Pakistan Army | News and Discussions

[Bratva]

https://www.facebook.com/video.php?v=873972615986778

Light commando battalion new black outfit. 0:50-1:10

 

[SekrutYakhni]

I have heard Komando Elite also took the prisoners out of the jail and fielded them in the Jihadi land - During early days.

If that is true, Komando Elite needs a Triple Article 6 announced by Thai Babe hunz.

 

[fatman17]

Military Promotions

According to a report published by BBC Urdu on September 17, the names of the new Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) chief and four new lieutenant generals of the army are likely to be announced next week. Army chief Gen. Raheel Sharif reportedly wants to promote five major generals to the position of lieutenant generals before the new ISI director general is named so as to allow one of the promoted generals to be in contention for the top intelligence post. The incumbent ISI chief and four other lieutenant generals are scheduled to retire from service in the first week of October.[12]

 

[Faraz5000]

 

[fatman17]

Military

• Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif, at the proposal of army chief Gen. Raheel Sharif, appointed now Lt. Gen. Rizwan Akhtar to the head the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI). Akhtar is considered an ally of Gen. Sharif. Prior to this appointment, then-Maj. Gen. Akhtar headed the Sindh Rangers where he oversaw an operation to clear Karachi of militants and gangs. Prior to that, Maj. Gen. Akhtar commanded the 9th Infantry Division in in South Waziristan. Five other major generals were promoted to lieutenant general as well. Lt. Gen. Hilal Hussain has been posted to the Mangla Corps from his post as Director General of Military Training in Rawalpindi. Lt. Gen. Hidayat was posted to Peshawar Corps from his post as Chief Instructor at the National Defence University (NDU). Lt. Gen. Navid Mukhtar was posted to the Karachi Corps from his post as a deputy director general in the ISI. Lt. Gen. Ghayur Mahmood was posted to the Gujranwala Corps from his post as Vice Chief of General Staff in Rawalpindi. Lt. Gen. Butt was appointed Inspector General of Commutation and Information Technology from his post as Commandant of the Pakistan Military Academy, Kakul.[1]

 

[osama zafar]

First-ever Sikh joins Pak Army

By Arslan Rafiq Bhatti

LAHORE, Punjab -- Sardar Harcharan Singh became the first Pakistani-born Sikh since 1947 to join the 116th Long Course as a cadet at the Pakistan Military Academy.

He reported for training at the academy last week. Christians and Hindus have already been in the civil, judicial and military services of Pakistan, however no Sikh ever applied for Army commission over the past 58 years.

Born to a lower-middle class family of Nankana Sahib, Harcharan is the son of the late Sardar Aya Singh, a local cloth trader. He died 11 years back leaving behind a widow and five children, Harcharan being the second last among his three daughters and two sons.

Harcharan was determined to do something different from other Sikhs. Since his childhood, he has been a good student and the credit goes to his mother, Mrs Ameer Kaur, who is the main source of encouragement for him.

Talking to The News, before joining the academy, Harcharan said: "I had a dream which comes true, and now I have been selected for the Army. I am standing here due to my mother’s efforts that is always a sources of inspiration for me and helped me reach the height in my academic carrier.

"I did matric from Govt Guru Nanka School, Nankana Sahib, with distinction and got 677 marks. I did intermediate from FC College in Pre-Engineering with 726 marks. I wanted to be in the armed forces since it is the most challenging job in the country. One really feels proud while wearing a uniform and same is the case with me. I am selected purely on merit. I was selected in National College of Arts for Architecture Department but after I got call from army, I was on top of the world."

He said: "My aim of joining the army is to serve the country like other communities. I was surprised to notice that no Sikh ever joined army as a regular officer. It was my effort during entire academic career that I should be the need of an institution and note vice versa."

"I am thankful to Veer Gee after my mother, who always encouraged me to study more and do something different from others, who are roaming in the bazaars of Nankana Sahib." Harcharan was number four in his family but elder in male members as his three elder sisters were married and living happily. His younger brother Sardar Surrinder Singh, a matric student, too wants to join the armed forces.

