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Twenty-five years ago, on July 27 1979 the first two Jaguar aircraft landed in India. It was the beginning of a new era in the aviation capabilities of the Indian Air Force (IAF). Vampires from De Havilland, first introduced in India in 1948, had retired. Canberra B(I)58 and Hawker Hunter F.56 both aircraft types of 1957 vintage were getting outdated. India needed a modern aircraft for low-level interdiction and close air support. The selection of an aircraft styled by IAF as the Deep Penetration Strike Aircraft (DPSA) was full of drama and conflict of vested interests. Victory for the Jaguar did not come easily.
Development of the Jaguar
The Royal Air Force (RAF) was feeling the aftereffects of Britain's Secretary for Defence Duncan Sandys' "The Way Forward", a 1957 paper that aimed to provide the UK with affordable defence. Sandys view was that conventional warfare was outdated and that future wars would be fought with nuclear weapons. But RAF continued to search vigorously for a trainer and also a low-level strike fighter-bomber for interdiction and reconnaissance. By the late 1950s, these became critical requirements. France also came to realise the need of similar aircraft.
RAF's plans for a twin-engine trainer aircraft proved to be rather costly. Instead of it, concurrent perception by Britain and France of the need for an aircraft to meet almost identical requirements led to a natural collaboration for developing the new fighter-bomber. The aircraft was named the Jaguar. The first Jaguar prototype made its maiden flight at Istres (France) on September 8, 1968. British Aircraft Corporation (BAC) and Breguet Aviation formed an Anglo-French company for design, development, production and marketing of the Jaguar. The company was given the unwieldy name SEPECAT (Société européenne de production de l'avion d'école de combat and d'appui tactique). Dassault acquired Breguet Aviation in 1967 and became party to the project. While the collaborative effort began well, it diverged into different directions with components and equipment being used which were not common to both countries.
The HF-24: First Competitor of Jaguar
Meanwhile, India had the ambition to meet the DPSA requirement indigenously. The first prototype of the Hf-24 designed by Kurt W Tank (of Focke Wolf 190 fame) and his fifteen-man German team made its first flight in July 1961. But the aircraft did not have suitable engines. It was designed around the Orpheus-12 without India having tied up a contract for it with Bristol Siddeley.
Bristol Siddeley, knowing its strong position, tried to extract the full development cost of the Orpheus-12 from India. It was rumoured that similar demands, without distributing costs between possible customers, were made to Italy and Sweden. In the event, the engine was not acquired by anyone and its development ceased. This was a major blow to Indian ambitions of developing the HF-24 to its expected potential. The HF-24 entered IAF service in 1965 still underpowered by two Orpheus-703 engines.
However, its safety record was the best of all fighter aircraft in IAF service till then. On at least three occasions the HF-24 was flown back to base after losing one engine. The first was in the 1971 War over Pak territory during ground attack when one engine broke up after ingesting debris from the attack site. A kite hawk hit the innards of the left engine of another HF-24. The engine shattered and a three feet by three feet square gap opened up on its side. The aircraft was then over Udaipur. It flew back to its base in Jodhpur 157 nautical miles away on the other engine and landed safely. Incidents like this convinced the IAF that a two-engine aircraft would be ideal for the DPSA role.
A search for alternative engines for the Marut began. With the help of Rolls Royce and Dowty, the Gas Turbine Research Establishment modified the Orpheus 701 for reheat. These engines were being produced in India for the Gnat. The HF-24 Mk1A with two reheat capable engines was flown and soon an aircraft designated HF-24 Mk1R began its trials. It was intended to match the Jaguar in most respects. Unfortunately, the rear fuselage had simply been enlarged to accommodate the larger diameter engines. This raised its after-body drag to very high levels. A similar airframe of HF-24 was loaned and later presented to Egypt for installation of the E-300 engine under development for HA-300 light fighter designed by Willy Messerschmitt. The misconception in India was that the E-300 could be used to power the HF-24 and the aircraft used by both countries. Since the Egyptians had no interest in the HF-24, no real collaboration was possible and India pulled out of the project. This spelt the death-knell of the HA-300 and of India using the E-300 for the HF-24.
IAF's Eye on Jaguar
The IAF watched the early development of the Jaguar with keen interest but with no real inclination to acquire it. The keenness was to see how its own HF-24 would do the job so that import or licence production of an aircraft would not be needed.
