Pakistan's C4ISR (Part 1): Introduction & Overview

[Quwa]

​

Pakistan's C4ISR (Part 1): Introduction & Overview
An introduction and overview of Pakistan’s implementation of C4ISR

Link: Pakistan’s C4ISR (Part 1): Introduction and Overview

08 March 2016

By Bilal Khan

Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (C4ISR) is a term commonly used to describe the idea of using a network to communicate and pass data between connected assets. These assets can range include aircraft, surface warships, armoured vehicles, ground stations, and even individual personnel. In the modern warfare environment, connecting new information to the right actors is vital to one’s capacity to survive and succeed on the battlefield. The reasons are obvious. Situational awareness at the tactical and strategic level are key, especially if one intends to properly understand a problem, and in turn, deploy the correct solution. Precise and objective decision-making can save lives, accrue gains, and win battles, which in turn can win wars.

The specifics will vary between scenarios and countries, but the core idea driving each country’s hardware choices, standards (for voice and data-transfer protocols), and deployments is the same: To build situational awareness by connecting new information to the right actors. Driving the process of building situational awareness are systems managing the flow of information and interaction between different assets. These systems are technological (via human-machine interface consoles) and organizational (e.g. delegating individuals or groups to preside over specific tasks).

The implementation of C4ISR typically centers on ISR [intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance] equipment (such as radars), voice and data communication technology, human-machine interface (HMI) consoles, electronic support measures (ESM) equipment, and information technology (IT) systems to process information from ISR and ESM equipment. This is not an exhaustive list by any stretch, but these elements are the most common in C4ISR. Moreover, the aspects described above can include a large number of individual assets, such as airborne early warning and control (AEW&C) aircraft, satellites, command and control (C2) stations on the ground (as well as in the sea and air), combat aircraft, people, unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV), and much more.

Like other modern militaries, the Pakistani armed forces also maintain a C4ISR system. The most visible elements of Pakistan’s C4ISR network include the Erieye and Karakoram Eagle AEW&C systems, but there is more at hand. However, over the past 10 years the Pakistani military has become sensitive about sharing information about its current C4ISR capabilities, and especially cagey about its future plans. Fortunately, Pakistani officials have offered hints in recent years about the armed forces’ C4ISR work. For example, Air Commodore Khalid Mahmood mentioned a national data-link solution, and the Pakistan Air Force (PAF) has openly discussed the Karakoram Eagle (KE)’s role in supporting maritime ISR operations.

It is possible a fair amount of detail will be disclosed during the upcoming IDEAS defence exhibition in Karachi, but until then, this series will offer a possible understanding of Pakistan’s C4ISR capabilities. Note, nothing in this article or in the series will be drawn from information not available to the public. While the analysis work in this series will offer some conclusions about Pakistan’s future C4ISR capabilities, please do not treat these conclusions as anything more than guesswork.

Pakistan’s C4ISR system could be understood as the implementation of core technologies, particularly ISR and communications. This article will offer a brief summary of each aspect, but over the next few weeks, we will review each part in greater detail. Note, neither this article or the series will offer an exhaustive technical discussion of C4ISR technology and concepts.

Part 2: Aerial and Surface Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR)

Sensors, such as radars, are perhaps the most visible aspects of C4ISR. AEW&C systems such as the Erieye and Karakoram Eagle play critical roles in providing the PAF and Pakistan Navy (PN) extended range radar surveillance coverage. In the simplest sense, these AEW&C systems provide early warning, just as a high-powered land-based radar would; but in reality, AEW&C are critically important pieces of network-driven battlefield operations. Moreover, radars are simply one aspect of ISR, and they function – alongside other sensors (such as electro-optical) – to observe the battlefield.

Part 3: Communications (including Data Link)

Communications is an integral component of C4ISR. The ability to exchange information as well as connect new sensory observations to the correct friendlies at the correct time is vital, tactically and strategically.

While high-speed and high-volume communication may not be a particularly difficult feat in the civil sector (thanks to fibre optics and saturated wireless networks), the battlefield space is a very different story. For one thing, militaries are heavily dependent on wireless communication, which in turn needs to be fast, powerful (in terms of range and penetration), and secure. This is not easy to accomplish, especially when one is dealing with fast moving assets or dense electronic warfare environments.

Tactical data-links (TDL), such as Link-16, use these core essentials to construct a ‘picture’ of the battlefield using information from sensors, such as radars. TDLs connectivity can be maintained between aircraft, surface ships, and ground-based vehicles.

