer perverse entertainment, read the likes of waraich66, hasang20, and dabong1. They're gone and there are too, too many of similar ilk here and elsewhere

Such are not serious persons and much unpleasantness awaits them, the shame of it all is that these are so advantageously positioned, relatively – anger and a sense of humiliation arising from dysfunctional personalities based on a idiot education, false sense of honor, and not honor arising out of humble service, rootedness and the self-worth it engenders. What always amazes me is their faithlessness, their need to be attached to an idea that is at its core totalitarian, barren, utopian, entirely un-Muslim.

What's that bode for the next twenty years

Much more justification for the project proposed. Yes, I very much agree that these are more dangerous for all and particularly for themselves

Carthage? Perhaps we can help formulate, structure, policies that can help these economies be more integrated into regional and global economies. And perhaps we can take a lesson from the idea that those imbued with certitude, when they find that results of testing do not confirm their theories, change not their theories but the results of the testing of those theories. Certitude is not a monopoly of the radical Islamist and we should keep that in mind.

 

[S-2]

You stud!!!

Read my mind. For others so interested-

Human Terrain System- U.S. Army

Kilcullen had his fingerprints all over that project and it's a MASSIVE hammer in our tool box of which too many everywhere are unaware.

Imams are preferred but I'll readily accept lay-students of Islamic theology if scholastically validated and security vetted properly. That could expand scope and reach while shielding the active clergy.

"Such [dabong1, hasang20, waraich66] are not serious persons..."

They may not be serious STUDENTS or SCHOLARS, but they are serious enemies of state through their imperfect grasp of issues and solutions. As such, they make potentially very dangerous foot-soldiers.

What's that bode for the next twenty years
"Much more justification for the project proposed."

Fair enough. There's work enough right here to keep mankind busy for a millenium or two.

"And perhaps we can take a lesson from the idea that those imbued with certitude, when they find that results of testing do not confirm their theories, change not their theories but the results of the testing of those theories."

Point taken and I'm tracking. A new Punic war remains on the far end of my solution-set. Or, at least, will return to the shelf as such.

 

[muse]

Freed by the U.S., Saudi becomes a Qaeda chief
By Robert F. Worth

Friday, January 23, 2009
BEIRUT, Lebanon: The emergence of a former Guantánamo Bay detainee as the deputy leader of Al Qaeda's Yemeni branch has underscored the potential complications in carrying out the executive order President Barack Obama signed Thursday that the detention center be shut down within a year.

The militant, Said Ali al-Shihri, is suspected of involvement in a deadly bombing of the United States Embassy in Yemen's capital, Sana, in September. He was released to Saudi Arabia in 2007 and passed through a Saudi rehabilitation program for former jihadists before resurfacing with Al Qaeda in Yemen.

His status was announced in an Internet statement by the militant group and was confirmed by an American counterterrorism official.

"They're one and the same guy," said the official, who insisted on anonymity because he was discussing an intelligence analysis. "He returned to Saudi Arabia in 2007, but his movements to Yemen remain unclear."

The development came as Republican legislators criticized the plan to close the Guantánamo Bay, Cuba, detention camp in the absence of any measures for dealing with current detainees. But it also helps explain why the new administration wants to move cautiously, taking time to work out a plan to cope with the complications.

Almost half the camp's remaining detainees are Yemenis, and efforts to repatriate them depend in part on the creation of a Yemeni rehabilitation program — partly financed by the United States — similar to the Saudi one. Saudi Arabia has claimed that no graduate of its program has returned to terrorism.

"The lesson here is, whoever receives former Guantánamo detainees needs to keep a close eye on them," the American official said.

Although the Pentagon has said that dozens of released Guantánamo detainees have "returned to the fight," its claim is difficult to document, and has been met with skepticism. In any case, few of the former detainees, if any, are thought to have become leaders of a major terrorist organization like Al Qaeda in Yemen, a mostly homegrown group that experts say has been reinforced by foreign fighters.

Long considered a haven for jihadists, Yemen, a desperately poor country in the southern corner of the Arabian Peninsula, has witnessed a rising number of attacks over the past year. American officials say they suspect that Shihri may have been involved in the car bombings outside the American Embassy in Sana last September that killed 16 people, including six attackers.