After the Chief Test Pilot of Hindustan Aeronautics Ltd (HAL) was killed in the HF-24 Mk1R prototype in January 1970, it became clear that the HF-24 would not meet the requirements of a DPSA. The project to power the aircraft with engines with reheat was abandoned. Nevertheless, the HF-24 performed creditably in the 1971 War with Pakistan in the Western Sector. The HF-24, renamed Marut, had other shortcomings apart from lack of power. It had no avionics worth the name. It ceased to be a viable competitor to the Jaguar, which became the first on IAF's wanted list after being held back by the HF-24 for almost seven years.
Early offers of Jaguar to IAF
In mid-1968, even before the maiden flight of the aircraft, SEPECAT made the first formal offer of the Jaguar to India. Jeffrey Quill and Paul Jaillard as a two-man team made a presentation of the aircraft to IAF and invited India to become its launch customer. The Jaguar was offered at an amazingly low cost. This was unacceptable to IAF after its unpleasant experience as the first and only customer for the largely under-developed Folland Gnat, which recorded the highest accident rate of all jet fighters of IAF including the MiG-21 series.
With this in mind and in the hope of developing the HF-24Mk IR, IAF was hardly interested in the aircraft. Two years later, Jeffrey Quill with Jimmy Dell (Deputy Chief Test Pilot of BAC) again made a presentation, this time at Delhi's Vigyan Bhawan (Science Hall). This was well attended, among others by the Chief of Air Staff and a number of Air Marshals. But the lack of interest of the IAF came through when at the end of the presentation no senior officer asked a single question. Later, there was perhaps more interest in quizzing Jeffrey Quill for his work in developing the Spitfire than asking anything about the Jaguar.
IAF was aware that the Jaguar was having difficulty in overshooting on a single engine with reheat. Dry power was not enough and reheat power was excessive. Modulated reheat, later officially named Part Throttle Reheat (PTR), was being developed. It is believed that the visitors were told that India had no interest in the Jaguar but would have liked to use its engines for the HF-24. Since the Adour 102 engine was having difficulties of its own in developing the reheat system, it could not be considered for the HF-24. The disappointed team returned to Europe.
European Competitors & IAF's Decision
India's large requirement of aircraft caught the attention of competitors. Dassault-Breguet offered the Mirage F-1, a single engine fighter aircraft with some ground attack capabilities. Sweden's Svenska Aeroplan Aktiebolaget came in with its SAAB 37 Viggen, also a single engine aircraft powered by a Swedish supersonic development of the Pratt & Whitney JT8D by-pass engine with a Swedish afterburner and thrust reversal.
As is common in India, many interested parties including agents, other promoters and even politicians got into the act of promoting the aircraft, which would give them the most personal benefit. However, IAF was clear in its stand of wanting only a two engine aircraft. Another complication was that after the 1965 Indo-Pak war, USA and Britain had placed embargoes on supply of military equipment to India. India always had a problem with USA's penchant for imposing sanctions for all kinds of reasons. Since the Viggen's engine was essentially of US origin, it would have been instantly disqualified but for political influence. The possibility of denial of equipment or spares from Britain was also a major hitch. Mr James Callaghan, the Prime Minister personally solved this problem. On his way back from Australia he gave an unequivocal commitment that Britain would never impose any sanctions on India in future.
After the imposition of a National Emergency, Mrs Gandhi had been ousted when elections took place. The Janata Dal Government decided to pursue the DPSA acquisition vigorously. Meanwhile, British Aerospace (BAe) was formed as a corporation in April 1977 by the merger of the BAC, Hawker Siddeley Aviation, Hawker Siddeley Dynamics and Scottish Aviation. In March 1978, an Indian team led by the Defence Secretary visited France, Sweden and England. After receiving its report, the Government decided to ignore the other two aircraft and to enter into a contract with BAe to acquire the Jaguar. A formal announcement of the selection of the Jaguar to meet DPSA requirements was made by the Government on October 6 1978. By then BAe's Wg Cdr Alan Keys (RAF Retd) had visited India 24 times to promote the Jaguar.
Mutually Beneficial Agreements
The memorandum of intention to proceed was followed in April 1979, almost seven months later, by formal contracts for purchase of around 130 aircraft, licence production and transfer of technology. BAe was to provide a batch of 35 Jaguars as Direct Supply (DS). These were to be manufactured at Warton Lancashire. with some parts coming from France. This gave considerable amount of work to BAC and generated or sustained significant employment. Following this, Hindustan Aeronautics Ltd (HAL) was to begin producing aircraft at Bangalore. In the meantime full-scale activity began. The RAF through BAe offered to loan eighteen aircraft including two trainers to IAF so that pilot familiarisation and training of engineers and airmen could begin. The RAF also offered training of twelve pilots, engineers and airmen in its own units and squadrons. The IAF could hardly refuse this very welcome offer, not matched by Dassault-Breguet or SAAB. BAe was getting good business while IAF was being facilitated for early induction of Jaguars. Twenty-five years later a similar pattern has been followed to help IAF acquire the Hawk as its Advanced Jet Trainer from BAE SYSTEMS, the new form of BAe after merger with GEC-Marconi in January 1999. Though no aircraft are being loaned to IAF, 75 of its pilots are to be trained by RAF in the UK.
