marcos98
FULL MEMBER
- Joined
- Jun 17, 2009
- Messages
- 1,429
- Reaction score
- 0
Promise and reality: the air-to-air BVR
Lt Col Patrick Higby, USAF - Virginia Military Institute
Introduction
The promise of air combat beyond visual range (BVR) makes sense: kill the enemy at long range - before he can hurt you.Developed through the Cold War, the BVR capabilities embedded in the structure of American force, which favored quality over quantity.
This structure envisioned a force of highly trained (American or Allied) equipped with advanced weapons by defeating a numerically superior enemy (USSR or Soviet ally).
Unfortunately, the search for costly BVR capabilities during the Cold War were not justified by performance BVR real.
To prove this thesis, this paper will first review the theory BVR and its implementation. This will be followed by a detailed analysis BVR in practice - results of four combat real Cold War conflicts involving documented BVR air combat.
Part of the work of Operation Desert Storm shows a relative improvement compared to the Cold War period, although not the original reasons alleged by the specialists in BVR.
The limited data in BVR after Desert Storm are reviewed in the section dedicated to that period. Before offering conclusions and recommendations, this work also presents relevant counter-arguments.
Theory BVR
BVR theory had its genesis at the end of World War II, a conflict that witnessed the operational use of radar, guided missiles and jets.For example, the first American BVR missile through the Cold War was the AIM-7 Sparrow, which was developed by the Navy, beginning in 1946.Although World War II to some degree has witnessed the fighting air-to-air BVR night directed by radar, the history of night fighters goes beyond this work, which focuses on the platforms of radar-guided missiles in place of gun platforms driven by radar, at very short ranges.
The theory implies BVR fighter technologically sophisticated and equipped with powerful radars and fire control system, radar-guided missiles launched against distant enemy aircraft.In the context of the Cold War, these enemy aircraft could be Soviet bombers attacking the U.S. mainland or swarms of Soviet fighters trying to establish air supremacy over Western Europe.
In both cases, the targets would be well out of sight - beyond visual range. Visual range depends on several factors: visual acuity, visual enhancements (eg, binoculars and imaging devices for long-range), visual inhibitors (eg, clouds and dust in the canopy), light conditions, an aspect of the target and target size .
Colonel James Burton selected 5 nautical miles (9.26 km) - in daylight - how to evaluate its limit BVR missiles beyond visual range. Alternatively, the criterion of the Gulf War Air Power Survey (GWAPS) depends on the target to be identified visually.In table 1, adapted from Stevenson, shows the average distance (in nautical miles) in which different aircraft are visible in the light of day, based on their size. Factors such as the smoke of the F-4 Phantom are not included. Dotted lines show the 5 nautical miles of the criterion of Burton.
The powerful radar BVR sought by the theory extends the range in which a pilot can detect enemy aircraft, thus justifying the increase in the size and scope in which their own aircraft are noticeable. Unfortunately, history shows that the trade-offs made to pursue BVR this aspect of the theory is equally unjustified, especially in the era of radar detectors.
The implementation of BVR
During the 1950s, the USAF acquired the series "Century" fighters (F-100, 101, 102, 104, 105, 106), which already exhibited many of the characteristics sought by the theory BVR. With some exceptions, were significantly larger, more complex, faster (when cleaned), and more expensive than their predecessors. The Navy, exploring two views of the BVR fight, wanted to buy the Douglas Missile F6D, which was very complex, but a platform for low-speed missile cruise, designed to defeat threats in the air at distances of 100 miles, with enormous Eagle missiles.
But during this time, the Navy also got the most prolific fighter BVR: the F4H-1 Phantom II. With the first flight in 1958, this was the first fighter designed to carry radar-guided Sparrow missiles, although some of the series "Century" have been adapted for the fights.
Finally, the USAF approved the Phantom of the Navy as the F-110A Spectre, the nomenclature which later became the F-4C Phantom II. BVR Other fighters have followed: the joint program of the Navy / Air Force "TFX" (which became if the F-111), the F-14 and F-15. Not to be outdone, the Soviets bought large complex BVR fighters during the 1960s and 1970s, such as: Yak-28, Tu-28, and of course the MiG-25.
Built around large and complex radar avionics systems, these fighters needed two powerful engines to overcome not only their excessive weight, but also because of the drag associated with the large radome mounted on the nose.
Its costs of acquisition and maintenance, were amazing. As shown in Table 2, for example, the operation and maintenance (O & M) costs of a fighter able to BVR, F-4 or F-15, was significantly higher than non-BVR, F-5 or F-16.