In the Internet statement, Al Qaeda in Yemen identified its new deputy leader as Abu Sayyaf al-Shihri, saying he returned from Guantánamo to his native Saudi Arabia and then traveled to Yemen "more than 10 months ago." That corresponds roughly to the return of Shihri, a Saudi who was released from Guantánamo in November 2007. Abu Sayyaf is a nom de guerre, commonly used by jihadists in place of their real name or first name.

A Saudi security official, speaking on the condition of anonymity, said Shihri had disappeared from his home in Saudi Arabia last year after finishing the rehabilitation program.

A Yemeni journalist who interviewed Al Qaeda's leaders in Yemen last year, Abdulela Shaya, confirmed Thursday that the deputy leader was indeed Shihri, the former Guantánamo detainee. Shaya, in a phone interview, said Shihri had described to him his journey from Cuba to Yemen and supplied his Guantánamo detention number, 372. That is the correct number, Pentagon documents show.

"It seems certain from all the sources we have that this is the same individual who was released from Guantánamo in 2007," said Gregory Johnsen, a terrorism analyst and the editor of a forthcoming book, "Islam and Insurgency in Yemen."

Shihri, 35, trained in urban warfare tactics at a camp north of Kabul, Afghanistan, according to documents released by the Pentagon as part of his Guantánamo dossier. Two weeks after the terrorist attacks of Sept. 11, 2001, he traveled to Afghanistan via Bahrain and Pakistan, and he later told American investigators that his intention was to do relief work, the documents say. He was wounded in an airstrike and spent a month and a half recovering in a hospital in Pakistan.

The documents state that Shihri met with a group of "extremists" in Iran and helped them get into Afghanistan. They also say he was accused of trying to arrange the assassination of a writer, in accordance with a fatwa, or religious order, issued by an extremist cleric.

However, under a heading describing reasons for Shihri's possible release from Guantánamo, the documents say he claimed that he traveled to Iran "to purchase carpets for his store" in Saudi Arabia. They also say that he denied knowledge of any terrorists or terrorist activities, and that he "related that if released, he would like to return to Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, wherein he would reunite with his family."

"The detainee stated he would attempt to work at his family's furniture store if it is still in business," the documents say.

The Yemeni branch of Al Qaeda has carried out a number of terrorist attacks over the past year, culminating in the assault on the American Embassy in Sana on Sept. 16. In that assault, the attackers disguised themselves as Yemeni policemen and detonated two car bombs. The group has also begun releasing sophisticated Internet material, in what appears to be a bid to gain more recruits.

Yemen began cooperating with the United States on counterterrorism activities in late 2001. But the partnership has been a troubled one, with American officials accusing Yemen of paroling dangerous terrorists, including some who were wanted in the United States. Some high-level terrorism suspects have also mysteriously escaped from Yemeni jails. The disagreements and security lapses have complicated efforts to repatriate the 100 or so Yemenis remaining in Guantánamo.

Despite some notable Yemeni successes in fighting terrorist groups, Al Qaeda in Yemen appears to be gaining strength.

"They are bringing Saudi fighters in, and they want to start to use Yemen as a base for attacks throughout region, including Saudi Arabia and the Horn of Africa," said Johnsen, an expert on Al Qaeda in Yemen.

 

[Ratus Ratus]

Muse, S-2:
Thanks.
Saves me writing lots.

De-programming: It would never have occurred nor, I suspect, ever intended to occur. This would have altered the affects/intent of the Military Tribunals.

The non serious persons: They are unfortunately a loss to the collective community. They also, in my small view, reflect the platitudes of stupidity coming out of the media and the inability of the media to deliver real meaningful information.
Correct and truthful Information is the key to providing guidance to such persons. Their selection of sources is holding them back.


If you study Kilcullen and read in detail the modern Counterinsurgency Manual as well as the associated ‘reader’ this is the underlying approach. In many ways this has only formalised the ‘doctrine’ approach to the matter. It was there in a ‘read between the lines’ of older Counterinsurgency manuals.
My main argument re the COIN manual as currently standing is it is outside the scope of the basic Pl comd and Sgt. It is at best aimed at the coy CO,(may be) and definitely higher in the pecking chain.