Training in the UK
Wing Commander DR (Natty) Nadkarni (now a retired Air Marshal) was picked to command No. 14 Squadron, which was to be the first Jaguar unit. The Wg Cdr arrived in London on February 26 1979 with three other experienced pilots. As the Squadron Diary records, the days in London were spent pub-crawling and surviving on Wimpy's Burgers. This mini-holiday was too good to last. Just before their allowances ran out, the four pilots reported to RAF for conversion to Jaguar aircraft. But first they had to undergo medical check-ups and orientation. Sea-survival training followed this. As Squadron Leader M (Mike) McMahon (Air Marshal now retired , from the post of VCAS) remembers,
"Before we started flying training, we did a Sea Survival Course at Plymouth. In February, water temperatures were teeth chattering. The 'actual' training took place in the English Channel, not a friendly swimming pool! I remember that the shock of hitting the chilly water was so great that I opened my mouth and promptly swallowed half the Channel! My fingers were numb for days thereafter".
All the chilled Indian pilots shared this opinion.
The first four pilots to convert to the Jaguar joined Course No.26 at 226OCU RAF Lossiemouth on Feb 26, 1979, and are shown in this special Sepecat Bulletin issued around that time. Top Row: Wg Cdr D R Nadkarni and Sqn Ldr Mike McMahon. Below : Sqn Ldr JS Sisodia and Flt Lt SCS Adhikari
The Conversion training that followed at Lossiemouth was excellent. Unlike Russia where ground training was always overly detailed, the RAF trained them on a need to know basis and expected the pilots to research further themselves. The format for training at No. 226 OCU was similar to that for RAF's own Jaguar pilots. But the syllabus was abridged to 45 hrs flying training at Lossiemouth and 25 hrs more for the first batch at RAF Coltishall with No 54 and No 6 Squadrons. In addition Squadron Leaders SP (Bundle) Tyagi and DDS (Dee Dee) Kumar did a photo-reconnaissance course at Coltishall with No 41 Squadron. As is common in the UK, they flew in all kinds of weather, which later made IAF dignitaries visiting BAe Warton raise their eyebrows! The other two batches of four pilots followed suit in April and August 79, taking around four months each for the training by RAF.
Five Ferry pilots, Flt Lt R Burli, Flt KR Singh, Wg Cdr M McMahon, Flt Lt SCS Adhikari and Flt Lt NM Gupte standing in front of the Direct Supply Jaguars destined for the IAF in 1979.
Pilots of the first two batches who arrived for training in the UK.
L to R: - Flt Lt DC Kumaria, Flt Lt SCS Adhikari, Sqn Ldr DDS Kumar, Wg Cdr DR Nadkarni, Sqn Ldr SP Tyagi, Flt Lt NAK Browne, Sqn Ldr M McMahon. Sqn Ldr JS Sisodia is on the ladder.
Averted hitch in acquiring Jaguars
When Mrs Indira Gandhi came back to power in 1980, her younger son Sanjay decided to scrutinise the Jaguar deal for suspected corruption. He was convinced that Viggen was the superior aircraft and that IAF had been influenced by the previous Government to opt for the Jaguar. He had no constitutional authority, except for his parentage. Nevertheless, he was invited by the IAF to examine its files. He was surprised to find that the IAF had throughout been steadfast in its intention to buy the Jaguar. The other two aircraft had been considered only for giving the semblance of multiple choices available to negotiators. Sanjay Gandhi was killed in a flying accident on June 23, 1980. No further doubts were ever raised on the wisdom of inducting Jaguars into the IAF.
Ferry of Jaguars to India
The first two aircraft, one trainer and one solo fighter, to be brought to India were ferried by BAe's test pilots. Wg Cdr Nadkarni flew in the trainer. Starting from Warton, with stopovers at Toulouse (France), Brindisi (Italy), Luqa (Malta), Akrotiri (Cyprus), Seeb (Oman), the aircraft arrived in Jamnagar (India) on July 27 1979, just three months after the actual signing of the contract. The journey had taken them one week. The pair arrived in Ambala on July 29. Except for one more aircraft flown by a BAe test pilot, all loaned aircraft and later the 35 direct supply aircraft were ferried to India by IAF pilots. Natty Nadkarni says that during the ferry, they were shadowed by F-14A Tomcat aircraft of the US Navy. The Tomcats were operating from the carrier USS Kitty Hawk. The American pilots took pictures of the Jaguars while the Indians merely looked back at them. The Americans may have been investigating what the aircraft types were, where they were heading and also ensuring that they did not fly over their carrier.
