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WASHINGTON, May 12 - Despite a $27 billion budget and a galaxy of spy satellites, U.S. Intelligence agencies failed to detect India's preparation for Monday's nuclear blast. Why? U.S. officials are blaming it on a leak to The New York Times. Senior Intelligence and military officials tell NBC News that India put its nuclear testing equipment underground in 1996 following a leak to The New York Times that U.S. spy satellites were monitoring that nation's nuclear test site.
"There was a leak that we knew would have a reaction and it did," said one senior intelligence official. "We watched as they put it underground... We warned back then that India now had the capability to test very quickly and predicted that we wouldn't be able to tell."
The Times report ran Dec. 14, 1995, and quoted unnamed government officials as saying satellites had recorded activity in western India that suggested a test might be imminent. No tests occurred and an Indian government spokesman said the Times report was "highly speculative." As a result, said officials, India was able to very "quickly and subtly" make preparations for the test of three nuclear devices Monday.
In fact, National Security Advisor Sandy Berger told reporters the United States still had no confirmation of the test nearly 12 hours after the blast occurred. India calculated the orbits of spy satellites and then moved equipment at times when they believed nothing was overhead. India, several officials noted, has long had a space program and is capable of determining what satellites are in which orbit. "They were in our blind spot," said a senior military official. Moreover, intelligence officials note that the Indian nuclear weapons program is the "most secretive" of all Third World programs. "We know more about the North Korean program than we do about the Indian program."
Satellite Imaging Capability
The reasons, say officials in both Washington and New Delhi, are varied. India has its own satellite-imaging capability, which gives it an understanding of what can and can't be seen from space. It's nuclear program is kept separate from its military, which like many militaries is prone to boasting and leaking. And unlike many programs, India's is not as dependent on outside help. India has a large pool of trained nuclear scientists and electrical engineers and an industrial infrastructure capable of producing key equipment. Much U.S. intelligence on other nations' nuclear programs is derived from electronic eavesdropping on sales of equipment related to weapons development. India has prevented Western intelligence from recruiting spies in India by an aggressive program of counterintelligence that includes surveillance and even attempted recruitment of diplomats and suspected agents. "They are very, very good," said one official. "Remember, this is the same country that produced the scientists who designed the Pentium chips," added an official. "They don't need a lot of outside help. They can do it on their own."
Televised Announcement
CIA officials say the United States did not know anything about the tests until Indian Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee announced the tests on television Monday morning, four hours after they had taken place. The announcement even preceded analysis of the seismic data on the tests. "A lot of people had their hair on fire," said one intelligence official. Intelligence officials say policy officials deserve some of the blame for the tests, noting that intelligence officials have repeatedly warned that India's Hindu Nationalist BJP party was serious about "going nuclear." Bill Richardson, the U.S. ambassador to the United Nations, told the Pakistani government last month that he was impressed with BJP "restraint" when he met with party officials prior to his visit to Islamabad. "The U.S. charge d'affaires got his butt chewed by the Pakistanis last night," an official noted, saying that the United States should have known of the Indian plan and that the tests proved there was little restraint in New Delhi.
Clinton Warned
The Pakistani ambassador to the United States said Tuesday that his prime minister, Nawaz Sharif, had warned President Bill Clinton of India's intentions, if not its specific plans. "South Asia has been on the back burner in this administration," said another official. "They have taken Indian restraint for granted and didn't take the BJP threats seriously." As for why India tested the weapons now, the intelligence assessment is that the tests were driven more by domestic political concerns, rather than any action by Pakistan. "The BJP couldn't get budget through by the end of the month without something to help them. If the budget deal fell through, they would have had to call new elections," said a senior intelligence official. "It was done clearly for nationalistic and domestic political concerns."
Meanwhile, U.S. intelligence officials say that in spite of Pakistani claims that it will match India's nuclear tests, there are no indications that Pakistan is preparing for such a test. The United States has moved its satellites and increased electronic surveillance to monitor Pakistan's nuclear test site in the Chagai Hills in the desert of western Pakistan. Officials note that Sharif is scheduled to return to Islamabad quickly from a trip to Kazakhstan. Once home, say officials, the United States expects some decisions. U.S. officials expect that if the Pakistanis don't detonate a nuclear device, they will probably again test the Ghauri missile, which is nuclear-capable. Pakistan first tested the missile, which it bought from North Korea, the first week of April.
---------- Post added at 11:01 AM ---------- Previous post was at 11:00 AM ----------
The detection of the test preparations by American satellites in 1995, had taught a lesson to the Indian scientists. It was decided that preparations for the May 1998 tests should be undertaken under a cloud of secrecy so that foreign powers could not detect the preparations and try to pressure the government. Extensive measures were taken in order to deceive intelligence agencies around the world. The decision to test was not disclosed even to senior cabinet ministers. The preparations were managed by a closed group of scientists, military officers and politicians.