Source: Jang

I have met the guy myself, hes a good officer and a really friendly one too, but the guy is huge he does gym atleast 6 -7 hours a day.

 

[fatman17]

I have met the guy myself, hes a good officer and a really friendly one too, but the guy is huge he does gym atleast 6 -7 hours a day.

SSG material......

 

[fatman17]

Domestic Politics

• According to a report in The News on September 23, a cabinet minister said that the new Director General of Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), Lt. Gen. Rizwan Akhtar, is a professional soldier and has been appointed with the complete agreement of Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif as well as Chief of Army Staff Gen. Raheel Sharif. The government also expects the new appointments in the Pakistan Army to add to the professionalism of the institution as well as improve civil-military relations.[3]

 

[fatman17]

New ISI Chief

• A report in The News on September 24 claims that the newly appointed Director General of the Directorate for Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), Lt. Gen. Rizwan Akhtar, is a firm believer in democracy, based on a research paper Lt. Gen. Akhtar wrote in March 2008 during his time at the U.S. Army War College in Pennsylvania. According to the report, the research paper, titled “US-Pakistan Trust Deficit and the War of Terror,” advocates that the role of the military should be limited to ensuring the nation’s security from external threats and should “only be utilized for internal security as a last resort.”[6]
• 
  couldnt agree more...

 

[fatman17]

Priceless...

 

[fatman17]

REFLECTIONS ON THE 1965 WAR:
Brian Cloughley.

One could spend a very long time going back over the ground of the 1965 war, because, as I have wriften elsewhere:the originsof the war, its conduct, and, its consequences are qUite complex. Most books covering
the period deal in the main with the outcome of the war rather than the reasons for it. This Isunderstandable given that there appears to have been no national aim on the part of Pakistan for going to war in the first place.
In 1965, the war aim of Pakistan was neither enunciated nor apparent. 'Survival' is not an aim, it is a pious desire, and although Pakistan's Armed Forces fought well during the 1965 war, they lacked the openly-declared Clausewitzian objective that they should fight to overcome the enemy, invest histerritory, and, ensure his total defeat. India’s forceshad no inhibitions. They attacked Pakistan on 6 September with the aim of crushing it. Destruction of Pakistan was essential, according to India's leaders, if India was to be confident of supremacy in the sub-continent. But Pakistan fought back, and the war ended on 23 September. Both countries' economies were badly affected and their defense forces had suffered severe blows. There was no winner, but important military lessons had been learnt. Perhaps the following description of one engagement might give an idea of some of them. It covers part of what went on in the Sialkot Sector.

Sialkot Sector is only six miles from the border with India and is not a 'good tank country' because there is little room for mass manoeuvre due to the extensive canal system's interlock with the main rivers. Further, the Chenab and Jhelum rivers would be (and still are) major obstacles to movementnorth-westwards towards Islamabad.

There are differing accounts of the reasons for the Indian advance towards Sialkot. It may be that the objectives were imprecise at the time of orders being issued, which is unlikely given long-standing plans for war in the west, or that they wereconcealed afterwards in the interests of avoiding'criticism of the failure to attain them. Oneincontrovertible fact is that a captured Indian Armyorder indicated the intention to cut the Grand Trunk Road and railway at Gujranwala, but this was probably a local tactical objective. The overall plan was and remains undefined, but reasonable conjecture may be made concerning its detailsbased on examination of Indian, Pakistani, and neutral sources. Notwithstanding any territorial imperatives, it is apparent that the Indian aim was to defeat the Pakistan Army in the field, and, according to one analysis by a distinguished academic, their accounts concerning the advance in the Sialkot sector had 'a cluster of generalobjectives' aiming to:

• pre-empt a Pakistani advance on Jammu planned for 10 September;
• draw off Pakistani forces from the Chhamb sector,
• prevent Pakistan reinforcing on the Lahore front; and
• draw into battle, and then destroy, Pakistani armour.

