DAWN
THE sudden increase in surveillance across the country to avert possible terrorist attacks has many looking for the reasons behind the increased efforts at this juncture.
More vigilance could simply be the outcome of the Kamra airbase attack and the alerts that intelligence agencies have been sharing with law-enforcement agencies against that backdrop. However, the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan has interpreted it as a precursor to a military operation in North Waziristan Agency. The TTP spokesperson has even claimed that the government plans to launch the operation in the tribal agency in the last week of August.
Public opinion on how to deal with the situation in the tribal area is still divided and opinion leaders and experts also do not appear convinced about the implications of, or prospects for, a military operation. The main arguments can be summed up thus: this is not Pakistan’s war; not all Taliban are bad; the military must protect its strategic interests and launching an operation under US pressure will hurt these interests; the operation will be counterproductive and could trigger a wave of terrorism in the country and lead to terrorists spreading out across the country; drone attacks are counterproductive and a hiatus in them will help improve Pakistan’s internal security (although that assertion has not been borne out by facts so far); and if the US can initiate talks with Taliban, so can Pakistan.
These perceptions reflect three different approaches. The first is regional and has a strategic focus. The second emphasises internal security concerns. The third is a mix of the broader ideological and political narratives of the ummah, Islamisation and reactionary thinking, and is popular among a large segment of religious clergy and the masses and influences policy debates. But, as the Oct 18 all-parties conference resolution indicates, all these approaches somehow agree that peace should be given a chance.
That stance seems to suggest that Pakistan has not tested that option already. Yet the state has given at least 13 chances to militants through peace deals which were generally agreed to have benefited only the militants. Many analysts reject this view by saying that these pacts were made by an unrepresentative regime under Gen Pervez Musharraf. But two of the agreements, in South and North Waziristan, are still intact. Through each of these agreements the state has compromised on its writ, allowing militants to further consolidate their grip on their areas.
After the Oct 18 resolution, a similar approach was initiated with the Taliban through direct and indirect channels. The move proved futile as the TTP and the Punjabi Taliban resisted such efforts and Al Qaeda foiled them by forming a shura-i-murakeba to resolve the militants’ internal disputes, bringing all Taliban factions, including the groups headed by Hafiz Gul Bahadar and Maulvi Nazir, under one umbrella. These two were supposed to be the ‘good’ Taliban. The Taliban’s argument for not responding to the state’s overture was purely ideological; they declared that their struggle would continue until the enforcement of Sharia and that they would not accept any demands to end their support for foreign ‘mujahideen’.
Pakistani analysts divide the Taliban and other militant groups into two categories: those who are in agreement with the state and those who are not or do not wish to be. But all of these groups are in agreement with each other, and their nexus has grown ever stronger. Alarmingly, those who are considered ‘good’ Taliban are equally responsible for attacking security forces and foreign elements are also found in their fold.
The security statistics and data demonstrate this complexity. Thirty-one drone attacks have been reported in North Waziristan since January 2012. Of these, 12 were reported in Miranshah, the stronghold of Hafiz Gul Bahadar, and 78 fatalities were reported in these attacks. Many of the victims were believed to be foreign or TTP militants and Punjabi Taliban.
Mir Ali town, the supposed operational hub of TTP in North Waziristan, was hit in five drone strikes, two of which targeted militants affiliated with Gul Bahadar. Thirty security personnel were killed in 12 militant attacks on security forces in North Waziristan in the first eight months of 2012. Only one attack was reported from Mir Ali, and the rest from Miranshah and Datta Khel.
Some media reports indicate that a military operation in North Waziristan will focus only on the TTP and its affiliates, but how that would be possible in such a complex scenario remains an open question. The TTP and Al Qaeda will use ideological, ethnic and socio-political ties with other Taliban factions, including the Afghans and the Haqqanis, to stress a natural cohesion among their operations and goals. This strategy had been instrumental in persuading Pakistani sectarian groups such as Lashkar-i-Jhangvi and splinter groups of Kashmir-focused militant outfits to side with the TTP. The militants prioritise and follow their own interests whether they are in a peace deal or not.
Without going into the operational complexities of an offensive in North Waziristan, it is worth noting that the military offensives in Swat and South Waziristan Agency had proved productive and significantly decreased the threat from terrorism to internal security. A 24 per cent decline in terrorist attacks was recorded following these operations. The operational and technical aspects of a possible offensive will get great attention in the coming days, but facts must not be lost sight of in policy- and opinion-making debates. These should help develop informed public opinion, which is badly needed to counter critical threats.