RabzonKhan
SENIOR MEMBER
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Stand-by arrangement with the Fund
EDITORIAL (November 18 2008): Adfter showing a great deal of reluctance, at least outwardly, the government of Pakistan has made the right move to avail itself of the stand-by facility of the International Monetary Fund (IMF). Announcing the decision, the Advisor to the Prime Minister on Finance, Shaukat Tarin said that the minimum amount of the bailout package would be $7.6 billion or five times of our quota in the Fund and the interest rate on the loan would range between 3.51 and 4.5 percent per annum.
The Facility will be available over a period of 23 months or seven quarters and Pakistan would be required to pay back the loan amount from 2011 to 2016. Making a simultaneous announcement from Washington, IMF's Managing Director, Strauss-Kahn added that this support was part of a broader package that includes financial assistance from other multilateral institutions and regional development banks.
He called on the donor community to act quickly to support Pakistan's programme in order to mitigate the impact of the current economic difficulties of the poor and ensure an adequate level of spending on development programmes.
It was also asserted in a press statement that Pakistan's programme was meant to restore the confidence of domestic and external investors by addressing macroeconomic imbalances through a tightening of fiscal and monetary policies and to protect the poor and preserve social stability through a well-targeted and adequately funded social safety net.
Giving the background which necessitated recourse to the Fund programme, Tarin highlighted the fact that Pakistan was facing challenging economic conditions brought about by a combination of global shocks, inaction of the previous government in certain key areas and the ongoing financial crisis hitting every part of the world.
The ultimate reflection of what has happened to Pakistan's economy is seen in the massive loss of exchange reserves from $16.4 billion in October, 2007 to less than $7 billion at present.
Other indicators of economic stress are the slowdown in growth, rising inflation, excessive expansion in monetary assets (21 percent reserve money growth during 2007-08), rising fiscal deficit, depreciating exchange rate (21.8 percent since March, 2008) and a steep decline in stock market valuation.
Salient features of the programme proposed by Pakistan are a sharp reduction in fiscal deficit from 7.4 percent to 4.3 percent of GDP, zero net borrowing from the State Bank, slowdown in monetary growth (M2) to 14 percent, monetary tightening stance of the central bank, adherence to exchange rate flexibility, raising of tax to GDP ratio from 9.6 percent to 15 percent over the next 5-7 years and the provision of adequately funded social safety net (SSN).
The Advisor was very frank in admitting that the government had approached the multilateral agencies and friendly countries to support our programme and help plug the financing gap. They were willing "to give us a helping hand" but advised us to get the endorsement of our programme from the IMF. The IMF, when contacted, showed a positive approach and felt that our targets were reasonable except the interest rate which was proposed to be enhanced further to curtail the core inflation.
The Advisor to the Prime Minister on Finance has, in our view, made a good case and provided adequate justification for going to the IMF and seeking its assistance at a time when major indicators of the economy were fast deteriorating or becoming untenable.
In order to placate the negative sentiments against the IMF prevailing in the country, it was also essential to establish that the financing gap was huge and no other source was willing to come forward to provide the needed assistance until and unless the programme was endorsed by the IMF and backed by its tangible assistance.
After the approval of the programme by the Fund Board, which is almost a certainty, we are sure that financial inflows including an amount of $4.5 billion from the IMF during 2007-08 would be enough to keep our foreign exchange reserves at a comfortable level and maintain solvency of the country.
A great advantage of the Fund programme would be restoration of credibility in our reform effort and the faith of international community that the country would soon regain macroeconomic stability. This will encourage both domestic and foreign investors and give a lot of comfort to donors and other multilateral agencies.
The improved investment environment coupled with the expected reduction in the imbalances in the economy would definitely help in overcoming the economic difficulties now being faced by the country. The claim by Shaukat Tarin that the programme was mostly home grown was probably directed to show that economic policies of the country would not be dictated by the IMF.