There does not appear to be evidence that a Pakistani plan existed to attack Jammu on 10 September. Their advance on Akhnur, twenty miles north of Jammu, had been halted five days previously and it was obvious that they could go no further without substantial reinforcement in the Chhamb area. It may well be that there was an
Indian plan to draw away Pakistani forces from Chhamb and Lahore but, if so, it is open to question why they should have committed an entire corps of more than three divisions, including the premier armoured formation, to an area in which a feint would have been enough to achieve these objectives. The possibility that one objectivewas the destruction of Pakistan's armour is difficult to substantiate as existing before the advance,

Although it might have become an aim after the Pakistani armour was committed. The Indiansadmit they were unaware of the existence of 6thArmoured Division, which was south-west ofSialkot. Even had its location and identity been known, the defeat of two tank units would hardlyhave represented 'destruction of Pakistani armour.'

The argument that the thrust would draw in all other Pakistani armour from elsewhere to meet with destruction does not stand up, because there could be no guarantee that all other armour would move into the Sialkot sector, and even were there a desire to do so, Indian pressure on Lahore would militate against complete withdrawal of Pakistani tanks from that area. As it happened, three more armoured regiments were brought in, but even this was hardly the concentration that would meet an objective of annihilation.

Accounts differ as to how many tanks were put out of action by both sides, but if it was India'sintention to win a battle of attrition this did not succeed. The advance was blunted and thePakistanis were able to hold their positions andprevent penetration of the vital ground between Sialkot and Lahore. It appears that the Indian aimwas simply to attack where it considered the enemy was weak and to gain as much ground as possible while endeavouring to keep the enemy off balance. Exploitation would come later, wheneither the Lahore or the Sialkot offensive was successful. This is a perfectly understandable aim,and one that might just have been achieved had it not been for the stubborn resistance of numerically inferior Pakistani formations.

The Indian invasion of Pakistan in the Sialkot sector began on the night of 7/8 September on two axes: the Jammu-Sialkot road, and a parallel route some twelve miles to the south-east.

1 (Indian) Corps was commanded by a steady and experienced officer, Lt-GeneralP 0 Dunn, who had been given only a few days to movehis HQ from Delhi to Jammu, where he arrived on 3 September.His corps consisted of:

· 26 Infantry Division, which advanced on the axis of the Jammu-Sialkot road via the Indian border village of Suchetgarh. Guizar Ahmed claims that the division had four infantry brigades and two armoured regiments, rather than the conventional three plus one, and it appears from other sources that this was so in at least the early stages of the advance. It is likely that the extra brigade and armoured regiment were corps' assets allocated for a specific phase of the operation - but whatever the arrangements; there was a powerful punch on this axis.

· 6 Mountain Division, on the southern axis, crossed the border near the Pakistani village of Charwa. It is claimed by one source that this formation and 1" Armoured Division were understrength, but no yardstick is given. A mountain division, by definition, does not have an integral armoured regiment, and the analyst may have mistaken the division’sorder of battle at the beginning of conflict with the organization that applied on 10/11 September, when one of its brigades came temporarily under command of the armoured division.

· 1 Armoured Division joined the advance at first light on 8 September, crossing the border near Charwa and moving south-west towards Chawinda. It had two armoured brigades each of two tank regiments and a lorried infantry battalion; and a lorried infantry brigade of two battalions. Its artillery included medium and heavy guns. It was a wellbalanced formation, but the division had exchanged one, and possibly two, of its Centurion-equipped regiments with Sherman regiments of 2 Independent Armoured brigade, thus reducing its clout.

· Elements of 14 Infantry Division were in the area but there are conflicting accounts of its role. One source states that 7 Mountain Division, and 1 Armoured Division advanced on a front stretching from exclusive of Bajra Garhi to just east of the Degh Nadi, apparently with the initial task ofcutting the Sialkot-Narowal-lahore railway. Another analyst claims it rolled down across the wide stretch Charwa-Bajra Garhi.' But it appears that the division was not complete in the area of operations until some days after the initial Indian assault, and even then that it had the task of covering the left flank of 1 Armoured and 6 Infantry Divisions, and the right flank of I5 Corps, which was attacking on the lahore front. During its move to the Jammu sector from Saugor (in central India) it had apparently 'received a pasting from the PAF' and was, as a result, 'in poor shape.'

