Reclaiming Pakistan's Frontier!

[Humble Pakistani]

The terrorists will be destroyed and the Pak military will prevail eventually. The curse is that in Pakistan, unfortunately noting works normally. The new found independence of the judiciary has made the judges operate like street thugs. It tickles down from the Chief Justice who is the biggest thug with a deep grudge against the nation’s military. So they keep letting the terrorists go once they are arrested. The politicians are another corrupt lot. Why can’t they make laws like the anit-terror laws all over the world? The courts would not have the power to free terrorists. We are in a mess created by all and irony of all ironies is that, we the people, have given the power to Judges and the law-makers (parliament and senate) but who gets screwed in the end by the same lot…. Yes, we the people!

 

[RabzonKhan]

TTP strategy and our naiveté


The Expree Tribune
By Ejaz Haider
April 30, 2013

Why is the Tehreek-e Taliban Pakistan (TTP) attacking the political interests of three parties, namely the Pakistan Peoples Party (PPP), the Awami National Party (ANP) and the Muttahida Qaumi Movement (MQM)? What does the TTP hope to gain out of this policy?

We have an answer to the first question from the TTP itself. These three parties are being attacked because they have a liberal-secular outlook, which makes them the bête-noire of the TTP. Second, they were part of the coalition government under whose watch the military operations against the Taliban were conducted. Is it then part ideological and part revenge?

No. That would be too simplistic and linear. While ideology and revenge play an important role as markers to motivate the heavy lifters, the foot soldiers, they are a means to an end. The end, the strategic mosaic, is bigger than the small, tactical pieces that make it up. Also, to think that the Taliban are merely uncouth fighters or their planners do not understand the sophisticated concepts of strategy will be a big mistake. There is reason to believe, and there is empirical evidence of it, that they are fully versed in the art of war, both its purpose and its aim — the first denoting the political objective, the second concerned with the actual conduct of battles.

Seen from this perspective, the violence the TTP is generating is not gratuitous. It is purposive. These are small-scale multiple attacks with a huge psychological cumulative impact; easy to manage, little cost, disproportionate gains.

So, what is the purpose? This is where matters become diabolically interesting.

The TTP knows it cannot capture political power directly. It is also too early for it to expect, despite the denominational conservatism of an average Pakistani, to have him or her reject the idea of elections or democracy. The average Pakistani may do abominable things on certain issues of religion, including murder, but is not unidimensional.

So, if elections cannot be prevented at this stage in the game, what’s the best alternative? It is to ensure that those parties whose presence in the socioeconomic and political life of Pakistan is threatening to the Taliban ideology must be pushed to the sidelines.

The strategy then becomes twofold. On the one hand, the TTP will use terror tactics to instill fear in the parties that it wants out of the game, and on the other, despite its opposition to the institutional mechanisms that define Pakistan today, support those political elements that it thinks will be more amenable to negotiating with it. Within this, there is a third minor strand too — parties like the Ahle Sunnat Wal Jama’at (ASWJ), which are primarily the political face of terrorist groups affiliated with the TTP.

These parties, more like groupings, link up with the right-of-centre and right-wing parties to capture enough political space to become useful in pushing for legislation that is regressive. Of course, there are local compulsions that both restrict and facilitate their operations, but that is in the nature of the game which, as noted earlier, is far from linear.

The TTP has one thing going in its favour — the fear factor. It knows that the state, despite multiple operations, has not been able to either make it irrelevant or dislocate it from the context that strengthens it. It has also played on the great confusion that runs through Pakistani society: is this our war? While it is possible to criticise American policies in the region and yet be anti-Taliban, this being a desirable course of action in fact, the problem is that the Pakistanis, for the most part, have chosen to lull themselves into thinking that with the Americans gone from here, the TTP will automatically demobilise and accept the writ of the state.

This is certainly the view of Imran Khan and has filtered down to his party leaders and supporters. One could perhaps laugh it off for its naiveté if the consequences of this linearity weren’t so threatening. Be that as it may, the TTP knows that this confusion plays to its advantage. At the minimum, it has precluded the state from developing a proper response to the TTP threat. Military operations in general and counterterrorism strategies in specific cannot be fully successful without a public buy-in, and the public’s acceptance of what the state must do is heavily contingent upon a clear understanding of the threat.

Of course, there is the matter of how successful the state has been. There is, for instance, the example of the ANP choosing to talk to the Taliban. The ANP did this because it realised that it is alone and the state cannot secure it. To that extent, the ANP’s reluctant decision to call an All Party Conference to this end is not the same thing as when the Jamiat Ulema-e Islam (Fazl) calls for one.

We will be remiss if we did not mention another important factor: governance. The out-gone coalition didn’t cover itself in glory on that count. That factor, in an election campaign and quite apart from TTP attacks, is also playing to its disadvantage and, by that logic, to the advantage of the very parties the TTP has given an open playing field to. It will be difficult to assess, in any meaningful or even acceptable way, whether — if they do — they lost out to other parties because of this threat or their poor performance. They have already said that because they cannot reach their voters, the election will not be free. And if it isn’t free, it can’t be fair.

If a situation arises in which these parties refuse to accept the election results, the gains will again be the TTP’s.

Finally, while this is the TTP’s long-term strategy, the conglomeration controls the tap from whence violence flows out. They will resort to it to supplement the broader strategy of pressuring the incoming government. Talking is never bad but talking from a position of weakness is always disastrous. Secondly, any talk about talks must keep in mind that while states negotiate with insurgent groups, they don’t with terrorists. If the TTP can get the state to accept its legitimacy as a negotiating partner, that would be a major plus for the TTP.

That is the mid-term strategy in the TTP’s march towards controlling Pakistan.

 

[RabzonKhan]

Achakzai’s pie-in-the-sky formula

By Ejaz Haider
June 18, 2013

Mehmood Khan Achakzai, chief of the Pakhtunkhwa Milli Awami Party, wants the state to withdraw security forces from the tribal areas, give immunity to the foreigners hiding there and start “serious” negotiations with the Taliban. He also wants the United States involved in these talks and thinks that Washington should be asked to put a moratorium on drone strikes until the conclusion of this process.

Now, Achakzai is a wise man and a seasoned politician. In this particular case, however, he seems to have allowed himself into a flight of fantasy instead of keeping his feet firmly planted on the ground.

Look at the implications and assumptions here.

Withdrawing troops from the tribal areas implies, or can be perceived to, that the trouble there is owed to military presence, not the Taliban. It assumes that by conceding the Taliban demand that the military be withdrawn from a territory that belongs to the state, the Taliban, by becoming more amenable to talks will start talking peace and, so it seems, will allow the state to extend its writ to Fata. It further assumes that the Taliban are attacking the state because of the military presence in the area and not because the military had to be sent in to check the accumulation in the area of undesirable elements, domestic and foreign.