Dr. A.P.J. Abdul Kalam, the Scientific Adviser to the Prime Minister, and Dr. R. Chidambaram, the head of the Department of Atomic Energy, were the chief coordinators for the operation. They were assisted by the 58th Regiment of the Army Engineering Corps in preparing the test site. Scientists from the Bhabha Atomic Research Centre (BARC) and the Defence Research and Development Organization (DRDO) were involved in assembling the weapons, moving them to Pokhran, placing them into shafts in the ground and laying a network of sensors to gather data during the explosions.
The Regiment 58 Engineers had learned much since the aborted 1995 test preparations about avoiding detection by American satellites. Much work was done at night, and heavy equipment was always returned to the same parking spot at dawn so that satellite image analysts would conclude that the equipment was never moved. Piles of dug-out sand were shaped to mimic the wind shaped dune forms in the desert area. The shafts were dug under camouflage netting. When cables for sensors were laid they were carefully covered with sand, and native vegetation was replaced to conceal the digging.
The scientists involved in the operation took care to ensure that even their close friends and colleagues would not detect the work being undertaken at Pokhran. All scientists involved in the operation did not depart for Pokhran simultaneously, but left in groups of two or three. One group would use the pretext of attending a seminar or a conference, and would tell their wives that they could not be contacted while they were away. Tickets were bought for a destination other than Pokhran (or cities nearby) under pseudonyms, and after arriving at their destination, the group would secretly leave for the military base in Jaisalmer from where they would be taken by the army to Pokhran. After finishing their work the group would return, retracing their path. Then another group would leave for the range employing similar means to do their work. In this way, information about the test was kept tightly under wraps. All technical staff at the range wore military fatigues, so that in satellite images they would appear to be military personnel maintaining the test range.
On the diplomatic front, India adopted a policy of ambiguity about deciding to go nuclear. Statements by Indian politicians and diplomats gave an impression to the world that India was not yet decided about its nuclear status. Deliberate steps were taken to ensure that the world community would not take the BJP's campaign promises seriously. In separate meetings with American officials, then Foreign secretary K.Raghunath and Defence Minister George Fernandes stated that India had not yet decided about going nuclear and they also conveyed to the officials that the National Security Council would be meeting soon to discuss the matter and decide about the nuclear option. The council was to meet on the 26th of May. Both the Indian officials had categorically told the Americans that "there would be no surprise testings". All this led the Americans and the world community to believe that India was not going to pursue the nuclear option in the near future. They did not take the BJP's campaign promises seriously and hence did not expect an Indian nuclear test so soon.
"There was a leak that we knew would have a reaction and it did," said one senior intelligence official. "We watched as they put it underground... We warned back then that India now had the capability to test very quickly and predicted that we wouldn't be able to tell."
The Times report ran Dec. 14, 1995, and quoted unnamed government officials as saying satellites had recorded activity in western India that suggested a test might be imminent. No tests occurred and an Indian government spokesman said the Times report was "highly speculative." As a result, said officials, India was able to very "quickly and subtly" make preparations for the test of three nuclear devices Monday.
In fact, National Security Advisor Sandy Berger told reporters the United States still had no confirmation of the test nearly 12 hours after the blast occurred. India calculated the orbits of spy satellites and then moved equipment at times when they believed nothing was overhead. India, several officials noted, has long had a space program and is capable of determining what satellites are in which orbit. "They were in our blind spot," said a senior military official. Moreover, intelligence officials note that the Indian nuclear weapons program is the "most secretive" of all Third World programs. "We know more about the North Korean program than we do about the Indian program."
Satellite Imaging Capability
The reasons, say officials in both Washington and New Delhi, are varied. India has its own satellite-imaging capability, which gives it an understanding of what can and can't be seen from space. It's nuclear program is kept separate from its military, which like many militaries is prone to boasting and leaking. And unlike many programs, India's is not as dependent on outside help. India has a large pool of trained nuclear scientists and electrical engineers and an industrial infrastructure capable of producing key equipment. Much U.S. intelligence on other nations' nuclear programs is derived from electronic eavesdropping on sales of equipment related to weapons development. India has prevented Western intelligence from recruiting spies in India by an aggressive program of counterintelligence that includes surveillance and even attempted recruitment of diplomats and suspected agents. "They are very, very good," said one official. "Remember, this is the same country that produced the scientists who designed the Pentium chips," added an official. "They don't need a lot of outside help. They can do it on their own."