In February 1980 four Jaguars piloted by IAF crew routed via Baghdad en route Jamnagar. But this route had to be abandoned after war broke out between Iraq and Iran. Thereafter aircraft flew via Luxor in Egypt. During almost all the ferries, the F-14s kept an eye of IAF aircraft flying bye. All DS aircraft were brought to India without a hitch.
Pilots who underwent conversion at RAF Lossiemouth in 1979 after their return to India. This photograph was taken at Ambala.
L to R Standing: Sqn Ldr JS Sisodia, Sqn Ldr JJ Williams, Sqn Ldr M McMahon, Sqn Ldr SC Mittal, Wg Cdr DR Nadkarni, Sqn Ldr SP Tyagi, Flt Lt NAK Browne, Sqn Ldr DDS Kumar.
L to R Sitting: Flt Lt DC Kumaria, Flt Lt SCS Adhikari, Flt Lt Sunil Laud, Flt Lt Nitin Gupte.
President Neelam Sanjeeva Reddy being shown the Jaguar by the then Chief of Air Staff, Air Chief Marshal IH Latif. The AOC-in-C Western Command, Air Marshal Dilbagh Singh is behind the president.
The Avionics Imbroglio
A major attraction of Jaguar had been its avionics suite, though similar equipment was available in the other two contenders as well. RAF's Jaguars were fitted with the NAVWASS (NAVigation Attack Weapon Aiming Sub-System) from Marconi-Elliot Avionics Systems Ltd, with a Head-Up display from Smiths. RAF had let India know that the Marconi equipment had very low reliability to the extent that during operations no aircraft could be expected on the flight line after just six (or so) sorties each. In 1975 Aircraft & Systems Testing Establishment (ASTE) in Bangalore had tested the full NAVWASS on an HF-24 and rejected it. But the NAVWASS was standard equipment on the loaned Jaguars and there was no quick way to replace it on the DS aircraft. The RAF wanted to upgrade the Inertial Navigation System (INS) with the Ferranti FIN 1024 INS and share development costs with IAF. But the IAF was offered its export version FIN 1024E. The catch was in the E, which meant that the gyros used in the system were inferior to those for the RAF. This led India to consider an upgrade on its own as early as possible.
The DARIN Story
The original name suggested for the project for upgrading the navigation attack system of Jaguars was INDRA, after the king of the minor Hindu gods. But this was uncomfortably close to the name of the PM Mrs Indira Gandhi. The CAS Air Chief Marshal Dilbagh Singh altered it to DARIN which stands for Display Attack Ranging Inertial Navigation. To manage the project, Inertial Nav-Attack System Integration Organisation (IIO) was specially set up at Bangalore under the aegis of Defence R&D Organisation (DRDO).
With IIO as the project office, Sagem (France) was designated Prime Integrator and HAL the prime agency for work on the aircraft. Specifications for various equipment and interface documents were drawn up at IIO. The task of selecting the equipment to be integrated as a Nav-Attack system was completed quickly by IIO in consultation with ASTE which already had the experience of flight trials on Inertial Navigation Systems (INS) and Head Up Displays (HUD). The major subsystems selected were Sagem Inertial Platform, Smiths Industries HUD/WAC, Ferranti Combined Map & Electronics Display (COMED), Crouzet Air Data Package and SFIM Flight Test Instrumentation Package - all to be integrated using dual Mil 1553B standard Digital Databus. The Sagem ULISS 82 box handled primary Navigation and weapon aiming functions, with Smiths HUD/WAC computer taking over if the ULISS failed. Target range was provided by Jaguar's original equipment, the Ferranti Laser Ranger and Marked Target Seeker. Ranges derived from radio and barometric altimeters were used in the secondary and tertiary modes.
British Aerospace was the official "Design Authority" for Jaguar and was therefore involved throughout with the project. For the modifications in India, BAe vetted draft specifications, installation drawings, ground and flight test schedules, electro-magnetic compatibility and test results, etc. Line Replaceable Units (LRUs) were first cleared by vendors and then moved to a static integration rig at Pontoise by Sagem. After about a year the integration rig and models of LRUs were transferred to IIO at Bangalore. This rig played an active part in integrating flight-worthy models and troubleshooting during subsequent phases.
