Pakistan Stumps Us Again

[Neo]

What the hell does Rajiv Dogra wants? Just to see Pakistan implicated in a way that would harm Pakistan for the fun of things? I mean we've already arrested relevant people, banned organizations, carried out investigations, shared evidence, we're looking like good guys because we ARE the good guys.

No one has said India is the villain in all of this either. But if India keeps insisting that Pakistan be forcibly treated as the bad guy, then naturally the world is sooner or later going to start thinking... "Wtf?" India is really going overboard, and the world is telling India to calm down... Rajiv Dogra doesn't like it. He wants India's war mongering to be appreciated not condemned.

Thats just not the way of the world.

Well said Asim!

 

[AgNoStiC MuSliM]

Unfortunately I don't have the time to read all the material on this thread, and my response is only limited to this important and interesting question stated in AM's post.
Two critical things:
1. India cannot negotiate anything with Pakistan under the threat of terrorism. The reason the diplomatic efforts with Musharraf were going well is because he was able to clamp down on the cross border terrorism after 2002 thereby giving the dialogue some credibility as being an effort made by the respective leaderships of two nation states motivated by national interest; as opposed to one where the main motivator is fear of terrorism/jihadi violence. Mind you, this isn't an India specific policy. No self respecting nation will allow terrorism to shape their policy for the obvious reasons.

The militancy supported by Pakistan has from its inception been an attempt to get India to the negotiating table, and India is aware of this. Therefore, movement towards resolution of Kashmir, especially in an environment like the one we have had in the past seven years or so with Pakistan sticking to its stated intent of not supporting cross border infiltration, would in fact continue to reduce the need for supporting those elements.

Furthermore, the reports being leaked right now suggest that the dialog with Pakistan had indeed progressed quite far, which also validates my point above, since your argument would preclude any such progress.

Historic Kashmir initiative stalled as Musharraf faltered

The argument of 'not negotiating under the threat of terrorism' is the non-sequitur here - the support for the freedom movement exists becasue of the Indian refusal to negotiate some resolution to the occupation, and the fact that the Indians have been negotiating despite the conditions on the ground, save for the cross border infiltration, indicates that your argument is moot.

2. National security always supersedes everything else. Even if a serving Pakistani leader is able to curb terrorism, the concern among the Indian security circles always remains... has the terrorism really been dismantled or merely suppressed for ad hoc purposes? Unfortunately the answer always seems to be the latter, and these concerns on the Indian side are always validated. The bottom line is that no country in its right mind will ever willingly open its borders to another state which has an effervescent terrorism problem akin to Pakistan's. And this is the basis of the world's common opinion, not some misplaced favoritism for India or a desire to target Pakistan, sure there will be the occasional comment against India for the sake of looking objective; but the bottom line is clear.

What you have to realize is that this "image" issue (a big obsession on Pakistani side) is actually a non sequitur. As long as Pakistan remains the hub of jihadi terrorism (a vetted fact) nobody will entertain bilateral arrangements which will put their own national security at critical risk, nor can you fault anyone for either outwardly or discreetly supporting this stance. I assure you the Western diplomats are well aware of this limitation.

This isn't about a 'serving Pakistani leader', the entire military and political leadership, except for the Islamist parties, was on board with the peace initiative. Your language implies another version of the oft repeated canard from the Indian side of 'who do we negotiate with' - negotiations on an issue of such import will not occur unless all power centers in Pakistan are on board.

Secondly, the 'adhoc dismantling' leads once again to the reson de etre for support of militancy by the Pakistani state in Kashmir as I explained above - the refusal of India to engage in a diplomatic resolution to the issue. Bilateral or any other engagement towards resolving Kashmri inherently addresses the principal reason behind support for militancy, which makes your argument a non-issue. As I said above, my point is validated by the information being reported on the extent to which the Indo-Pak negotiations had advanced, despite no dismantling of the Kashmiri Freedom Movement on the Pakistani side, though Pakistan did keep to its word on clamping down on cross-border movement.

Now if your argument purports to explain why the Indians keep getting 'cold feet' on the issue, then I would argue that the Indian leadership shoudl have been upfront about these 'national security concerns' as you articulated, instead of going through what basically amounts to a charade of negotiations, only to step away at the last moment. It is a charade since the issues (of national security) you suggest are of concern to the GoI existed before the GoI entered into negotiations, and why go through the entire process and get so close to a resolution only to step back when these 'issues of national security' existed from the get go?

And this has happened twice now, at Agra and with the recent more detailed back channel diplomacy.

The other possibility to explain this backtracking is that your point about 'issues of national security' does not play into the situation at all, and is merely an excuse drummed up after the fact to explain away the failure to engage with sincerity.

Either way, it reflects poorly on the GoI's ability to engage comprehensively and sincerely with Pakistan. I might have bought your apologetics had the negotiations at Agra or in this particular case not advanced as far as they did, but the fact that on both occasions India and Pakistan were extremely close to a resolution only for the process to be shot down, by what I can only imagine is the iron grip of hardliners and extremists in India (possibly the military), gives lie to your argument of 'national security'. Were that the case, the initiation of negotiations themselves would have been subject to a concrete demonstration of Pakistani intent to the satisfaction of India.

