Pakistan Army Infantry - Support from other Arms

[Signalian]

Some western militaries constantly use fire power from other arms to support their infantry for every mission. Infantry goes in, finds a target, requests fire support from Armor, Artillery, Aviation (Gunships/UAV), Air Force (CAS Fighter/Fighter-Bomber/Strategic Bomber etc) or in some cases Navy (Naval sir support/Frigate/Destroyer etc) to take out the target. In Pakistan Army, Infantry, is considered to go in and complete the job even if the fire support is not available. 1948, 1965, 1971 wars have been fought with infantry having little or no supporting firepower from other arms.

This was also seen in 1999 kargil war, when only fire support was artillery. Gunships were not used. Armor and Navy couldn't operate in the mountains. PAF was not keep in the loop at the start of Ops and later conducted AD CAPs.

This time around for COIN war, PA has used Armor, Artillery, Aviation Gunships and PAF fighter-bombers to assist the infantry in clearing insurgent strongholds. On top of that PA has also raised specialized infantry formations to conduct warfare in urban theater of war- LCB (Light Commando Battalion) with secondary skill set as Air Assault qualified.

Opinion for Strategy in Planning

Coming to conventional war, should Pakistan Infantry assault an enemy position if it:

1. Always has support from Armor, Artillery, Aviation and Air Force? (all support assets ready to deploy)

2. Just has support from Armor or Artillery ? (either Tanks or Howitzers)

3. Just has support from UAV/UCAV/ Aviation Gunships ? (if other support assets cannot reach or do not have the range)

4. is led by SSG or LCB, after that the regular infantry regiments can assault ?

5. is on its own, since it has the necessary light weapons to accomplish the task ?

ISSUES

Issues without heavy firepower from supporting arms are:

1. Causality Rate increases . Un-necessary loss of life. Pakistan has lost thousands of soldiers in the recent COIN war as well as conventional wars in the past

2. Delay in time for capturing a position. Critical delays can cause failures in consolidating a position.

3. Pakistan is pre-dominantly an Infantry Army including para military. Armor-Infantry ratio is miserable. Aviation has very gunships as well as UAV/UCAV to support half million troops. Some trainer aircraft in PAA can be fitted with weaponry but their survival will be questionable in presence of enemy AD and AF. Pakistan Artillery is the only firepower which is considered reliable.

4. Training doctrine allows infantry to conduct assault with or without supporting fire power. So it is expected that infantry will assault with or without fire support.

5. PAF has a history of not providing CAS until recently now in COIN war.

6. Navy is restricted to coastline only and doesn't operate assets for providing firepower in Punjab/KPK/AJK.

WARFARE PSYCHOLOGY

The use of T-59/AZ MBTs and AH-1 Gunships supporting infantry on front lines in COIN created psychological havoc on insurgents. The insurgents didnt fear LMG/RPG and took cover in dug outs and tunnels and caves during Artillery fire. In the face of heavy insurgent fire power, when the MBTs when rolled on the ground with infantry forcing the insurgents to retreat and who were then picked out by AH-1 and targeted to be be stopped in their tracks. Similarly, PAF jets gave no reaction time to insurgents to flee and take cover.

In conventional war with the enemy, the morale and motivation of Infantry rises up to the sky, when the MBT tracks are heard as their main guns look for targets as well as rotors of Gunships are seen hovering above them, loaded with different kinds of weaponry. Friendly Air force in the horizon is also a mark of victory since Infantry knows that bombs will be dropped on enemy positions to soften up enemy defences and command is hell bent for this Operation to succeed.

QUESTION for FUTURE

Should the MO (Military Ops) Directorate in its future planning, only sends infantry, if, the necessary support elements with their firepower are available and will take part to conduct an operation successfully ?

 

[SQ8]

Some thoughts
1. COIN losses in 71, Balochistan and WoT were also in part due to poor training and equipment for regulars. Even with support from gunships, poor patrolling formations and lack of situational awareness cost a lot of lives.

3. This is a big consideration in the southern(Desert) areas since lack of natural and constructed defenses will lead to most Infantry being overrun by the enemy’s overwhelming superiority in mechanized units.

5. This was pointed out even in the Hamood-ur-Rehman commission report but was implemented late due to traditional “superiority” of the Army in defense affairs leading to isolated thought processes. Until very recently most of the Army Cadre held unrealistic expectations of PAF capabilities.

 

[Genghis khan1]

Some western militaries constantly use fire power from other arms to support their infantry for every mission. Infantry goes in, finds a target, requests fire support from Armor, Artillery, Aviation (Gunships/UAV), Air Force (CAS Fighter/Fighter-Bomber/Strategic Bomber etc) or in some cases Navy (Naval sir support/Frigate/Destroyer etc) to take out the target. In Pakistan Army, Infantry, is considered to go in and complete the job even if the fire support is not available. 1948, 1965, 1971 wars have been fought with infantry having little or no supporting firepower from other arms.

This was also seen in 1999 kargil war, when only fire support was artillery. Gunships were not used. Armor and Navy couldn't operate in the mountains. PAF was not keep in the loop at the start of Ops and later conducted AD CAPs.

This time around for COIN war, PA has used Armor, Artillery, Aviation Gunships and PAF fighter-bombers to assist the infantry in clearing insurgent strongholds. On top of that PA has also raised specialized infantry formations to conduct warfare in urban theater of war- LCB (Light Commando Battalion) with secondary skill set as Air Assault qualified.