None of these assumptions is correct. In fact, by withdrawing, all the agencies in Fata will become like North Waziristan and all the gains will be lost. It is true that the Taliban will be more amenable to talking, but that will not be because they would have been weakened but because they will have the confidence to talk from a position of strength provided to them by the state. The state will have effectively ceded its writ to them.

When the state cut the ill-advised Shakai Agreement in April 2004 with Nek Mohammad, a former petty car thief, Nek told the media that by coming to his lair, the army had surrendered to him, not the other way round.

Regarding giving immunity to foreigners, Achakzai needs to remember that the state, on multiple occasions, while cutting deals with the local tribes, made this concession: the foreigners, who are settled here and have contracted marriages, can live in the area but they must remain peaceful and must not indulge in unlawful activities. It was as effective as the Maginot Line before the Panzers. Nothing has changed. The foreigners, also allied with Al-Qaeda, make up effective fighting cadres for the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP). Why would they remain peaceful and settle down to tending sheep, if not taking their kids out to have ice cream and watching Fast and Furious in some multiplex in North Waziristan?

How will the immunity for peaceful existence, presumably Achakzai’s formula, be enforced in Fata, especially if the state has withdrawn from the area and by doing so accepted the TTP’s suzerainty over Fata? And what guarantees will Achakzai extract from the TTP regarding those tribal lashkars which have stayed faithful to the state and have fought alongside the army? Going by previous experience, all local deals ended up strengthening the Taliban, who avenged themselves by merrily killing and beheading those who had sided with the state.

In fact, not only did the army lose much goodwill because of such deals, it also left pro-state elements at the mercy of these groups, making it extremely difficult subsequently for any tribe to openly side with the state.

As for Washington putting a moratorium on drone strikes in order for Achakzai’s brilliant formula to succeed, I suspect there won’t be many buyers in that town. Getting Washington to do so also assumes, again with the naivete of a winsome damsel, that no elements in Fata cross over into Afghanistan to attack Nato-Isaf troops there, just like no elements cross west to east to attack Pakistani troops.

I have a suggestion for Achakzai. If he can work out an enduring peace deal with the Ghabizais in his area, a much less complicated affair than the cross he wants to bear, I will have more faith in his ability to find solutions to wicked problems.

Now that I mention the Ghabizais, here is a bird’s eye view of what that is.

In the Gulistan area of Balochistan, along the road to Chaman, home to Achakzai, a feud erupted in 1990. It has so far consumed over 200 people, locals say. This is how it began.

Mohammad Khan Ghabizai murdered a man, Aslam, from the Achakzai tribe. Jirgas were held and an agreement was reached. Locals told me that Mohammad Khan, despite the agreement, continued to act arrogantly. This led to some Achakzai tribesmen ambushing and killing Mohammad Khan, along with his two sons, at Syed Hameed Cross on the road to Chaman. Our Achakzai had nothing to do with these killings but the Ghabizais held him responsible for the killings. Thus began a cycle with many a battle fought, Ghabizais led by Ahmad Khan and now Shakoor Khan, both sons of Mohammad Khan.

Typical tribal feud that and yet, 23 years down the line it remains alive, simmering and occasionally flaring up. As I said, if Achakzai can make peace in Gulistan, as a test case of sorts, I will be a little more confident of his scheme apropos of the TTP.

As I have argued several times in this space, talking is the only way to ultimately settle things. But talking requires an enabling environment which, in a conflict, depends on using force in ways that lead to utility of force. Achakzai’s formula is based on assumptions that are either untested or have been tried, tested and found wanting.

Another point which I have attempted to make before, and often, relates to the overall strategy to deal with these groups. Physical dominance of the area is important. This is what the army has done in large parts of Fata through counterterrorism military operations. But it’s not enough and it doesn’t address the other flank, neutralising urban terrorism, the advantage these groups have and which they will utilise. We have been like a boxer fighting with one strong arm. Before we get to talking, let’s first develop a viable CT strategy. There are aspects of that which need a separate discussion.

The eeriness of our situation reminds me of Pinter’s The Caretaker. The drop falls into the bucket; it has been falling for years now, followed by a pause. Nothing seems to come out of it. We don’t even know what it signifies.

Corollary: pie-in-the-sky schemes are not going to work.

 

[RazorMC]

^^ the writer is correct in saying that Pakistan is still undecided on whether we want to fight them to the end or just talk to them or is it even our fight?

This keeps us on the back foot all the time while these TTPs just smile under their masks..

 

[RabzonKhan]

Terror in Gilgit-Baltistan indicates more trouble

The Express Tribune
By Ejaz Haider
June 25, 2013


The June 23 incident at the western base camp of Nanga Parbat, in which nine foreign tourists and their local guide were gratuitously killed, raises many questions.

Reports indicate the area has been cordoned off and search parties are scouring all possible approaches to and away from the base camp. Aerial surveillance is being conducted, local community leaders have been co-opted and suspects have been rounded up. The surviving guide and a Chinese trekker are also being questioned for any clues.

So, who were the people who mounted this attack? Going by the local reaction to the terrible incident, it is difficult to assume they were locals, even as facilitation by some among the local population cannot be discounted. That said, it is clear, given the terrain and the gruelling trek that the attackers were acclimatised to operate in rarefied air conditions.

The area in and around Chilas — also some other parts of Gilgit-Baltistan (G-B) — has a history of sectarian violence. Since 2005, there have been at least three incidents of targeted sectarian killings in which Shia passengers were forced out of buses, lined up and killed. The latest attack was only last year, in much the same way as the minibus incident on a cold January evening in Northern Ireland, narrated by Seamus Heaney in his Nobel lecture, Crediting Poetry. Except that there is no Heaney here to narrate the harrowing tales that have become all too common in our beloved land.

But while sectarian terror has visited the area on many occasions, the question remains: why would sectarian terrorists target a group of foreign tourists? It can’t be because of denominational differences. Also, as it seems, mounting this attack required a long trek. Moreover, at the time of the incident, reportedly, there were other trekkers and mountaineers in the area too. Almost all have since been evacuated.

What was the attacking group’s extrication plan? The place where the attack happened is not a built-in area. No one can kill anyone and then walk over to another street to have coffee. Chances are the group split up in smaller two- to three-man teams for extrication. What did they do with the weapons? It’s unlikely they carried the weapons when extricating, except possibly handguns that can be easily concealed. Did they conceal the weapons somewhere close by? Could it be that they picked up the weapons after the trek to the point and before killing the tourists? If so, then the weapons got to the designated spot before the group did. Who carried the weapons to that point? Were there local facilitators?

Reports suggest there were 10 to 14 attackers. Why would, whoever planned the attack, need such a large group when three to four trained people with automatic weapons would be enough to kill a dozen unarmed men caught by surprise? How could such a large body of armed men go undetected in an area where there’s a large, covert and overt presence of intelligence personnel and their informers, and non-locals can be fairly easily picked up — unless they moved to a pre-designated rendezvous in small groups.

