Juggernautjatt
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Lt-Gen Amarjeet S Chabbewal
THERE was a lot of heat and dust in the immediate aftermath of Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s announcement in March to acquire 36 Rafale aircraft from France, in a government-to-government deal, instead of the 126 originally intended through a global tender. There were insinuations, conjecture and general commentary on the motive, political capital and worthiness of the decision. On balance, more commentators gave a ‘thumbs up’ to the government and the decision. This being the first major acquisition decision of the National Democratic Alliance (NDA) government, the follow-up will be watched with interest and will give a good indication of the viability of ‘Make in India’ and, more importantly, the probability of India’s emergence as a power of consequence.
With the dust having settled and with no further progress after the initial flurry of statements, this is therefore a good time to reflect on why this decision was taken and what can be unravelled about the real truth of India’s armed forces and defence preparedness.
The sad neglect of defence modernisation under the decade-long United Progressive Alliance (UPA) rule has made most branches of the armed forces so ‘hollow’ that conventional deterrence — the prime peacetime ‘raison d'etre’ of the forces — is grossly eroded. Our nuclear neighbours (Pakistan and China) can continue to follow and further their policies, confident in their beliefs that India is not capable of effective military options in pursuance of its national interest. In the recent past, the political leadership didn't care (or comprehend) and the military leadership could only wring their hands. The reality is that the water is already well above the head. The Comptroller and Auditor General (CAG) of India, who is chartered to review government operations, has, in a recent report, highlighted the grave shortages in ‘war ammunition reserves’. Ironically, this person, by virtue of his previous appointments, is culpable for the mess. The reality, however, is that this report is just a reiteration of what has already been repeatedly told to the government by the forces. These are facts and no exaggeration.
Coming specifically to Rafale: the government had no option but to acquire two squadrons worth of aircraft ASAP in the backdrop of the deadlock on the 126 aircraft contract, the issues about the Fifth Generation Fighter Aircraft (FGFA) with Russia, delays in the indigenous Light Combat Aircraft (LCA) and the serviceability of SU-30 squadrons. Russia is reluctant to share complete design details of the FGFA and Hindustan Aeronautics Limited’s (HAL) share in joint production will drop from 25 per cent to 13 per cent. For once, the Air Chief would have made it clear, that as it stands, India is not capable of fighting a two-front war and, thankfully, somebody listened. Under normal circumstances, buying these 36 planes would be a poor decision but under the present circumstances it is a ‘forced decision by a desperate man’. However, there are implications the Air Force will have to live with, unless there is a follow-up add on to the 36. There are issues of maintenance, logistics, crew management and operational planning. The acquisition of new technology from a new source will add to the burden of inventory proliferation and training of maintenance personnel in an air force whose inventory is 75 per cent of Soviet/Russian origin. It is therefore hoped that the long-term implications have been thought through at the political level.
The kick start to the Air Force modernisation plan will need to be followed up with similar initiatives for the Army and the Navy, since both have their own ‘must-get’ lists. Adequate fiscal commitment for ‘in the wings’ acquisitions will require a defence budget which is more than 2 per cent of the GDP. The government will be hard-pressed to meet this need, until the annual growth rate exceeds 8 per cent and subsidies are greatly reduced. This is a challenge the government will have to address immediately, head on. The problem will be accentuated by the further ballooning of the revenue expenditure, post the Seventh Pay Commission, for the extremely manpower-intensive Army, the second largest in the world (behind only China and ahead of the US, Russia and North Korea).
What about ‘Make in India’? Obviously, the government has realised that saying and doing are two different things. The much-hyped enablement of the private sector in defence manufacturing is not going to happen in the next five to 10 years. Despite the outwardly exuberance of the five or so, so-called ‘defence majors’ of India and an equal number ‘new to the bandwagon’ companies, India is not likely to make a quick switch from the public sector to the private sector for major equipment like tanks, combat aircraft and naval ships. The change will have to be gradual, since the public sector has huge infrastructure, investments, manpower and technical expertise, which will have to be vectored into ‘Make in India’. Capping FDI at 49 per cent for virtually all defence manufacturing will also have to be revisited. The government succumbed to the domestic industrial lobbies despite the obvious reality to go beyond 50 per cent. The earlier the Indian business houses realise this, the better off they will be, because nobody parts with high-end technologies without requisite control. It is therefore essential that concerted efforts are made to streamline the public sector, gradually increase the opportunities for the private sector and increase the FDI, so that the whole industry becomes competitive and high-tech rather than inward looking.
In conclusion, firstly, India’s conventional deterrence is quite eroded and will need almost a decade of sincere efforts to restore it to a viable level. Secondly, modernisation will need a much larger fiscal support, a challenge the government must address immediately. Thirdly, a holistic review of force structures and war-waging potential is overdue, preferably by civilian and military experts, jointly. Lastly, considerable farsightedness is required to actualise ‘Make in India’. Expediency must not trump wisdom. All the above can be done but it will not be easily done. The taxpayer must demand it from their elected representatives.
The writer retired as the Master General of Ordnance, Army Headquarters.
