What's new

Pakistani Offensive into North Waziristan to begin after EID

Swat was a great success.

But why the hell did it get to that level?

Why was Pakistan taking back Swat from the Taliban? I mean why didn't the Pakistani Army initially repulse them instead of letting them capture Swat and then finally waking up and doing something about it.

Because they (terrorists) started out with "good looks" of Afghan Taliban.They took some time in developing a reputation. Everything they started was welcomed by locals, in few months they took their "good deeds" to next level, some locals admired them some thought its too strict definition of Islam.

Finally when they started killing all those on spot who don't agree with their definition of Islam, bombing schools of boys and girls, kidnapping people for ransom, collecting "donations" (read Extortion) with guns and destroying Govt property...all these lead Govt to maintain their writ in those areas.
 
Because they (terrorists) started out with "good looks" of Afghan Taliban.They took some time in developing a reputation. Everything they started was welcomed by locals, in few months they took their "good deeds" to next level, some locals admired them some thought its too strict definition of Islam.

Finally when they started killing all those on spot who don't agree with their definition of Islam, bombing schools of boys and girls, kidnapping people for ransom, collecting "donations" (read Extortion) with guns and destroying Govt property...all these lead Govt to maintain their writ in those areas.

I think Pak Military might not go there and start up such operations being conducted with Tribes men in all of FATA and KPK along with Gilgit Baldistan very soon.
 
Because they (terrorists) started out with "good looks" of Afghan Taliban.They took some time in developing a reputation. Everything they started was welcomed by locals, in few months they took their "good deeds" to next level, some locals admired them some thought its too strict definition of Islam.

Finally when they started killing all those on spot who don't agree with their definition of Islam, bombing schools of boys and girls, kidnapping people for ransom, collecting "donations" (read Extortion) with guns and destroying Govt property...all these lead Govt to maintain their writ in those areas.

Yes I agree 50% of that but how they came this is the story.
When Pervaz Mushraf wants to keep out the 2 major parties, they made plan and to get sympathy on the name of Islam, The MMA was given power in the province.
What is MMA? in my simple opinion a thug of team from Madras’s Who came to power as per Mushraf due to keep balance with US. The MMA though as many as they can put their Student on the posts and specially to bring their own police and start throwing normal police they will get the benefits both from people due to straight their own ruling and also will hold one province for any future black mailing (I call it black mailing it’s not Islam) Please keep in mind when sentencing any punishment in public you have multiple benefits. Some People will appreciate, most of them will be afraid, Keeping the people in their mind “Our Way or the Highway which leads to Graveyard and Humiliation”
So who ever came with hard line and abusing of others rights Even the Pakistani Taxi drivers they become the ameers, means leaders of 10, 20, 30 person and start collecting money and beating women’s and killings Shia’s . Even some time kidnapping college girls, raping them on the name of Islam that they were alone in the Markets etc. Whatever the worst thing they want to do they did and MMA government gives them shelter under the Umbrella of their government.
To clean this mess it will take time. We were cleaning the mess of Zia Ul Haq and now MMA mess is there.
 
Haqqani network cant be defeated by US/NATO in 10 years , let see PA performance ?
 
Haqqani network cant be defeated by US/NATO in 10 years , let see PA performance ?

Because they are able to retreat into Pakistan where US/NATO forces cant go.. Just like Pakistan is not able to defeat TTP since last 4-5 years...
 
Every 15 days I see a thread saying we will start operations then another news comes that they are not starting operations. I am hearing this for over a year now. I am not sure why they are so confused.
 
Every 15 days I see a thread saying we will start operations then another news comes that they are not starting operations. I am hearing this for over a year now. I am not sure why they are so confused.

and who are you to judge them, why are you upset when there is no operation?
 
Haqqani network cant be defeated by US/NATO in 10 years , let see PA performance ?

Many factors you have to consider. You are at home, knowing the language and terrain. Also you do not have to do much for supplies.

Another aspect is gathering intelligence data which is easy for a local.

I also heard affected area in Afghanistan is bigger than affected area in Pakistan.
 
Because they are able to retreat into Pakistan where US/NATO forces cant go.. Just like Pakistan is not able to defeat TTP since last 4-5 years...

well and how do you explain all the other talibans who have been living in afghanistan since a millennium??
 
Because they are able to retreat into Pakistan where US/NATO forces cant go.. Just like Pakistan is not able to defeat TTP since last 4-5 years...

Seriously ?? Are you kidding or being serious ??

If they all together retreat to Pakistan, then who is doing the bombing missions in Afghanistan & who is doing fire fights and attacking the VIP locations in Kabul ??

And lets say, they do retreat to Pakistan, then NATO?/US much by know the locations the militants use to cross over, they hve the best aerial recon platforms, best SF guys, thus why not put some 20-30K troops on the border, monitor these routes and aunch drone strikes or SF guys ambush the infiltrators and stop the cross border movement.

Reason is, the Taiban resistance is very much local and they are fighting 24hrs a day from the locations within Afghanistan and do not retreat anywhere else.
 