Surge/COIN .. Ho Hum!!!
Unfortunately I subscribe to the belief that the US military, in general, see the SURGE = COIN. They also see COIN as a pure military exercise. There are many I also think still believe in ‘holding ground’/’there is a front line’ as per conventional warfare.

COIN ever since it was discussed/initially doctrined way back in Vietnam was a combination of many services, military, civil, home nation, etc.
How it is collectively applied requires some thought and real planning.
This ain’t happened YET.
I don’t as yet see it even hitting the planning table to start.

Ok have the thread back.
(---
The SWJ was interesting read on this topic.
Also following is entertaining:
Think Again: Counterinsurgency, By Gian P. Gentile, Posted January 2009
Foreign Policy: Think Again: Counterinsurgency
---)

 

[S-2]

"Unfortunately I subscribe to the belief that the US military, in general, see the SURGE = COIN."

I don't think this could be further from the truth. We abhor the term and it's misapplication by the media and general public. It in no way dictates a war-fighting strategy for either theatre and is simply what it implies- a surge of troops. How they are employed is an altogether different story and therein lies the operational nuances of our campaign in Iraq.

Therein also lies the salient reasons why there isn't perfect cross-application of TTPs (tactics, techniques & procedures) from one theatre to the other.

"They also see COIN as a pure military exercise. There are many I also think still believe in ‘holding ground’/’there is a front line’ as per conventional warfare."

Couldn't be further from the truth. You've mid-career officers and N.C.O.s who've gone from platoon to battalion assignments over multiple war tours in theatres with nothing to do with conventional operations. They know functionally nothing but combat/security/pacification operations in assymetric battle environments.

To this end, our army and marines have assumed too many of the roles once the preserve of USAID, Dept. of State, and USIA. Some because they're gone (USIA-massive mistake by congress) and others because of a reluctance to engage as far down-range as necessary to effect real change.

It's left to the soldier.

Here's an example of soldiers on anything but a "front line"-

National Guard Farmers-AFPS

Robert Gates has repeatedly stressed his desire as SECDEF to see the Dept. of State better funded by congress. His intent is clear. There are roles to play that are being forced upon the U.S. military for which it's adapted admirably but should not necessarily need as a base war-fighting skill set.

So be it. Our army is a better force for the twin experiences of Iraq and Afghanistan. We've much to improve upon but it's hardly a stultified stagnant organization lacking intellectual curiousity.

"In many ways this has only formalised the ‘doctrine’ approach to the matter. It was there in a ‘read between the lines’ of older Counterinsurgency manuals."

True enough and we allowed our own considerable experiences in the Phillippines, Nicaragua and Haiti (Banana wars of the 1920s), Dominican Republic, Vietnam, and our contra engagements to wither here and there.

Now it's been formalized and if nothing else is read by a dullard officer, even he can be held accountable for reading a nicely contained synopsis of COIN perspectives and concepts.

"My main argument re the COIN manual as currently standing is it is outside the scope of the basic Pl comd and Sgt. It is at best aimed at the coy CO,(may be) and definitely higher in the pecking chain."

With the high degree of autonomous operations being directed by 2LT platoon leaders and SFC platoon sergeants, we've needed something that could serve as a ready resource for some of the higher order intelligence processes that they must be able to mimic in the absence of formalized higher direction or control.

In fact, we've consciously attempted to push this intelligence collection management process down to the end-users and place the onus of responsibility for designing and executing H.I (Human intelligence) operations in their lap. To this end, FM 3-24 has been a useful adjunct to S-2/S-3 (Battalion/Brigade intell/operations) guidance.

I hope that sheds a bit of perspective on our operations. I really think that you might be missing the prevailing culture in our army/marines right now. It's far different than you've suggested, IMHO.

 

[Ratus Ratus]

I hope that sheds a bit of perspective on our operations. I really think that you might be missing the prevailing culture in our army/marines right now. It's far different than you've suggested, IMHO.

Simply, No.
It is just that you need a bit of prodding as you write it so eloquently vs. me, where it would be cut down to a few blunt lines.

