Pakistan Is an Arsonist That Wants You to Think It’s a Firefighter

[Falconless]

Pakistan needs to diplomatically bring her up in meetings so she gets kicked out of influential govt schools and circles.

she seriously have mental issues.

Leave it to a group of Pakistan friendly yet credible academics to expose her.

Any hint of Pakistan’s involvement will make her an instant hero.

 

[Genghis khan1]

Leave it to a group of Pakistan friendly yet credible academics to expose her.

Any hint of Pakistan’s involvement will make her an instant hero.

There are ways to do things. She will be discredited if not removed.

 

[Zarvan]

It's time Pakistan takes on anti Pakistan jokers. They have to be confronted and exposed at all fronts.

 

[mudas777]

US is 1000's of miles away, the life style US and West is enjoying today is the endeavours of defeating USSR in Afghanistan which were the results of the handy work of ISI, support of the US and the fighters of Afghans, Arabs and other contributors.
Otherwise Berlin wall would still be standing and the US and the Western alliance member states tax payers still be paying more for their defence. So ungrateful lady you shouldn't be spitting in the same plate you are eating from.
Hillary when remarked about the snakes she also admitted in the same breath that US have let down Pakistan in the past after the USSR withdrawal from the Afghanistan, so don't pick and choose from the same speech lady Christine the fart. We didn't came begging for the help after the USSR 1979 invasion infect Carter and Regan did so lady i will suggest to you to visit your optician again. The help which was given to us by the US during that period was the investment that rewarded US/West many fold back. Even investor in the stocks market would have been proud of the gains West made.
We didn't had anything to do with the 9/11 so why we were dragged, threatened, coerced, encouraged, begged and US went to all of our friends to force us to join the US war which was not ours war?? US needed help not us and if we were that bad should not have came to us for the help and after all Afghanistan share borders with other countries too.
Yes we are the victims of the the US idiotic polices, selection of snake friend like India, and grand US games to loose 80000 loved ones on your WOT and economically we were left in tatters. The pet snakes we do keep like US does too also 1000's of US families do. Our snakes were kept in well secured and locked up places till WOT broke the cages and snakes escaped, who is to blame the snakes or the broken cages or the keepers. While US knowing well rented out the Afghan soil to the Indian's for snake farming to teach us the lesson, who is doubled crossed who here? When things became tough for the US, then US forgot even to collect the rent and those farmed snakes are still running and looking for the cover and the safety. Lady we will be more then willing to send you few caught snakes and then you can hire Indian snake charmers to please yourself.
We are still helping US citizens and forces to get them out safely we could very easily have let them to rot their after the snake farming antics and bad mouthing us which this lady is expert at.

 

[El Sidd]

After getting kicked off of BBC for saying this, she decides to write an article about it LMAO. Enjoy


Washington has an endless appetite for Islamabad’s con games.
By C. Christine Fair, a professor at Georgetown University’s security studies program within the Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service.


SEPTEMBER 10, 2021, 1:37 PM
On Aug. 27, U.S. Sen. Lindsey Graham tweeted, “Any sustainable solution in Afghanistan must include Pakistan,” while also expressing his appreciation for the “efforts of the Pakistani government to assist with the evacuation of U.S. citizens, our allies, and other nations.” His comments reflect a familiar play: Pakistan has spent decades setting fires in South Asia—and then expected praise and renumeration for offering to put them out.

It’s astonishing that U.S. officials continue to peddle Pakistan’s own fictions—alongside such media outlets as the BBC, as I discovered recently when I was cut off in the middle of an interview for speaking about it. But with the Afghanistan debacle on policymakers’ minds, it’s a good time to think critically about Washington’s perpetual vulnerability to Pakistan’s rent-seeking ruses. Both political parties have long been responsible for coddling Pakistan in hopes that there is some mystical U.S. policy that could reform its supposed wayward ally. Even though Pakistan’s involvement in Afghanistan goes back some seven decades, the Washington elite continues to fall for Pakistan’s efforts to sell itself as the solution to the very problems it created.