Afghan Taliban and their allies have significant support among Pakistani masses.Even the war against TTP are justified by many Pakistanis by consoling each other that--"TTP is not related to afghan Taliban,they are NATO agents,mullah omer had clearly warned against attacking pak army..etc etc".As such,opening a front against afghan Taliban factions will make these people against pak army.PA need to be cautious there,while continuing silent support to drone attacks and providing enough Intel so as not to antagonise NATO.
 
DAWN

THE sudden increase in surveillance across the country to avert possible terrorist attacks has many looking for the reasons behind the increased efforts at this juncture.

More vigilance could simply be the outcome of the Kamra airbase attack and the alerts that intelligence agencies have been sharing with law-enforcement agencies against that backdrop. However, the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan has interpreted it as a precursor to a military operation in North Waziristan Agency. The TTP spokesperson has even claimed that the government plans to launch the operation in the tribal agency in the last week of August.

Public opinion on how to deal with the situation in the tribal area is still divided and opinion leaders and experts also do not appear convinced about the implications of, or prospects for, a military operation. The main arguments can be summed up thus: this is not Pakistan’s war; not all Taliban are bad; the military must protect its strategic interests and launching an operation under US pressure will hurt these interests; the operation will be counterproductive and could trigger a wave of terrorism in the country and lead to terrorists spreading out across the country; drone attacks are counterproductive and a hiatus in them will help improve Pakistan’s internal security (although that assertion has not been borne out by facts so far); and if the US can initiate talks with Taliban, so can Pakistan.

These perceptions reflect three different approaches. The first is regional and has a strategic focus. The second emphasises internal security concerns. The third is a mix of the broader ideological and political narratives of the ummah, Islamisation and reactionary thinking, and is popular among a large segment of religious clergy and the masses and influences policy debates. But, as the Oct 18 all-parties conference resolution indicates, all these approaches somehow agree that peace should be given a chance.

That stance seems to suggest that Pakistan has not tested that option already. Yet the state has given at least 13 chances to militants through peace deals which were generally agreed to have benefited only the militants. Many analysts reject this view by saying that these pacts were made by an unrepresentative regime under Gen Pervez Musharraf. But two of the agreements, in South and North Waziristan, are still intact. Through each of these agreements the state has compromised on its writ, allowing militants to further consolidate their grip on their areas.

After the Oct 18 resolution, a similar approach was initiated with the Taliban through direct and indirect channels. The move proved futile as the TTP and the Punjabi Taliban resisted such efforts and Al Qaeda foiled them by forming a shura-i-murakeba to resolve the militants’ internal disputes, bringing all Taliban factions, including the groups headed by Hafiz Gul Bahadar and Maulvi Nazir, under one umbrella. These two were supposed to be the ‘good’ Taliban. The Taliban’s argument for not responding to the state’s overture was purely ideological; they declared that their struggle would continue until the enforcement of Sharia and that they would not accept any demands to end their support for foreign ‘mujahideen’.

Pakistani analysts divide the Taliban and other militant groups into two categories: those who are in agreement with the state and those who are not or do not wish to be. But all of these groups are in agreement with each other, and their nexus has grown ever stronger. Alarmingly, those who are considered ‘good’ Taliban are equally responsible for attacking security forces and foreign elements are also found in their fold.

The security statistics and data demonstrate this complexity. Thirty-one drone attacks have been reported in North Waziristan since January 2012. Of these, 12 were reported in Miranshah, the stronghold of Hafiz Gul Bahadar, and 78 fatalities were reported in these attacks. Many of the victims were believed to be foreign or TTP militants and Punjabi Taliban.

Mir Ali town, the supposed operational hub of TTP in North Waziristan, was hit in five drone strikes, two of which targeted militants affiliated with Gul Bahadar. Thirty security personnel were killed in 12 militant attacks on security forces in North Waziristan in the first eight months of 2012. Only one attack was reported from Mir Ali, and the rest from Miranshah and Datta Khel.

Some media reports indicate that a military operation in North Waziristan will focus only on the TTP and its affiliates, but how that would be possible in such a complex scenario remains an open question. The TTP and Al Qaeda will use ideological, ethnic and socio-political ties with other Taliban factions, including the Afghans and the Haqqanis, to stress a natural cohesion among their operations and goals. This strategy had been instrumental in persuading Pakistani sectarian groups such as Lashkar-i-Jhangvi and splinter groups of Kashmir-focused militant outfits to side with the TTP. The militants prioritise and follow their own interests whether they are in a peace deal or not.

Without going into the operational complexities of an offensive in North Waziristan, it is worth noting that the military offensives in Swat and South Waziristan Agency had proved productive and significantly decreased the threat from terrorism to internal security. A 24 per cent decline in terrorist attacks was recorded following these operations. The operational and technical aspects of a possible offensive will get great attention in the coming days, but facts must not be lost sight of in policy- and opinion-making debates. These should help develop informed public opinion, which is badly needed to counter critical threats.
 
Back
Top Bottom