Although the unit cost of an F-15 was more than double from an F-4, F-15 promises to have much lower costs of O & M. In 1999 dollars, the F-15C was costing $ 8,000 per time of flight (O & M direct) versus $ 5,000 for an F-4E. A similar promise is being made now for next-generation BVR fighter, the F-22, vis-à-vis the F-15.
Table 2: O & M costs per flight hour fighter selected (1980 data)
F-5E F-16A F-4E F-15A
940$ U.S. $ 1,734 U.S. $ 2,733 U.S. $ 3,305
The most neglected aspect of the BVR implementation, however, was the persistent deficit in the identification of a technological enemy at long distances. Friend or Foe - (IFF), is still not considered reliable, as evidenced by the identification requirement of other systems such as AWACS.
Not surprisingly, the IFF has created a concern fratricidal deficient, leading to extreme restrictions on the use of resources BVR. However, the U.S. continued to pay a significant amount to acquire and operate systems with BVR capability, although the capacity is generally usable in practice.
BVR in Practice
During the Cold War, conflicts in which there were eight air-to-air missile programs were used, representing 407 known killing by missiles (missiles guided by radar more heat-seeking missiles): Taiwan Straits (1958), Vietnam / Rolling Thunder (1965 to 1968 ), Vietnam / Linebacker (1971-1973), the Six Day War (1967), India and Pakistan (1971), the Yom Kippur War (1973), Falklands (1982), and the Bekaa Valley (1982). There are no reliable data available for the Iran-Iraq War (1980-1988, formerly known as the Gulf War).
As mentioned in the introduction, only four of these conflicts have seen the use of radar-guided missiles designed for killing BVR: Vietnam / Rolling Thunder (1965-1968), Vietnam / Linebacker (1971-1973), the Yom Kippur War (1973) and Vale the Bekaa (1982).
Table 3 shows the total withdrawals (kills) air to air or documented by the U.S. allies (ie, Israel) in each of these conflicts. Reliable data on aerial victories for the missiles North Vietnamese or Arab air forces, are not available, but probably consisted solely of guns and missiles for warmth.
For example, during the conflict in the Bekaa Valley, Syria said it had intercepted the second wave of Israeli air strike early, knocking down 19 Israeli planes, while 16 lost. Israel says it shot down 22 Syrian jets, with zero losses. The analysis conducted by the USAF Burton is next to Israel's demands, while reducing some aerial victories.
Despite significant investment in BVR capability during the Cold War, Table 3 shows that the radar-guided missiles only accounted for 14% of total slaughter. It kills twice as many (27%) were made by cannons and more than four times (58%) were made by heat-seeking missiles.
It is interesting to reflect on the potential for a lightweight and agile fighter equipped with cannon and Sidewinders in the hands of skilled pilots enough to lead to a good duel, the F-4 and F-105s against the MiG-21.
These lightweight fighters in 1960/1970 correspond to a P-51 was in World War II, when compared with more expensive and heavier P-38 and P-47.
What is most disturbing about the performance of radar-guided missile is that the vast majority of kills (69, 73, or 95%) were initiated and made effective visual range, as shown in Table 4. The acquisition of weapons systems such as the F-4 and AIM-7 missiles were designed to kill the enemy with missile strikes BVR accurate.
Unfortunately, the doctrine and practice real job do not match (even in Israel), due to the constraints above the IFF. However, even when the deficiencies were overcome and the IFF BVR shots were performed, only four of 61 were successful. This translates into a probability "kill" (kill probability) or PK only 6.6%!
There are only four withdrawals BVR documented throughout the history of aerial combat even before Operation Desert Storm. This revelation is surprising because throughout the Cold War era, the platforms of radar-guided missiles were touted as the transformation that would fundamentally change the air combat. This would consist of air combat missile platforms (fighters complex, heavy and expensive), armed with radar-guided missiles, destroying the enemy beyond visual range.
There was no need for agility, just to reach the location of missile launch soon. As examples of the concept, we have the F-102, F-106 and F-4. Based on the lesson of Vietnam, the latest versions of F-106 and F-4 began to be equipped with internal gun and F-4 received slats to improve maneuverability in dogfights.
Another game in the series "Century", the F-105, was equipped with a gun (after much debate, despite the conventional wisdom), and although it was a platform designed for tactical nuclear attack, could in fact numerous aerial victories in Vietnam with his cannon.
There are three major faults associated with the use of AIM-7 Sparrow missiles that led to disappointing results in the hands of experienced operators:
1. the missile often do not work properly;
2. the shooter had to keep the aircraft nose pointed at the target throughout the engagement (to keep the target illuminated) and;
3. Once illuminated by the radar of shot needed to guide the missile, the victim was alerted by a radar warning receiver and began evasive maneuvers to make the missile or radar aircraft to lose lock.