As for HUMINT, it has to move down the food chain anyway.
There was a discussion from memory at SWJ on this as well.

Your example re the National Guard framers also provides extended examples of the needed approach.
As you do say it should be coming from outside the military.

 

[S-2]

"As for HUMINT, it has to move down the food chain anyway."

Well, you guys know better than most that HUMINT networks in these environs are usually developed by N.C.O.s and company-grade officers, if there's any chance at all.

As they develop the intel, these platoons benefit first and they should-it's their turf. The question is whether the companies, battalions and brigades are networked correctly to make certain adjacent units benefit nearly as quickly. Urban, semi-rural areas, things can spill over into your sector quickly.

"As you do say it should be coming from outside the military."

Well we've benefited there from our nat'l guard and army reserve units. Outside skills to the table that aren't available in active units. Guard infantry battalions had a high preponderance of police officers. Turned out great patrolling battalions in Iraq that networked with locals really well.

Active artillery battalions that had to make conversions over to reaction companes for their brigades while still maintaining their indirect fire responsibilities.

I understand why it's hard to get civilian technical experts and diplomats down-range. You can die in these places as our U.S. AID rep in Peshawar found out last month. Our soldiers factor that risk into their choices differently. In the end they make good candidates for the work.

Until it's secure, we won't deliver the levels of help possible nor needed. Yet you can't wait for full security to get started. The needs are so compelling. Google CJTF 101 some time. It's the link to the Combined Joint Task Force 101 (Airborne) site. It's actually amazing the projects that these guys are into- beekeeping in the Korengal. Whoda thunk it but it's the backbone of farming.

 

[waraich66]

Look here and, for sheer perverse entertainment, read the likes of waraich66, hasang20, and dabong1. They're gone and there are too, too many of similar ilk here and elsewhere

Such are not serious persons and much unpleasantness awaits them, the shame of it all is that these are so advantageously positioned, relatively – anger and a sense of humiliation arising from dysfunctional personalities based on a idiot education, false sense of honor, and not honor arising out of humble service, rootedness and the self-worth it engenders. What always amazes me is their faithlessness, their need to be attached to an idea that is at its core totalitarian, barren, utopian, entirely un-Muslim.

What do you mean by such are not serious persons.

First of all which kind of think tanker you are ,back biting is not good habbit,if you have problem or difference of opinion with these fellows you can discuss with them directly ,that is reason this forum developed.Indirectly passing comment on members is not good attitude ,read my signature.

You think you have correct understanding of WOT ,and i know you are one of members who are in support of American strategies of WOT,but in fact america is losing control not only in battle field but also in financial front.

Keep on writing in this forum we dont want to lose you also but review your attitude.

 

[waraich66]

You stud!!!

Read my mind. For others so interested-

Human Terrain System- U.S. Army

Kilcullen had his fingerprints all over that project and it's a MASSIVE hammer in our tool box of which too many everywhere are unaware.

Imams are preferred but I'll readily accept lay-students of Islamic theology if scholastically validated and security vetted properly. That could expand scope and reach while shielding the active clergy.

"Such [dabong1, hasang20, waraich66] are not serious persons..."

They may not be serious STUDENTS or SCHOLARS, but they are serious enemies of state through their imperfect grasp of issues and solutions. As such, they make potentially very dangerous foot-soldiers.

What's that bode for the next twenty years
"Much more justification for the project proposed."

Fair enough. There's work enough right here to keep mankind busy for a millenium or two.

"And perhaps we can take a lesson from the idea that those imbued with certitude, when they find that results of testing do not confirm their theories, change not their theories but the results of the testing of those theories."

Point taken and I'm tracking. A new Punic war remains on the far end of my solution-set. Or, at least, will return to the shelf as such.

S2,

You should also not pass comments on members in their absence,this is against the ethics of forum, i know you have difference of opinion with us but in your society it is considered healthy sign what you think ?

Even though i dont agree with your idealogy and mind set but still i have soft corner for you because you dont understand islam .

Here i blame my self we could not educate you well.

For your information i have VC obtained by my grand grand father but i am not proud of that now, because what your army is doing with drone attacks killing innocent people in pakistan .

Killing of innocient people ,women and children no religion allow this genocide what ever is your justification .