Pakistani officials tell a heart-wrenching story. Pakistan was minding its business when, in 1979, the United States persuaded Pakistan to shoulder the burden of the struggle against communism in Soviet-controlled Afghanistan. Pakistani officials contend that they were a victim of American perfidy when the latter forgot Pakistan existed in the 1990s, leaving Islamabad to contend with the mess—while Washington had the effrontery to impose sanctions on a bamboozled ally because of its well-known efforts to secure a nuclear weapon.

But Pakistan’s interests in Afghanistan have deep roots. As Husain Haqqani, Rizwan Hussain, and I have shown, Islamabad inherited the British conception of Afghanistan as a buffer state with Russia. From the point of view of the security managers of a newly minted Pakistan, Pakistan inherited the most turbulent threat frontier with a fraction of the British Raj’s resources.

Afghanistan made early fateful decisions that would lock the country in an unwinnable security competition with Pakistan. Afghanistan initially attempted to block Pakistan’s bid to join the United Nations. Beginning in September 1950, Afghanistan began military incursions into Pakistan’s tribal agencies and Baluchistan province. Afghanistan’s efforts to antagonize its much stronger neighbor continued well into the 1970s.

Pakistan, seeking to influence its obstinate western neighbor, began supporting the growth of the reformist Islamist organization Jamaat-e-Islami in Afghanistan, where it originally had little support. This development was propitious. The majority of the so-called mujahideen groups that would eventually be mobilized by Pakistan were rooted in Jamaat-e-Islami.

After Mohammed Daoud Khan came to power in Afghanistan in 1973 and established a one-party republic that embarked on an aggressive top-down social reform program and purged Islamists and communists alike, Pakistan saw an opportunity. Zulfikar Ali Bhutto took the helm of a vivisected Pakistan, which lost half of its population when Bangladesh gained independence in a 1971 war. Bhutto resolved to lose nothing else.

In August 1973, Bhutto set up the Afghan working group within Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) directorate. Despite a brief interregnum, Gen. Muhammad Zia-ul-Haq continued with this policy after he ousted Bhutto in a July 1977 coup. Fifty or so Afghan resistance groups were consolidated by the ISI into a smaller, more manageable number. The ISI was tasked with deepening the links between Pakistani and Afghan Islamist groups. These efforts resulted in seven major Sunni Afghan Islamist militant groups, as well as several Shiite groups. By the time the Soviets had crossed the Amu Darya river into Afghanistan, Zia-ul-Haq’s army and the ISI had already created the key Islamist groups that would become the cornerstone of the so-called anti-Soviet jihad.


As I wrote recently in Foreign Policy, that involvement continues today. The ISI nurtured, created, and supported the Taliban in their first incarnation; it returned to doing the same after the Taliban regime’s fall in late 2001. Pakistan has deployed its spin doctors to claim otherwise—using the same old strategy. Pakistan opines that it is the real victim of terrorism, that it is being unjustly maligned, and that if the West wants to fight terrorism, it needs to give Pakistan more money—and ignore its wrongdoings, which include sponsoring numerous Islamist terrorist groups as well as vertical and horizontal nuclear proliferation.

Ordinary Pakistanis are, indeed, the victims of terrorist monsters—monsters bred and trained by the military-intelligence establishment. As then-U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton told a gathering of Pakistanis in 2011, “You can’t keep snakes in your backyard and expect them only to bite your neighbors.” Yet Islamabad continues to do so—and to offer its snake-catching expertise when they escape.

Pakistan’s ability to convince Americans of its signal importance might seem baffling—but it represents a sophisticated and strategic diplomatic approach. First and foremost, Pakistan exploits information asymmetries. As Teresita and Howard Schaffer wrote in 2011, the United States is one of the most important portfolios for diplomatic, political, and military officials. They are required to know their briefs and recite them convincingly. Most often their American counterparts lack the most rudimentary knowledge of U.S.-Pakistan relations and tend to be persuaded by the narratives on offer. Even intelligence officials will have little operational familiarity with Pakistan, in part because substantive international contacts and travel pose problems for obtaining clearances. The easiest hires are young graduates with little international experience.