When the missile was visually located, evasive maneuvers could also cause a failure even to exceed the maneuverability of the missile.
Lt Col Patrick Higby, USAF - Virginia Military Institute
Introduction
The promise of air combat beyond visual range (BVR) makes sense: kill the enemy at long range - before he can hurt you.Developed through the Cold War, the BVR capabilities embedded in the structure of American force, which favored quality over quantity.
This structure envisioned a force of highly trained (American or Allied) equipped with advanced weapons by defeating a numerically superior enemy (USSR or Soviet ally).
Unfortunately, the search for costly BVR capabilities during the Cold War were not justified by performance BVR real.
To prove this thesis, this paper will first review the theory BVR and its implementation. This will be followed by a detailed analysis BVR in practice - results of four combat real Cold War conflicts involving documented BVR air combat.
Part of the work of Operation Desert Storm shows a relative improvement compared to the Cold War period, although not the original reasons alleged by the specialists in BVR.
The limited data in BVR after Desert Storm are reviewed in the section dedicated to that period. Before offering conclusions and recommendations, this work also presents relevant counter-arguments.
Theory BVR
BVR theory had its genesis at the end of World War II, a conflict that witnessed the operational use of radar, guided missiles and jets.For example, the first American BVR missile through the Cold War was the AIM-7 Sparrow, which was developed by the Navy, beginning in 1946.Although World War II to some degree has witnessed the fighting air-to-air BVR night directed by radar, the history of night fighters goes beyond this work, which focuses on the platforms of radar-guided missiles in place of gun platforms driven by radar, at very short ranges.
The theory implies BVR fighter technologically sophisticated and equipped with powerful radars and fire control system, radar-guided missiles launched against distant enemy aircraft.In the context of the Cold War, these enemy aircraft could be Soviet bombers attacking the U.S. mainland or swarms of Soviet fighters trying to establish air supremacy over Western Europe.
In both cases, the targets would be well out of sight - beyond visual range. Visual range depends on several factors: visual acuity, visual enhancements (eg, binoculars and imaging devices for long-range), visual inhibitors (eg, clouds and dust in the canopy), light conditions, an aspect of the target and target size .
Colonel James Burton selected 5 nautical miles (9.26 km) - in daylight - how to evaluate its limit BVR missiles beyond visual range. Alternatively, the criterion of the Gulf War Air Power Survey (GWAPS) depends on the target to be identified visually.In table 1, adapted from Stevenson, shows the average distance (in nautical miles) in which different aircraft are visible in the light of day, based on their size. Factors such as the smoke of the F-4 Phantom are not included. Dotted lines show the 5 nautical miles of the criterion of Burton.
The powerful radar BVR sought by the theory extends the range in which a pilot can detect enemy aircraft, thus justifying the increase in the size and scope in which their own aircraft are noticeable. Unfortunately, history shows that the trade-offs made to pursue BVR this aspect of the theory is equally unjustified, especially in the era of radar detectors.
The implementation of BVR
During the 1950s, the USAF acquired the series "Century" fighters (F-100, 101, 102, 104, 105, 106), which already exhibited many of the characteristics sought by the theory BVR. With some exceptions, were significantly larger, more complex, faster (when cleaned), and more expensive than their predecessors. The Navy, exploring two views of the BVR fight, wanted to buy the Douglas Missile F6D, which was very complex, but a platform for low-speed missile cruise, designed to defeat threats in the air at distances of 100 miles, with enormous Eagle missiles.
But during this time, the Navy also got the most prolific fighter BVR: the F4H-1 Phantom II. With the first flight in 1958, this was the first fighter designed to carry radar-guided Sparrow missiles, although some of the series "Century" have been adapted for the fights.
Finally, the USAF approved the Phantom of the Navy as the F-110A Spectre, the nomenclature which later became the F-4C Phantom II. BVR Other fighters have followed: the joint program of the Navy / Air Force "TFX" (which became if the F-111), the F-14 and F-15. Not to be outdone, the Soviets bought large complex BVR fighters during the 1960s and 1970s, such as: Yak-28, Tu-28, and of course the MiG-25.
Built around large and complex radar avionics systems, these fighters needed two powerful engines to overcome not only their excessive weight, but also because of the drag associated with the large radome mounted on the nose.
Its costs of acquisition and maintenance, were amazing. As shown in Table 2, for example, the operation and maintenance (O & M) costs of a fighter able to BVR, F-4 or F-15, was significantly higher than non-BVR, F-5 or F-16.
Although the unit cost of an F-15 was more than double from an F-4, F-15 promises to have much lower costs of O & M. In 1999 dollars, the F-15C was costing $ 8,000 per time of flight (O & M direct) versus $ 5,000 for an F-4E. A similar promise is being made now for next-generation BVR fighter, the F-22, vis-à-vis the F-15.