The Three versions of the Jaguar in IAF Service. The Strike version (IS) , The Maritime Strike (IM) and the two seater trainer (IB).
An early illustration from a BAe Sales Brochure shows a classic pose by a fully armed Jaguar in IAF Markings.
Development of the Jaguar
The Royal Air Force (RAF) was feeling the aftereffects of Britain's Secretary for Defence Duncan Sandys' "The Way Forward", a 1957 paper that aimed to provide the UK with affordable defence. Sandys view was that conventional warfare was outdated and that future wars would be fought with nuclear weapons. But RAF continued to search vigorously for a trainer and also a low-level strike fighter-bomber for interdiction and reconnaissance. By the late 1950s, these became critical requirements. France also came to realise the need of similar aircraft.
RAF's plans for a twin-engine trainer aircraft proved to be rather costly. Instead of it, concurrent perception by Britain and France of the need for an aircraft to meet almost identical requirements led to a natural collaboration for developing the new fighter-bomber. The aircraft was named the Jaguar. The first Jaguar prototype made its maiden flight at Istres (France) on September 8, 1968. British Aircraft Corporation (BAC) and Breguet Aviation formed an Anglo-French company for design, development, production and marketing of the Jaguar. The company was given the unwieldy name SEPECAT (Société européenne de production de l'avion d'école de combat and d'appui tactique). Dassault acquired Breguet Aviation in 1967 and became party to the project. While the collaborative effort began well, it diverged into different directions with components and equipment being used which were not common to both countries.
The HF-24: First Competitor of Jaguar
Meanwhile, India had the ambition to meet the DPSA requirement indigenously. The first prototype of the Hf-24 designed by Kurt W Tank (of Focke Wolf 190 fame) and his fifteen-man German team made its first flight in July 1961. But the aircraft did not have suitable engines. It was designed around the Orpheus-12 without India having tied up a contract for it with Bristol Siddeley.
Bristol Siddeley, knowing its strong position, tried to extract the full development cost of the Orpheus-12 from India. It was rumoured that similar demands, without distributing costs between possible customers, were made to Italy and Sweden. In the event, the engine was not acquired by anyone and its development ceased. This was a major blow to Indian ambitions of developing the HF-24 to its expected potential. The HF-24 entered IAF service in 1965 still underpowered by two Orpheus-703 engines.
However, its safety record was the best of all fighter aircraft in IAF service till then. On at least three occasions the HF-24 was flown back to base after losing one engine. The first was in the 1971 War over Pak territory during ground attack when one engine broke up after ingesting debris from the attack site. A kite hawk hit the innards of the left engine of another HF-24. The engine shattered and a three feet by three feet square gap opened up on its side. The aircraft was then over Udaipur. It flew back to its base in Jodhpur 157 nautical miles away on the other engine and landed safely. Incidents like this convinced the IAF that a two-engine aircraft would be ideal for the DPSA role.
A search for alternative engines for the Marut began. With the help of Rolls Royce and Dowty, the Gas Turbine Research Establishment modified the Orpheus 701 for reheat. These engines were being produced in India for the Gnat. The HF-24 Mk1A with two reheat capable engines was flown and soon an aircraft designated HF-24 Mk1R began its trials. It was intended to match the Jaguar in most respects. Unfortunately, the rear fuselage had simply been enlarged to accommodate the larger diameter engines. This raised its after-body drag to very high levels. A similar airframe of HF-24 was loaned and later presented to Egypt for installation of the E-300 engine under development for HA-300 light fighter designed by Willy Messerschmitt. The misconception in India was that the E-300 could be used to power the HF-24 and the aircraft used by both countries. Since the Egyptians had no interest in the HF-24, no real collaboration was possible and India pulled out of the project. This spelt the death-knell of the HA-300 and of India using the E-300 for the HF-24.
IAF's Eye on Jaguar
The IAF watched the early development of the Jaguar with keen interest but with no real inclination to acquire it. The keenness was to see how its own HF-24 would do the job so that import or licence production of an aircraft would not be needed.
After the Chief Test Pilot of Hindustan Aeronautics Ltd (HAL) was killed in the HF-24 Mk1R prototype in January 1970, it became clear that the HF-24 would not meet the requirements of a DPSA. The project to power the aircraft with engines with reheat was abandoned. Nevertheless, the HF-24 performed creditably in the 1971 War with Pakistan in the Western Sector. The HF-24, renamed Marut, had other shortcomings apart from lack of power. It had no avionics worth the name. It ceased to be a viable competitor to the Jaguar, which became the first on IAF's wanted list after being held back by the HF-24 for almost seven years.
