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Redefining ties with China:ChinaFlag:
April 23, 2007 Monday Rabi-us-Sani 05, 1428
http://www.dawn.com/2007/04/23/op.htmwith China
By Tanvir Ahmad Khan
THERE are indications that Pakistan is more aware than a couple of years ago of the complexity of the unfolding international situation. It is reflected in a new quest for a more diversified foreign policy. While this would mean exploring avenues that have not received full attention before, its main vector would doubtless be the consolidation and expansion of time-tested friendships.
Inevitably, China is the centrepiece of fresh initiatives and it would be fair to say that the Sino-Pakistan relationship is poised to enter a period of enhanced salience. It will be a period of great promise and some peril as it is predicated on a certain reading of how global power would be distributed in the years to come.
Pakistan is beginning to recover from the misplaced euphoria of becoming once again a front line state in a US-led coalition in the region. Catch phrases like a non-Nato ally of the United States and claims of an entente with the sole superpower of our times that from now on would never be subject to expediency or erosion had a strange self-hypnotic effect; the foreign policy establishment of Pakistan looked like a mere implementing arm of a decision-making machine that stood in no particular need of its counsel or experience.
Pakistan has had a long history of interaction with the United States; in fact it spans virtually all the 60 post-independence years. For most of the time, it was a complex interaction. Pakistan benefited a great deal in certain areas during some of the phases of what, by definition, was always an unequal and fluctuating alliance. It is doubtful if without this alliance, bilateral as in the 1959 treaty or multilateral as in the military pacts of 1954, Pakistan would have ever been able to raise armed forces of such size and strength.
It is also true that this assistance conferred no great leverage on Pakistan in settling issues with India on equitable terms. It might even have been counter-productive in this context. Furthermore, from time to time, Pakistan was punished hard and in some instances its interests were irreparably hurt.
On its part, Pakistan too endeavoured to maintain a policy that reflected much compliance and some selective defiance. The opening to China in the mid-1960s and the single-minded pursuit of the nuclear weapon capability after India demonstrated it in the 1970s are obvious examples of that assertion of national interest.
The team that took President Pervez Musharraf headlong into the war on terror without even a minimum effort to negotiate mutually beneficial terms of engagement was, however, notably characterised by a servile imagination. There were apprehensions in Pakistan that its foreign policy may have become hopelessly lopsided and that, more ominously, Pakistan may miss a correct view of the cross-currents of international politics in a period of major changes. In aligning itself with one turn of the tide, it may just blink on the tides to follow.
It is said that you cannot speak authentically about the future because it has not happened as yet. But an honest appraisal of the past and present does help map out the space and time in which the drama of future events would be enacted. It is not a precise science but the strategic context for coming developments can be discussed intelligently.
Perhaps one should venture to share one’s private crystal gazing with one’s readers on a relatively reckless day. It may, however, be in order to mention some of the more obvious conjectures relevant to this piece here.
One, the events of the first seven years of the 21st century foreshadow a long period of instability. Two, the journey towards a multipolar world would not be smooth; it is likely to take place in an environment of continuous friction and conflict. Third, the Cold War alternatives of two sharply antagonistic economic strategies would not return; global economy will develop at an accelerated pace and it will continue to be driven by the western capitalistic model.
Four, this rapid growth under the rubric of globalisation will be uneven and will almost certainly exacerbate inequalities. Fifth, disparities will intensify strife much of which would take the form of asymmetrical warfare and terrorism. Sixth, countries like Pakistan are situated in stress zones where metropolitan powers will not hesitate to change partners arbitrarily. In Pakistan’s specific case, India will most probably become a greater focus of American interest and support. All the talk about a long-haul collaboration with Washington may fade away before long.
The world of tomorrow will be a chequered board of interdependence and rivalry. The most important theatre for working out this dialectic would be the scramble for natural resources. Energy should be expected to be the pivot of the new and perhaps a more ruthless Great Game. Pakistan has been unsuccessfully trying to position itself appropriately for it since the early 1990s only to see Afghanistan wrecking most of its initiatives.
By making itself a major candidate to be an energy corridor, Pakistan is at once reiterating its heavy stake in this game and also opening itself to new pressures and threats. At the heart of this project lies the Sino-Pakistan friendship.
A potentially dramatic factor in the emerging scene is the new Pakistani deep sea port of Gwadar in which the Chinese have invested $200 million. In fact, some observers are already talking about the new Great Game centring on this port. Pakistan, they argue, may be setting off “alarm bells in Washington” that may impact on the current Pakistan-US alliance.
Suggesting that Gwadar is indicative of how Chinese largesse is coming into open competition with the US, one American analyst has this to say : “The more money China dishes out, the more Pakistan is likely to gravitate towards Beijing as a countervail to US influence, given that Islamabad is increasingly pummelled to do more in the war on terrorism”. If sovereign decision-making becomes an irritant in Pakistan-US relations, history would have come full circle reminding Pakistan of the hostility experienced as Ayub Khan went to Beijing to open that great window for his beleaguered country.