Islamabad understands the value of congressional delegations in shaping policymakers’ opinions. Unlike protocol-bound India, Pakistan dispenses with all diplomatic protocol on these occasions. Delegates meet the army chief, the ISI chief, and the prime minister, and they are often treated to military tourism opportunities.

In addition to having lavish budgets for legal lobbyists, Pakistan also has a history of cultivating shadowy figures who launder Islamabad’s dirty laundry and promote its pet projects to American policymakers and opinion-makers. It discourages criticism by denying visas, restricting access, or outright threatening violence to those who dare expose the dark side of Pakistan’s deep state. Conversely, Pakistan incentivizes apologists: It offers free trips where beneficiaries are treated to the famous Pakistani hospitality, which includes private meetings with important Pakistanis across the civilian and military spectrums, helicopter rides to places ordinarily forbidden to foreigners, and a cultivated practice of appearing open and affable. Such access is critical for people working in think tanks who eat from the grants they secure, which require such access to Pakistan’s corridors of power. The combination of these various measures results in a silenced coterie of critics and a sprawling ecosystem of those who happily promote Pakistan’s narratives in exchange for access.


With the U.S. Embassy in Kabul shuttered, the United States is very likely to do what it usually does: go back to the arsonist and sustain the pretense that it is in fact the fire brigade. The United States will likely find itself more dependent on Pakistan as it seeks a foothold to retain intelligence cooperation and likely drone basing for targeting the terrorist refuges in Pakistan, even while Pakistan continues to cultivate the same refuges. As in the past, whether it was the use of Pakistan territory for U-2 flights or for drones, Pakistan and the United States will likely establish yet another pay-to-play scheme. Pakistan will continue to provide the minimal results to justify the expenditures to a U.S. Congress that is always wary of Pakistan but not enough to do anything meaningful to curtail its myriad outrages. In the meantime, Pakistan’s militant assets cultivated for action in India will benefit enormously from the terrorist safe havens protected by the Taliban-led house of horrors that is the Afghan government.

Pakistan Is an Arsonist That Wants You to Think It’s a Firefighter

Washington has an endless appetite for Islamabad’s con games.

foreignpolicy.com

and?

the article looks to be cut off in the end. i wonder if editorials at FP censored her last paragraph.

 

[CrazyZ]

C. Fair is a lobbyist not an academic. Obama administration got tough on Pakistan and made a strong tilt toward India.......result was a disaster for the USA.

Pakistan did what all factions did in this conflict did (and all sides backed questionable factions). ISI simply beat RAW and NDS in the black ops war..... largely since the hindutva-afghans in Kabul were morons.

The USA simply backed the wrong horses. This is the lesson the professor has to understand.

 

[Zibago]

After getting kicked off of BBC for saying this, she decides to write an article about it LMAO. Enjoy


Washington has an endless appetite for Islamabad’s con games.
By C. Christine Fair, a professor at Georgetown University’s security studies program within the Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service.


SEPTEMBER 10, 2021, 1:37 PM
On Aug. 27, U.S. Sen. Lindsey Graham tweeted, “Any sustainable solution in Afghanistan must include Pakistan,” while also expressing his appreciation for the “efforts of the Pakistani government to assist with the evacuation of U.S. citizens, our allies, and other nations.” His comments reflect a familiar play: Pakistan has spent decades setting fires in South Asia—and then expected praise and renumeration for offering to put them out.

It’s astonishing that U.S. officials continue to peddle Pakistan’s own fictions—alongside such media outlets as the BBC, as I discovered recently when I was cut off in the middle of an interview for speaking about it. But with the Afghanistan debacle on policymakers’ minds, it’s a good time to think critically about Washington’s perpetual vulnerability to Pakistan’s rent-seeking ruses. Both political parties have long been responsible for coddling Pakistan in hopes that there is some mystical U.S. policy that could reform its supposed wayward ally. Even though Pakistan’s involvement in Afghanistan goes back some seven decades, the Washington elite continues to fall for Pakistan’s efforts to sell itself as the solution to the very problems it created.

