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Pakistan offers global nuclear fuel services

Activists Breach Security at Kleine Brogel

If you watch this video on YouTube it is very clear that a group of Belgian peace activists not only got inside the wire at Kleine-Brogel Airbase — where some US nuclear weapons may be stored — but they also got into the area where the hardened shelters are located (within the shelters are aircraft and WS3 storage vaults with US B61 nuclear gravity bombs.)

Between the Youtube video, a pair of stories on the Der Standard and Neusblad websites, their Facebook page and website, and Google Earth, it is pretty easy to recreate their path. (Hans K came to the same conclusion.)

Here are some images, with annotations linked to the time stamps in the video.
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It looks like the activists approached Kleine-Brogel from the farms to the south of the airbase. Indeed, another group hopped the fence in November 2009. Apparently, they planned to go out on the runway and get arrested just like the previous group in November 2009. But, according to the group’s website “to their surprise, they were able to walk for over an hour on the runway.” (One of the press reports suggests it was forty minutes.)

The base is surrounded by signs indicating that the area is patrolled by guard dogs, but Milou was nowhere to be found.

Eventually, they noticed an open gate to the area where US nuclear weapons are believed to be stored. Belgian peace groups had previously identified the area based on a map handed out an airshow. (As you can see from their website, they had very good maps.)

1695.jpg


It looks like this was a side gate — apparently it had been left open to keep from freezing shut — so the activists were able to enter the secure area and approach one of the hardened aircraft shelters from the rear. If you could get inside, it would look something like this.

hanscom_ws3_vltphoto.jpg

Well, I suspect the vault (with the bomb) would be in the floor.

The activists defaced the shelter with stickers and then emerged onto the concrete plaza in the center of the area.

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They then walked the length of the plaza — having traversed both the width of the base, and now the width of the secure area for nuclear weapons — when security force finally showed up.

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The “security force” appears to comprise one moderately annoyed-looking Belgian guy with a rifle. (Which RAJ47 observes is unloaded.) The effect would only be more comedic if he had some powdered sugar on his face and maybe a little bit of waffle stuck to his uniform.

How The [REDACTED] Did This Happen?

The reality is that significant shortcomings exists in the security of European airbases where US nuclear weapons are stored. That was made absolutely clear to me on my visit to SHAPE — and it was reported in the 2008 Air Force Blue Ribbon Review. Host-nations are supposed to provide security but they often cut corners. This is basically confirmed by the Belgian commander of the base, who explained that he just doesn’t have enough security forces:

Onze luchtmachtbasis is in totaliteit 450 hectare groot. Een derde is bosgebied waarin ik me drie weken kan bevinden zonder te worden gezien. Vandaar dat we onze bewaking, gelet op onze getalsterkte, concentreren op enkele gevoelige zones.
That works out to, more or less, “Our airbase is 450 hectares in size. A third is wooded areas in which I could stay perfectly well for three weeks without being seen. That is why we concentrate our surveillance on a few sensitive zones where there are aircraft and equipment.” (The translation is by the Open Source Center.)

Mort Halperin tells a funny story about when, in the late 1990s, then-German Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer called on NATO to adopt a policy of no-first use, widely seen at the time as the beginning of a discussion about withdrawal of nuclear weapons from Germany. Mort, then serving in the Clinton Administration, told a colleague that the German government had opened the door to the removal of US forward-deployed nuclear weapons. His colleague retorted: “You are not talking to the real German government.”

What Mort’s colleague meant was that there is — and has been for many years — a gap between Europe’s public, represented by elected leaders, and the so-called “real” governments — the national security bureaucracies in NATO and the European allies. So while NATO and European defense ministries make the case privately that forward-based nuclear weapons are politically and militarily essential to NATO, European political leaders have declined to make that case to their constituents for the money to modernize either aircraft or to keep up security.

What Should We Do?

As excuses go “It’s a big, wooded base and I don’t have that many troops” doesn’t cut it. In fact, when we are talking about nuclear weapons, it frankly sucks. When it comes to securing nuclear weapons, the United States Air Force has standards for both denial and recapture. If the Belgians and other NATO members won’t provide the forces and equipment necessary to meet both standards, then it is time to put the weapons on a US airbase.

The most direct route to securing US nuclear weapons in Europe is to immediately — like yesterday — consolidate all remaining forward deployed nuclear weapons to just one or two US airbases in Europe. Take your pick from Aviano, Incirlik, Lakenheath and Ramstein. This would immediately improve the overall security of the weapons, while starting a dialogue about whether forward-deployed weapons are really essential to maintaining NATO’s nuclear character twenty years after the fall of the Berlin Wall. This is a point that several of us made in a letter to the President

The actual removal of such weapons should await formal consultations within NATO and may, in part, depend on arms control negotiations with Russia. But a useful first step would be the immediate consolidation of remaining forward-deployed nuclear weapons to one or two U.S. airbases in Europe.

The classic argument for leaving US nuclear weapons on European bases has always been burden-sharing — there is a value to forcing European governments to make the public case for spending money on NATO’s nuclear mission. Of course, that assumes that the governments actually make the necessary investments, rather than skimping on security.