Part 4: Command and Control

Command and Control (C2) is technological and organizational. When looking at C2 technology, one might think about human machine interfaces (HMI), such as consoles, which are often found in secure locations, onboard surveillance aircraft and surface warships, and even integrated into portable systems. In terms of organizational aspects, militaries establish hierarchical structures whereby individuals and groups are empowered to make decisions, to access varying degrees of information, and undertake specific tasks.

Part 5: Intelligence

“Intelligence” is a broad term, but it generally centers around the idea of gathering information. How this is done depends on the scenario, mission objectives, and tools employed. In common C4ISR structures, intelligence is often conducted using electronic support measures (ESM), which in turn is broken into electronic intelligence (ELINT), communications intelligence (COMINT), and signals intelligence (SIGINT).

Part 6: Advancing in Network Centric Warfare

Once we develop a grasp of Pakistan’s C4ISR capabilities and plans, we will take a look at what Pakistan could and ought to pursue in terms of future development. Areas such as development in space, future tactical platforms, and emerging warfare concepts will be explored.

@Horus

 

[Zarvan]

​

Pakistan's C4ISR (Part 1): Introduction & Overview
An introduction and overview of Pakistan’s implementation of C4ISR

Link: Pakistan’s C4ISR (Part 1): Introduction and Overview

08 March 2016

By Bilal Khan

Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (C4ISR) is a term commonly used to describe the idea of using a network to communicate and pass data between connected assets. These assets can range include aircraft, surface warships, armoured vehicles, ground stations, and even individual personnel. In the modern warfare environment, connecting new information to the right actors is vital to one’s capacity to survive and succeed on the battlefield. The reasons are obvious. Situational awareness at the tactical and strategic level are key, especially if one intends to properly understand a problem, and in turn, deploy the correct solution. Precise and objective decision-making can save lives, accrue gains, and win battles, which in turn can win wars.

The specifics will vary between scenarios and countries, but the core idea driving each country’s hardware choices, standards (for voice and data-transfer protocols), and deployments is the same: To build situational awareness by connecting new information to the right actors. Driving the process of building situational awareness are systems managing the flow of information and interaction between different assets. These systems are technological (via human-machine interface consoles) and organizational (e.g. delegating individuals or groups to preside over specific tasks).

The implementation of C4ISR typically centers on ISR [intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance] equipment (such as radars), voice and data communication technology, human-machine interface (HMI) consoles, electronic support measures (ESM) equipment, and information technology (IT) systems to process information from ISR and ESM equipment. This is not an exhaustive list by any stretch, but these elements are the most common in C4ISR. Moreover, the aspects described above can include a large number of individual assets, such as airborne early warning and control (AEW&C) aircraft, satellites, command and control (C2) stations on the ground (as well as in the sea and air), combat aircraft, people, unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV), and much more.

Like other modern militaries, the Pakistani armed forces also maintain a C4ISR system. The most visible elements of Pakistan’s C4ISR network include the Erieye and Karakoram Eagle AEW&C systems, but there is more at hand. However, over the past 10 years the Pakistani military has become sensitive about sharing information about its current C4ISR capabilities, and especially cagey about its future plans. Fortunately, Pakistani officials have offered hints in recent years about the armed forces’ C4ISR work. For example, Air Commodore Khalid Mahmood mentioned a national data-link solution, and the Pakistan Air Force (PAF) has openly discussed the Karakoram Eagle (KE)’s role in supporting maritime ISR operations.

It is possible a fair amount of detail will be disclosed during the upcoming IDEAS defence exhibition in Karachi, but until then, this series will offer a possible understanding of Pakistan’s C4ISR capabilities. Note, nothing in this article or in the series will be drawn from information not available to the public. While the analysis work in this series will offer some conclusions about Pakistan’s future C4ISR capabilities, please do not treat these conclusions as anything more than guesswork.

Pakistan’s C4ISR system could be understood as the implementation of core technologies, particularly ISR and communications. This article will offer a brief summary of each aspect, but over the next few weeks, we will review each part in greater detail. Note, neither this article or the series will offer an exhaustive technical discussion of C4ISR technology and concepts.