Early offers of Jaguar to IAF
In mid-1968, even before the maiden flight of the aircraft, SEPECAT made the first formal offer of the Jaguar to India. Jeffrey Quill and Paul Jaillard as a two-man team made a presentation of the aircraft to IAF and invited India to become its launch customer. The Jaguar was offered at an amazingly low cost. This was unacceptable to IAF after its unpleasant experience as the first and only customer for the largely under-developed Folland Gnat, which recorded the highest accident rate of all jet fighters of IAF including the MiG-21 series.
With this in mind and in the hope of developing the HF-24Mk IR, IAF was hardly interested in the aircraft. Two years later, Jeffrey Quill with Jimmy Dell (Deputy Chief Test Pilot of BAC) again made a presentation, this time at Delhi's Vigyan Bhawan (Science Hall). This was well attended, among others by the Chief of Air Staff and a number of Air Marshals. But the lack of interest of the IAF came through when at the end of the presentation no senior officer asked a single question. Later, there was perhaps more interest in quizzing Jeffrey Quill for his work in developing the Spitfire than asking anything about the Jaguar.
IAF was aware that the Jaguar was having difficulty in overshooting on a single engine with reheat. Dry power was not enough and reheat power was excessive. Modulated reheat, later officially named Part Throttle Reheat (PTR), was being developed. It is believed that the visitors were told that India had no interest in the Jaguar but would have liked to use its engines for the HF-24. Since the Adour 102 engine was having difficulties of its own in developing the reheat system, it could not be considered for the HF-24. The disappointed team returned to Europe.
European Competitors & IAF's Decision
India's large requirement of aircraft caught the attention of competitors. Dassault-Breguet offered the Mirage F-1, a single engine fighter aircraft with some ground attack capabilities. Sweden's Svenska Aeroplan Aktiebolaget came in with its SAAB 37 Viggen, also a single engine aircraft powered by a Swedish supersonic development of the Pratt & Whitney JT8D by-pass engine with a Swedish afterburner and thrust reversal.
As is common in India, many interested parties including agents, other promoters and even politicians got into the act of promoting the aircraft, which would give them the most personal benefit. However, IAF was clear in its stand of wanting only a two engine aircraft. Another complication was that after the 1965 Indo-Pak war, USA and Britain had placed embargoes on supply of military equipment to India. India always had a problem with USA's penchant for imposing sanctions for all kinds of reasons. Since the Viggen's engine was essentially of US origin, it would have been instantly disqualified but for political influence. The possibility of denial of equipment or spares from Britain was also a major hitch. Mr James Callaghan, the Prime Minister personally solved this problem. On his way back from Australia he gave an unequivocal commitment that Britain would never impose any sanctions on India in future.
After the imposition of a National Emergency, Mrs Gandhi had been ousted when elections took place. The Janata Dal Government decided to pursue the DPSA acquisition vigorously. Meanwhile, British Aerospace (BAe) was formed as a corporation in April 1977 by the merger of the BAC, Hawker Siddeley Aviation, Hawker Siddeley Dynamics and Scottish Aviation. In March 1978, an Indian team led by the Defence Secretary visited France, Sweden and England. After receiving its report, the Government decided to ignore the other two aircraft and to enter into a contract with BAe to acquire the Jaguar. A formal announcement of the selection of the Jaguar to meet DPSA requirements was made by the Government on October 6 1978. By then BAe's Wg Cdr Alan Keys (RAF Retd) had visited India 24 times to promote the Jaguar.
Mutually Beneficial Agreements
The memorandum of intention to proceed was followed in April 1979, almost seven months later, by formal contracts for purchase of around 130 aircraft, licence production and transfer of technology. BAe was to provide a batch of 35 Jaguars as Direct Supply (DS). These were to be manufactured at Warton Lancashire. with some parts coming from France. This gave considerable amount of work to BAC and generated or sustained significant employment. Following this, Hindustan Aeronautics Ltd (HAL) was to begin producing aircraft at Bangalore. In the meantime full-scale activity began. The RAF through BAe offered to loan eighteen aircraft including two trainers to IAF so that pilot familiarisation and training of engineers and airmen could begin. The RAF also offered training of twelve pilots, engineers and airmen in its own units and squadrons. The IAF could hardly refuse this very welcome offer, not matched by Dassault-Breguet or SAAB. BAe was getting good business while IAF was being facilitated for early induction of Jaguars. Twenty-five years later a similar pattern has been followed to help IAF acquire the Hawk as its Advanced Jet Trainer from BAE SYSTEMS, the new form of BAe after merger with GEC-Marconi in January 1999. Though no aircraft are being loaned to IAF, 75 of its pilots are to be trained by RAF in the UK.