This insincere behaviour by India is part of a pattern unfortunately - starting with the trilateral (British, Indian, Pakistani) acceptance of the condition of plebisicte in case of a disputed accession, to the agreement on holding a plebiscite under the UNSC resolutions, to Agra and this - at each step of the way the Indian leadership has been engaged politically by Pakistan, on the first two occasions come to concrete agreements, and then backed out. This pattern of deception needs to stop.

 

[IceCold]

Pakistan Stumps Us Again

Rajiv Dogra

Last Updated : 16 Feb 2009 09

The deception is complete. The entire world can see it, yet we refuse to acknowledge it. Once again Pakistan has conned us into an unenviable corner, but not without some muted acquiescence by others. It played its cards in a masterly fashion. Initially, after the Mumbai attacks, when India was livid and the international revulsion high, it pretended injured innocence, promising the fullest cooperation to India. But behind the scenes it was busy cultivating the masters of the world and converting them to its view that India protests too much, and far too often, without good reason.


With India, it grew steadily bolder. Over time it gave up its passive stance and started bantering, engaging the Indian leadership in a slanging match of calculated attrition.

During the last few weeks, Indian people were witness to a college like debate via the media. It defies belief that we allowed ourselves to be led into such a trap.

Once Pakistan had achieved its first objective of temporising, it grew more brazen.

More importantly, the masters of the world weighed in subtly on its side. Pakistan was no longer in the guilty corner.

If any proof of this dramatic turnaround was needed, it has come loud and clear in a series of public pronouncements recently.

A few days ago in an interview to the NBC network President Obama said, “Afghanistan has to be stabilised to ensure the stability of Pakistan.” With that single pronouncement he shifted the goal posts.

It was with the objective of eliminating terrorism that US had attacked Afghanistan in the aftermath of 9/11. Now Obama seems to have set his sights on an altogether different horizon. Now, stability of Pakistan, more than anything else, is his top priority.

Privately that message was conveyed even more bluntly to President Karzai.

This happened before Obama as sworn in.

According to published reports when vice president-elect Joe Biden was visiting Afghanistan in early January 2009, President Karzai spoke to him at length about the difficulties that Afghanistan was facing due to Pakistan’s actions. Biden told him brusquely, “Pakistan is fifty times more important to America than Afghanistan!” Biden is not a first time Senator. He is an experienced politician, and he is deeply involved in the mysterious world of foreign policy where every nuance, each word is pondered over and debated. So he must have known that the news of his brush off to the Afghan President would get around.

That statement contains a message for us too. If Pakistan scores that much higher, and if that is the American priority with regard to Afghanistan which till recently was central to America’s global fight against terror, the natural question one must ask is where does that place India? But we are both unable and unwilling to see the writing on wall. Obama seems to have opted for the Pakistani route to solve its Afghanistan imbroglio. It has been influenced by the view propagated by the Pakistani establishment that they are the good guys and the terrorists who are giving them a bad name are: fighting for a cause like Kashmir, terrorising Pakistan as well; and besides Kashmir the other root causes of terror are poverty and illiteracy so the world needs to help Pakistan economically.

Joe Biden sponsored bill proposes to provide $15 billion in assistance over the next 10 years to Pakistan to strengthen civilian institutions.

Still, if there was any doubt, the Munich Security Conference (February 6-8) provided incontrovertible proof of American intent. Vice President Joe Biden’s speech was to be the highlight of this conference.

His statement was eagerly awaited as it was going to be the first articulation of Obama administration’s worldview at an international forum. Biden declared, “No strategy for Afghanistan can succeed without Pakistan.” He added, “We must all strengthen our cooperation with the people and the government of Pakistan, help them stabilise the tribal areas and promote economic development and opportunities throughout the country.” This could well have been written by a Pakistani.

Yet we keep our blinkers on. At the same Munich conference our recent bete-noire, the British foreign secretary David Miliband had this to say, “…Yet the paradox is that while our nations (in Europe) are more peaceful and prosperous than ever, our citizens do not feel secure. Why? Because they know how the breakdown in law and order in Pakistan or Afghanistan can threaten their security in London, Hamburg or Istanbul.” This should be considered along with another development where the Britishers are taking out advertisements in Pakistani media, the effect of which is virtually to plead that UK should not be attacked because it has so many people like them living there.

How do we term these developments? Self-interest above everything else? Will self preservation be the primary motive of international discourse? If that is so then why are we expecting the international community to fight our battle? Moreover this new trend is also reflective of the concerns reportedly expressed by the CIA to President Obama that British born Pakistani terrorists who have extensive links with the Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) are the biggest threat to the US. Read between the lines the message is clear — West would not like to do anything that upsets Pakistan and consequently has security implications for people in west.

The Munich Conference was also addressed by Shah Mehmood Qureshi, the foreign minister of Pakistan. So soon after the Mumbai attacks any other leader would have squirmed, perhaps even called the attack a ‘national shame’. But not the Pakistani foreign minister; he was hectoring and conciliatory in turn. He also prescribed the course that West should adopt. His focus wasn’t just on terrorism, he included extremism too. His diagnosis identified root causes such as Kashmir as leading to terrorism.