There are formidable problems in creating an all-weather corridor from Gwadar to Xinjiang through Pakistan’s majestic mountain ranges but, if successful, the project will hugely reduce the distance and expense, making China a very serious player in a region that the United States traditionally dominates. Pakistan is the geopolitical hub for bringing China, the Gulf including Iran and Africa into a thriving economic interaction.
Mr Shaukat Aziz’s visit to China shows that his hosts were willing to make the enterprise worthwhile for Pakistan by further diversifying cooperation. China is ready to make a large investment in Pakistan’s chronically weak manufacturing sector. It is also the only worthwhile partner of Pakistan in defence technology and production. Already, the strong differentiation made by the United States between Pakistan and India on the question of transferring sophisticated American technology for peaceful nuclear energy programmes has become an argument for enhancing relations with Beijing.
China is the only country in the world that has helped set up a nuclear power reactor and may be open to Pakistani requests for more reactors. More than 20 agreements in the public and private sectors have been signed during Shaukat Aziz’s latest visit to China. If the trade target set out in Beijing is achieved, it would easily become a major transformational factor in Pakistan’s economy. One could not also miss the clear security symbolism of many of his engagements.
Washington is not indifferent to Pakistan’s looming energy crisis or, for that matter, its economic growth. But it favours solutions that remain subordinate to its global agenda. It opposes the eminently feasible Iran-Pakistan-India gas pipeline which offers the additional advantage of giving India and Pakistan a joint stake in regional peace.
It is, however, willing to help promote a gas pipeline to South Asia from Turkmenistan and a hydroelectric power grid from Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan to Pakistan, projects which are today vulnerable to instability in Afghanistan. Turkmenistan’s ability to supply gas in quantity after its recent agreements with the Russian Federation also has a question mark.
Conscious of being the greatest ever military power, the United States has tried to pre-empt history through the Bush era doctrines of pre-emptive military interventions. So far, the results have been catastrophic. The destruction of Iraq has led some states to seek nuclear deterrence and many more to accelerate the dawn of a multipolar world order. It is highly unlikely that American military might can overcome varied forms of resistance and revolt.
Confronted with this dilemma, the United States should not be expected to regard any alliance outside the inner circle of western power as sacrosanct. The present alliance with Pakistan remains as dependent upon unilateral American perceptions of the need for it as in the past. It is high time Pakistan outgrows the habit of lamenting changes of policy and preference considered necessary by an increasingly embattled United States.
Against the chequered backdrop of past alliances, Pakistani diplomacy faces the challenge of persuading the United States that Pakistan needs to supplement its American connection with a robust regional role anchored in a special relationship with China.
The writer is a former foreign secretary.
http://www.dawn.com/2007/04/23/op.htm
April 23, 2007 Monday Rabi-us-Sani 05, 1428
http://www.dawn.com/2007/04/23/op.htmwith China
By Tanvir Ahmad Khan
THERE are indications that Pakistan is more aware than a couple of years ago of the complexity of the unfolding international situation. It is reflected in a new quest for a more diversified foreign policy. While this would mean exploring avenues that have not received full attention before, its main vector would doubtless be the consolidation and expansion of time-tested friendships.
Inevitably, China is the centrepiece of fresh initiatives and it would be fair to say that the Sino-Pakistan relationship is poised to enter a period of enhanced salience. It will be a period of great promise and some peril as it is predicated on a certain reading of how global power would be distributed in the years to come.
Pakistan is beginning to recover from the misplaced euphoria of becoming once again a front line state in a US-led coalition in the region. Catch phrases like a non-Nato ally of the United States and claims of an entente with the sole superpower of our times that from now on would never be subject to expediency or erosion had a strange self-hypnotic effect; the foreign policy establishment of Pakistan looked like a mere implementing arm of a decision-making machine that stood in no particular need of its counsel or experience.
Pakistan has had a long history of interaction with the United States; in fact it spans virtually all the 60 post-independence years. For most of the time, it was a complex interaction. Pakistan benefited a great deal in certain areas during some of the phases of what, by definition, was always an unequal and fluctuating alliance. It is doubtful if without this alliance, bilateral as in the 1959 treaty or multilateral as in the military pacts of 1954, Pakistan would have ever been able to raise armed forces of such size and strength.
It is also true that this assistance conferred no great leverage on Pakistan in settling issues with India on equitable terms. It might even have been counter-productive in this context. Furthermore, from time to time, Pakistan was punished hard and in some instances its interests were irreparably hurt.
On its part, Pakistan too endeavoured to maintain a policy that reflected much compliance and some selective defiance. The opening to China in the mid-1960s and the single-minded pursuit of the nuclear weapon capability after India demonstrated it in the 1970s are obvious examples of that assertion of national interest.
The team that took President Pervez Musharraf headlong into the war on terror without even a minimum effort to negotiate mutually beneficial terms of engagement was, however, notably characterised by a servile imagination. There were apprehensions in Pakistan that its foreign policy may have become hopelessly lopsided and that, more ominously, Pakistan may miss a correct view of the cross-currents of international politics in a period of major changes. In aligning itself with one turn of the tide, it may just blink on the tides to follow.