Part 2: Aerial and Surface Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR)

Sensors, such as radars, are perhaps the most visible aspects of C4ISR. AEW&C systems such as the Erieye and Karakoram Eagle play critical roles in providing the PAF and Pakistan Navy (PN) extended range radar surveillance coverage. In the simplest sense, these AEW&C systems provide early warning, just as a high-powered land-based radar would; but in reality, AEW&C are critically important pieces of network-driven battlefield operations. Moreover, radars are simply one aspect of ISR, and they function – alongside other sensors (such as electro-optical) – to observe the battlefield.

Part 3: Communications (including Data Link)

Communications is an integral component of C4ISR. The ability to exchange information as well as connect new sensory observations to the correct friendlies at the correct time is vital, tactically and strategically.

While high-speed and high-volume communication may not be a particularly difficult feat in the civil sector (thanks to fibre optics and saturated wireless networks), the battlefield space is a very different story. For one thing, militaries are heavily dependent on wireless communication, which in turn needs to be fast, powerful (in terms of range and penetration), and secure. This is not easy to accomplish, especially when one is dealing with fast moving assets or dense electronic warfare environments.

Tactical data-links (TDL), such as Link-16, use these core essentials to construct a ‘picture’ of the battlefield using information from sensors, such as radars. TDLs connectivity can be maintained between aircraft, surface ships, and ground-based vehicles.

Part 4: Command and Control

Command and Control (C2) is technological and organizational. When looking at C2 technology, one might think about human machine interfaces (HMI), such as consoles, which are often found in secure locations, onboard surveillance aircraft and surface warships, and even integrated into portable systems. In terms of organizational aspects, militaries establish hierarchical structures whereby individuals and groups are empowered to make decisions, to access varying degrees of information, and undertake specific tasks.

Part 5: Intelligence

“Intelligence” is a broad term, but it generally centers around the idea of gathering information. How this is done depends on the scenario, mission objectives, and tools employed. In common C4ISR structures, intelligence is often conducted using electronic support measures (ESM), which in turn is broken into electronic intelligence (ELINT), communications intelligence (COMINT), and signals intelligence (SIGINT).

Part 6: Advancing in Network Centric Warfare

Once we develop a grasp of Pakistan’s C4ISR capabilities and plans, we will take a look at what Pakistan could and ought to pursue in terms of future development. Areas such as development in space, future tactical platforms, and emerging warfare concepts will be explored.

@Horus

I have few questions
1: How good it is and How much it helps us to carry out our missions ?
2 : How safe it is from enemies cyber attacks ?

 

[Old School]

Looking forward to read the next iteration. C4ISR is a philosophy that sits at the very heart of our defense capabities. The foremost challenge is to translate this philosophy into implemention all across the spectrum of tactical , operational and strategic planning. Carry on.

 

[Quwa]

I have few questions
1: How good it is and How much it helps us to carry out our missions ?
2 : How safe it is from enemies cyber attacks ?

C4ISR is not one thing, it is a collection of systems, each with a specific function. Asking "how good it is" is like asking, "how good are the KE-3s, the Erieyes, the AN/TPS radars, the AWC C4I consoles, the portable radio, the protocol of putting XYZ guy in charge of 123, etc" ... It'll be a while before anyone can answer that question

 

[HAIDER]

Using Chinese satellite frequency for live input ....pretty much stable.

 

[AZADPAKISTAN2009]

Once again via Musharraf Sahibs visions we got the Chinese AWAC

 

[New World]

@jhungary @Quwa sir, is Pakistan's C4ISR is comparable to the UK or USA's C4ISR?? and how is China's C4ISR system??

@jhungary @Quwa sir, is Pakistan's C4ISR is comparable to the UK or USA's C4ISR?? and how is China's C4ISR system??

 

[_NOBODY_]

According to you how good are our airborne early warning and control (AEW&C) aircraft as compare to of other armies around the world?
@Quwa @Horus @Viper0011. @Bratva @The Eagle @HRK

 

[jhungary]

@jhungary @Quwa sir, is Pakistan's C4ISR is comparable to the UK or USA's C4ISR?? and how is China's C4ISR system??

This would be a very long response, which unfortunately I do not have time for it, I will try to slim down my response and try to answer your question.

if you compare capability-wise, the system are the same between US, UK and Pakistan.

We each uses the same C4ISR structure and we all use the same protocol (Datalink, Net-Centric Warfare and so-on).

The different is what is the Reach of C4ISR for Pakistan compare to the reach of US, and UK, that will be the obvious different there.