And in his prescriptive advice he asked the West to: adopt a regional approach; avoid overemphasis on military solution; people must have the ownership in governance; provide priority to education and development with due regard to the religious sentiments; and there should be renewed efforts against the drug trade. Isn’t it interesting that the Obama administration is thinking along similar lines? Eventually it may also mean that the Kashmir issue becomes a focus of that regional approach.

Already, the world has moved on since 26/11 and India has been successfully stonewalled by Pakistan. Despite our threats of keeping all our options open, time has shown that we are option-less.

The terror masters and their actors must be pleased with the turn of events. Now they can plan their next attack, as and when they fancy. The time may have come for us to face some blunt basics of the real world; where Pakistan successfully employs a large element of hypocrisy in its dealings with others

About the author:

Rajiv Dogra is a former Ambassador

A classic example of Indian whining. They wouldn't just want to accept anything less then Pakistan being declared a terrorist state. Guess what that isn't just your lucky day, better luck next time.

 

[Energon]

Re: AM's post

I have actually had the chance to interact with some academicians, policy experts and diplomats (first and third party arbitrators) who have been involved in the Indo-Pak back-channel engagement at some junction or another. The point of view that I have presented is based on what I got from them. Since I am not an expert in this matter, my personal views are inconsequential.

The current consensus is as it stands at least from India's pov they will keep at least a back channel dialogue going both bilaterally as well as through third party arbitrators (there are multiple reasons for this), but will not commit to anything with Pakistan under the threat of terrorism; or by exposing critical aspects of their own national security.

Either way, it reflects poorly on the GoI's ability to engage comprehensively and sincerely with Pakistan. I might have bought your apologetics... I can only imagine is the iron grip of hardliners and extremists in India (possibly the military), gives lie to your argument of 'national security'...

This insincere behaviour by India is part of a pattern unfortunately...

All your online haranguing is a waste of time. Nobody cares. What the people who are actually making decisions care about is their own safety, which recent events have clearly shown is only possible if the borders with Pakistan are sealed not relaxed, at least until the uncontrolled problem of mass radicalism and terrorism no longer poses a threat to Indian civilians and its economy. And your rant against India's national security concern vis a vis Pakistani based terrorism isn't even worthy of being entertained; their concerns are being vindicated time and time again, not yours. Also, it doesn't necessarily take "hard liners and extremists" to enforce an "iron grip" to raise the fundamental issues of national security. The bulk of the concerns come from people who don't want to be gunned down in a restaurants or blown up on commuter trains or face the consequences of an economic meltdown brought about by terrorism related instability; these are the people who vote a lot.

Again these concerns at least from what I have seen are something most third party arbitrators seem to relate to; again not because they favor India, but rather it is because these are the standards they have set for themselves. As Ive said before, this status quo is unlikely to change as long as there is a critical and imminent threat of Pakistan based terrorism. If you are unable to reconcile with this very simple situation then that's your prerogative; I just wouldn't hold my breath for anything radical to happen.

 

[AgNoStiC MuSliM]

Energon,

Lets be clear, the facts are that India has been insincere in negotiating and holding up to its commitments regardless of whether terrorism and instability has been an issue or not. Assuming your claim of articulating the position of Indian interlocutors is correct, the facts are that India has backtracked and weaseled out of commitments and negotiations starting from partition under Nehru.

So no, despite your continued apologetics on this issue, I do not buy the Indian argument since they have shown themselves to be insincere regardless of the dynamics on the ground. Duplicity and backtracking - these are the facts of the history of Indian engagement with Pakistan, bilateral or multilateral.

Secondly, on the issue of third party arbiters, what we know of what these 'third party arbiters' want from Pakistan is a cessation of cross border attacks into India, and action against any organizations that have been deemed 'terrorist'. On the former Pakistan has delivered significantly, on the latter the final word will likely depend upon how the Mumbai prosecutions pan out.

The picture painted by the alleged interlocutors holds in a perfect world, but the reality of the freedom movement an accompanying sentiment in Pakistan is that Pakistan will not be able to deliver upon closures and significant military action against these groups unless it has some significant movement to show on Kashmir.

Your argument is also highly flawed becasue it absurdly assumes that negotiations, or even a successful compromise, once made public somehow marginalizes India's national security by automatically opening the gates and allowing 'militants' to flood Kashmir and India. An agreement after engagement and dialog will only be a starting point - what will follow after it is made public is national discourse and likely the very sort of confidence building moves and crackdowns on violent groups that both sides will wish to see before advancing further. I can only hope these interlocutors you spoke to had brains enough to not seriously peddle this garbage about 'national security being compromised', or were at least only being rhetorical.

Do take time to read this very interesting commentary by karan Thapar, goes to the heart of the problem on the Indian side:http://www.defence.pk/forums/pakistan-india-crisis/22267-pakistan-prejudice.html

 

[AgNoStiC MuSliM]

Energon,

You may also want to look into the Steve Coll interview on NPR.

He essentially makes the same argument I did - you cannot expect Pakistan to stop thinking of India as an existential threat, and therefore break off ties completely with the Kashmiri Freedom fighters, unless there is normalization with India which brings us back to Kashmir.