This was perhaps not needed because everybody knows that conditionalities are agreed by mutual consultations. It was another matter if, keeping the past experience in view, economic managers of the country were already aware of the IMF prescriptions and willing to accept them beforehand for successful negotiation of the programme at an early date.
However, experience suggests that negotiation of the programme is the easier part. The devil is in its details and implementation. For instance, while measures like tightening of monetary policy and maintaining exchange rate flexibility could be undertaken without much resistance, fiscal part of the programme would be most difficult to implement.
The Government of Pakistan has pledged to increase tax to GDP ratio to 15 percent in the medium term, reduce the budget deficit from 7.4 percent last year to 4.3 percent this year and maintain a strict financial discipline throughout the programme period. This would call for measures like imposition of income tax on exempted sectors and withdrawal of subsidies, besides pruning of both current and development expenditures.
Although it is well known that worsening fiscal outcome is the root cause of most of the economic problems of the country, the above mentioned measures are likely to be resisted all the way, risking the derailment of the programme. The recent uproar against the privatisation of Qadirpur gas field and increase in electricity tariff is a rough indication of the things to come.
Wriggling out of the Fund programme under public pressure would be highly regrettable and sure to hurt the image of the country very badly. Unfortunately, opposition parties of the country are not known for extending a helping hand to the government in matters of fiscal prudence and preparing the public for necessary sacrifices.
While Pakistan has its own difficulties, IMF also needs to change its outlook in order to ensure successful conclusion of its programmes. Assistance of $7.6 billion over a period of two years appears to be small compared to the projected current account deficit during this period and reflects the desire of the Fund to keep the country on a tight leash.
It would have been better to increase the loan amount under the Facility to about $10 billion so that economic managers of the country could fully concentrate on the reform process without feeling the need to run in other directions and negotiate for funds from other sources.
Also, the broad parameters of the (detailed conditionalities are not yet available) the terms agreed with the Fund indicate that compression of demand has been given more importance than supply side imperatives to restore macroeconomic stability. We feel that a Fund programme should be so devised that it is desirable and doable without inflicting an intolerable degree of pain.
EDITORIAL (November 18 2008): Adfter showing a great deal of reluctance, at least outwardly, the government of Pakistan has made the right move to avail itself of the stand-by facility of the International Monetary Fund (IMF). Announcing the decision, the Advisor to the Prime Minister on Finance, Shaukat Tarin said that the minimum amount of the bailout package would be $7.6 billion or five times of our quota in the Fund and the interest rate on the loan would range between 3.51 and 4.5 percent per annum.
The Facility will be available over a period of 23 months or seven quarters and Pakistan would be required to pay back the loan amount from 2011 to 2016. Making a simultaneous announcement from Washington, IMF's Managing Director, Strauss-Kahn added that this support was part of a broader package that includes financial assistance from other multilateral institutions and regional development banks.
He called on the donor community to act quickly to support Pakistan's programme in order to mitigate the impact of the current economic difficulties of the poor and ensure an adequate level of spending on development programmes.
It was also asserted in a press statement that Pakistan's programme was meant to restore the confidence of domestic and external investors by addressing macroeconomic imbalances through a tightening of fiscal and monetary policies and to protect the poor and preserve social stability through a well-targeted and adequately funded social safety net.
Giving the background which necessitated recourse to the Fund programme, Tarin highlighted the fact that Pakistan was facing challenging economic conditions brought about by a combination of global shocks, inaction of the previous government in certain key areas and the ongoing financial crisis hitting every part of the world.
The ultimate reflection of what has happened to Pakistan's economy is seen in the massive loss of exchange reserves from $16.4 billion in October, 2007 to less than $7 billion at present.
Other indicators of economic stress are the slowdown in growth, rising inflation, excessive expansion in monetary assets (21 percent reserve money growth during 2007-08), rising fiscal deficit, depreciating exchange rate (21.8 percent since March, 2008) and a steep decline in stock market valuation.