For the US, C4ISR was maintained by 9 different command which have a deployment capability WORLDWIDE

Africa Command (AFRICOM)
Central Command (CENTCOM)
European Command (EUCOM)
Northern Command (NORTHCOM)
Southern Command (SOUTHCOM)
Pacific Command (PACOM)
Special Operation Command (SOCOM)
Strategic Command (STRATCOM)
Transportation Command (TRACOM)

In which all these command are to be reported to Joint Chief of Staff and the President, the command structure are spread worldwide and also separate into 2 direction, one is regional command (Command of the whole region) another is operational command (Commanding operation)

With all these, they also have their specific task group of c4ISTAR or c5ISTAR capability attached to it, allowing each command to function independently of other, but on the other hand, the information can also be shared by each other command and complete the whole picture of the battlefield.

With Pakistan Armed Force, the High Command (Joint Chief of Staff Committee) in charge of all command aspect, however, it spread across the regional need and therefore its GCHQ include element of Army, Air and Navy HQ only. The reach and the means to reach them are significantly different than the one that was implemented in the US, although the method remain almost identical to the US (Satellite, AWACS and drone for intelligence gathering. and Data/Network linkage for Net-centric command) however, the skill in some battlespace (namely space and information) are not as up to the game as with the US and UK counterpart.

The difference?

The difference always goes back to warfighting capability. So it would be okay and manageable for US to fight a war in middle east while tracking a target in Africa which related to the war currently ongoing in the middle east, the US Military have the means and structural capability to carry out strike simultaneously all over the world (Given they have enough battle asset to do so) While for Pakistan, the same capability are retained, but only for regional warfare. And the space and information warfare capability are seriously hampered by the lacking of skills and infrastructure.

For China, it's like Pakistan, they are also on par as with C4ISR, however, they are also still limited to regionals capability, however, unlike Pakistan, they have up to the game Space and Information capability to raise an all-rounded war with all 6 Battlespace (Air, Land, Sea, Cyber, Information and Space)

 

[Viper0011.]

Once again via Musharraf Sahibs visions we got the Chinese AWAC

And due to his corruption, you lost a LOT of other things!! Sorry, I wanted to correct the record. But yes, I do agree, a couple of things that he did (I think anyone sane would do the same in terms of building towards Pakistan focused solutions.

 

[AZADPAKISTAN2009]

Honorable Musharaf Sahib helped Pakistan rise against Terrorism and protected national interest by purchasing AWACs with his connections and vision

Remarkable man , under which Pakistan saw tremendous economic progress unseen since time of Ayub

I thought he was a Tactical Genius only mistake NRO

 

[Viper0011.]

According to you how good are our airborne early warning and control (AEW&C) aircraft as compare to of other armies around the world?
@Quwa @Horus @Viper0011. @Bratva @The Eagle @HRK

That's a loaded question and unfair in some ways too:

1) On the Karakoram Eagle, its range and capabilities are classified, so its hard to understand. But by looking at the console pictures and a video on the internet recently, I think this would be a close match of the Hawkeye system (older generation capabilities, not the 2D one).

2) Unless all jets are connected through the homemade or link-16 type solution, you'd be a step behind. I don't think there are plans to connect F-7's and Mirages (older one's, non-upgraded) to the data link. So you'd have to wait till all these older platforms are retired and new ones are connected.

3) Pakistan lacks one of the most critical component, proprietary Satellites (I know they use the Chinese ones). Satellites are used a LOT for ISR operations and also, for C&C. You could borrow someone else's but if you had your own, it would be dedicated and available to you 24*7, giving you a LOT of capability you'd need to develop a C4ISR system,

4) Drones, Pakistan's drones are good for the theater she's in. But they aren't MALE or HALE's (Global Hawk for example). But again, what are the goals? For Pakistan specific threats, I think these are good assets. They need to be expanded in numbers.

But Pakistan has a great road-map and she's made serious progress on C4ISR, within the last ten years. I think it'll take another 5-7 years to establish a true C4ISR where ALL assets are connected with the network, form all branches of the military. Right now, that's not the case.

 

[IceBreaker]

I have few questions
1: How good it is and How much it helps us to carry out our missions ?
2 : How safe it is from enemies cyber attacks ?

What sorts of enemies.
Remember they're of 2 types?