Could it be that the number of attackers was much less than what is being reported? It makes more sense, both for the purposes of attacking and extricating, to keep the group small. Detection is more difficult and concealing movement can be relatively easy. Weapons can be carried, field-stripped and then assembled before the attack. They can either be hidden after the attack or destroyed. This was not a suicide mission so it must have had an extrication plan.

Still, regardless of any theories, the issue of motive remains. Looters don’t trek long distances to pick up backpacks and money, unless they chance upon a target. According to one police report, the attackers did not touch the victims’ belongings.

Is the motive then to destroy the economy of the area? Is it to open a new front for the government and turn the relatively calm but strategically very sensitive G-B into another hotbed of extremist terrorism? If it is the latter, the former being just a spin-off of it, then we should see more attacks on both soft and hard targets. If such a scenario comes to pass, it will put terrible pressure on security forces, primarily elements of the Force Command Northern Areas (FCNA). If the FCNA troops have to get involved in an internal low-intensity conflict (LIC), the Command will be spread thin and will either have to induct more troops dealing with the LIC or take the pressure on its primary role which is to defend against India along a very difficult Line of Control as well as along the western ridges of the Saltoro Range. The Karakoram Highway could also come under threat and the Road Maintenance Battalions will either need additional troops for local protection or increase their own components for such protection to fulfil their primary role.

The Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) has taken responsibility for the attack and claims a group under its banner is now operating in the area. One report suggests the involvement of the Asmatullah Moavia group which, for some time, has linked up with local sectarian groups. There is a strong possibility of this and we are told the security teams are following up on these leads.

No matter how one looks at it, unless there is an off chance of this incident being an isolated aberration, which is highly unlikely, the government, the intelligence agencies and the army should brace for more trouble. This is why it is absolutely crucial that the terrorists who mounted this attack are hunted down and captured. If this was a planned operation and the beginning of more to come, getting these criminals is a must not just to show the state’s resolve in dealing with what has happened but also in unravelling any bigger strategic plan to destabilise the area.

I have said before but it bears repeating: sectarian terrorists form a major component of the TTP whose ideology is essentially sectarian and rabidly anti-Shia. Those who think that sectarian terrorism and the TTP are different phenomena, and while one must be put down and the other talked to, are either dissemblers or hopeless fools.

 

[RabzonKhan]

This is one of the best pieces I have read after a long time.

Three cheers for the author.




Narratives on the TTP

Asad Munir
July 06, 2013


Nawaz Sharif wants to talk to the Taliban. Imran Khan has, for many years, considered negotiations to be the only option to get rid of terrorism and is convinced that Waliur Rehman was a pro-Pakistan militant, who was only droned because the US wants to sabotage the process of negotiations with the TTP.

Two APCs, attended by all political parties, also preferred the option of negotiations over the use of force. So the majority of Pakistanis want to negotiate with the terrorists. In a democratic state we must honour the opinion of the majority and go for the option of dialogue.

An offer of talks was initiated by the TTP through a Punjabi Taliban leader Asmatullah Muawiya in late 2012, laying down three conditions, “The government should make independent foreign policy, withdraw from the Afghan war, and form and implement a new Islamic constitution in the country”. The offer was later endorsed by the TTP, naming three politicians – Nawaz Sharif, Fazlur Rehman and Munawar Hasan – to act as guarantors for the implementation of any agreement that was finalised through the negotiations.

This offer was withdrawn once Waliur Rehman was killed in a drone strike. Since the TTP is so sure that the nation is in favour of talks, it has conditionally renewed the offer “if the group sees that the elected government is able to take a stand against the country’s intelligence agencies, only then will the option of talks be considered”.

Before opting for talks, the Taliabanisation of Pakistan needs to be understood in its correct perspective. This process did not start with the US war on terror, as believed by the majority of Pakistanis.

In 1994 the Tehreek-e-Nafaz-e-Shariat-e-Mohammadi (TNSM) initiated an armed movement for enforcement of shariah in the Malakand Division. The group took control of some districts through the use of force. It took the troops of Frontier Corps more than a month to dislodge the TNSM from the areas it had captured. Nizam-e-Adl was introduced and established in Malakand in 1995 – later revised in 1998.

However, the issue was not completely resolved and TNSM activists continued with their protests till 2001. Leaders of the TNSM enforced Taliban’s rule in Swat and Bajaur, led by Fazlullah – son-in-law of Sufi Mohammad – and Faqir Mohammad respectively. In 1996 the Afghan Taliban captured Kabul. Inspired by their achievements, a Taliban force was raised in the Orakzai Agency in 1997. In 1998 a Taliban force emerged in Mirali, North Waziristan.

A few tribals from South Waziristan had joined the Afghan Taliban and taken part in battles against the Northern Alliance. By the year 2000 Talibanisation had spread to Fata and some districts of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. Once Afghanistan was invaded, the Pakistani Taliban were already active in some parts of Fata. They provided the required support system to the foreign militants who fled Afghanistan and took refuge in Pakistan.

The army was inducted into Waziristan in 2001/2002 with two objectives – to develop infrastructure in the inaccessible areas of Waziristan and to conduct targeted operations against foreign militants who had entered Waziristan in large numbers in March 2002. The narrative that there was no terrorism before 2004 and it started because the army entered Fata is not based on facts. The army entered Fata because there were a large number of Al-Qaeda terrorists in Waziristan. These militants had plans to create a state with Fata and some border districts of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa included in it.

The other popular narrative believed by Pakistanis is that the issue of terrorism cannot be addressed by the use of force as we have failed to eliminate terrorism in the last eleven years. The fact is that in 2008-2009 there were eighteen administrative units, districts, tribal agencies and frontier regions that were either completely or partially under the influence of the TTP. Now they have their bases only in North Waziristan. They have been dislodged from all other areas through the use of force; they refuse to surrender through negotiations.

Very few people know that negotiations with the tribals were initiated in 2002, before the start of any operations – and the process of dialogue continued all through these eleven years. Numerous peace deals were inked, but none produced the desired results. All such deals were used by the Taliban to their advantage; they regrouped, increased their strength, trained their fighters, explored avenues of funding and extended their influence from two tribal agencies to the whole of Fata and Malakand Division in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa.

Negotiations are likely to be a complicated process, which will require many issues to be addressed as well as a framework accepted by both parties. Since the offer has been made by Hakeemullah Mehsud, talks will be held with his group. There are many other groups of the TTP like those of Fazlullah of Malakand, Faqir Mohammad of Bajaur, and Khalid Umer of the Mohmand Agency. Some of these militants are presently based in Kunar and the Nuristan province of Afghanistan.

Are they still part of Hakeemullah Mehsud’s TTP? Will they accept any agreement reached between the state and the TTP led by Hakeemullah Mehsud? In all probability they will not.

