Pakistan's dept for reconciling the irreconcilable

[AgNoStiC MuSliM]

Pakistan's dept for reconciling the irreconcilable​

* Mark Urban
* Mon 8 Dec 08, 06:40 PM

Taj Mahal Hotel in Mumbai Monday's raids on a camp in Kashmir show that India, the US and Pakistan, which used its army to arrest 'more than a dozen' suspected militants at the site, seem to share a view about what happened in Mumbai. The authorities in Islamabad early demands for proof from India have given way to action based upon the assumption that Lashkar e-Taiba, a Kashmiri militant group, played a key role in organising last month's terrorist attacks on that city. This in turn will lead investigators closer to Inter-Services Intelligence - the ISI - the Pakistani military's organisation for gathering secret information, and one of the most written about but least understood intelligence agencies in the world.

The ISI helped to establish Lashkar e-Taiba, just as it played a key role in organising religious students (Taleban) to fight in Afghanistan. During the 1980s Pakistan's leaders wanted to foment trouble in neighbouring countries and these religious-based organisations were a useful tool in that policy. More recently Pakistani leaders have sworn that they would have nothing to do with organising Mumbai or the blowing up of the Indian embassy in Kabul earlier this year, but nobody who knows the region is completely sure that these events were unconnected with the ISI.

Having met a few serving members of the ISI, the impression they usually give is of serving military officers who are on secondment to military intelligence. In other words they seem no more religious, conspiratorial, or devious than any other service type one meets in the sub-continent, carrying out normal military duties.

There is though an odd duality about many of these people. Meeting one senior officer in ISI recently, I asked him some questions about insurgency in various parts of Pakistan only to have him shoot back at me, "and what efforts have you made to interview the Taleban?" It was a fair question. Was it born of an intelligence officer's curiosity about what 'the opposition' think? Or did he feel that organisations like the BBC do not give enough attention to the Taleban's point of view? Was it, in other words an expression of some form of sympathy for them?

Alas our conversation did not last long enough to get beyond my expressions of anxiety about how such an interview could be conducted without a high risk to myself and others or, indeed, whether he could facilitate it. I may though get in touch with him again to pursue this last question.

The view of some of those in Western organisations that liaise professionally with the ISI is that there is an, educated, politically-sensitive, senior management who have become de-coupled from some of the foot soldiers - the captains or majors who have trained insurgents or run sources in Lashkar e-Taiba or the Taleban. As if this is not already a problem, the ISI has indeed just been through one of its periodical management re-shuffles - something apparently designed to ensure its loyalty to the current army chief.

Some Pakistani observers buy this theory too - hence talk of 'elements within the ISI' still being loyal to the Taleban. It is however an organisation that runs on the basis of military hierarchy, and the New York Times reported today, apparently based on US intelligence briefing, that the CIA believes the ISI has been liaising closely recently with a senior Lashkar e-Taiba militant called Zarrar Shah. This suggests the military command structure must know something about these contacts.

The ISI might argue that penetration of these organisations - including paying some militants - is all part of the struggle for intelligence information. It is also probable that some of the recent US drone attacks on suspected militants in the tribal areas have relied upon intelligence provided by the ISI.

So how does one explain these contradictions: arresting Lashkar militants after years of supporting them? Sympathising with the Taleban while providing the Americans with intelligence needed to kill them? In the end, the ISI is part of Pakistan's impossible balancing act - trying to reconcile its need for cooperation with the west against its sympathy and sense of Islamic solidarity with many of those the Indians or Americans despise. We might marvel at some of the verbal gymnastics of a Pakistani politician trying to explain a recent American attack in the tribal areas but the ISI is different in that it attempts to reconcile the irreconcilable in secret and when it fails, the consequences can be quite terrible.

BBC NEWS | NEWSNIGHT | Mark Urban's blog | Pakistan's dept for reconciling the irreconcilable

 

[AgNoStiC MuSliM]

"the CIA believes the ISI has been liaising closely recently with a senior Lashkar e-Taiba militant called Zarrar Shah."