Secondly, regardless of what you claim your interactions with the people mentioned suggest, the fact remains, as Coll discussed, that India and Pakistan were extremely close to a deal on Kashmir, despite the dynamics on the ground largely unchanged.

As I said before, that is why your argument of 'total peace' before negotiations or resolution of disputes' is naive and Utopian. 'Comprehensive peace' is an end goal in Indo-Pak relations, not a means or pre-condition, and that view is validated by the recent revelations regarding the Kashmir negotiations.

 

[RedBaron]

As I indicated in a separate thread, I'm actually flexible to the idea of "irrelevant" borders in Kashmir with the provision that LOC is converted to a formal IB. I've seen such a model working beautifully in EU during my travels.
I'm not averse to Pakistani families shopping in Srinagar, if at the same time, I can go hiking near K2 base camp - no visas needed, just flash your IND/PAK passports at the border and carry on in either direction. IB can be manned by border police, not army, as in EU.

So if all the i's are dotted and t's are crossed to formalize IB (to prevent back-tracking), and AFTER Mumbai masterminds are executed, I would vote for the peace plan.
GOI/GOP need to plan it carefully so it is sellable to majority in both countries, which is the best outcome. We surely won't get 100% support in either country, but majority shoud suffice.

 

[Energon]

Energon,

You may also want to look into the Steve Coll interview on NPR.

He essentially makes the same argument I did - you cannot expect Pakistan to stop thinking of India as an existential threat, and therefore break off ties completely with the Kashmiri Freedom fighters, unless there is normalization with India which brings us back to Kashmir.

Secondly, regardless of what you claim your interactions with the people mentioned suggest, the fact remains, as Coll discussed, that India and Pakistan were extremely close to a deal on Kashmir, despite the dynamics on the ground largely unchanged.

As I said before, that is why your argument of 'total peace' before negotiations or resolution of disputes' is naive and Utopian. 'Comprehensive peace' is an end goal in Indo-Pak relations, not a means or pre-condition, and that view is validated by the recent revelations regarding the Kashmir negotiations.

The near successful agreement that Coll is referring to in the OP between Musharraf and the GoI in 2004 is actually based on a formula that was scripted in the early-mid 90s when the Kashmir insurgency was at its lowest ebb for India. I do not know what it's official designation is, but I have often heard people refer to it as the "autonomy+ secession-" plan where both Pakistan and India will administer certain aspects of their respective Kashmirs and come up with an established framework to manage investments coming in. The borders between the two Kashmirs will be relaxed allowing open trade and transit (akin to the borders between some Western European countries like Switzerland and Germany). From what I'm told each successive government coming into power on either side has maintained some level of dialog on it because they hope it will lead to something substantial which they can then claim bragging rights to (this of course has always been a constant in global politics) and hence any watershed agreement even in the future will more than likely be some variant of this established formula.

I don't think anyone is delusional enough to believe that the entire cohort of people who were engaged in the insurgency against India would simply vanish, nor is that a preamble to a discussion. If that were so, India wouldn't even entertain talks. What they do require however is that

1. The settlement have some credibility as being one between the leaders of two nation states acting on behalf of their respective national interests and not one which comes under a direct threat of terrorist attacks. The reason there was success under Musharraf is because he was able to provide this credibility when he curbed down the violence coming from the India specific terrorism groups after the parliament attacks which then only left his administration to represent Pakistan when dealing with India.

2. The terrorist groups operating in Pakistan no longer pose an imminent threat to Indian citizens and it's economic interests. The idea was for Musharraf's military administration to break the back of the terrorism infrastructure rendering their ability to conduct massive attacks on India inert and rather engage and involve as much of the manpower (still willing to reason) into a political process. The Indian side was always fine with this considering that is exactly how they handled the Punjab insurgency; if that weren't the case they wouldn't even have bothered to engage Pakistan in discussions. The Musharraf administration even issued an analysis through one of its armed forces institutions which laid out a plan as to how the PA would go about achieving this objective and the time it would take them to do this (which seemed reasonable) hence fitting in perfectly with the time line of the agreement itself.

I don't think anyone is denying the scenario of Pakistan viewing India as an existential threat... but what you have to realize is that for India, Pakistan is an existential threat; and it is based on this empirical evidence of repeated devastating terrorist attacks that for India, these two factors were of utmost and critical importance. Despite this palpable threat every new Pakistani leader who promised to tackle the terrorism aimed at India was taken seriously which again is the only reason why the talks even took place. Heck, the GoI even engaged Musharraf in heavy diplomatic dialog, the very man who had sabotaged the last peace process by orchestrating an invasion that nearly led to large scale war. Nonetheless, the hope was that Pakistan would be able to deliver upon the basic steps required to ensure India's national security which was not up for negotiation.

Unfortunately the recent spate of attacks with Mumbai being the latest one have shown that the capabilities for Pakistan based terrorist groups to hit soft targets in India remains all too intact (and seems to be improving with time). If these are the sorts of attacks they can carry out when the borders are closed one can only wonder what all they'd do if Kashmir was opened up.
There isn't a single head of state who would willingly expose the populace to such a risk for the sake of a peace agreement. This is a very clear, simple and justified axiom that shapes up the majority of the opinions. And nobody including Steve Coll expects India to throw its gates open (a necessity to settling the Kashmir issue) as long as the imminent threat is still very much real. Expecting that would be naive and phantasmagoric in addition to believing that the terrorism threat will simply vanish if the Kashmir dispute is settled. These terrorist groups may have been inducted under the banner of Kashmir, but they have gone way beyond it now and will not stop until they are dismantled from within.