It is said that you cannot speak authentically about the future because it has not happened as yet. But an honest appraisal of the past and present does help map out the space and time in which the drama of future events would be enacted. It is not a precise science but the strategic context for coming developments can be discussed intelligently.
Perhaps one should venture to share one’s private crystal gazing with one’s readers on a relatively reckless day. It may, however, be in order to mention some of the more obvious conjectures relevant to this piece here.
One, the events of the first seven years of the 21st century foreshadow a long period of instability. Two, the journey towards a multipolar world would not be smooth; it is likely to take place in an environment of continuous friction and conflict. Third, the Cold War alternatives of two sharply antagonistic economic strategies would not return; global economy will develop at an accelerated pace and it will continue to be driven by the western capitalistic model.
Four, this rapid growth under the rubric of globalisation will be uneven and will almost certainly exacerbate inequalities. Fifth, disparities will intensify strife much of which would take the form of asymmetrical warfare and terrorism. Sixth, countries like Pakistan are situated in stress zones where metropolitan powers will not hesitate to change partners arbitrarily. In Pakistan’s specific case, India will most probably become a greater focus of American interest and support. All the talk about a long-haul collaboration with Washington may fade away before long.
The world of tomorrow will be a chequered board of interdependence and rivalry. The most important theatre for working out this dialectic would be the scramble for natural resources. Energy should be expected to be the pivot of the new and perhaps a more ruthless Great Game. Pakistan has been unsuccessfully trying to position itself appropriately for it since the early 1990s only to see Afghanistan wrecking most of its initiatives.
By making itself a major candidate to be an energy corridor, Pakistan is at once reiterating its heavy stake in this game and also opening itself to new pressures and threats. At the heart of this project lies the Sino-Pakistan friendship.
A potentially dramatic factor in the emerging scene is the new Pakistani deep sea port of Gwadar in which the Chinese have invested $200 million. In fact, some observers are already talking about the new Great Game centring on this port. Pakistan, they argue, may be setting off “alarm bells in Washington” that may impact on the current Pakistan-US alliance.
Suggesting that Gwadar is indicative of how Chinese largesse is coming into open competition with the US, one American analyst has this to say : “The more money China dishes out, the more Pakistan is likely to gravitate towards Beijing as a countervail to US influence, given that Islamabad is increasingly pummelled to do more in the war on terrorism”. If sovereign decision-making becomes an irritant in Pakistan-US relations, history would have come full circle reminding Pakistan of the hostility experienced as Ayub Khan went to Beijing to open that great window for his beleaguered country.
There are formidable problems in creating an all-weather corridor from Gwadar to Xinjiang through Pakistan’s majestic mountain ranges but, if successful, the project will hugely reduce the distance and expense, making China a very serious player in a region that the United States traditionally dominates. Pakistan is the geopolitical hub for bringing China, the Gulf including Iran and Africa into a thriving economic interaction.
Mr Shaukat Aziz’s visit to China shows that his hosts were willing to make the enterprise worthwhile for Pakistan by further diversifying cooperation. China is ready to make a large investment in Pakistan’s chronically weak manufacturing sector. It is also the only worthwhile partner of Pakistan in defence technology and production. Already, the strong differentiation made by the United States between Pakistan and India on the question of transferring sophisticated American technology for peaceful nuclear energy programmes has become an argument for enhancing relations with Beijing.
China is the only country in the world that has helped set up a nuclear power reactor and may be open to Pakistani requests for more reactors. More than 20 agreements in the public and private sectors have been signed during Shaukat Aziz’s latest visit to China. If the trade target set out in Beijing is achieved, it would easily become a major transformational factor in Pakistan’s economy. One could not also miss the clear security symbolism of many of his engagements.
Washington is not indifferent to Pakistan’s looming energy crisis or, for that matter, its economic growth. But it favours solutions that remain subordinate to its global agenda. It opposes the eminently feasible Iran-Pakistan-India gas pipeline which offers the additional advantage of giving India and Pakistan a joint stake in regional peace.
It is, however, willing to help promote a gas pipeline to South Asia from Turkmenistan and a hydroelectric power grid from Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan to Pakistan, projects which are today vulnerable to instability in Afghanistan. Turkmenistan’s ability to supply gas in quantity after its recent agreements with the Russian Federation also has a question mark.
Conscious of being the greatest ever military power, the United States has tried to pre-empt history through the Bush era doctrines of pre-emptive military interventions. So far, the results have been catastrophic. The destruction of Iraq has led some states to seek nuclear deterrence and many more to accelerate the dawn of a multipolar world order. It is highly unlikely that American military might can overcome varied forms of resistance and revolt.
Confronted with this dilemma, the United States should not be expected to regard any alliance outside the inner circle of western power as sacrosanct. The present alliance with Pakistan remains as dependent upon unilateral American perceptions of the need for it as in the past. It is high time Pakistan outgrows the habit of lamenting changes of policy and preference considered necessary by an increasingly embattled United States.
Against the chequered backdrop of past alliances, Pakistani diplomacy faces the challenge of persuading the United States that Pakistan needs to supplement its American connection with a robust regional role anchored in a special relationship with China.
The writer is a former foreign secretary.
http://www.dawn.com/2007/04/23/op.htm