I fail to see why the CIA, and especially its opportune leaks to the media through 'sources' should be treated as a holy grail of information.

Ties to groups like LeT and the Haqqani network are par for the course, given the ISI's role in creating/supporting them at various points in time. Those channels of communication do not automatically imply knowledge of or culpability in acts like the Embassy bombing or the Mumbai attacks.

 

[AgNoStiC MuSliM]

"The view of some of those in Western organisations that liaise professionally with the ISI is that there is an, educated, politically-sensitive, senior management who have become de-coupled from some of the foot soldiers - the captains or majors who have trained insurgents or run sources in Lashkar e-Taiba or the Taleban."

This view seems a tad dated and incorrect (perhaps Blain might clarify further) but from what I understood, even those 'foot soldiers' are rotated back to their parent services. There is no evidence that Pakistan has run any sort of training camps for the Taliban since the Afghan invasion.

And an LeT leader stated a couple of days ago how hard it had become for the organization to operate since Pakistan pulled out support for it after the last crackdown.

Therefore I don't necessarily buy the disconnect argument in the context that the disconnect occurs because of intimate involvement in training etc., though it could occur because of continued engagement with the organizations, for intelligence purposes, as the author suggests.

I think the larger reason for the disconnect may be because it replicates the disconnect seen throughout Pakistani society in general - a lack of trust in the intentions of the US and India, belief in the culpability of the Indians and Afghans in terrorism in Pakistan etc.

 

[TruthSeeker]

I don't understand how the ISI could maintain any continuity and expertise on specialized matters (like liasing with LeT, for example) if the majority of its staff members rotate in and out every 2-3 years. How could the ISI individuals build any trust with the militant groups? Isn't there a core of people who make their whole careers in the ISI? I thought the ISI was like our CIA. In the CIA, case officers become experts on the work of their "desk" only after many years. How big is the ISI? For all the credit and blame it is given for doing this and that, it must be huge! But I'm sure the truth of it is much different. Is it even as much as 2% of the Pak military in staffing?

 

[Awesome]

I don't understand how the ISI could maintain any continuity and expertise on specialized matters (like liasing with LeT, for example) if the majority of its staff members rotate in and out every 2-3 years. How could the ISI individuals build any trust with the militant groups? Isn't there a core of people who make their whole careers in the ISI? I thought the ISI was like our CIA. In the CIA, case officers become experts on the work of their "desk" only after many years. How big is the ISI? For all the credit and blame it is given for doing this and that, it must be huge! But I'm sure the truth of it is much different. Is it even as much as 2% of the Pak military in staffing?

Not all that is written about the ISI is true. It's a convenient scapegoat in the failures of security for Afghanis and the Indians.

 

[daredevil]

Having met a few serving members of the ISI, the impression they usually give is of serving military officers who are on secondment to military intelligence. In other words they seem no more religious, conspiratorial, or devious than any other service type one meets in the sub-continent, carrying out normal military duties.

What about Hamid Gul, the former chief of ISI?. He seem to be a conspiratorial guy, at least from what I saw in his interview with Fareed Zakaria.

 

[AgNoStiC MuSliM]

Having met a few serving members of the ISI, the impression they usually give is of serving military officers who are on secondment to military intelligence. In other words they seem no more religious, conspiratorial, or devious than any other service type one meets in the sub-continent, carrying out normal military duties.

What about Hamid Gul, the former chief of ISI?. He seem to be a conspiratorial guy, at least from what I saw in his interview with Fareed Zakaria.

Hamid Gul is also from a different time, and was intimately involved in Afghanistan. I believe most professional organizations would require you leave your personal opinions at the door, and follow company policy and directives.

Of course when Gul was in the military, 'company policy', in conjunction with the CIA and GID, was one of training and supporting the Mujahideen. So you have to put his personal views in perspective.