Thanks for your reply. I was not linking the 123 agreement with India's nuclear capability, just pointing out that India could test if it wanted to down the line without any major consequences (IMO).
Yes It can test if it wants to but it will have some severe issues, You see the point is not that easy that I want to test and I'll test, it requires huge balls which our politicians promptly lacks, There is a fear that this deal will/might create a strong non-testing or non-ploriferation lobby inside India which will oppose any testing or any such issues, Our issue with testing remains entirely domestical opposition , if the need arise of national interest that need to test becomes pre-eminent for whatever diplomatic reasons down the line after decades this deal I feel will be not what will stop us from testing.
But yes down the line in 20/25 years if India wants to test it can test, If US wants to get back US supplied materials it can, US will help us to look into some other fuel sources (we have already started looking more into this later
**) , Us can take back their things but yes not without compensating us on the then market value of the things it wishes to take back.
So if India gets more and more reliant on thorium fuel cycle (read produces them on mass scale and the cycle reaches a maturity where it does not depends much on the initial U-Pu reprocessed output), there is little which will effect us this deal, but then again we truly wont test and dont need to test until and unless something really serious issue demands it. (read aliens attacking us?)
Your point about not wanting to replicate the LWR tech. is interesting. Is that because of India's continued research into the AHWR?
Yes say for example China has started liscence producing Westinghouse 1000 MW LWR's, There is a possibility for China to replicate it down the line but I dont think she will do so, We today are building liscence producing 1000 MW Russian VVER's left and right (a kind of LWR), We were never interested in making LWR's nor we have sustained Uranium to feed LWR's nor LWR's will help in our weapons programme in direct means.
Its not like we cannot replicate LWR's and make our own, but why will we and breach liscence agreements? when it has zero economic viability for us and our own, nor it is a very cutting edge type of reactor technology. Its all about fuel, Russian VVER's comes with agreement of guaranteed fuel supply from Russia throughout its life.
Regarding AWHR, yes thats only a part of new set of reactors we are making and Thorium to us is the future, recall kalpakkam will be totally outside safeguards, so deal or not we can make more than enough nuke bombs, this realisation of US has concluded them to come into the table for the deal.
You can check AWHR fuel cycle here and see interesting thigns yourself that we dont need to 'divert' uranium to make bombs..
http://www.indian-nuclear-society.org.in/conf/2003/1.pdf
Lastly, you say that the fuel from the LWR's will be "contaminated" and not fissile grade until reprocessed, but if India IS reprocessing it, and you have indicated that the U.S will not necessarily be interested in taking it back because of the complications involved in disposal, then does that not potentially offer India more fuel to reprocess into fissile grade material than it would have in the absence of the agreement? Or do you think that argument is moot because of the extra effort (and possible lower yield ?) involved in converting the spent fuel from the LWR's to fissile grade?
1. Yes contaminated from my one of previous reply,
U-233 contaminated with U-232 is not a weapons threat It is known as spiked up fuel I have said this before very shortly. So there was never any issue with any sort of Civilian deal but was issue with Reprocessing the spent fuel as it would produce highly enriched Plutonium, Even if we will recieve un-spiked up fuel you see there is no question of taking it to other reactors, you can do a bit of study on the same.
Also U-232 and Th-228 are highly radioactive, but neither are neutron emitters. (it would be useful if they were!) Rather, they both decay quickly along the same decay chain as thorium but far faster. One of the decay products is thallium-208 which emits a strong and penetrating gamma ray during its decay. The strong gamma emitted by Th-208 makes U-232-contaminated uranium pretty worthless for nuclear weapons, which is basically the main reason U-233 has never been used in operational nuclear weapons. The U-232 contamination disadvantages U-233 as a fuel in solid-core reactors, but has little effect on fluid-fueled reactors that don't require fuel fabrication. LWR is fluid-fuelled Reactor as the name suggests which are what we building aka VVER's and which is what China is buying from GE/Westinghouse 1000MW ones.
2. Yes if we would use 'DUAL USE' of the reprocessing feeding both our fuel cycle then it can deemed legally as inappropriate however we are not doing so,
The reprocessing plant we will build will be totally a seperate one, will be under INDIA SPECIFIC IAEA safeguards and materials will NOT be diverted into power plants for bombs.
Issue is here the reprocessed fuel will be feeded into a civilian grade AWHR, but civilian grade thorium cycle (even if we dont use it for weapons) once declared civilian grade will be open for IAEA legally (boon is India specific) inspections, only and only problem will be with protecting decades of IP regarding the same, I'm hopeful scientists will do things right in this aspect like Brazil is doing in their FBR.
3. Regardless of diversion or no diversion (i have already cleared the reprocessing of foreign fuel will be in a dedicated safeguarded reactor and reprocessed fuel from there will go only in civilian grade reactors) read the above fuel cycle or check link below deal or no deal, We have enough stuff to make more than enough weapons we will ever need (read tellis et al for a bit of easy mathematical calculation), add to that 2 FBR's in kalpakkam are being build outside safeguards.
Check this site this is one of them unsafeguarded FBR...
:==: Bharatiya Nabhikiya Vidyut Nigam Limited :==:
Some points i made in older thread with blain,
https://defence.pk/forums/strategic...ndia-deal-said-increase-nuclear-danger-4.html
The last post of mine there,
1. India has enough uranium reserve to make bobms regardless of this deal, check tellis et al If you want more intrinsic calculation I can try the same as well. Then there is enrichment programme et al.
2. The propagation of that this deal will free up existing stockpiles for only and only weapons is a myth as well, because existing stockpiles without this deal was to be used in a manner shich would not interfere with the weapons programme, not to mention additional new mining et al, as Tellis quotes just presently we can more bombs from the unsafeguarded reactors than we will ever need with the existing Uranium which without this deal is not what was supposed to be used for any LWR's. The Russian VVER's comes with Russian N-Fuel.
3. I hope I also have made you clear there is no so called technology infusion regarding LWR's the only blockade was reprocessing facility , the reason of which I have given as well, Indias commitment to make a new reprocessing facility with IAEA India specific safeguards has cleared the issue of diverting any such fuel, now again Reprocessing technology is a close guarded secret and unlike LWR's if Reprocessing is what US would be giving us could have had ramifications of dual use as you once suggested but with much of the reality the reprocessing facility is going to be a India built one. The fuel is also a non-weapons material fuel as fuel used in LWR's are always spiked up with other things which makes them useless as a fissile material.
The problems we faced in this deal will be of,
1. Proper seperation issue.
2. Protection of IPR in the dedicated reprocessing facility which will be indian built with IAEA safeguards for reprocessing US/Other country origin spent fuel.
3. Protection of IPR incase we want to use the reprocessed fuel from that DEDICATED facility in one of CIVILIAN grade FBR.
4. Proper national law and vision and legal expert in tackling issue which might rise with any future testing.
5. Chalking out clear goals on strategic reserve of fuel, including date and timeline when India will start making the reprocessing facility et al, by no means these are small tasks, as For the reprocessing facility India will have to see India specific safeguards from IAEA protecting Indian IPR along with clearing that we are not reprocessing and diverting foreign fuel into our weapons programme
Heck we have puted TIFR (tata inst of fundamental researcg), Variable cyclotron centre, SINP (saha inst of nuke physics) et al under safeguards as well check DAE seperation plan.
I'm only concerned that we have puted VSCC and TIFR under safeguards where will DEW weapons now come from? lol