Rafale — the larger picture
THERE was a lot of heat and dust in the immediate aftermath of Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s announcement in March to acquire 36 Rafale aircraft from France, in a government-to-government deal, instead of the 126 originally intended through a global tender. There were insinuations, conjecture and general commentary on the motive, political capital and worthiness of the decision. On balance, more commentators gave a ‘thumbs up’ to the government and the decision. This being the first major acquisition decision of the National Democratic Alliance (NDA) government, the follow-up will be watched with interest and will give a good indication of the viability of ‘Make in India’ and, more importantly, the probability of India’s emergence as a power of consequence.
With the dust having settled and with no further progress after the initial flurry of statements, this is therefore a good time to reflect on why this decision was taken and what can be unravelled about the real truth of India’s armed forces and defence preparedness.
The sad neglect of defence modernisation under the decade-long United Progressive Alliance (UPA) rule has made most branches of the armed forces so ‘hollow’ that conventional deterrence — the prime peacetime ‘raison d'etre’ of the forces — is grossly eroded. Our nuclear neighbours (Pakistan and China) can continue to follow and further their policies, confident in their beliefs that India is not capable of effective military options in pursuance of its national interest. In the recent past, the political leadership didn't care (or comprehend) and the military leadership could only wring their hands. The reality is that the water is already well above the head. The Comptroller and Auditor General (CAG) of India, who is chartered to review government operations, has, in a recent report, highlighted the grave shortages in ‘war ammunition reserves’. Ironically, this person, by virtue of his previous appointments, is culpable for the mess. The reality, however, is that this report is just a reiteration of what has already been repeatedly told to the government by the forces. These are facts and no exaggeration.
Coming specifically to Rafale: the government had no option but to acquire two squadrons worth of aircraft ASAP in the backdrop of the deadlock on the 126 aircraft contract, the issues about the Fifth Generation Fighter Aircraft (FGFA) with Russia, delays in the indigenous Light Combat Aircraft (LCA) and the serviceability of SU-30 squadrons. Russia is reluctant to share complete design details of the FGFA and Hindustan Aeronautics Limited’s (HAL) share in joint production will drop from 25 per cent to 13 per cent. For once, the Air Chief would have made it clear, that as it stands, India is not capable of fighting a two-front war and, thankfully, somebody listened. Under normal circumstances, buying these 36 planes would be a poor decision but under the present circumstances it is a ‘forced decision by a desperate man’. However, there are implications the Air Force will have to live with, unless there is a follow-up add on to the 36. There are issues of maintenance, logistics, crew management and operational planning. The acquisition of new technology from a new source will add to the burden of inventory proliferation and training of maintenance personnel in an air force whose inventory is 75 per cent of Soviet/Russian origin. It is therefore hoped that the long-term implications have been thought through at the political level.
The kick start to the Air Force modernisation plan will need to be followed up with similar initiatives for the Army and the Navy, since both have their own ‘must-get’ lists. Adequate fiscal commitment for ‘in the wings’ acquisitions will require a defence budget which is more than 2 per cent of the GDP. The government will be hard-pressed to meet this need, until the annual growth rate exceeds 8 per cent and subsidies are greatly reduced. This is a challenge the government will have to address immediately, head on. The problem will be accentuated by the further ballooning of the revenue expenditure, post the Seventh Pay Commission, for the extremely manpower-intensive Army, the second largest in the world (behind only China and ahead of the US, Russia and North Korea).
What about ‘Make in India’? Obviously, the government has realised that saying and doing are two different things. The much-hyped enablement of the private sector in defence manufacturing is not going to happen in the next five to 10 years. Despite the outwardly exuberance of the five or so, so-called ‘defence majors’ of India and an equal number ‘new to the bandwagon’ companies, India is not likely to make a quick switch from the public sector to the private sector for major equipment like tanks, combat aircraft and naval ships. The change will have to be gradual, since the public sector has huge infrastructure, investments, manpower and technical expertise, which will have to be vectored into ‘Make in India’. Capping FDI at 49 per cent for virtually all defence manufacturing will also have to be revisited. The government succumbed to the domestic industrial lobbies despite the obvious reality to go beyond 50 per cent. The earlier the Indian business houses realise this, the better off they will be, because nobody parts with high-end technologies without requisite control. It is therefore essential that concerted efforts are made to streamline the public sector, gradually increase the opportunities for the private sector and increase the FDI, so that the whole industry becomes competitive and high-tech rather than inward looking.
In conclusion, firstly, India’s conventional deterrence is quite eroded and will need almost a decade of sincere efforts to restore it to a viable level. Secondly, modernisation will need a much larger fiscal support, a challenge the government must address immediately. Thirdly, a holistic review of force structures and war-waging potential is overdue, preferably by civilian and military experts, jointly. Lastly, considerable farsightedness is required to actualise ‘Make in India’. Expediency must not trump wisdom. All the above can be done but it will not be easily done. The taxpayer must demand it from their elected representatives.
The writer retired as the Master General of Ordnance, Army Headquarters.
Rafale — the larger picture