Training in the UK
Wing Commander DR (Natty) Nadkarni (now a retired Air Marshal) was picked to command No. 14 Squadron, which was to be the first Jaguar unit. The Wg Cdr arrived in London on February 26 1979 with three other experienced pilots. As the Squadron Diary records, the days in London were spent pub-crawling and surviving on Wimpy's Burgers. This mini-holiday was too good to last. Just before their allowances ran out, the four pilots reported to RAF for conversion to Jaguar aircraft. But first they had to undergo medical check-ups and orientation. Sea-survival training followed this. As Squadron Leader M (Mike) McMahon (Air Marshal now retired , from the post of VCAS) remembers,
"Before we started flying training, we did a Sea Survival Course at Plymouth. In February, water temperatures were teeth chattering. The 'actual' training took place in the English Channel, not a friendly swimming pool! I remember that the shock of hitting the chilly water was so great that I opened my mouth and promptly swallowed half the Channel! My fingers were numb for days thereafter".
All the chilled Indian pilots shared this opinion.
The first four pilots to convert to the Jaguar joined Course No.26 at 226OCU RAF Lossiemouth on Feb 26, 1979, and are shown in this special Sepecat Bulletin issued around that time. Top Row: Wg Cdr D R Nadkarni and Sqn Ldr Mike McMahon. Below : Sqn Ldr JS Sisodia and Flt Lt SCS AdhikariThe Conversion training that followed at Lossiemouth was excellent. Unlike Russia where ground training was always overly detailed, the RAF trained them on a need to know basis and expected the pilots to research further themselves. The format for training at No. 226 OCU was similar to that for RAF's own Jaguar pilots. But the syllabus was abridged to 45 hrs flying training at Lossiemouth and 25 hrs more for the first batch at RAF Coltishall with No 54 and No 6 Squadrons. In addition Squadron Leaders SP (Bundle) Tyagi and DDS (Dee Dee) Kumar did a photo-reconnaissance course at Coltishall with No 41 Squadron. As is common in the UK, they flew in all kinds of weather, which later made IAF dignitaries visiting BAe Warton raise their eyebrows! The other two batches of four pilots followed suit in April and August 79, taking around four months each for the training by RAF.
Five Ferry pilots, Flt Lt R Burli, Flt KR Singh, Wg Cdr M McMahon, Flt Lt SCS Adhikari and Flt Lt NM Gupte standing in front of the Direct Supply Jaguars destined for the IAF in 1979.
Pilots of the first two batches who arrived for training in the UK.
L to R: - Flt Lt DC Kumaria, Flt Lt SCS Adhikari, Sqn Ldr DDS Kumar, Wg Cdr DR Nadkarni, Sqn Ldr SP Tyagi, Flt Lt NAK Browne, Sqn Ldr M McMahon. Sqn Ldr JS Sisodia is on the ladder.
Averted hitch in acquiring Jaguars
When Mrs Indira Gandhi came back to power in 1980, her younger son Sanjay decided to scrutinise the Jaguar deal for suspected corruption. He was convinced that Viggen was the superior aircraft and that IAF had been influenced by the previous Government to opt for the Jaguar. He had no constitutional authority, except for his parentage. Nevertheless, he was invited by the IAF to examine its files. He was surprised to find that the IAF had throughout been steadfast in its intention to buy the Jaguar. The other two aircraft had been considered only for giving the semblance of multiple choices available to negotiators. Sanjay Gandhi was killed in a flying accident on June 23, 1980. No further doubts were ever raised on the wisdom of inducting Jaguars into the IAF.
Ferry of Jaguars to India
The first two aircraft, one trainer and one solo fighter, to be brought to India were ferried by BAe's test pilots. Wg Cdr Nadkarni flew in the trainer. Starting from Warton, with stopovers at Toulouse (France), Brindisi (Italy), Luqa (Malta), Akrotiri (Cyprus), Seeb (Oman), the aircraft arrived in Jamnagar (India) on July 27 1979, just three months after the actual signing of the contract. The journey had taken them one week. The pair arrived in Ambala on July 29. Except for one more aircraft flown by a BAe test pilot, all loaned aircraft and later the 35 direct supply aircraft were ferried to India by IAF pilots. Natty Nadkarni says that during the ferry, they were shadowed by F-14A Tomcat aircraft of the US Navy. The Tomcats were operating from the carrier USS Kitty Hawk. The American pilots took pictures of the Jaguars while the Indians merely looked back at them. The Americans may have been investigating what the aircraft types were, where they were heading and also ensuring that they did not fly over their carrier.