Salient features of the programme proposed by Pakistan are a sharp reduction in fiscal deficit from 7.4 percent to 4.3 percent of GDP, zero net borrowing from the State Bank, slowdown in monetary growth (M2) to 14 percent, monetary tightening stance of the central bank, adherence to exchange rate flexibility, raising of tax to GDP ratio from 9.6 percent to 15 percent over the next 5-7 years and the provision of adequately funded social safety net (SSN).
The Advisor was very frank in admitting that the government had approached the multilateral agencies and friendly countries to support our programme and help plug the financing gap. They were willing "to give us a helping hand" but advised us to get the endorsement of our programme from the IMF. The IMF, when contacted, showed a positive approach and felt that our targets were reasonable except the interest rate which was proposed to be enhanced further to curtail the core inflation.
The Advisor to the Prime Minister on Finance has, in our view, made a good case and provided adequate justification for going to the IMF and seeking its assistance at a time when major indicators of the economy were fast deteriorating or becoming untenable.
In order to placate the negative sentiments against the IMF prevailing in the country, it was also essential to establish that the financing gap was huge and no other source was willing to come forward to provide the needed assistance until and unless the programme was endorsed by the IMF and backed by its tangible assistance.
After the approval of the programme by the Fund Board, which is almost a certainty, we are sure that financial inflows including an amount of $4.5 billion from the IMF during 2007-08 would be enough to keep our foreign exchange reserves at a comfortable level and maintain solvency of the country.
A great advantage of the Fund programme would be restoration of credibility in our reform effort and the faith of international community that the country would soon regain macroeconomic stability. This will encourage both domestic and foreign investors and give a lot of comfort to donors and other multilateral agencies.
The improved investment environment coupled with the expected reduction in the imbalances in the economy would definitely help in overcoming the economic difficulties now being faced by the country. The claim by Shaukat Tarin that the programme was mostly home grown was probably directed to show that economic policies of the country would not be dictated by the IMF.
This was perhaps not needed because everybody knows that conditionalities are agreed by mutual consultations. It was another matter if, keeping the past experience in view, economic managers of the country were already aware of the IMF prescriptions and willing to accept them beforehand for successful negotiation of the programme at an early date.
However, experience suggests that negotiation of the programme is the easier part. The devil is in its details and implementation. For instance, while measures like tightening of monetary policy and maintaining exchange rate flexibility could be undertaken without much resistance, fiscal part of the programme would be most difficult to implement.
The Government of Pakistan has pledged to increase tax to GDP ratio to 15 percent in the medium term, reduce the budget deficit from 7.4 percent last year to 4.3 percent this year and maintain a strict financial discipline throughout the programme period. This would call for measures like imposition of income tax on exempted sectors and withdrawal of subsidies, besides pruning of both current and development expenditures.
Although it is well known that worsening fiscal outcome is the root cause of most of the economic problems of the country, the above mentioned measures are likely to be resisted all the way, risking the derailment of the programme. The recent uproar against the privatisation of Qadirpur gas field and increase in electricity tariff is a rough indication of the things to come.
Wriggling out of the Fund programme under public pressure would be highly regrettable and sure to hurt the image of the country very badly. Unfortunately, opposition parties of the country are not known for extending a helping hand to the government in matters of fiscal prudence and preparing the public for necessary sacrifices.
While Pakistan has its own difficulties, IMF also needs to change its outlook in order to ensure successful conclusion of its programmes. Assistance of $7.6 billion over a period of two years appears to be small compared to the projected current account deficit during this period and reflects the desire of the Fund to keep the country on a tight leash.
It would have been better to increase the loan amount under the Facility to about $10 billion so that economic managers of the country could fully concentrate on the reform process without feeling the need to run in other directions and negotiate for funds from other sources.
Also, the broad parameters of the (detailed conditionalities are not yet available) the terms agreed with the Fund indicate that compression of demand has been given more importance than supply side imperatives to restore macroeconomic stability. We feel that a Fund programme should be so devised that it is desirable and doable without inflicting an intolerable degree of pain.