· 7 Mountain Division' is mentioned by one academic in his excellent analysis but, so far as can be determined, by nobody else who has written about the war. 7 Infantry Division fought on the lahore front, but it is possible that a misidentification occurred, resulting in confusion of 7 Mountain Division with a brigade of the same number that belonged to 6 Mountain Division. If anyone reading this can enlighten me about the matter or any other matter -I would be grateful.

In the opening stages of the battles, Pakistan's 1 Corps covered the Sialkot sector with I5 Infantry Division consisting of seven battalions in four brigades (24, 101, 104, and 115), with 25 Cavalry as itsarmoured regiment, and a good allocation of artillery.

But there were problems, not the least of which was that 115 Brigade was fighting in the Jassar area, where it was required to remain for the rest of the war. 101 Brigade (19 Punjab and 13 FF) was the only formation directly defending Sialkot, and was located astride the main road to Jammu where it faced the onslaught of the Indian 26 Division. 24 Brigade (2 Punjab and 3 FF, plus 25 Cavalry under command) was between the border and Chawinda, which lies due east of an almost right-angled bend in the Sialkot lahore railway. 104 Brigade, which consisted of a single battalion, 9 Baloch, was in reserve in the area of Uggoke/Raipur, about four miles west of Sialkot. It seemed that in the Jammu/Sialkot sector, the Indian Army might be able to bring sufficient force to bear to carry the day and even win the war. India's 1 Corps advanced with two infantry divisions and an armoured division against a Pakistani armoured brigade and a single infantry division that hadfragmented and understrength fighting units, no cohesive defensive plan, and some leaders of dubious quality who were already under considerable pressure. India's Ist ArmouredDivision was ready to exploit the advantage won by the infantry force preceding it. The way to the west seemed open.

6 Armoured Division, consisting of the Guides Cavalry, 22ndCavalry, Ist(SP) Regiment of 25 pounder guns on tracked chassis,and '4thBattalion The Frontier Force Regiment' (in fact no morethan a brigade of eighty tanks, 12 guns, and 700 infantry inlorries), was in leaguer around Kot Daska, I5 miles south-west ofSialkot and 30 miles west of the border. Chawinda, where it wasto win its spurs, was twenty miles away. The units moved quicklywhen it became apparent that the Indian invasion was takingplace.

In the north, two battalions of India's 26 Division crossed the border astride the Jammu Sialkot road at about midnight on 7 September. They quickly overcame the outposts of the Sutle! Rangers (light scouting forces) but were brought to a halt by 101 Brigade and the weight of Pakistan's artillery. According to one writer, the approaches to Sialkot 'bristled with pill-boxes, bunkers and gun emplacements,' the latter including 'three field and one medium artillery regiments, one heavy battery and one heavy mortar regiment.' A concentration of this number of guns and mortars would cover an area of about 500 meters by 150 meters in which the weight of shells and mortar bombs from one round of fire from each equipment would be approximately two tons. Not only this, but the artillery was well-handled and 'some senior Indian army officers who had served in World War II likened the scale of Pakistani artillery fire to heavy Concentrations in the latter stages of that war. While this is not borne out by inspection of battlefields, it does indicate that Pakistan's artillery fire was substantial and effective.'

26 Division managed to reach the village of Kalarawanda, about three miles west of the border, by the time of the cease-fire on 23 September. There was a massive effort on the part of the Indian Army on the northern axis of the Sialkot front, but an advance of only three miles cannot be called satisfactory when one considers the numerical superiority of 26 Division. The defence of Sialkot by 19 Punjab and 13 FF and their supporting gunners was more dogged than glamorous, more indefatigable than dramatic; but, their courage and tenacity were unmatching.