Pakistani officials tell a heart-wrenching story. Pakistan was minding its business when, in 1979, the United States persuaded Pakistan to shoulder the burden of the struggle against communism in Soviet-controlled Afghanistan. Pakistani officials contend that they were a victim of American perfidy when the latter forgot Pakistan existed in the 1990s, leaving Islamabad to contend with the mess—while Washington had the effrontery to impose sanctions on a bamboozled ally because of its well-known efforts to secure a nuclear weapon.

But Pakistan’s interests in Afghanistan have deep roots. As Husain Haqqani, Rizwan Hussain, and I have shown, Islamabad inherited the British conception of Afghanistan as a buffer state with Russia. From the point of view of the security managers of a newly minted Pakistan, Pakistan inherited the most turbulent threat frontier with a fraction of the British Raj’s resources.

Afghanistan made early fateful decisions that would lock the country in an unwinnable security competition with Pakistan. Afghanistan initially attempted to block Pakistan’s bid to join the United Nations. Beginning in September 1950, Afghanistan began military incursions into Pakistan’s tribal agencies and Baluchistan province. Afghanistan’s efforts to antagonize its much stronger neighbor continued well into the 1970s.

Pakistan, seeking to influence its obstinate western neighbor, began supporting the growth of the reformist Islamist organization Jamaat-e-Islami in Afghanistan, where it originally had little support. This development was propitious. The majority of the so-called mujahideen groups that would eventually be mobilized by Pakistan were rooted in Jamaat-e-Islami.

After Mohammed Daoud Khan came to power in Afghanistan in 1973 and established a one-party republic that embarked on an aggressive top-down social reform program and purged Islamists and communists alike, Pakistan saw an opportunity. Zulfikar Ali Bhutto took the helm of a vivisected Pakistan, which lost half of its population when Bangladesh gained independence in a 1971 war. Bhutto resolved to lose nothing else.

In August 1973, Bhutto set up the Afghan working group within Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) directorate. Despite a brief interregnum, Gen. Muhammad Zia-ul-Haq continued with this policy after he ousted Bhutto in a July 1977 coup. Fifty or so Afghan resistance groups were consolidated by the ISI into a smaller, more manageable number. The ISI was tasked with deepening the links between Pakistani and Afghan Islamist groups. These efforts resulted in seven major Sunni Afghan Islamist militant groups, as well as several Shiite groups. By the time the Soviets had crossed the Amu Darya river into Afghanistan, Zia-ul-Haq’s army and the ISI had already created the key Islamist groups that would become the cornerstone of the so-called anti-Soviet jihad.


As I wrote recently in Foreign Policy, that involvement continues today. The ISI nurtured, created, and supported the Taliban in their first incarnation; it returned to doing the same after the Taliban regime’s fall in late 2001. Pakistan has deployed its spin doctors to claim otherwise—using the same old strategy. Pakistan opines that it is the real victim of terrorism, that it is being unjustly maligned, and that if the West wants to fight terrorism, it needs to give Pakistan more money—and ignore its wrongdoings, which include sponsoring numerous Islamist terrorist groups as well as vertical and horizontal nuclear proliferation.

Ordinary Pakistanis are, indeed, the victims of terrorist monsters—monsters bred and trained by the military-intelligence establishment. As then-U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton told a gathering of Pakistanis in 2011, “You can’t keep snakes in your backyard and expect them only to bite your neighbors.” Yet Islamabad continues to do so—and to offer its snake-catching expertise when they escape.

Pakistan’s ability to convince Americans of its signal importance might seem baffling—but it represents a sophisticated and strategic diplomatic approach. First and foremost, Pakistan exploits information asymmetries. As Teresita and Howard Schaffer wrote in 2011, the United States is one of the most important portfolios for diplomatic, political, and military officials. They are required to know their briefs and recite them convincingly. Most often their American counterparts lack the most rudimentary knowledge of U.S.-Pakistan relations and tend to be persuaded by the narratives on offer. Even intelligence officials will have little operational familiarity with Pakistan, in part because substantive international contacts and travel pose problems for obtaining clearances. The easiest hires are young graduates with little international experience.

Islamabad understands the value of congressional delegations in shaping policymakers’ opinions. Unlike protocol-bound India, Pakistan dispenses with all diplomatic protocol on these occasions. Delegates meet the army chief, the ISI chief, and the prime minister, and they are often treated to military tourism opportunities.