Table 2: O & M costs per flight hour fighter selected (1980 data)
F-5E F-16A F-4E F-15A
940$ U.S. $ 1,734 U.S. $ 2,733 U.S. $ 3,305
The most neglected aspect of the BVR implementation, however, was the persistent deficit in the identification of a technological enemy at long distances. Friend or Foe - (IFF), is still not considered reliable, as evidenced by the identification requirement of other systems such as AWACS.
Not surprisingly, the IFF has created a concern fratricidal deficient, leading to extreme restrictions on the use of resources BVR. However, the U.S. continued to pay a significant amount to acquire and operate systems with BVR capability, although the capacity is generally usable in practice.
BVR in Practice
During the Cold War, conflicts in which there were eight air-to-air missile programs were used, representing 407 known killing by missiles (missiles guided by radar more heat-seeking missiles): Taiwan Straits (1958), Vietnam / Rolling Thunder (1965 to 1968 ), Vietnam / Linebacker (1971-1973), the Six Day War (1967), India and Pakistan (1971), the Yom Kippur War (1973), Falklands (1982), and the Bekaa Valley (1982). There are no reliable data available for the Iran-Iraq War (1980-1988, formerly known as the Gulf War).
As mentioned in the introduction, only four of these conflicts have seen the use of radar-guided missiles designed for killing BVR: Vietnam / Rolling Thunder (1965-1968), Vietnam / Linebacker (1971-1973), the Yom Kippur War (1973) and Vale the Bekaa (1982).
Table 3 shows the total withdrawals (kills) air to air or documented by the U.S. allies (ie, Israel) in each of these conflicts. Reliable data on aerial victories for the missiles North Vietnamese or Arab air forces, are not available, but probably consisted solely of guns and missiles for warmth.
For example, during the conflict in the Bekaa Valley, Syria said it had intercepted the second wave of Israeli air strike early, knocking down 19 Israeli planes, while 16 lost. Israel says it shot down 22 Syrian jets, with zero losses. The analysis conducted by the USAF Burton is next to Israel's demands, while reducing some aerial victories.
Despite significant investment in BVR capability during the Cold War, Table 3 shows that the radar-guided missiles only accounted for 14% of total slaughter. It kills twice as many (27%) were made by cannons and more than four times (58%) were made by heat-seeking missiles.
It is interesting to reflect on the potential for a lightweight and agile fighter equipped with cannon and Sidewinders in the hands of skilled pilots enough to lead to a good duel, the F-4 and F-105s against the MiG-21.
These lightweight fighters in 1960/1970 correspond to a P-51 was in World War II, when compared with more expensive and heavier P-38 and P-47.
What is most disturbing about the performance of radar-guided missile is that the vast majority of kills (69, 73, or 95%) were initiated and made effective visual range, as shown in Table 4. The acquisition of weapons systems such as the F-4 and AIM-7 missiles were designed to kill the enemy with missile strikes BVR accurate.
Unfortunately, the doctrine and practice real job do not match (even in Israel), due to the constraints above the IFF. However, even when the deficiencies were overcome and the IFF BVR shots were performed, only four of 61 were successful. This translates into a probability "kill" (kill probability) or PK only 6.6%!
There are only four withdrawals BVR documented throughout the history of aerial combat even before Operation Desert Storm. This revelation is surprising because throughout the Cold War era, the platforms of radar-guided missiles were touted as the transformation that would fundamentally change the air combat. This would consist of air combat missile platforms (fighters complex, heavy and expensive), armed with radar-guided missiles, destroying the enemy beyond visual range.
There was no need for agility, just to reach the location of missile launch soon. As examples of the concept, we have the F-102, F-106 and F-4. Based on the lesson of Vietnam, the latest versions of F-106 and F-4 began to be equipped with internal gun and F-4 received slats to improve maneuverability in dogfights.
Another game in the series "Century", the F-105, was equipped with a gun (after much debate, despite the conventional wisdom), and although it was a platform designed for tactical nuclear attack, could in fact numerous aerial victories in Vietnam with his cannon.
There are three major faults associated with the use of AIM-7 Sparrow missiles that led to disappointing results in the hands of experienced operators:
1. the missile often do not work properly;
2. the shooter had to keep the aircraft nose pointed at the target throughout the engagement (to keep the target illuminated) and;
3. Once illuminated by the radar of shot needed to guide the missile, the victim was alerted by a radar warning receiver and began evasive maneuvers to make the missile or radar aircraft to lose lock.
When the missile was visually located, evasive maneuvers could also cause a failure even to exceed the maneuverability of the missile.