The writer is a France based retired officer of Australian Army and Is an expert on South Asian affairs. He is also author of different books, and contributesextensively in international media. beec/uff@gmail.com

 

[fatman17]

The man who keeps Pakistan prime ministers on edge
By Faseeh Mangi
Bloomberg News
Published: October 2, 2014

Pakistan army chief Raheel Sharif
KARACHI, Pakistan — Aboard a private bus heading to the funeral of a Pakistani army instructor, Raheel Sharif fumed as a small television set showed provocative dancers. Finally he took matters into his own hands.
"He stood, smashed the screen with some object and shouted 'Don't you guys have any decency? Families are sitting here and you screened such rubbish,'" Simon Sharaf, a former roommate of Sharif who witnessed the exchange back in 1993, said in an interview in Rawalpindi, home to the military's headquarters. "Nobody dared to move or say anything."

Two decades later, Raheel Sharif is keeping Pakistan's civilian leaders on edge as army chief even as he refrains from seizing power in a country with a long history of military rule. Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif, who was ousted in a 1999 coup and isn't related to the army chief, has seen his authority diminish in recent months as the military's has risen.

The standoff is increasing Raheel Sharif's influence over government policies, particularly how to handle often terse relations with neighboring countries as the U.S. begins reducing its troop presence in Afghanistan. Nawaz Sharif's moves to seek peace talks with nuclear-armed India and Taliban militants operating along the Afghan border are indefinitely stalled.

"Eventually there will be a negotiated outcome — brokered by the military — that keeps the government in power, offers some concessions to the protesters, and above all makes the military even stronger than it has been," Michael Kugelman, an Asia analyst at the Woodrow Wilson Center in Washington, said by email of the political impasse. "The military will likely take over the India and Afghanistan portfolios, jeopardizing — unfortunately — the progress the civilians have made toward rapprochement with both of those countries."

Nawaz Sharif bypassed two more senior generals last year when he appointed Raheel Sharif, who was seen as an apolitical choice that would enhance civilian control of the armed forces. Tensions slowly rose as the government sought talks with Taliban militants and brought treason charges against former military ruler Pervez Musharraf, who had ousted Nawaz Sharif in 1999.

Now, after six of weeks of protests led by opposition leader Imran Khan, Raheel Sharif has asserted the army's role as power broker.

In mid-August, Khan and religious cleric Muhammad Tahir-ul- Qadri moved past police lines into a restricted zone and set up camp in parliament. Nawaz Sharif then held meetings with Raheel Sharif to help resolve the impasse.

Raheel Sharif met separately with Khan, Qadri, Nawaz Sharif and his brother Shahbaz Sharif, who leads Pakistan's state of Punjab. Nawaz Sharif later told parliament he never asked Raheel Sharif to mediate a solution, prompting Khan to file a lawsuit with the Supreme Court seeking the prime minister's disqualification for lying.

"Raheel Sharif has shown significant restraint at events that in the past may have provoked a coup," Oliver Coleman, an analyst at Maplecroft, a Britain-based global risk forecasting company, said in emailed comments. The opposition Pakistan Peoples Party is seeking closed-door talks between political parties and the military, which has ruled the nuclear-armed country for about half its history.

Amid the protests, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi's administration scrapped the first formal talks planned with Pakistan in two years after its envoy sought to meet Kashmiri separatist groups. The army has also continued a fight against Islamic militants on the border with Afghanistan, where the Taliban is seeking to regain power as the U.S. withdraws troops over the next few years.

"Sharif is building himself up," Ayesha Siddiqa, author of "Military Inc.," a book about Pakistan's armed forces, said by phone from Islamabad, referring to the army chief. "Maximum manipulation ensures civil institutions remain weak and cannot challenge the military."

Raheel Sharif, 58, was born in Quetta on the Afghan border in a military family. He and his brothers followed in the footsteps of his father, a major. One brother, Mumtaz Sharif, is a captain. Elder brother Maj. Shabbir Sharif was killed in 1971 while battling Indian soldiers during one of three wars between the neighboring countries.
After earning a degree from the Royal College of Defence Studies in the U.K., Raheel Sharif started as infantry officer and later oversaw the army's training operations. At one point he was a military instructor at the Pakistan Military Academy in Abbottabad, near where Osama bin Laden was hiding before he was killed in 2011.