In addition to having lavish budgets for legal lobbyists, Pakistan also has a history of cultivating shadowy figures who launder Islamabad’s dirty laundry and promote its pet projects to American policymakers and opinion-makers. It discourages criticism by denying visas, restricting access, or outright threatening violence to those who dare expose the dark side of Pakistan’s deep state. Conversely, Pakistan incentivizes apologists: It offers free trips where beneficiaries are treated to the famous Pakistani hospitality, which includes private meetings with important Pakistanis across the civilian and military spectrums, helicopter rides to places ordinarily forbidden to foreigners, and a cultivated practice of appearing open and affable. Such access is critical for people working in think tanks who eat from the grants they secure, which require such access to Pakistan’s corridors of power. The combination of these various measures results in a silenced coterie of critics and a sprawling ecosystem of those who happily promote Pakistan’s narratives in exchange for access.


With the U.S. Embassy in Kabul shuttered, the United States is very likely to do what it usually does: go back to the arsonist and sustain the pretense that it is in fact the fire brigade. The United States will likely find itself more dependent on Pakistan as it seeks a foothold to retain intelligence cooperation and likely drone basing for targeting the terrorist refuges in Pakistan, even while Pakistan continues to cultivate the same refuges. As in the past, whether it was the use of Pakistan territory for U-2 flights or for drones, Pakistan and the United States will likely establish yet another pay-to-play scheme. Pakistan will continue to provide the minimal results to justify the expenditures to a U.S. Congress that is always wary of Pakistan but not enough to do anything meaningful to curtail its myriad outrages. In the meantime, Pakistan’s militant assets cultivated for action in India will benefit enormously from the terrorist safe havens protected by the Taliban-led house of horrors that is the Afghan government.

Pakistan Is an Arsonist That Wants You to Think It’s a Firefighter

Washington has an endless appetite for Islamabad’s con games.

foreignpolicy.com

 

[CrazyZ]

She is suffering from serious menstrual disorder, leading to hysteria and eccentricity.

Never thought a non combatant would get PTSD.

 

[sparten]

Please find her a man already!

Or a woman, transgender, really we aren’t discriminatory. She just needs to get some and stop thinking about us.

 

[AgnosticIndian]

2 pages filled with misogynist abuses focusing on the fact that she's an independent woman; the sight of an independent woman alone sets fire to asses who have their whole life only enjoyed it from a male status. and of course delusions of grandeur about Pakistan somehow single handedly destroying all of USSR. this is the "discourse".

 

[Dalit]

You will seldom find such an American who wants to be more Indian than Indians themselves.

2 pages filled with misogynist abuses focusing on the fact that she's an independent woman; the sight of an independent woman alone sets fire to asses who have their whole life only enjoyed it from a male status. and of course delusions of grandeur about Pakistan somehow single handedly destroying all of USSR. this is the "discourse".

You lost and we won. Deal with it.

 

[Maula Jatt]

2 pages filled with misogynist abuses focusing on the fact that she's an independent woman; the sight of an independent woman alone sets fire to asses who have their whole life only enjoyed it from a male status. and of course delusions of grandeur about Pakistan somehow single handedly destroying all of USSR. this is the "discourse".

Seriously you rat looking Pajeets

Seriously these people are so frickin idiotic, if she said it against India

Literally millions of Pajeets will start threatening her with rape, rape of her family members etc

Atleast we are asking her to get a man and looking out for her, but PC they think they're Norway

A truly disgusting and repulsive group of people/nation

 

[TNT]

So poor Pakistan is spending money and all and convincing US policymakers while rich india is doing nothing? Dumb b**** doesn't know india is spending way more but they spend money on dumb b*****s like her and other hateful idiots.

 

[Dalit]

So poor Pakistan is spending money and all and convincing US policymakers while rich india is doing nothing? Dumb b**** doesn't know india is spending way more but they spend money on dumb b*****s like her and other hateful idiots.

Let this American hooker vent her frustration. The winners and losers are declared by now.

 

[Thorough Pro]

Don't insult women

This woman is deranged.