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Introduction
Pakistan’s militant rehabilitation programme was launched in September 2009 after the successful completion of a military operation (Rah-e-Rast) against the Pakistani Taliban in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province’s Swat district. Swat district had fallen in the hands of the Taliban in the summer of 2007. The Pakistani military took two years to regain the control of the area and restore the writ of the state. Many of the militants apprehended during the operation were teenagers trained as suicide bombers (Burke 2013). The overwhelming presence of teenagers among the detainees exposed the limitations of hard approaches to countering the problems associated with terrorism in the country. So, the military decided to initiate a rehabilitation programme for the detained militants to provide them with a second chance to live a normal life. Later, the programme was expanded to Punjab and the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA). Like the programme in Swat district, the militant rehabilitation initiative in FATA also focuses on the detained militants of different local Taliban groups. Meanwhile, the programme in Punjab rehabilitates those militants who surrender to the government voluntarily and are ready to renounce militancy. Majority of the militants rehabilitated in Punjab belong to terrorist groups like Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT), Jaish-e-Muhammad and Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LeJ). This is the background against which Islamabad’s militant/detainee rehabilitation programme is founded. It comprise of four phases; (i) psychological counselling; (ii) correction of their extremist views through religious education; (iii) imparting of formal education followed by vocational training; and (iv) re-integration to facilitate their transition back into the society. Currently, there are at least 10 militant rehabilitation centres operating in different parts of the country (See Table 1).
Need for a Militant Rehabilitation Programme in Pakistan
The rationale for militant rehabilitation initiatives in Pakistan is based on the following; First, militants who want to surrender by actively demobilising from violence, disassociating from their respective militant organisations and who also agree to follow the law of the state deserve a second chance to lead normal lives (Qazi 2011). Second, research indicates that many especially the youth who have joined Islamist militant groups participate in violence for reasons that have very little to do with extremist ideology (Manzar 2013). They are either coerced by their families and communities, or driven by socioeconomic factors. With proper guidance, they can be persuaded to adopt a more moderate worldview and can be weaned away from the path of violence (Holmer 2014). Third, at its core, fighting terrorism today is fundamentally a war of ideas in which deradicalisation and rehabilitation, together with kinetic means, are important components (Pervez 2011). Last but not the least, in Pakistan, extremism and terrorism have a cause and effect relationship. Whereas extremist ideology has often been found to be the cause of terrorist violence in recent years, on its own, the extremist narratives stem from the widespread presence of diverse local and foreign militant organisations, sectarian fissures within the religion itself and illiteracy. Therefore, deradicalisation and rehabilitation initiatives are necessary to counteract extremists’ ideological appeal in the society (Sial 2013). It is in this context that this article examines militant rehabilitation programmes in different parts of Pakistan.
Militant Rehabilitation in Swat
In Swat district, the militant rehabilitation programmes, which are referred to as the ‘DeRadicalisation and Emancipation Programmes’ (DREPs), are comprised of three components based on the age of the beneficiaries. Sabaoon (First Ray of Dawn) and Rastoon (Place of Right Path) is for juveniles between 12 and18 years of age; Mashal (Torch of Light) is for youths between 19 and 25 years of age, and Sparlay centre is for militants’ family to create awareness about aftercare initiatives for rehabilitated individuals (Rana 2011). These centres are run as learning places rather than as prisons. The programmes are run within a framework of public-private partnership, although the overall supervision is with the Pakistan Army. The Hum Pakistan Foundation (HPF), an umbrella body of local civil society and non-governmental organisations in Swat, assists the army in managing the programmes (Rafique and Ahmed 2013). Moreover, the Swat programmes are supported by a dedicated team of doctors, psychologists, religious clerics and other professionals. The programmes have four components: psychological rehabilitation; religious counselling; formal and vocational training and social reintegration. The programmes also include meeting with parents and engaging the beneficiaries to participate in sports, cultural events and festivals (Abbasi 2014).
Psychological Counselling
Psychological rehabilitation has always been the first stage in the rehabilitation process. In this stage, psychologists investigate an individual’s emotional, psychological, and intellectual condition and the personal narratives of detained or surrendered militants to determine how they were recruited, what their roles were within the organisation and the nature of their relationship with other militants (e.g. community-based links or family ties) which forms the basis of assessing their continued inclination towards militancy (Hargon 2010). Based on these findings, psychologists classify individuals according to four broad categories: very high risk, high risk, medium risk and low risk. For instance, a child who served in a terrorist group for a shorter time period and mostly carried out menial tasks like cleaning, cooking, fetching water etc. would be considered low-risk. A medium-risk inmate would become responsible for providing logistical support, such as transport and access to food. In contrast, high-risk individuals are those who have received training in using weapons and executed attacks, guarded Taliban check-posts or worked as spies. Finally, those who were found to be inclined and were trained as suicide bombers would be considered as belonging to the very high risk category (Sohail 2010). From a psychological perspective, the rehabilitation process, which varies from six months to two or three years, is tailored according to the risk category in which the concerned individual falls under (Hargon 2013).
Religious Counselling
Religious counselling is the second stage of the militant rehabilitation programme. Religious counselling serves to moderate the militants’ extremist religious views and is hence a slow process with a longer time frame. The need for religious counselling is based on the notion that the detainee must undergo a behavioural modification through changing his extremist religious views. An important component of this counselling is the use of religious dialogue with clerics well versed with mainstream Islamic concepts. This is critical in challenging the extremist mind-set, which seeks to legitimise violent behaviour. The goal of such initiatives is to ensure that the individual entertains more balanced and moderate views especially in respect of key Islamic concepts, including the fact that only the official authorities of a state can proclaim armed jihad. Moreover, as per the Islamic ruling in a Muslim majority country like Pakistan, only the state is authorised to declare jihad in strict conformity with international law (Hassan 2007).