What about Mangal Bagh and other groups operating in the Khyber Agency? What will be the fate of Al-Qaeda and other foreign militants presently operating from North Waziristan? Will they surrender and agree to be handed over to their countries of origin or decide to live as peaceful refugees in Pakistan? What about the LeJ and other groups operating in Waziristan?

Hafiz Gul Bahadur and Mullah Nazir’s groups are presently not conducting terrorist activities inside Pakistan – will they disband their forces once the US leaves Afghanistan? In all probability they will not; they will either join the Afghan Taliban in their battle for the capture of Kabul. If that does not happen they will keep their forces, control Waziristan and try to expand their influence to other parts of Fata, like the TTP did.

The PML-N should go ahead with the negotiations ‘option’, but in all probability it may not achieve the desired results, and may not bring peace and end terrorism in this unfortunate country.

The TTP is likely to make unconstitutional and unreasonable demands. But the only advantage of such talks, in my opinion, is that it may help in building a national consensus that the use of force is the only language terrorists like the TTP understand.


The writer is a retired brigadier.

 

[RabzonKhan]

 

[RabzonKhan]

[URL='http://www.dawn.com/news/1076409/north-waziristan-appears-close-to-full-blown-conflict']North Waziristan appears close to full-blown conflict[/url]

12/26/2013
Ismail Khan

Government officials put the total number of local militant groups operating in North Waziristan, including the Haqqani network, at 43. — File photo


GUNS have fallen silent in Mirali — a bustling town 35km to the east of North Waziristan’s regional headquarters of Miramshah, but now with rows of burnt down and bombed shops and houses.

The sudden flare-up and military’s fierce response to a suicide bombing at one of its main camps in Khajori on Dec 18 have shown that the situation in North Waziristan remains volatile, dangerously close to a full-blown conflict.

That the peace process would be illusive was known to all but what many people fail to understand is just how complex it would be, given the large number of militant groups with different agendas and goals.

A ceasefire has now been in effect. But the question is for how long. The military is edgy. For far too long, they say, they sat out there, taking casualties.

Since September, they say, a total of 67 improvised explosives devices were planted to harm them; 40 were neutralised, 27 exploded, resulting in deaths and injuries to about a hundred of their men.

Since 2009, compared with other tribal regions, the casualty rate the military has suffered is the highest in North Waziristan and eleven times the casualties they have taken in South Waziristan. Patience has worn out.

“The question is for how long,” asked one military officer. “It’s better to go out and die fighting them than take casualties sitting inside our camps.”

In Mirali the fighting has stopped but the situation remains fluid. The military, despite its furious response, says it is committed to the political leadership’s plan to initiate peace dialogue with militants in Waziristan.

Commitment notwithstanding, no-one in the know is willing to put his bottom dollar on the success of the yet-to-start peace process. Such is the complexity of the situation. There are so many groups and with so varied objectives that no matter whom the government speaks to sue peace, any of the groups not happy with the process can light a match to burn down the entire process. Consider what happened on December 18. The Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) posted an English translation of its statement on the Jamia Hafsa Urdu Forum on Tuesday, saying that the military responded with air and ground attack after a group of “frustrated fighters” had bombed a military convoy.

In the event, it said, fighters from the IMU, the TTP and Ansarul Mujahideen hit back to ‘defend civilians’.

Two IMU fighters were killed and 22 foreign “refugees” wounded. It put the civilian casualty figures at 70. The military, the IMU said, had suffered more than 300 casualties.

The military rubbishes the claim and insists that not a single soldier was killed or injured in the follow-up action which, it says, left more than 30 foreign militants dead, most of them Uzbeks.

This is what Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif and his pointman for the peace process in North Waziristan, Chaudhry Nisar, will have to grapple with: a plethora of militant groups ever keen to attack security forces and an increasingly edgy military. And they may not have much time at hand.

No-one seems to be in control in North Waziristan. Together with the military and the paramilitary, the political administration is confined to the fort in Miramshah. With curfew clamped, the military moves only on what is called the Road Opening Days, suffering roadside bombings and ambushes.

As for the militant groups, they are many. Government officials put the total number of local militant groups operating in North Waziristan, including the Haqqani network, at 43.

Dattakhel-based Hafiz Gul Bahadar has the highest number of groups affiliated with him — 15, followed by 10 independent groups. There are six TTP-affiliated groups. The Punjabi Taliban have four groups.

In addition, there are 12 foreign militant groups, including Al Qaeda.

With a combined strength of roughly 11,000 fighting men, the Pakistani and foreign militant groups represent a formidable challenge, officials acknowledge.

Given the enormity and complexity of the problem, the lack of trust between the militants and the state and prevalent scepticism within the civil-military establishment regarding success and sustainability of the proposed peace process, the path to peace, if and when taken, would not be easy.

 

[RabzonKhan]

New Year resolutions

Dawn
Babar Sattar
Dec 30 2013

IF we can change one thing about Pakistan in 2014 can that please be our mindset? Can we cure ourselves of the Pakistan-versus-the-rest paranoia that cultivates the image of a conspiring wicked world ganged up against us? Can we begin appraising our acts and omissions critically and take responsibility for our faults instead of justifying them and reinforcing failure? Can we build a Pakistan that is not infested with rabid intolerance that is dehumanising us as a society?

Paranoia is a mental condition in which one loses touch with reality. If you took Pakistan to a psychiatrist, it would be prescribed a pill. Individuals inspire themselves in different ways: motivation can come from the constructive desire to succeed or from negative emotions such as jealousy. But hatred for others can’t be the source of inspiration leading an entire country towards progress. If our national leadership is united over one thing, it is blaming the world for our failures.

Pakistan lives on false binaries. If we love Pakistan, we must hate the US and the West and India. If we don’t, we are enemy agents who have sold ourselves for financial gain. In public our leaders compete rabidly for appearing more anti-West. But in their personal lives they are rational. They will send their kids to the West for education or to settle down. They will even form a beeline to shake the US ambassador’s hand when possible, but froth at the mouth in public.

Hypocrisy isn’t the key problem here. Our problem is that states don’t exist in a vacuum and embracing angry isolationism is not in Pakistan’s interest. By drumming up hatred against the world as policy, our leaders are squandering the required room and flexibility for security and foreign policymaking. Pursuing policies that allow us more autonomy in an interdependent world is a no-brainer. But North Korea or Taliban’s Afghanistan aren’t models to emulate.

Why not follow China’s example? At some point a few decades back the country decided to throw its head down and singularly focus on building itself up — its economy, its security, its infrastructure — without projecting its power outward. And nothing succeeds like success. India is another example. Over the last two decades it has accumulated the ability not just to pull its weight but also assert its influence.