One thing that seems certain is that India will not agree upon a settlement until they are convinced that they no longer face an imminent threat from Pakistani based militant groups, and this will take time to ascertain. What they want to avoid at all costs is to strike an arrangement only to find out that the threat is very much alive which then results in reneging upon the agreement. That would create a huge mess which is just not worth the risk.

 

[AgNoStiC MuSliM]

Energon,

"I don't think anyone is denying the scenario of Pakistan viewing India as an existential threat... but what you have to realize is that for India, Pakistan is an existential threat; and it is based on this empirical evidence of repeated devastating terrorist attacks that for India'

There is no 'viewing' about the existential threat India poses to Pakistan, as Coll mentioned, and I have in the past, India has demonstrated its ability to be an existential threat to Pakistan by what it did in East Pakistan, and IMO through its support for the insurgency in Balochistan. The security establishment continues to strongly view India as responsible in destabilizing Pakistan through support for insurgents and terrorism, but has nonetheless supported the peace talks. This argument cuts both ways.


Secondly, many of the terrorist attacks in India have also had a significant local component, bar the high profile Mumabai attacks that are now pretty clearly being linked to the LeT by both Pakistan and India. To that extent it is India that needs to address the radicalization within India, that is not something Pakistan can do. Pakistan, as I indicated earlier, has to show that it is serious about tackling obstacles to peace by pursuing convictions against the perpetrators, and tightening its control over the existing groups to ensure that the atmosphere is not vitiated, but beyond that what I said earlier about domestic political compulsions and a violent backlash from acting strongly against the freedom movement, in the absence of progress on Kashmir, is the unfortunate reality of the situation.

We seem to be talking past each other - the modalities of the 'non-paper' and what not is not my point. It is simply that negotiations with Pakistan took place in the absence of any dismantling of the infrastructure of the freedom movement in Pakistan, albeit with tangible efforts by Pakistan to curb cross border infiltration into Kashmir and India, acknowledged by India and many in the international community.


"If these are the sorts of attacks they can carry out when the borders are closed one can only wonder what all they'd do if Kashmir was opened up."

You say that 'nobody expects India to throw the gates open' yet you contradict yourself when you say the above. As I said before, a mutually agreed upon solution between India and Pakistan, once made public, will only be the start of this process. It will have to be sold to the people and Pakistan especially is going to have to sell it to the insurgents it supports and dismantle them for things to progress further. In fact the agreement, if accepted by the militant groups, would likely have the opposite effect to the hellish scenario you describe, in that militants disarm and radicals are marginalized and lose public support. Your 'solution' is one that perpetuates the problems, instead of creating the conditions to resolve them. That the talks will likely not restart any time soon in the aftermath of Mumbai is apparent, and was not my point. My point was that holding negotiations hostage to a complete dismantlement of the Kashmiri Freedom Movement is not feasible or realistic. Going forward I believe the environment is going to be based upon the two indicators I outlined above:

1. Continued adherence to the prevention of cross border infiltration by Pakistan

2. Movement on the prosecution and conviction of LeT figures complicit in the Mumbai attacks and concrete assurances that the remaining LeT is either under control or out of circulation.

You would argue far more needs to be done, but this goes to the broader question I posed within the context of this thread, and what Steve Coll alluded to, that the conflict between India and Pakistan is not merely related to stability in Kashmir, but has a significant impact on stability in the region, and that makes the West and especially the US a significant stakeholder in the resolution of Kashmir. Will this quiet encouragement from the US therefore force compromises from both sides, and make what I outlined as 'CBM's' enough to move forward on?

I think it will, though only time will tell, and the results of the Indian elections will have strong implications on this.

 

[AgNoStiC MuSliM]

For those interested in the Steve Coll interview on Indo-pak relations and the Kashmir 'non-paper':

Steve Coll: The Secret Plans For Kashmir : NPR

 

[Bull]

What the hell does Rajiv Dogra wants? Just to see Pakistan implicated in a way that would harm Pakistan for the fun of things? I mean we've already arrested relevant people, banned organizations, carried out investigations, shared evidence, we're looking like good guys because we ARE the good guys.

No one has said India is the villain in all of this either. But if India keeps insisting that Pakistan be forcibly treated as the bad guy, then naturally the world is sooner or later going to start thinking... "Wtf?" India is really going overboard, and the world is telling India to calm down... Rajiv Dogra doesn't like it. He wants India's war mongering to be appreciated not condemned.

Thats just not the way of the world.

Rajiv is mainly pointing to the fact that although Pak has accepted the blame that elements from pakistan was behind 26/11 they still dont stop asking questions, clarifications etc.

When you have done a investigation and arrested people and 'banned' organisation, why do you have to still prolong the dossier drama?

How has India gone overboard?

India from day one said you are behind it, directly or indirectly is irrelevant from India's point of view. Taking Rajiv's own word your govt showed 'injured innocence' and promised full co-operation which never came through till we send in those dossiers and had FBI double check it. So where was the co-operation, it never came ofrth untill was forced on.

if we have made noices we have made noices with a reason.