Raheel Sharif is Pakistan's first army chief who hasn't seen combat with India, and regards home-grown militants as an existential threat on the same level, according to Burzine Waghmar, an academic at the Centre for the Study of Pakistan at the School of Oriental and African Studies in London.

"He remains committed to rooting, not rehabilitating militants — unlike dangerously naive Nawaz or Islamist-veering Imran," Waghmar said in an email. He's developed counter- insurgency and low-level warfare training for rank-and-file soldiers, something that hadn't been part of the military's strategic thinking prior to 2007, he said.

Raheel Sharif rarely speaks in public, with his only comments coming through the army spokesman's office since the latest political crisis began. Raheel Sharif's office didn't respond to an interview request, and Pakistan army spokesman Asim Bajwa didn't return a message left at his office Wednesday.

Pakistan's top general is also reserved in private, according to those who've worked with him over the years.
"He isn't talkative," said retired Lieutenant General Asif Yasin Malik, the former top bureaucrat in the defense ministry. "But when he speaks, he speaks clearly."

The army's popularity has risen in Pakistan, according to a survey published in August by Pew Research Center. Some 87 percent of respondents said it has a good influence, compared with 79 percent in 2013. Nawaz Sharif's favorable rating dropped slightly to 64 percent, it said.

Abdul Qadir Baloch, a member of Nawaz Sharif's cabinet who previously served as Raheel Sharif's commander for three years, said the army chief remains courteous when they meet in private.

"He believes in democracy and constitution, but there is pressure," Baloch said. "The army has a mindset. It ruled the country for more than half its existence, so there is always pressure."

Reported with assistance from Khurrum Anis in Karachi.

 

[fatman17]

Pakistan Welcomes Afghan-US Bilateral Security Pact; Analysts Uncertain

Oct. 2, 2014 - 08:50PM | By USMAN ANSARI |

Afghan security personnel stand near burning NATO military vehicles after a clash between Taliban and Afghan security forces in the Torkham area, near the Pakistan and Afghan border, in 2013. Pakistan has officially applauded an Afghan-US security pact. (Omar Gul / AFP)

ISLAMABAD — Pakistan’s civil and military leadership has welcomed the signing of the Afghan-US Bilateral Security Agreement (BSA) and pledged support for the new Afghan government, but analysts are doubtful of the long-term regional security and stability.

Government officials have said a continued Western military presence in Afghanistan to train and support the Afghan military would be beneficial. This reverses the previous view that a long-term Western military presence in Afghanistan was destabilizing.

Gen Raheel Sharif, head of the Army, was quoted in Pakistani media as saying the deal was “a good move for durable peace in Afghanistan” during a Corps Commander’s meeting at the Army’s General Headquarters in Rawalpindi.

Officials hoped the continued Western military presence could help stop Afghanistan from sliding into a civil war. The agreement comes as Kabul’s new government has pledged not to allow Afghan territory to be used against its neighbors.

Analysts are unconvinced.

“I doubt it will make any difference at all to Pakistan,” said analyst, author and former Australian defense attache to Islamabad, Brian Cloughley. “The BSA is just a formal document required by the US to enable its forces and those of some other NATO countries to remain in country.”

His views are echoed by Salma Malik, assistant professor, in the Department of Defence & Strategic Studies, at Islamabad’s Quaid-i-Azam University.

“The BSA gives Pakistan a semblance of security that the ISAF [International Security Assistance Force] or at least the US forces continue their presence and commitment in the neighboring Afghanistan,” she said.
However, she questions the level of commitment.

“What we don’t take into account fully is that the US mentally packed its bags two to three years back and this is just a cleanup job, compounded by new emerging threats and problems which compel the US and Western powers to focus elsewhere.”