The defensive US posture in the row over the arrest of the Indian diplomat in New York isn’t about America’s adherence to Indias concepts of honour or India’s willingness to defend such honour. It is all about India’s ability to protect its interests. Twenty years back, mistreating an Indian envoy would have been equally wrong. But with a broken economy and limited leverage, India’s threat of reprisal would have meant nothing. Today, it is not in US interest to mistreat an Indian envoy.

Self-confidence that engenders belief in one’s ability to succeed is healthy. Pakistanis are an intelligent, industrious and hardworking lot with the potential to succeed amidst fierce competition, as established by our students and expats across the world. But such self-confidence need not spring from hatred for others. Today in Pakistan we find our leaders bandy about xenophobia as patriotism. Provoking anger and using rhetoric as substitutes for progressive change and leadership is dangerous.

We are faced with complex problems and the solutions aren’t simple either. Drones, for example, are instruments of execution and can never be justified from a rule of law perspective. But so long as we have terror sanctuaries within our territory that threaten other states (not to mention our citizens) and we want to tell the world to take a hike for it is our land and thus our way, our very genuine case against the use of drones in our territory will find little traction.

Combine the anti-drone drive with an actionable time-bound plan to clean up sanctuaries and we’ll have a sympathetic international audience. We have an indigenous terrorism problem that won’t go away with the US withdrawal from Afghanistan or the end of drones. The solution is again not a binary choice between a full-blown military operation and appeasement dressed up as peace talks. Cleaning up sanctuaries is only one part of the challenge.

We will need to extinguish violent non-state actors by changing our security policy. We will need to shut down hate-producing factories masquerading as madressahs. We will need to introduce a plan to mainstream Fata in phases (initially by extending to them benefits of citizenship and later by introducing responsibilities). We will need to fix our criminal justice system (especially police) to punish criminals. And we will need to do all this simultaneously.

The manner in which we have defined our mission as a nation and our relationship with the world has embroiled us in a vicious cycle of hate, violence and resentment that’s eating us up from within. Let’s focus on building our ability to defend our interests as a nation-state and we will find our honour getting defiled less and less.

If we don’t fix our security we can’t fix our economy. Without a vibrant economy we can’t invest in education and health or preserve our natural resources. Without human and natural resources essential to sustain a population our size and creating opportunities for upward mobility, we will be a cramped, hot, illiterate, angry, scary place in 30 years that will have nothing to feed on other than primitive notions of honour and injured pride.

The writer is a lawyer.

 

[RabzonKhan]

Anti-terrorism policy alone is not enough

Daily Times
Dr Haider Shah
January 25, 2014

In the media and educational institutions, sermonisers were given a free hand to spread their discourse of hatred and bigotry while progressive rationalist thinkers were actively discouraged.

Just as we bid farewell to an eventful 2013, hardly did we know that much worse awaited us in the first month of the New Year. An unprecedented rise in terrorist activities has been witnessed as, from ordinary polio workers to services personnel, from political workers to worshippers belonging to various faith communities, all have fallen prey to the hounds of militant extremism. The recent surgical operations in the tribal areas might be a precursor to a full-blown operation against the militant groups but can a military operation alone remedy a situation that is the result of our choices in the past? That is the million dollar question we need to consider more dispassionately.

As calls for an anti-terrorism strategy are becoming a rising chorus, it is useful to first understand what ‘strategy’ is. A strategy answers four simple questions. One, where are we at the moment? Two, what did we do in the past that brought us here? Three, where do we want to be? And, four, how do we get there?

Perhaps we can help the government devise its strategy if it is finding it hard to come up with one by answering these four questions. However, the thrust of analysis should be anti-extremism and not anti-terrorism. The latter amounts to curing symptoms and not addressing the causes as terrorism is the outcome of the choices we made in the past in various fields of public policy. In my last piece, I had argued that faith is used by different sections of society differently depending on their special needs. While the haves enjoy religion for contentment and social ritual purposes, the have-nots use communal faith for organising and motivational purposes. If the ruling classes are using religion to maximise their social control, it is very naïve to expect that the deprived classes will not use it for their own empowerment by motivational slogans of jihad and sharia.

Where we are is not hard to answer. From businessmen to sportspersons, everyone shudders at the thought of visiting the country of Buddha, Bulleh Shah and Rehman Baba. “You are free; you are free to go to your temples” was the promise of the founder of the nation and today no member of any faith community feels safe in his/her place of worship. What were our choices in the past that led us to the situation we find ourselves in is the second question. Political leaders like Imran Khan and Munawar Hasan make us believe with their ‘Amreeka ki jang’ (this is the US’s war) rhetoric that it was all rosy before 9/11 in the country. In reality, religious and provincial rights questions began rocking the boat soon after Pakistan came into being. Religious extremism demonstrated its first show of muscle when martial law had to be imposed in 1953 to quell riots spearheaded by leaders of the Khatm-e-Nabuwwat movement. We kept appeasing the religious establishment and it kept gaining more muscle.

Unfortunately, while the founder of the country was sincere in his vision of a secular and liberal state, his deeds did not always support his words. In his enthusiasm to outmanoeuvre Nehru, he played the religion card in the tribal areas and, in order to lure the tribesmen, promised them unrealistic and unwarranted terms for joining Pakistan. As an unfortunate corollary of this original sin, use of tribesmen for waging proxy wars in our neighbouring countries further sowed the seeds of the troubles that we now see mushrooming all around us. Adoption of religion-coated motivational doctrines by our military institutions further paved the way for encouragement of jihadi discourse. In the media and educational institutions, sermonisers were given a free hand to spread their discourse of hatred and bigotry while progressive rationalist thinkers were actively discouraged. This environment proved an ideal breeding place for the militants who now, like Frankenstein’s monster, are threatening the existence of their inventors.

Once the first two questions are honestly answered, finding answers to the remaining two questions is not difficult. We want to be an emerging economic tiger like India, Turkey, Brazil and Vietnam. In order to attain that desired ideal we need to have an anti-extremism policy, which should encompass all spheres of our socio-economic life. The syllabus of mainstream and religious institutions will have to be purged of any extremist content. The media and educational institutions need to discourage unbridled discourse of hate and should instead promote critical, rationalist thinking. Those who challenge the writ of the state should be summarily taken out of business. Most importantly, necessary amends need to be made to address the original sin. There is no place for tribalism and safe havens in 21st century Pakistan and hence FATA needs to be brought into the general rule of law with accompanying duties and responsibilities.

As an emergency measure, demolishing the terrorism infrastructure of extremist gangs needs to be high on the national agenda. This short-term policy needs to be supplemented by a long-term anti-extremism policy with a wider outlook. Before the elections last year, I had stressed upon Nawaz Sharif to find the missing ‘E’ of extremism in his party’s manifesto, which centred on ‘economy, energy and education’. Surgical operations can bring some temporary relief but only a comprehensive solution based on redefining our foreign policy paradigm and rationalising the use of religion in our public policy can guarantee long-term peace and progress.