Whats the status on lakhvi. GoP arrests, releases and re arrests him based on the 'heat factor'.

And even now, what has GoP done, other than making a 3 arrests and banning an organisation which was earlier banned !!!

 

[Energon]

There is no 'viewing' about the existential threat India poses to Pakistan, as Coll mentioned, and I have in the past, India has demonstrated its ability to be an existential threat to Pakistan by what it did in East Pakistan, and IMO through its support for the insurgency in Balochistan.

This is a weak and circular argument that is likely to go nowhere, but I'll give it a one time limited shot anyways. The 71 conflict was a response to the 65 one where Pakistan attempted to infiltrate irregular forces supported by their regular army under the banner of a local uprising. Either way, things were finally settled by a war between two states, one that India won and Pakistan lost; a usual outcome of war, which most nations around the world have experienced at some point or another. But the world has moved on since then, especially India. Also, as a side note, I have never seen a Pakistani representative ever refer to the results of the 71 war when addressing the threat perception in the current context, which is why I too remain dismissive of it. What does however currently constitute an existential threat from the Pakistani perspective is the possibility of an exaggerated military response from India in the event of a terrorist attack launched from Pakistan.

In the past two decades, there have been three instances where India has taken an aggressive approach with Pakistan (on a war footing). Two of them were on account of gruesome attacks on Indian soft targets by Pakistan based terrorists and the third on account of yet another attempt to infiltrate regular and irregular troops under the guise of an uprising which almost led to a cataclysmic war. In addition to this there has been an endless spate of border infiltration, terrorist attacks, hijackings, killings and of course the violent insurgency in Kashmir that has directly led back to Pakistan. But despite military build ups, India has never launched an attack on Pakistani soil despite having a casus belli, which certainly shows some level of restraint which has been noticed and appreciated by the international community.

In regards to the Baloch issue: there is no palpable evidence that India has a protracted involvement in the Baluchistan insurgency. This IMO is primarily because they don't need to do much, nobody at home really identifies with their cause (a necessity when launching a successful insurgency campaign), and unfortunately for India, it does not share a contiguous border which inherently limits the effort. Also if they really were giving them a lot of support, the Baluchis would be far better armed and be able to exact a lot more damage. Which is not to say the Indian intelligence agencies aren't trying to monitor the situation closely and do everything in their power to build at least some level of potential that can be exploited in an exigent situation. They also have to establish a vast network of humint resource considering the tribal areas of Pakistan are also a second home to the anti-India effort. All of this however pales in comparison to the potential Pakistan holds over India in the Kashmir insurgency along the contiguous border which it has directly supported for decades on end. Again, one is a reactive measure to the other and they aren't equitable by any means. The bottom line is that India (and almost all states around the world) do not serve as breeding grounds and logistical centers for trans national terrorism. Pakistan does and this poses a great risk for anyone who wants to deal with Pakistan.


My point is that by any objective quantifiable means the terrorism emanating from Pakistan poses an exponentially greater risk to India than the other way round. And subsequently India has a LOT more to lose by willingly exposing itself to the imminent threats from Pakistan than vice versa.

You say that 'nobody expects India to throw the gates open' yet you contradict yourself when you say the above.

I'm not sure you understood the context properly. Nobody expects India to throw their gates open as long as an imminent threat exists, but this hasn't stopped India from constantly assessing the scenario as part of the Kashmir dialog. My comment is merely based on the recent events which indicates that this scenario is no longer feasible because the imminent threat is very much present and only getting worse. Hence for the foreseeable future the objective will be to seal the border even tightly, which will impede any talks about relaxing it.

Either way all of this is inconsequential because it is unlikely to change the status quo.

 

[AgNoStiC MuSliM]

Energon,

This is pretty much just rehashing the same thing that has been said already. You know my response to the excused for Indian support for terrorism in East Pakistan and its role in its subsequent destabilization, 1965 is not a valid excuse given Indian weaseling out of bilateral and multilateral commitments on Kashmir, and Indian support for Afghanistan's Pashtunistan effort.

A lack of success in making the Baloch insurgency count for more, due to various factors, does not excuse Indian support for terrorism and militancy in Pakistan in order to destabilize it, and continues to validate the argument, especially given historical precedent, that India is an existential threat to Pakistan. Indian intent is clear from its actions in Balochistan, despite the lack of success there.

"I'm not sure you understood the context properly. Nobody expects India to throw their gates open as long as an imminent threat exists, but this hasn't stopped India from constantly assessing the scenario as part of the Kashmir dialog. My comment is merely based on the recent events which indicates that this scenario is no longer feasible because the imminent threat is very much present and only getting worse. Hence for the foreseeable future the objective will be to seal the border even tightly, which will impede any talks about relaxing it."

I understood your context fine - you are twisting yourself into knots to somehow justify a refusal to engage, and it isn't surprising since your views on resolving Kashmri have always been hawkish, even before Mumbai. In fact suggestions for resolving Kashmir such along the lines of what Coll suggests were discussed on this forum, and IIRC dismissed by you.

