Vinod2070
BANNED
- Joined
- Dec 24, 2007
- Messages
- 10,552
- Reaction score
- -2
- Country
- Location
When Pakistan Fails
Even as the Indian public and legislators are yet to be provided well-researched reports on the Mumbai terror attack, the incident has been
subjected to careful study by various US agencies. The key findings on the attack, from an American point of view, have been presented before the US Senate Committee of Homeland Security and Government Affairs. One of the experts who has submitted his findings is Brian Michael Jenkins, a specialist on terrorism for well over four decades.
Among his findings, which are likely to influence American judgment, are the following. First, India will continue to face a serious jihadi terrorist threat from Pakistan-based terrorist groups for the foreseeable future. However, India lacks military options that have strategic-level effects, as it faces a significant risk of a military response from Pakistan. Neither Indian nor US policy is likely to be able to reduce that threat significantly in the short or medium term.
Second, safe havens continue to be key enablers for terrorist groups. Safe havens allow terrorist leaders to recruit, select and train their operators and make it easier for terrorists to plan and execute complex operations, such as the Mumbai attack. Therefore, at the strategic level, the Mumbai attack underscores the imperative of addressing the transnational sources of Islamist terrorism in India. How to do this is an extraordinarily difficult question that will require the reassessment of basic assumptions concerning policy towards Pakistan by members of the international community.
Third, intelligence failure, inadequate counterterrorist training and equipment of local police, delays in the response of the NSG commandos, flawed hostage rescue plans and poor strategic communications and information management all contributed to a less-than-optimal response in Mumbai. These gaps suggest the need for improved counterterrorist coordination between national level and local security agencies. Unless India can improve the quality and functioning of its entire internal security apparatus it will remain acutely vulnerable to further terrorist penetration and attacks.
These assessments are indisputable. Jenkins has also referred to terrorists of indigenous origins and possible local support to Pakistan-based jihadi terrorists. This has been picked up and highlighted in sections of the Pakistani media. Jenkins has not gone deeply into the consequences of Pakistan nurturing terrorism for the Pakistani state and civil society. He however observes, significantly, that "Pakistan's principal defence against external pressure is not its nuclear arsenal, but its own political fragility... its government's less-than-full cooperation is preferable to the country's collapse and descent into chaos."
The 9/11 attack on the US was followed by the largest reorganisation in its administrative structure with the creation of the Department of Homeland Security, and a very radical restructuring of its intelligence set-up. The basic norm of intelligence functioning up to that time that intelligence be shared on a need-to-know basis was changed to the understanding that intelligence has to be shared on the basis of functional imperatives. While the US agencies have been trying to draw lessons from the Mumbai attacks to enhance America's security, what lessons can India draw from the US experience?
It is abundantly clear that the relationship between India and Pakistan is more akin to a cold war. There is a basic incompatibility between a state which, in spite of having become a victim of the terrorist Frankenstein it nurtured, is reluctant to fight terrorism because of its religious affiliations though the jihadi project is a perversion of Islam and a secular state. As of today, the Pakistani civil society has not yet made up its mind to fight, without any reservation, the jihadi cult. As long as the Pakistani civil society does not take a stand on this issue, it cannot be helped either by India or the rest of the world.
If this is understood in India, this country has to prepare itself to wage a campaign against jihadi terrorism. Pakistan should be contained by the international community till forces within that country rise to fight against the jihadi cult. The Indian response following the Mumbai attack has been feeble, not in respect of an imprudent military response advocated by a hawkish section, but in terms of internal preparedness. We need a full-time cabinet minister for internal security. There is an imperative need to have a director of national intelligence and our National Security Council should be focusing wholly on protecting this country against jihadi aggression. Public opinion should be mobilised to educate the public about the nature of the threat we face.
There is increasing understanding in the US and NATO countries about the limitations of a civilian government in Pakistan vis-a-vis the Pakistani army and the ISI, and their relationship with jihadi groups. There is a limit beyond which Pakistani civil society cannot blackmail the rest of the world that unless their unreasonable demands are continuously met, even while they will not take a stand against jihadis, they will end up as a failed state. There are sections in Pakistan which threaten that if Pakistan goes down it will take India along. Our preparedness should be aimed at averting that contingency. The jihadi cult has a suicidal tendency. The rest of the world does not.
The writer is a Delhi-based strategic affairs analyst.
TOP ARTICLE | When Pakistan Fails-Editorial-Opinion-The Times of India