 

[RabzonKhan]

Cut the crap

Najam Sethi
31 Jan 2014

Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif met COAS General Raheel Sharif on Tuesday, January 28, to cement the government’s resolve to finally slay the terrorists. The same day, he met with PMLN parliamentarians to obtain a green light in launching military operations against the TTP. But the following morning, as his definitive “war” speech was readied for presentation before parliament, there was a last-ditch amendment in it to give “peace” a “final chance” by setting up a four-member committee to hold out the olive branch to the TTP. That is why when the PM finally arrived in parliament and began to unfurl his agenda, it seemed as if all signals were go for war, until he arrived at the last paragraphs and took a somersault.

The PM’s meeting with the KPK chief minister a day earlier may have prompted a change of heart. The PTI remained the last hurdle in cobbling an All Parties consensus in favour of war. Therefore the nomination of three religio-political mediators from KPK, including PTI’s Rustam Shah (a fierce opponent of any military action against the TTP) suggests that the PM is covering his flanks before launching military action. The reasoning is that when, not if, the Committee fails to persuade the TTP to cease fire, the KPK-PTI will have no option but to fall in line with the war consensus.

But there are strategic problems in this tactical move. For starters, the TTP is making impossible pre-conditional demands – halt military operations and withdraw the military from Waziristan, free TTP prisoners (especially the Big 3 from Mulla Fazlullah’s Swat Group, ie, Muslim Khan, Mahmood Khan and Maulvi Umar), pay billions in compensation, establish TTP Shariah in Pakistan, etc. Then there are many unanswered questions: how much time has been given to the committee to conclude whether there can be any meaningful talks or whether the TTP is simply buying time to regroup and upgrade (last October, after assassinating GOC Swat Maj-Gen Sanaullah Niazi, TTP leader Mulla Fazlullah declared that “the negotiations with the government were a component of a war that is continuing”); what if there are divisions in the committee about what to do and how to go about it; who is the committee going to talk to if not directly to Fazlullah’s publicly nominated representatives who may or may not be upfront; what if attacks by TTP franchises continue during the talks and the TTP pretends it has nothing to do with them; And so on. In short, instead of paving the way for war or peace, the committee could sow further confusion and controversy and dilute the current consensus to respond forcefully to the TTP’s killing spree.

Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif’s reluctance to opt for full-fledged war springs from some hard and fearful realities on the ground. Topmost is an expected TTP backlash in the PM’s home province of Punjab that has so far been largely untouched by the TTP’s retribution policies. The provincial IGP has urgently advised Special Branch and Counter-Terrorist Department to be ready to face the challenge of TTP attacks on government leaders, functionaries and buildings. The problems are three-fold. First, TTP cells in the Rawalpindi-Islamabad area along with SSP franchises in rural Punjab can be activated to wreck havoc and sow fear among the police and populace. Second, the police are neither trained nor adequately equipped for counter-terrorism in the province and make a soft target for ideologically motivated suicide-guerillas fighters. Three, the province is porous for terrorists from FATA and also provides for demographic clusters of similar ethnic groups in which the terrorists can find safety and fluidity. In short, what is a dreadful reality in Karachi already could soon become a distinct probability in Punjab.

But this excuse doesn’t wash. The ruling PMLN has always known that one day the chickens would come home to roost since Punjab remains the base of all sectarian and jihadi organizations in the country. These were originally nurtured by the military establishment but have become independent or autonomous in recent years and struck out on their own with links to Al-Qaeda and the Afghan Taliban. However, successive PMLN governments in Punjab have turned a blind eye to them for politically opportunist reasons enabling them to dig roots and expand their networks, especially in the southern part of the province that is now a launching pad for sectarian terrorism in Balochistan and Karachi. Indeed, that is why it is ironic that Rana Sanaullah, the Punjab Law Minister who has always defended his government’s dubious role in allowing these non-state organs to flourish, should now come out all guns blazing against them. In an interview to a UK paper, Rana said that “Pakistan is on war footing to smash terrorists… and 174 areas in Punjab have now been earmarked for action against them”. The next day, his prime ministerial boss reprimanded him for spilling the beans!

It is time to cut the crap and get on with it if Pakistan is not to become another Afghanistan.

 

[RabzonKhan]

[URL='http://www.dawn.com/news/1086501/from-jihad-to-terrorism']From jihad to terrorism[/url]

Dawn
2/12/2014
Zahid Hussain

AS he squatted under a TTP banner and toted his Kalashnikov, his face looked familiar, though his beard had grown much thicker and was perhaps dyed in henna, hiding the grey. After a long disappearance, Mast Gul resurfaced last week in North Waziristan with another militant commander claiming responsibility for a terrorist attack on a hotel in Peshawar that killed several Shias.

That takes me down memory lane more than 18 years ago when the burly young tribesman had returned to a hero’s welcome after leading a bloody, two-month siege of Charar Sharif, a 14th-century shrine in India-held Kashmir. The fighting killed several Indian soldiers and ended in the destruction of the historical holy place.

Working on a BBC documentary on Islamic blowback we travelled with Mast Gul for days filming his ‘victory’ processions in Punjab. Escorted by the top leadership of the Jamaat-i-Islami he was hailed as a great ‘Islamic warrior’. It was apparent that the JI was using him to boost its jihadi credentials and get maximum political mileage.

My most vivid memory was a reception for him at the Punjab University campus in Lahore. The jam-packed auditorium thundered with slogans of “jihad” as Mast Gul entered surrounded by armed militants in camouflage jackets. The atmosphere became more charged as he narrated the story of his encounter with Indian troops. “Kashmir will soon be liberated,” he vowed amid thunderous applause and salutary gunfire.

Such salutation was overwhelming for this tribal bumpkin known as a daredevil maverick to his acquaintances in Peshawar where he had resided. He was non-serious, often poking his colleagues with his Kalashnikov which he loved to keep by his side. He would randomly fire it to show off. The ‘hero of Charar Sharif’, however, was soon in oblivion after falling out with his patrons — until his reappearance last week.

That was the time when militant groups openly operated under the state’s patronage, recruiting volunteers that mostly attracted young men like Mast Gul, fascinated by guns and with a love for adventure. There were others too motivated by religious belief.

The militant groups would demonstrate guerrilla training sessions on Lahore’s Mall Road and other city centres. Through graffiti, wall posters and pamphlets they invited young men for training. ‘Jihad is the shortest route to heaven’ was one of many exhortations.

Many ideologically indoctrinated men died fighting in various global jihad theatres from Kashmir to Afghanistan, Bosnia and Chechnya. Pakistan had earned the unparalleled distinction of being the only country using militancy as a tool of its foreign and security policy, turning the country into a nursery for jihad. People like Mast Gul were certainly no aberration. The ruthless use of militancy for dangerous proxy wars has ultimately come back to haunt this country. The transition of Mast Gul from street urchin to jihadist and to ultimately ending up as a terrorist is also the story of many others.