Given the appalling state of security at Kleine Brogel, that argument seems unpersuasive today.

ArmsControlWonk: Activists Breach Security at Kleine Brogel
 
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A really good decision to announce this policy and not let any other country cry proliferation. Proud of you PM.

Aren't there any other countries willing to enter the market, looking for reactor grade fuel? Many arab countries are sure looking forward to it. We can definitely become a supplier but we have to set up more NPPs for ourselves as well. I won't say it's chest thumping but we do realize that competing in the market would be difficult

If reactor grade fuel can be produced by some cost effective process... sure. Before people start getting agitated, just think about it. What competitive advantage does Pakistan have in producing reactor grade fuel against Australia for example. Added to this is the logistics of supply. Pakistan won't be on equal footing to members of IAEA for its proliferation history and stringent constraints on material movement will be imposed. This will add cost and not make it cheaper.

Business is not about wishful thinking. If it is not a business proposition then it is a chest thumping exercise or showing defiance. Whatever your interpretation of it may be, it is not a business proposition. Period.
:cheers:
 
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Spoken like an adversary, therefore carries no value.

Well, If you can be objective and let me know what is that you will disagree in my comment, that will be better instead of one lines.

:azn:
 
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By LOUIS CHARBONNEAU | REUTERS

Published: Apr 14, 2010 03:55 Updated: Apr 14, 2010 03:57

WASHINGTON: Pakistan, the country of the disgraced nuclear scientist who provided Iran, Libya and North Korea with uranium enrichment technology, is once again offering its atomic fuel services to the world.

Pakistan's Prime Minister Yusuf Raza Gilani made the public offer in a statement of his country's commitments presented at US President Barack Obama's two-day summit on nuclear security. The written statement was distributed on Tuesday.

This is international perception and lets come down to reality.
:coffee:
 
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Pakistan nuclear arsenal is in good hands,the media needs to stop spreading propaganda.the real threat is the Indian nuclear reactors most of them are in the south west area,if the naxalites can kill 70 Indian troops in a few hours then they can surely make their way to those reactors.
 
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Pakistan nuclear arsenal is in good hands,the media needs to stop spreading propaganda.the real threat is the Indian nuclear reactors most of them are in the south west area,if the naxalites can kill 70 Indian troops in a few hours then they can surely make their way to those reactors.


The only difference is that the Maoists don't want to get into Nuclear facilities because, they donot want to mass-murder the people of their own country. Their fight is with India's Govt. They try to kill Security personnel only, not trying to blowup a full city.

Whereas in case of Jihadist groups, they WANT a nuclear weapon to hold India and other Western countries hostage to their demands.
 
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Russia's Lost Suitcase Nukes

by Eric Margolis




MORE
on Russia's suitcase bombs

Call it the ultimate missing luggage story.
Last year, Gen. Alexander Lebed, Russia's former National Security Advisor, claimed more than 100 suitcase-sized nuclear weapons had 'disappeared.' Another senior Russian security official, Alexei Yablokov, backed Lebed's allegations.

Lebed, now a presidential candidate, asserted Russia's military had lost track of the portable nuclear weapons, each of which can produce a 1 kiloton explosion, equivalent to 1,000 tons of TNT. A single suitcase nuke, placed in an urban area, could kill up to 100,000 people and cause enormous physical damage.

Russian security officials scoffed at Lebed's claims, blaming poor record keeping rather than theft or diversion. US officials claimed Libya, Iraq and Iran were the real nuclear danger, not mini-nukes. In fact, these nations pose a potential threat only to Israel. By contrast, Russia's missing nukes are a very real menace to US security.

Two months ago, the highest ranking officer ever to defect from GRU, Russia's military intelligence service, testified in closed hearings before Congress. The former GRU colonel, who defected in 1992, said he had personally identified locations in the US for suitcase nuclear devices that would be used in case of war.

The colonel admitted he had no knowledge any devices had actually been smuggled into the US, but said 'it was possible,' because many of the weapons had disappeared from Russia's inventory. Meaning the mini-nukes are either missing -- and possibly in the hands of terrorists -- or secreted in the United States, Canada, and Europe.

The Soviet mini-nukes, described as the size of a golf club bag, were designed to destroy vital targets, such as military command and control centers, air defense headquarters, missile bases, communications nodes, power stations, bridges, dams, airports, and the St. Lawrence Seaway.

If one such weapon, hidden in the back of a delivery van, were detonated outside the Pentagon, America's military leadership would be decapitated.

The GRU colonel explained the mini-nukes were to be smuggled into the US the same way drugs were -- by speedboat, light aircraft, or landed on the coast by Soviet subs. Soviet special force 'Spetsnaz' units would retrieve the weapons and conceal them close to their intended targets. One key hiding place was Northern Virginia's beautiful Shenandoah Valley, located a short drive from Washington.

The colonel also revealed that during the 1962 Cuban missile crisis, the Soviets stockpiled suitcase nuclear weapons in Cuba without the knowledge of Castro, ready for use by special forces troops.