Televised Announcement
CIA officials say the United States did not know anything about the tests until Indian Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee announced the tests on television Monday morning, four hours after they had taken place. The announcement even preceded analysis of the seismic data on the tests. "A lot of people had their hair on fire," said one intelligence official. Intelligence officials say policy officials deserve some of the blame for the tests, noting that intelligence officials have repeatedly warned that India's Hindu Nationalist BJP party was serious about "going nuclear." Bill Richardson, the U.S. ambassador to the United Nations, told the Pakistani government last month that he was impressed with BJP "restraint" when he met with party officials prior to his visit to Islamabad. "The U.S. charge d'affaires got his butt chewed by the Pakistanis last night," an official noted, saying that the United States should have known of the Indian plan and that the tests proved there was little restraint in New Delhi.
Clinton Warned
The Pakistani ambassador to the United States said Tuesday that his prime minister, Nawaz Sharif, had warned President Bill Clinton of India's intentions, if not its specific plans. "South Asia has been on the back burner in this administration," said another official. "They have taken Indian restraint for granted and didn't take the BJP threats seriously." As for why India tested the weapons now, the intelligence assessment is that the tests were driven more by domestic political concerns, rather than any action by Pakistan. "The BJP couldn't get budget through by the end of the month without something to help them. If the budget deal fell through, they would have had to call new elections," said a senior intelligence official. "It was done clearly for nationalistic and domestic political concerns."
Meanwhile, U.S. intelligence officials say that in spite of Pakistani claims that it will match India's nuclear tests, there are no indications that Pakistan is preparing for such a test. The United States has moved its satellites and increased electronic surveillance to monitor Pakistan's nuclear test site in the Chagai Hills in the desert of western Pakistan. Officials note that Sharif is scheduled to return to Islamabad quickly from a trip to Kazakhstan. Once home, say officials, the United States expects some decisions. U.S. officials expect that if the Pakistanis don't detonate a nuclear device, they will probably again test the Ghauri missile, which is nuclear-capable. Pakistan first tested the missile, which it bought from North Korea, the first week of April.
---------- Post added at 11:01 AM ---------- Previous post was at 11:00 AM ----------
The detection of the test preparations by American satellites in 1995, had taught a lesson to the Indian scientists. It was decided that preparations for the May 1998 tests should be undertaken under a cloud of secrecy so that foreign powers could not detect the preparations and try to pressure the government. Extensive measures were taken in order to deceive intelligence agencies around the world. The decision to test was not disclosed even to senior cabinet ministers. The preparations were managed by a closed group of scientists, military officers and politicians.
Dr. A.P.J. Abdul Kalam, the Scientific Adviser to the Prime Minister, and Dr. R. Chidambaram, the head of the Department of Atomic Energy, were the chief coordinators for the operation. They were assisted by the 58th Regiment of the Army Engineering Corps in preparing the test site. Scientists from the Bhabha Atomic Research Centre (BARC) and the Defence Research and Development Organization (DRDO) were involved in assembling the weapons, moving them to Pokhran, placing them into shafts in the ground and laying a network of sensors to gather data during the explosions.
The Regiment 58 Engineers had learned much since the aborted 1995 test preparations about avoiding detection by American satellites. Much work was done at night, and heavy equipment was always returned to the same parking spot at dawn so that satellite image analysts would conclude that the equipment was never moved. Piles of dug-out sand were shaped to mimic the wind shaped dune forms in the desert area. The shafts were dug under camouflage netting. When cables for sensors were laid they were carefully covered with sand, and native vegetation was replaced to conceal the digging.
The scientists involved in the operation took care to ensure that even their close friends and colleagues would not detect the work being undertaken at Pokhran. All scientists involved in the operation did not depart for Pokhran simultaneously, but left in groups of two or three. One group would use the pretext of attending a seminar or a conference, and would tell their wives that they could not be contacted while they were away. Tickets were bought for a destination other than Pokhran (or cities nearby) under pseudonyms, and after arriving at their destination, the group would secretly leave for the military base in Jaisalmer from where they would be taken by the army to Pokhran. After finishing their work the group would return, retracing their path. Then another group would leave for the range employing similar means to do their work. In this way, information about the test was kept tightly under wraps. All technical staff at the range wore military fatigues, so that in satellite images they would appear to be military personnel maintaining the test range.
On the diplomatic front, India adopted a policy of ambiguity about deciding to go nuclear. Statements by Indian politicians and diplomats gave an impression to the world that India was not yet decided about its nuclear status. Deliberate steps were taken to ensure that the world community would not take the BJP's campaign promises seriously. In separate meetings with American officials, then Foreign secretary K.Raghunath and Defence Minister George Fernandes stated that India had not yet decided about going nuclear and they also conveyed to the officials that the National Security Council would be meeting soon to discuss the matter and decide about the nuclear option. The council was to meet on the 26th of May. Both the Indian officials had categorically told the Americans that "there would be no surprise testings". All this led the Americans and the world community to believe that India was not going to pursue the nuclear option in the near future. They did not take the BJP's campaign promises seriously and hence did not expect an Indian nuclear test so soon.