Claude Rakisits, nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s South Asia Center, however, is generally more supportive and says it disproves previous Pakistani fears.

“Pakistani academics, analysts and officials, civilian and military, have been asserting in the lead-up to 2014 that the US would once again leave Pakistan to its own devices as it had after the Soviets left Afghanistan in 1989,” he said.

“This was never going to be the case because the two situations are completely different in time [25 years] and the issues [terrorism was not present and Pakistan is now a nuclear-armed state],” he added.

Therefore, he believes “America’s continued presence in Afghanistan, albeit a limited one in numbers and in time, will be good news for bilateral relations between Islamabad and Washington.”

Despite the agreement and the new Afghan government, Cloughley says serious problems threaten even its short-term stability.

“Afghanistan is collapsing even further under the weight of Taliban assaults, while the warlords remain in the background for the moment, reaping the profits from drug production, kidnapping and general mayhem,” he said.

Even Rakisits concedes that in this regard the BSA may not deliver additional security for Pakistan.

“I seriously doubt that the presence of less than 10,000 US military personnel, the bulk of whom will be trainers and advisers to the Afghan military, will make much of a difference to Pakistan’s own security. The limited special forces personnel based in Afghanistan will be involved in hunting down al-Qaida terrorists rather than the TTP [Pakistani Taliban],” he said.

“The injection of $8 billion annually of military aid should help the Afghan security forces deal with the Afghan Taliban and hopefully the TTP when they cross over into Afghanistan. How effective the Afghan forces will be is, of course, another issue,” he said. “The Afghan Taliban have successfully conducted a number of attacks in Afghanistan recently, and this despite the presence of 40,000 ISAF troops still in the country.”

“So all in all, it is doubtful that the TTP and their fellow ideological travelers will feel under too much pressure from the Afghan military, which will have its own problems to deal with,” Rakisits added.

“One must not forget that the BSA is only a temporary and limited military assistance crutch for three years,” he said.

Ultimately, Afghan “stability, and therefore security” rests in the hands of the newly appointed government being able to work together and overcome Afghanistan’s numerous problems. However, he has little faith in this. Therefore, by extension, the longer-term security implications for Pakistan are also bleak. ■

Email: uansari@defensenews.com.

 

[fatman17]

HJ-10 Heavy ATGM

can be easily mounted on a M-113 APC

 

[fatman17]

Sept 19/14: Pakistan. The US DSCA announces Pakistan’s official export request for 160 Navistar Mine Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP) vehicles. That would certainly be an easy delivery from Afghanistan, for Excess Defense Article vehicles that the US Army was prepared to blow up rather than paying to ship them home:

• 30 MaxxPro Base DXM
• 110 MaxxPro Dash DXM
• 10 MaxxPro Dash DXM Ambulances
• 10 MaxxPro Recovery Vehicles with protection kits
• spare and repair parts, support and test equipment, publications and technical documentation, personnel training and equipment training, U.S. Government and contractor engineering, technical and logistics support services, and other related elements of logistical and program support.

The estimated cost is $198 million. These vehicles would be added to 22 MaxxPros (incl. 2 MRV recovery vehicles) that were already transferred under the Pakistan Counterinsurgency Capability Fund. The country’s years-long civil war involving the Pakistani Taliban will certainly provide Pakistan with opportunities to use these vehicles.
The principal contractor will be Navistar Defense Corporation in Madison Heights, MI. The proposed sale will require about 2 US Government and 24 Navistar contractor representatives in Pakistan for a period of approximately 18 months. They’ll perform inspections and deprocessing of vehicles upon delivery; provide assistance in installation of vehicle accessory kits; provide fault diagnosis and repairs; perform corrective maintenance, to include accident and battle damage assessment and repairs; conduct operator and maintainer training; and conduct inventories and maintain accountability of USG provided material. Sources: US DSCA #14-32, “Pakistan – Mine Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP) Vehicles” | Gannett Military Times, “Source: Pakistan already has U.S.-made MRAPs, new deal in works” (April 2014).