KGB sources also recently told me that at the height of the crisis, Soviet commanders in Cuba were authorized to launch intermediate range ballistic missiles against the US and Canada if communications links with Moscow were broken or jammed.

The US also developed a 1-kiloton nuclear suitcase bomb designed for the same tactical demolition role as the Soviet version. If the Warsaw Pact attacked westward, US Special Forces were tasked to employ the mini-nukes for behind-the- lines sabotage of Soviet command, logistics and communications. US Army field commanders were given release authority over hundreds of tactical mini-nukes in Europe, independent of NATO.

Some House Republicans claim the Soviets may have actually hidden a number of nuclear devices near Washington and New York City, where they remain. Some could still be active. Such simple, pure-fission nuclear devices may have a shelf- life of up to 8-10 years without refurbishing.

US security officials, who have been nonchalant about hidden suitcase nukes, should bear in mind the stranger- than-fiction case of a GRU 'sleeper' agent who settled in Edmonton, Canada, the late 1940's as a supposed refugee from Ukraine. A decade ago, he turned himself into the RCMP, and showed them a large, trunk-bomb he had hidden in his basement. His orders: when a coded signal comes in from GRU, transport the conventional bomb in his truck to a main oil pumping station north of Edmonton, and destroy it. He had been waiting nearly 40 years.

How many other such sleepers are out there? How many have nuclear devices? This is pretty scary stuff. Not just for North America, either. Rumors have circulated for years that Israeli agents may have hidden suitcase nukes in Moscow, St. Petersburg, Kiev, Odessa, Sevastapol, and Kharkov, not to mention Arab capitols, Tehran, even Pakistan.

The danger of terrorists getting their hands on a suitcase bomb is real, but lower. Arming the mini-nukes takes 30 minutes, the colonel revealed, and can only be done by trained specialists. The weapons are designed to self- destruct if improperly opened.

Unless, of course, terrorists or the Russian mafia manage to buy a nuclear specialist, or open the weapon's locks.A suitcase nuke attached to a drum of anthrax or botulism would be a hellish terror weapon, ideal for political fanatics or blackmailers. Defenses against such weapons are currently minimal, though the US is trying to develop senors that will detect hidden nuclear weapons.

We shouldn't panic about reds under our beds with suitcase nukes, but we shouldn't ignore this very real threat, either. Given the number of Soviet suitcase nukes still hidden, or unaccounted for, it seems probable at least one will eventually be used somewhere.
(11/10/98) Russia's Lost Suitcase Nukes
 
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India's nukes are 'ground zero' for jihadists


Even as Canadian Prime Minister Stephen Harper and Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh resolved to deepen bilateral ties, the Canadian media says a nuclear deal could be risky because of terrorist threats to India's sites. They cite the recent alert at India's nuclear facilities as a warning to the Canadian government that is keen to clinch the deal.

In their reports, the Canadian journalists, who even spell the name of one of the most known faces of the 20th century as Ghandi (for Mahatma Gandhi), have also raked up the past - that India cannot be trusted because it appropriated their nuclear technology to make nuclear bombs.

Before embarking on this assignment, perhaps these journalists were briefed by biased Canadian bureaucrats for whom "terrorist violence, such as bombings in public areas and on public transportation, occurs throughout India....attacks can take place anywhere and at any time in India..."

Opposing the proposed civil nuclear deal between the two countries, John Ibbitson of the Globe and Mail, who is perhaps visiting India for the first time, says: "But India's nuclear facilities have been placed on high alert, as evidence emerges that two men, one of them Canadian, might have scouted sites for the terrorist attack on Mumbai last year..."

Carrying his ridiculous argument further, he writes:"Does Canada really want to help sell nuclear technology to a country that is the midst of such a volatile region, a country that in the 1970s appropriated our first foray into building Indian nuclear reactors to help fashion nuclear weapons, a country whose nuclear reactors would be an ideal ground zero for jihadists?"

Writing in the left-wing Toronto Star, Rick Westhead says: "For Harper, the visit may have to do less with new trade deals or warmed relations than with building ties to Indo-Canadian voters before the next election.

"So rather than strategizing on new bilateral investment with India's Ambani brothers, the prime minister will travel to the Golden Temple in Amritsar - the holiest shrine in the Sikh faith - and meet with Hindi film star Akshay Kumar, a torchbearer for the Vancouver Olympics."

Not surprisingly, the current Canadian prime minister has always had prickly relations with his nation's media.

http://www.hindustantimes.com/News-Feed/india/Indian-nukes-are-ground-zero-for-jihadists-Canadian-media/Article1-477588.aspx
 
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Good Job PM Gillani.;)
I can't stop laughing on Indians they are discussing David Coleman Headly in Nuclear Summit:rofl: and they are raising issues like why US vice president didnt invited Manmohan to his home.:rofl:
 
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Good job Pakistan! Just simply ignore some jealous Indians and keep up the solid move :D
 
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Good job Pakistan! Just simply ignore some jealous Indians and keep up the solid move :D

this is nothing ground breaking, Pakistan has just offered its services, does not mean that it will get any. Its pure business, Pakistan does have any competitive advantage against other nuclear capable nations. Not personal just business.
 
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