 

[Bratva]

​

Pakistan's C4ISR (Part 1): Introduction & Overview
An introduction and overview of Pakistan’s implementation of C4ISR

Link: Pakistan’s C4ISR (Part 1): Introduction and Overview

08 March 2016

By Bilal Khan

Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (C4ISR) is a term commonly used to describe the idea of using a network to communicate and pass data between connected assets. These assets can range include aircraft, surface warships, armoured vehicles, ground stations, and even individual personnel. In the modern warfare environment, connecting new information to the right actors is vital to one’s capacity to survive and succeed on the battlefield. The reasons are obvious. Situational awareness at the tactical and strategic level are key, especially if one intends to properly understand a problem, and in turn, deploy the correct solution. Precise and objective decision-making can save lives, accrue gains, and win battles, which in turn can win wars.

The specifics will vary between scenarios and countries, but the core idea driving each country’s hardware choices, standards (for voice and data-transfer protocols), and deployments is the same: To build situational awareness by connecting new information to the right actors. Driving the process of building situational awareness are systems managing the flow of information and interaction between different assets. These systems are technological (via human-machine interface consoles) and organizational (e.g. delegating individuals or groups to preside over specific tasks).

The implementation of C4ISR typically centers on ISR [intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance] equipment (such as radars), voice and data communication technology, human-machine interface (HMI) consoles, electronic support measures (ESM) equipment, and information technology (IT) systems to process information from ISR and ESM equipment. This is not an exhaustive list by any stretch, but these elements are the most common in C4ISR. Moreover, the aspects described above can include a large number of individual assets, such as airborne early warning and control (AEW&C) aircraft, satellites, command and control (C2) stations on the ground (as well as in the sea and air), combat aircraft, people, unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV), and much more.

Like other modern militaries, the Pakistani armed forces also maintain a C4ISR system. The most visible elements of Pakistan’s C4ISR network include the Erieye and Karakoram Eagle AEW&C systems, but there is more at hand. However, over the past 10 years the Pakistani military has become sensitive about sharing information about its current C4ISR capabilities, and especially cagey about its future plans. Fortunately, Pakistani officials have offered hints in recent years about the armed forces’ C4ISR work. For example, Air Commodore Khalid Mahmood mentioned a national data-link solution, and the Pakistan Air Force (PAF) has openly discussed the Karakoram Eagle (KE)’s role in supporting maritime ISR operations.

It is possible a fair amount of detail will be disclosed during the upcoming IDEAS defence exhibition in Karachi, but until then, this series will offer a possible understanding of Pakistan’s C4ISR capabilities. Note, nothing in this article or in the series will be drawn from information not available to the public. While the analysis work in this series will offer some conclusions about Pakistan’s future C4ISR capabilities, please do not treat these conclusions as anything more than guesswork.

Pakistan’s C4ISR system could be understood as the implementation of core technologies, particularly ISR and communications. This article will offer a brief summary of each aspect, but over the next few weeks, we will review each part in greater detail. Note, neither this article or the series will offer an exhaustive technical discussion of C4ISR technology and concepts.

Part 2: Aerial and Surface Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR)

Sensors, such as radars, are perhaps the most visible aspects of C4ISR. AEW&C systems such as the Erieye and Karakoram Eagle play critical roles in providing the PAF and Pakistan Navy (PN) extended range radar surveillance coverage. In the simplest sense, these AEW&C systems provide early warning, just as a high-powered land-based radar would; but in reality, AEW&C are critically important pieces of network-driven battlefield operations. Moreover, radars are simply one aspect of ISR, and they function – alongside other sensors (such as electro-optical) – to observe the battlefield.

Part 3: Communications (including Data Link)

Communications is an integral component of C4ISR. The ability to exchange information as well as connect new sensory observations to the correct friendlies at the correct time is vital, tactically and strategically.

While high-speed and high-volume communication may not be a particularly difficult feat in the civil sector (thanks to fibre optics and saturated wireless networks), the battlefield space is a very different story. For one thing, militaries are heavily dependent on wireless communication, which in turn needs to be fast, powerful (in terms of range and penetration), and secure. This is not easy to accomplish, especially when one is dealing with fast moving assets or dense electronic warfare environments.

Tactical data-links (TDL), such as Link-16, use these core essentials to construct a ‘picture’ of the battlefield using information from sensors, such as radars. TDLs connectivity can be maintained between aircraft, surface ships, and ground-based vehicles.