The reality is as I pointed out, even if an initiative such as the 'non-paper' translates into an official agreement between the two nations, the dynamics on the ground do not 'miraculously' change into national security nightmare for India. Actual implementation of such an agreement would be contingent upon a lot of factors, not least of which will be security concerns the Indians have relative to the militant infrastructure.

"Either way all of this is inconsequential because it is unlikely to change the status quo."

Perhaps, but this was pretty much the 'party line' parroted by most Indians on the possibility of a resolution to the Kashmir dispute even before the Mumbai attacks, and now we find out that back channel negotiations had indeed progressed to an advanced stage. I remain optimistic that if Pakistan can show tangible and strong action against the perpetrators of Mumbai along with some other measures, and hardliners do not hijack the political process in India, we will potentially be back on track in the medium term.

 

[Energon]

As I said before, a mutually agreed upon solution between India and Pakistan, once made public, will only be the start of this process. It will have to be sold to the people and Pakistan especially is going to have to sell it to the insurgents it supports and dismantle them for things to progress further. In fact the agreement, if accepted by the militant groups, would likely have the opposite effect to the hellish scenario you describe, in that militants disarm and radicals are marginalized and lose public support. Your 'solution' is one that perpetuates the problems, instead of creating the conditions to resolve them.

This is what was supposed to happen before Musharraf's government started faltering. There was supposed to be a public announcement of the intended plan to set both nations on a certain track where the progress on each side would be evaluated; and only upon the satisfactory completion of these objectives would a final settlement be made

Within such a framework how Pakistan invalidates the radical elements is entirely up to them; India certainly won't take the leap of faith and commit to an agreement without total disarmament and hope that the good news will result in a decreasing support for the Jihadi maniacs if that is what you're hoping for. It is unrealistic to expect such irresponsible decision making from any sane head of state. Pakistan as sponsor of terrorism will have to show some results first and only then will things move forward considering that Pakistan has nothing to lose here while India does.

That the talks will likely not restart any time soon in the aftermath of Mumbai is apparent, and was not my point. My point was that holding negotiations hostage to a complete dismantlement of the Kashmiri Freedom Movement is not feasible or realistic.

Holding negotiations "hostage" is a non sequitur. That India even engages Pakistan in talks despite the recent history of terrorism and subversive war (Kargil for instance) is proof enough that there is a strong desire to move ahead on this matter; the ultimate national security concern however is non negotiable. And this is a completely valid and justified demand that any nation worth its salt would have. It is the Pakistani establishment that has been unable to dismantle the terrorism institutions within its borders who very much remain an imminent threat to Indian civilians; and it is unrealistic to expect India to commit to an agreement which would expose them to this risk. Of course if Pakistan is able to eliminate this threat from within (and that is truly the only way it is possible) then this is no longer an issue and as I said, how they go about doing this is completely up to them.

Going forward I believe the environment is going to be based upon the two indicators I outlined above:

1. Continued adherence to the prevention of cross border infiltration by Pakistan

2. Movement on the prosecution and conviction of LeT figures complicit in the Mumbai attacks and concrete assurances that the remaining LeT is either under control or out of circulation.

You would argue far more needs to be done

I completely agree with these two points provided of course they're not just cosmetic displays; and a quick look into my post history on this matter will confirm that I do not demand anything more in the immediate aspect (including extradition of Pakistani citizens to face charges in India).

Although you have only mentioned LeT, I'm assuming you mean that all similar institutions (organized or amorphic) should be handled in the same way: where their ability to orchestrate acts of terrorism is neutered and they're engaged in a political process instead, or taken out of circulation altogether; and this of course would result in the cessation of cross border terrorism. IMO its the ideology and the ability to conduct terrorism that matters more than the ever changing denominations of these groups. Nonetheless, doing so would ensure that they no longer pose an imminent threat to India which would probably bring the process back to where Musharraf left it.

Unfortunately it is now becoming increasingly evident that the Pakistani establishment is incapable of achieving this objective in the foreseeable future, if ever which in turn renders the abovemention scenario as nothing more than a hypothetical. It appears that even with the best efforts of the PA under a relatively well administered military dictatorship the violent arms of the various insurgencies (regardless of whether they're aimed at India, Afghanistan or internally) can only be temporarily suppressed, but certainly not dismantled. This is sure to only provide a facade of both the aforementioned indicators while the underlying pathology remains very much alive; and that would be unacceptable for India (for very good reasons).

In regards to serious prosecution of the criminals behind the Mumbai attacks, IMO it will certainly be a symbolic display of Pakistan's commitment to renouncing India specific terrorism which of course will be a step in the positive direction. But the damage for the most part has already been done and although the brunt of it seems to have been borne by India for now, it will certainly affect Pakistan in a big way for a long time to come.

Will this quiet encouragement from the US therefore force compromises from both sides, and make what I outlined as 'CBM's' enough to move forward on?

I think it will, though only time will tell, and the results of the Indian elections will have strong implications on this.

As I said in my earlier post, the basic framework was actually decided a long time ago and it is only a matter of putting it into effect and being able to perform the critical precursory tasks. The only impediment here is Pakistan's inability to create a secure enough environment within its own borders to facilitate this agreement.