A large number of militant fighters like Mast Gul have now taken up jihad inwards, killing their old patrons in security agencies as well as innocent Pakistanis. Their targets are also members of the Shia community and of other religious minorities: anyone who does not subscribe to their retrogressive worldview has to be eliminated.

Though the state’s change of tack after 9/11 may have precipitated Pakistan’s war within, it was only a matter of time before these motivated holy warriors turned against their own people in the name of religion. The culture of jihad sponsored by the mullah-military alliance was bound to catch up sooner or later. In fact, it would have been more catastrophic had Pakistan not decided to roll back its policy on militancy and withdraw its support for the Afghan Taliban regime.

It is utterly nonsensical to link the rise of violent militancy to the US occupation in Afghanistan or to drone strikes in Pakistan’s tribal regions. Militancy has been deeply rooted in Pakistan for more than two decades. People like Mast Gul are certainly not the product of the post-9/11 situation.

Therefore, it is an extremely flawed argument that the withdrawal of foreign forces from Afghanistan will bring an end to the jihadi narrative and lead subsequently to the winding down of terrorism. The militants are not fighting for Afghanistan but for the control of Pakistan.

There is no ambiguity whatsoever about what the militants want. They are seeking to impose their retrogressive ideology through brute force. For them democracy is an un-Islamic system and unacceptable. Their war against the Pakistani state has nothing to do with the presence of foreign forces — something that Taliban apologists like Imran Khan want us to believe. Mast Gul and his sort will not disappear post-2014 following the withdrawal of coalition forces across the border.

What an irony that the state is bowing before murderers and criminals like Mast Gul who proudly own the killing of innocent Pakistanis. There’s no precedence anywhere of a state acting so weakly before the terrorists challenging its authority.

What our political leadership does not realise is that conceding their retrogressive ideology would certainly inflame religious tensions and even lead to sectarian civil war in the country. As the state loses control, militant leaders of all hues are resurfacing to assert themselves and revive the jihad industry. This culture of militancy has to be rolled back before it is too late.

The writer is an author and journalist.

 

[RabzonKhan]

War or peace

The Friday Times
Feb 14 2014
Najam Sethi

Facts are facts. They should be admitted because they illuminate the way forward.

On February 12, Taliban terrorists stormed the house of an Aman Lashkar (Peace Force) activist on the outskirts of Peshawar and mowed down nine family members in cold blood. Zafar Khan, the object of the Taliban’s wrath, and his two brothers and nephews were killed earlier, on February 2. This time the Taliban came and wiped out his remaining family members.

Since the last All Parties Conference was held in Islamabad on September 9, 2013, to back a resolution for initiating peace talks with the Taliban, 313 people have been killed and over 400 injured in Taliban attacks on security agencies, political leaders and lay civilians in Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa alone. Indeed, since the PMLN government decided on January 29, 2014, to make a last ditch effort to engage the Taliban in committee-led talks aimed at securing a ceasefire, there have been 15 terrorist attacks in the last fifteen days in KPK in which 75 people have lost their lives and over 200 have been seriously injured.

The Taliban have now announced plans to target the minority Ismaili sect and the polytheistic Kalash tribe in Chitral valley. A 50-minute video was uploaded on a Taliban website on February 2 warning the Kalash to convert to Islam or face death: “We will eliminate you along with your Western protectors, the Western agents, if you don’t embrace Islam”. The video accuses foreign-funded NGOs of creating an “Israel-like” state in Chitral by protecting the Kalash and luring them away from Islam.

Much more ominously, the Aga Khan Foundation of the Ismailis is targeted for reprisals. “The Aga Khan Foundation is running 16 schools and 16 colleges and hostels where young men and women are given free education and brainwashed to keep them away from Islam”, says the accusing video, “they are espionage tools in the hands of foreigners”. It should be noted that the Aga Khan Foundation is a leading social welfare organization in Pakistan and caters to the needs of the Ismaili community in Karachi and Northern Pakistan.

In the last two years, TTP leader Maulana Fazlullah’s group has been particularly active in the Dir and Chitral areas that border his base area in North-Eastern Afghanistan and the Pakistan army has launched several operations to counter and chase out the terrorists. It is also well established that Karachi and Northern Pakistan are subject to sectarian violence by extremist groups allied with the Taliban and Al-Qaeda. After the continuing genocidal violence against the minority Hazaras in Balochistan, any Taliban targeting of the Ismailis would provoke an angry worldwide backlash in view of the Aga Khan network’s global goodwill, and halt its philanthropist activities in Pakistan that cater to millions of needy people.

Now a hitherto unknown “breakaway” Taliban group, that calls itself “Ahrar-ul-Hind” has vowed to continue its attacks on the “enemies of Islam”. It has rejected the core demand of the TTP for control of the tribal areas from Pakistan instead of imposition of Shariah across the country. This organization was active in the Mohmand Agency but has now relocated to the north above Kunar in the northern Pakistan border with Afghanistan. The name of the organization suggests links to urban jihadi groups in Pakistan.

Meanwhile, the two committees set up to negotiate with and on behalf of the Taliban are seemingly stuck on a list of demands and counter demands. The government is only insisting on two pre-conditions, ie, that the constitution, which is sufficiently Islamic in the sense that it doesn’t allow any law repugnant to Islam to prevail, is non-negotiable, and the negotiations are only in relation to the situation of militancy and unrest in the tribal areas. The Taliban, however, have made a dozen demands before they will agree to a ceasefire. These include a withdrawal of the army from FATA, release of thousand of Taliban prisoners and compensation of billions to them and to the families of deceased Taliban, and an end to drone strikes. They have also disclaimed responsibility for the continuing acts of terrorism by franchises affiliated to the TTP. This effectively means that they want to talk AND fight.

The Pakistan army is also resolved to hit back if and when it is attacked regardless of any on-going talks process.

Finally, there is the unresolved question of the drones. The Americans have said that if they find a high value target they will not be afraid to press the button. This could be problematic if any senior member of the Haqqani network or Maulana Fazlullah is hit. Taliban supporters like Imran Khan will claim that the Americans have deliberately sabotaged the talks and the peace process will be derailed.

So these are the facts: breakaway Taliban groups, continuing terrorist attacks, unpredictable drones, unacceptable demands, increasing confusion and rifts among Taliban committee members. Come March, we should dig in for targeted strikes by the army and a Taliban backlash in the Punjab.

 

[RabzonKhan]

Pakistan plans military operation in North Waziristan, targeting extremist groups

Washington Post
Karen DeYoung
February 25 2014

The Pakistani government is on the verge of launching a major military offensive in the North Waziristan tribal region following a series of brutal Taliban attacks in recent weeks and the apparent failure of peace talks with the militants, according to a senior Pakistani official.

“It could be any day,” said the official, who added that military plans have been shared with top U.S. officials who have long urged an offensive.