Part 4: Command and Control

Command and Control (C2) is technological and organizational. When looking at C2 technology, one might think about human machine interfaces (HMI), such as consoles, which are often found in secure locations, onboard surveillance aircraft and surface warships, and even integrated into portable systems. In terms of organizational aspects, militaries establish hierarchical structures whereby individuals and groups are empowered to make decisions, to access varying degrees of information, and undertake specific tasks.

Part 5: Intelligence

“Intelligence” is a broad term, but it generally centers around the idea of gathering information. How this is done depends on the scenario, mission objectives, and tools employed. In common C4ISR structures, intelligence is often conducted using electronic support measures (ESM), which in turn is broken into electronic intelligence (ELINT), communications intelligence (COMINT), and signals intelligence (SIGINT).

Part 6: Advancing in Network Centric Warfare

Once we develop a grasp of Pakistan’s C4ISR capabilities and plans, we will take a look at what Pakistan could and ought to pursue in terms of future development. Areas such as development in space, future tactical platforms, and emerging warfare concepts will be explored.

@Horus

One of the major Con of our C4ISR system ? the inter-operatibility b/w american european and chinese systems.

US faced the similar issues. They had multiple Data link protocols running in parallel in battle field or in to their day to day opeations which were inoperable with each other and resolved the issue with "BACN ( Battlefield airborne communication Node)

"While many platforms have implemented tactical data links that allow some measure of collaboration between flights of aircraft, very little information is passed between command and control elements and attack aircraft at the tactical edge. Since 2001, the DoD has made significant progress in "linking" platforms together. This would include some degree of cross service interoperability but within common groupings like ground attack aircraft and fighters. USAFF-15s and US NavyF/A-18s can link together using Link 16 and share some limited information between flights like target data, fuel and weapons status. On the other hand, USAF bombers like the B-52 and B-1 are not equipped with data links and cannot interoperate with either F-15s and F/A-18s. Furthermore, half the USAF fighter force based in the Air National Guard (ANG) are equipped with Situational Awareness Data Link (SADL) gear that cannot interoperate with Link 16 unless there is a "gateway" which has radios for both data links, and a computer system that can interconnect them and translate the data. While the deployment of data links to fighter aircraft has aided flights of aircraft to coordinate their attacks locally, these systems are constrained by line of sight and cannot reach command and control centers that are often hundreds, if not thousands, of miles distant from where the fighting is taking place. While the USAF has taken the lead to field "gateways" that can handle both connecting dissimilar links and relaying data over satellite back and forth to connect command and control to the tactical edge, the platform that carries the gateway is more often than not dedicated to another mission (like air refueling) that consumes limited resources and sub-optimizes some other critical theater activity."

Battlefield Airborne Communications Node - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

 

[Quwa]

One of the major Con of our C4ISR system ? the inter-operatibility b/w american european and chinese systems.

US faced the similar issues. They had multiple Data link protocols running in parallel in battle field or in to their day to day opeations which were inoperable with each other and resolved the issue with "BACN ( Battlefield airborne communication Node)

"While many platforms have implemented tactical data links that allow some measure of collaboration between flights of aircraft, very little information is passed between command and control elements and attack aircraft at the tactical edge. Since 2001, the DoD has made significant progress in "linking" platforms together. This would include some degree of cross service interoperability but within common groupings like ground attack aircraft and fighters. USAFF-15s and US NavyF/A-18s can link together using Link 16 and share some limited information between flights like target data, fuel and weapons status. On the other hand, USAF bombers like the B-52 and B-1 are not equipped with data links and cannot interoperate with either F-15s and F/A-18s. Furthermore, half the USAF fighter force based in the Air National Guard (ANG) are equipped with Situational Awareness Data Link (SADL) gear that cannot interoperate with Link 16 unless there is a "gateway" which has radios for both data links, and a computer system that can interconnect them and translate the data. While the deployment of data links to fighter aircraft has aided flights of aircraft to coordinate their attacks locally, these systems are constrained by line of sight and cannot reach command and control centers that are often hundreds, if not thousands, of miles distant from where the fighting is taking place. While the USAF has taken the lead to field "gateways" that can handle both connecting dissimilar links and relaying data over satellite back and forth to connect command and control to the tactical edge, the platform that carries the gateway is more often than not dedicated to another mission (like air refueling) that consumes limited resources and sub-optimizes some other critical theater activity."

Battlefield Airborne Communications Node - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

Agreed. I've been writing about that for the article specifically about radios.