Also I'm not sure what you're expecting from the Indian elections; at least based on what I have gathered from the Indian side, I can assure you that regardless of who leads the new coallition government or fill's the PMs seat, there will be no deal with Pakistan on Kashmir until the imminent threat of Pakistani based terrorism against India ceases to exist. And no Indian leader will hurry along a Kashmir settlement unless this basic security concern is catagorically resolved and the US at least right now is entirely sympathetic to this concern (again, because it is very fundamental in nature and it is the same standard we uphold for our own nation).

 

[Energon]

Energon,

A lack of success in making the Baloch insurgency count for more, due to various factors, does not excuse Indian support for terrorism and militancy in Pakistan in order to destabilize it,

There is no evidence suggesting that India promotes terrorism against Pakistani civilians akin to what Pakistan does to their Indian counterparts. There are no Indian terrorists holding Pakistani cities hostage, blowing up their commuter trains or taking their planes hostage to get other terrorists freed who then live in India as celebrities (until of course they make the mistake of killing a Caucasian man with an American passport). You are trying very hard to create the impression that India and Pakistan are somehow equals when it comes to sponsorship of terrorism and murder. But that isn't the case, and the world is well aware of this, which is why Pakistan is constantly referred to as the epicenter of terrorism not India. But all of this is very clear and self evident so I won't waste any more of my time on it.

I understood your context fine - you are twisting yourself into knots to somehow justify a refusal to engage, and it isn't surprising since your views on resolving Kashmri have always been hawkish, even before Mumbai. In fact suggestions for resolving Kashmir such along the lines of what Coll suggests were discussed on this forum, and IIRC dismissed by you.

The reality is as I pointed out, even if an initiative such as the 'non-paper' translates into an official agreement between the two nations, the dynamics on the ground do not 'miraculously' change into national security nightmare for India. Actual implementation of such an agreement would be contingent upon a lot of factors, not least of which will be security concerns the Indians have relative to the militant infrastructure.

I have absolutely no idea what you're talking about. I normally don't even participate all that much in Kashmir related threads, simply because I consider it to be a waste of time. Ever since I stumbled upon the details of the back channel diplomatic efforts (purely by accident) I realized that the final outcome is already pre designated and its only a matter of getting the conditions right to go through with it. It is also why this Coll revelation doesn't come as a surprise to me by any means.

Just so there is no misunderstanding, let me clarify my position on Kashmir once and for all (I have never explicitly stated this before). At this point in time I am a total supporter of the basic principles of the 'autonomy+ secession-' model, a variant of which is highlighted in the "non-paper" and briefly explained both in my earlier post as well as in Coll's narrative. I support this model because I'm convinced it is the only one where most of the parties get what they want in a pragmatic way. I'm also farily certain that this is about as far as the effots of the diplomatic cadres will go.

However I think you are mistaking my cynicism for hawkishness and then contorting my words to retrofit your misunderstanding. Although I am a strong supporter of this hypothetical model, I'm well aware that it is not going to come to fruition unless Pakistan can dismantle the infrastructure within its borders which enables a vast number of terrorist groups to launch attacks upon India. And I have always had my doubts about Pakistan's ability to accomplish this task. Pakistan as it stands right now just doesn't have what it takes to dismantle the labs in which their Frankenstein monsters of yesteryear were created. All of this has gone completely out of control and there is no end in sight; FUBAR if you will. It is only now that people are admitting this publicly.

I think you are referring to my having vehemently opposed the oppening up of the border between the two Kashmirs (essentially what the model is proposing) some time last year (I forget if it was 07 or 08). Anyways, the reason for that was because even back then there were strong suspicions that the virulence of anti-Indian terrorism consortium was all too intact and that Musharraf had merely done a showcase job after 2002; (the Mumbai attacks merely proved this). Also there had been a lot of violence in the backdrop and so adopting a change in policy would have come off capitulating under militant pressure, which would have disastrous consequences the entire region in the long term which are just not worth it. Basically it was violating the two principle tenets of the preamble:
1. The agreement should have validity for being set between two nation states, and not under the threat of terrorism and violence.
2. Terrorism in Pakistan should no longer pose an imminent threat to Indian civilians and it economic interests by the time the border is relaxed.

Also there was no basic agreement in place as to how the system was going to be administered. There are actually also other peripheral problems that have propped up over the past decade or so which seriously need to be addressed. But this post is already too long and I won't elaborate upon this for now.

I remain optimistic that if Pakistan can show tangible and strong action against the perpetrators of Mumbai along with some other measures, and hardliners do not hijack the political process in India, we will potentially be back on track in the medium term.

The problem is that the details of the "some other measures" that you are referring to are extremely critical to the success of this plan. Unfortunately they are also beyond the scope of the Pakistani establishment, and your insistence upon blaming this all upon the Indian hardliners just to pacify yourself is a complete waste of time. This matter is entirely dependent upon Pakistan's performance (pathetic so far) not the 'hijacking of the political process' by Indian hardliners. All of these so called hawks (and self proclaimed cynics like me) have already been vindicated; and any government henceforth will no longer have the ability to move forward with a peace process just on the basis of a successful anti terrorism facade on Pakistan's behalf. It is Pakistan that has blown its own case (literally) not India. But there is still some hope, but no time to get into that now.