Formal Education and Vocational Training
The Swat programme also offers formal education from grades 1 to 12 (or high school). The aim of such formal education is to promote critical thinking and equip these individuals with tools to pursue higher education after the rehabilitation process. The programme also helps them to have more informed views of the world. The curriculum attempts to teach students about religious pluralism and tolerance (Abbasi 2014). The focus of providing vocational training is to equip individuals with the teaching skills to enhance his or her employability in fields like electronics, computing, carpentry, automobile mechanics, welding, appliance repair, basic electrician skills, masonry, and poultry farming. Vocational training serves to furnish the former militants with the technical skills to enable them to gain some form of employment – formal or informal. It follows the basic philosophy that to dissuade extremist ideology and to discourage the militants from pursuing violence, these men need practical skills to allow them the ability to have some income for themselves and to support their families (Raston 2013).
Social Reintegration
In the social reintegration process, the detainees are prepared to return to their families and communities. This is done through participation in community-level activities. These activities include religious and cultural festivals as well as debate competitions (Hassan 2014) both at the local and national level. This is carried out through a three-month syllabus incorporating both curricular and extra-curricular activities. During this period, individuals are assessed as to whether they are fit to return to the mainstream society and the community is taken on board in making such determinations (Abbasi 2014). Low risk children are reintegrated earlier if they and their families do not have militant connections and if there is no militant presence in their community. Monitoring teams visit villages and communities to ensure that this is so. Furthermore, the teams also ensure that upon successful completion of the rehabilitation programme, individuals can either enrol in a school for further education or gain employment. To counter the potential for these individuals to return to their old ways, the monitoring teams check in with reintegrated children on a weekly or monthly basis, depending on the risk level assessed at the beginning. This monitoring process, which is targeted at reducing recidivism rates, lasts for a minimum of two years.
Militant Rehabilitation Program
in Punjab In 2011, a militant rehabilitation programme was inaugurated in the Punjab province. This programme was jointly run by the Counter Terrorism Department (CTD) and Technical Vocational Training Authority (TEVTA) of the Punjab government. While the militant rehabilitation programmes in Swat rehabilitates Taliban militants, the programme in Punjab rehabilitated former militants of groups like Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT or Army of the Pure), Jaish-e-Muhammad (JeM or Muhammad’s Army) which were focused on the liberation of Kashmir from India and anti-Shi’ite militants group like Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LeJ or Army of the Jhangvi) and Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan (Rafique and Ahmed 2013). Like the Swat rehabilitation programme, the one in Punjab was also based on a three-pronged strategy of prevention, rehabilitation and aftercare. The programme comprised of three modules: psychological rehabilitation, religious counselling and vocational training. Approximately 311 former militants completed training in three batches. These trainings and rehabilitations were organised at various regional and district headquarters to make it convenient for participants to attend (Noor 2013). However, due to the lack of funding, the Punjab government shelved the programme in 2012. As a result, about 1,300 militants who had been selected to undergo rehabilitation could not be taken on board due to the programme’s closure (Ghuman 2015).
Militant Rehabilitation Centres in FATA
In 2012, Pakistan army established two new militant rehabilitation centres in the Bajaur and Khyber districts of Pakistan’s Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA). The programme in Bajaur Agency is set up in the Sikandaro and it is jointly run by the army and the paramilitary Frontier Corps (FC). Like the Swat rehabilitation programme, it also focuses on psychological and religious counselling, along with formal education and vocational training. However, a distinguishing feature of this programme is that it operates as a learning centre, and not as a prison (Abbasi 2014). The programme in Khyber Agency has three rehabilitation centres with approximately 400 former militants. Beneficiaries spend 18 hours a day under the supervision of instructors both from the army and from the civilian sector (Tribune 2015). Similar to the Swat programme, detainees receive corrective religious counselling. In addition, the inmates are taught employability skills like tailoring, welding furniture and repairing cell phones. One unique feature of the Khyber rehabilitation programme is that it incorporates feedback from students on what they would like to learn (Wajahat 2015). The underlying motive of taking the feedback from students is to know what the students would like to learn that will make them a useful citizen and embraces more balanced views and not intended to force them to go through the modules devised by the government. The idea is to help these individuals with self-empowerment which is an important antidote to extremism.
Conclusion
Terrorism in Pakistan has been dynamic and constantly evolving. The terrorist groups in Pakistan keep changing their modes of recruitment, attack tactics and propaganda. Those involved in counter-terrorism have to be equally innovative with their preventive and preemptive policies in order to remain relevant and effective. Pakistan’s de-radicalisation programme, with its focus on militant rehabilitation is a step in the right direction. However, it is still in its early stages. To strengthen its viability and effectiveness, the programme should be expanded at the national level since at present the initiatives are mostly local or ad-hoc and lack resources as was the case in the Punjab province. A comprehensive counter-radicalisation policy should also be introduced in conjunction with the militant rehabilitation programme to create an environment that is fertile for the spread of tolerant ideas and resistant to the growth of extremism. Given the scale of extremism in Pakistan and in the absence of a counterradicalisation policy, existing de-radicalisation interventions appear to be narrow, and run the risk of losing steam over time.
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Abdul Basit is an Associate Research Fellow (ARF) at the International Centre for Political Violence and Terrorism Research (ICPVTR) of the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), Singapore.
https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/26351388.pdf?refreqid=excelsior:f31a90653069cd3e4d340e764787db64