Planning for the operation comes amid a Pakistan-requested pause in U.S. drone strikes now entering its third month — the longest period without an attack in more than two years — and a series of high-level U.S.-Pakistan meetings.

Pakistan’s defense secretary, Asif Yasin Malik, is currently heading a delegation of security officials in Washington. CIA Director John Brennan quietly visited Pakistan last week, days after Gen. Lloyd J. Austin III, head of the U.S. Central Command, held meetings at military headquarters in Rawalpindi.

Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif’s national security adviser said Cabinet-level consultations on the military option would take place this week. “Dialogue with the Taliban has derailed and the writ of the state will be established in the region,” Sartaj Aziz told reporters Monday in Islamabad.

With 150,000 troops already based in the tribal regions, the Pakistani official said the government is prepared to begin a full-fledged clearing operation. “We really don’t have to start from scratch,” the official said.

The official said that an official evacuation had not yet begun, but noted that tens of thousands of residents, who he said were “spooked” by reports of imminent government attack, had already left on their own.

U.S. officials, while hailing the current level of cooperation and saying they are encouraged by Pakistan’s apparent determination, noted that they have been frequently disappointed in the past. “We’ll believe it when we see it,” said one U.S. official, who like other U.S. and Pakistan officials spoke on condition of anonymity to discuss diplomatic contacts and military plans.

“We’re not doing it for their happiness,” said the senior Pakistani official of the United States’ urging. Instead, he said, the execution last week of 23 Pakistani soldiers held by the Pakistani Taliban since 2010, along with a series of recent attacks, including one that killed 19 at a Karachi police station, have turned public opinion against the militants and the already sputtering peace talks. That has opened new political space for military action.

In statements Monday, the Pakistan People’s Party, the official parliamentary opposition, said it supported a military offensive. Imran Khan, head of the opposition Movement for Justice party, indicated that military action was now inevitable. “Talks would have still been a better option,” he said, but he called on the government now to “take political ownership of any military operation,” and fully inform the nation.

Khan, whose northwest power base borders the tribal regions and who has been harshly critical of both Sharif and the United States in the past, called for the government to begin evacuating civilians from North Waziristan before starting a bombardment of the area, as it did prior to major military offensives in the Swat region in 2009, and in South Waziristan in 2010.

The Pakistani Taliban, also known by its initials TTP, is allied with but separate from the Afghan Taliban fighting against U.S. forces in Afghanistan. Elements of both, along with the Afghan Haqqani network and remnants of al-Qaeda’s core leadership, are located in North Waziristan.

The TTP’s stated goal is to overthrow the Pakistani government and install an Islamic state based on religious law.

Peace talks were first proposed early last fall by Sharif, who took office in June after the first democratic transition in Pakistani history. Those talks were cancelled when a U.S. drone strike in November killed TTP leader Hakimullah Mehsud. The action led to one of the frequent downturns in U.S.-Pakistani relations, as Sharif’s government accused the Obama administration of trying to undermine negotiations.

In late December, as it prepared to relaunch the talks, the government asked the administration to hold off on further drone attacks and made clear that it was prepared to begin a military offensive if negotiations did not succeed.

The senior Pakistani official cautioned that the government has not yet formally declared the talks a failure, and said that “it’s politically important for the government to take this to its logical conclusion.” At least one round had taken place, with no discernible results, when the execution of the Pakistani soldiers took place. In recent days, the government has carried out several retaliatory airstrikes that it says have killed dozens of militants in North Waziristan.

The 2010 South Waziristan offensive began with air bombardment, followed by waves of ground troops, although the official cautioned that the terrain and militant locations in North Waziristan are somewhat different.

The official said that government targeting would “not discriminate” among TTP, Haqqani and other groups in North Waziristan, including al-Qaeda.

U.S. officials have long attributed Pakistani reluctance to attack there to ties between Pakistani intelligence and Afghan groups, such as the Haqqani network, and Pakistan’s desire to keep its options open in Afghanistan, should U.S. efforts there fail and the Afghan Taliban return to power.

Pakistan has repeatedly denied those charges, and said it would take action that suited its own strategic priorities.

Even as the United States and Afghanistan have accused Pakistan of failing to prevent Afghan and al-Qaeda militants from crossing the border, Pakistan has charged U.S. and Afghan forces with failing to go after TTP forces, many of whom fled into Afghanistan during previous Pakistani offensives.

Both the United States and Pakistan have touted the advantages of a hammer-and-anvil strategy, with coordinated operations along the border to stop fleeing militants in both directions. But as their relationship has ebbed and flowed over the years, that level of cooperation has never come to pass.

Now, with the U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan well underway, the United States no longer has the military resources in eastern Afghanistan to adequately patrol the border, the senior Pakistani official said.

 

[RabzonKhan]

Time for a reckoning

Dawn
Editorial
March 04 2014

IF they cannot guarantee no militant violence during the negotiations phase, how will they be able to guarantee no violence after an agreement has been reached? It is a question that has from the outset haunted the very idea of talks with the TTP — and one that keeps coming back each time it appears that dialogue may be attempted again. For Taliban apologists and their ilk, each time there is fresh violence — even before the facts are established, as was the case yesterday after the attack on a local court complex in Islamabad — either some unnamed third force or thinly veiled outside power is alleged to be behind the violence. The logic of this illogic: the TTP, an insurgent group with the explicit agenda of the violent overthrow of the state, is actually in favour of peace and stability, while there are other unspecified elements that want to destabilise Pakistan. Atrocious as that suggestion may be, the obvious follow-up question is: why negotiate with the peace-loving TTP at all when the elements really bent on destabilising Pakistan are elsewhere?

Of course, advocates of talks cannot admit in public what they quietly accept in private: talking to the TTP is a policy rooted in fear. If the TTP is not engaged, according to this logic of wretched compromise, they will unleash far more murder and mayhem than the country has witnessed so far — so better to talk to the TTP than to suffer the effects of blowback if the fight is taken to the TTP in its strongholds. Still, even from that original position of weakness that the quest for a deal suggests, the state can do at least two things to demonstrate negotiations will not be conducted on the TTP’s terms. First, the government and its negotiating team should make a clear demand of the TTP now: if the TTP is not to be held responsible for any violence going forward, then the TTP leadership should make explicit which sub-groups and franchises it controls and directs and which are the elements that are beyond its control. Without that explicit and formal clarity, the wriggle room the TTP has to deny attacks linked to it would be unacceptably large.

Second, the government in a joint effort with the military leadership should continue to work on a plan to knock off the remaining TTP strongholds while also tightening security in the cities and towns where blowback can be expected. That would send the clearest possible signal to the TTP that negotiations are not the only option — that the state security apparatus is able and ready to protect the citizenry and the state itself. If that resolve is shown and maintained, the TTP’s room to manoeuvre will diminish greatly.