In February 1980 four Jaguars piloted by IAF crew routed via Baghdad en route Jamnagar. But this route had to be abandoned after war broke out between Iraq and Iran. Thereafter aircraft flew via Luxor in Egypt. During almost all the ferries, the F-14s kept an eye of IAF aircraft flying bye. All DS aircraft were brought to India without a hitch.
Pilots who underwent conversion at RAF Lossiemouth in 1979 after their return to India. This photograph was taken at Ambala. L to R Standing: Sqn Ldr JS Sisodia, Sqn Ldr JJ Williams, Sqn Ldr M McMahon, Sqn Ldr SC Mittal, Wg Cdr DR Nadkarni, Sqn Ldr SP Tyagi, Flt Lt NAK Browne, Sqn Ldr DDS Kumar.
L to R Sitting: Flt Lt DC Kumaria, Flt Lt SCS Adhikari, Flt Lt Sunil Laud, Flt Lt Nitin Gupte.
President Neelam Sanjeeva Reddy being shown the Jaguar by the then Chief of Air Staff, Air Chief Marshal IH Latif. The AOC-in-C Western Command, Air Marshal Dilbagh Singh is behind the president.
The Avionics Imbroglio
A major attraction of Jaguar had been its avionics suite, though similar equipment was available in the other two contenders as well. RAF's Jaguars were fitted with the NAVWASS (NAVigation Attack Weapon Aiming Sub-System) from Marconi-Elliot Avionics Systems Ltd, with a Head-Up display from Smiths. RAF had let India know that the Marconi equipment had very low reliability to the extent that during operations no aircraft could be expected on the flight line after just six (or so) sorties each. In 1975 Aircraft & Systems Testing Establishment (ASTE) in Bangalore had tested the full NAVWASS on an HF-24 and rejected it. But the NAVWASS was standard equipment on the loaned Jaguars and there was no quick way to replace it on the DS aircraft. The RAF wanted to upgrade the Inertial Navigation System (INS) with the Ferranti FIN 1024 INS and share development costs with IAF. But the IAF was offered its export version FIN 1024E. The catch was in the E, which meant that the gyros used in the system were inferior to those for the RAF. This led India to consider an upgrade on its own as early as possible.
The DARIN Story
The original name suggested for the project for upgrading the navigation attack system of Jaguars was INDRA, after the king of the minor Hindu gods. But this was uncomfortably close to the name of the PM Mrs Indira Gandhi. The CAS Air Chief Marshal Dilbagh Singh altered it to DARIN which stands for Display Attack Ranging Inertial Navigation. To manage the project, Inertial Nav-Attack System Integration Organisation (IIO) was specially set up at Bangalore under the aegis of Defence R&D Organisation (DRDO).
With IIO as the project office, Sagem (France) was designated Prime Integrator and HAL the prime agency for work on the aircraft. Specifications for various equipment and interface documents were drawn up at IIO. The task of selecting the equipment to be integrated as a Nav-Attack system was completed quickly by IIO in consultation with ASTE which already had the experience of flight trials on Inertial Navigation Systems (INS) and Head Up Displays (HUD). The major subsystems selected were Sagem Inertial Platform, Smiths Industries HUD/WAC, Ferranti Combined Map & Electronics Display (COMED), Crouzet Air Data Package and SFIM Flight Test Instrumentation Package - all to be integrated using dual Mil 1553B standard Digital Databus. The Sagem ULISS 82 box handled primary Navigation and weapon aiming functions, with Smiths HUD/WAC computer taking over if the ULISS failed. Target range was provided by Jaguar's original equipment, the Ferranti Laser Ranger and Marked Target Seeker. Ranges derived from radio and barometric altimeters were used in the secondary and tertiary modes.
British Aerospace was the official "Design Authority" for Jaguar and was therefore involved throughout with the project. For the modifications in India, BAe vetted draft specifications, installation drawings, ground and flight test schedules, electro-magnetic compatibility and test results, etc. Line Replaceable Units (LRUs) were first cleared by vendors and then moved to a static integration rig at Pontoise by Sagem. After about a year the integration rig and models of LRUs were transferred to IIO at Bangalore. This rig played an active part in integrating flight-worthy models and troubleshooting during subsequent phases.
The Three versions of the Jaguar in IAF Service. The Strike version (IS) , The Maritime Strike (IM) and the two seater trainer (IB).
An early illustration from a BAe Sales Brochure shows a classic pose by a fully armed Jaguar in IAF Markings.