Opinion for Strategy in Planning

Coming to conventional war, should Pakistan Infantry assault an enemy position if it:

1. Always has support from Armor, Artillery, Aviation and Air Force? (all support assets ready to deploy)

2. Just has support from Armor or Artillery ? (either Tanks or Howitzers)

3. Just has support from UAV/UCAV/ Aviation Gunships ? (if other support assets cannot reach or do not have the range)

4. is led by SSG or LCB, after that the regular infantry regiments can assault ?

5. is on its own, since it has the necessary light weapons to accomplish the task ?

ISSUES

Issues without heavy firepower from supporting arms are:

1. Causality Rate increases . Un-necessary loss of life. Pakistan has lost thousands of soldiers in the recent COIN war as well as conventional wars in the past

2. Delay in time for capturing a position. Critical delays can cause failures in consolidating a position.

3. Pakistan is pre-dominantly an Infantry Army including para military. Armor-Infantry ratio is miserable. Aviation has very gunships as well as UAV/UCAV to support half million troops. Some trainer aircraft in PAA can be fitted with weaponry but their survival will be questionable in presence of enemy AD and AF. Pakistan Artillery is the only firepower which is considered reliable.

4. Training doctrine allows infantry to conduct assault with or without supporting fire power. So it is expected that infantry will assault with or without fire support.

5. PAF has a history of not providing CAS until recently now in COIN war.

6. Navy is restricted to coastline only and doesn't operate assets for providing firepower in Punjab/KPK/AJK.

WARFARE PSYCHOLOGY

The use of T-59/AZ MBTs and AH-1 Gunships supporting infantry on front lines in COIN created psychological havoc on insurgents. The insurgents didnt fear LMG/RPG and took cover in dug outs and tunnels and caves during Artillery fire. In the face of heavy insurgent fire power, when the MBTs when rolled on the ground with infantry forcing the insurgents to retreat and who were then picked out by AH-1 and targeted to be be stopped in their tracks. Similarly, PAF jets gave no reaction time to insurgents to flee and take cover.

In conventional war with the enemy, the morale and motivation of Infantry rises up to the sky, when the MBT tracks are heard as their main guns look for targets as well as rotors of Gunships are seen hovering above them, loaded with different kinds of weaponry. Friendly Air force in the horizon is also a mark of victory since Infantry knows that bombs will be dropped on enemy positions to soften up enemy defences and command is hell bent for this Operation to succeed.

QUESTION for FUTURE

Should the MO (Military Ops) Directorate in its future planning, only sends infantry, if, the necessary support elements with their firepower are available and will take part to conduct an operation successfully ?

All your assets, all your support units, there sole purpose, reason for existence is to support your war fighter, which is your infantry.

Every jet, every Tank, Every piece of artillery’s main mission is to clear the way for your infantry. There method of employment and strategies (when where, why, How) are taught in defense academies.

If PA didn’t employ these assets to supplement and save the lives of foot soldiers. (Stories from Kargil) Then I would say your Generals are inept, criminally negligent and should be court martial.

To answer your Question:

In Afghanistan No foot patrol (even into peaceful village) was sent out of Forward operating Bases (FOBs) without another company on stand by in the rare, a fighter Or Gunship on standby, drone reconnaissance and medevac helo on standby.

During height of insurgence in Iraq, marines were destroying homes using Anti Armor rounds on Abrams. Freaking round would slice through 5 houses instead of bringing the intended target down. Situation was fixed quickly.

So for your question, what support element or capability (fire power) should be called is depends upon mission at hand and enemy capability in that theater.

 

[Cuirassier]

Essential to enhance organic firepower available to an infantry unit. Start from grassroots

 

[313ghazi]

I think it depends on the terrain and the combat environment but troops should always be supported by some form of accurate, long range firepower.

I think the PAA wing should be armed with a fleet of combat drones, used to bring accurate strike capability. They should be specifically for use by units on the ground

 

[Awan68]

Some western militaries constantly use fire power from other arms to support their infantry for every mission. Infantry goes in, finds a target, requests fire support from Armor, Artillery, Aviation (Gunships/UAV), Air Force (CAS Fighter/Fighter-Bomber/Strategic Bomber etc) or in some cases Navy (Naval sir support/Frigate/Destroyer etc) to take out the target. In Pakistan Army, Infantry, is considered to go in and complete the job even if the fire support is not available. 1948, 1965, 1971 wars have been fought with infantry having little or no supporting firepower from other arms.

This was also seen in 1999 kargil war, when only fire support was artillery. Gunships were not used. Armor and Navy couldn't operate in the mountains. PAF was not keep in the loop at the start of Ops and later conducted AD CAPs.

This time around for COIN war, PA has used Armor, Artillery, Aviation Gunships and PAF fighter-bombers to assist the infantry in clearing insurgent strongholds. On top of that PA has also raised specialized infantry formations to conduct warfare in urban theater of war- LCB (Light Commando Battalion) with secondary skill set as Air Assault qualified.

Opinion for Strategy in Planning

Coming to conventional war, should Pakistan Infantry assault an enemy position if it:

1. Always has support from Armor, Artillery, Aviation and Air Force? (all support assets ready to deploy)

2. Just has support from Armor or Artillery ? (either Tanks or Howitzers)

3. Just has support from UAV/UCAV/ Aviation Gunships ? (if other support assets cannot reach or do not have the range)

4. is led by SSG or LCB, after that the regular infantry regiments can assault ?

5. is on its own, since it has the necessary light weapons to accomplish the task ?

ISSUES

Issues without heavy firepower from supporting arms are:

1. Causality Rate increases . Un-necessary loss of life. Pakistan has lost thousands of soldiers in the recent COIN war as well as conventional wars in the past

2. Delay in time for capturing a position. Critical delays can cause failures in consolidating a position.

3. Pakistan is pre-dominantly an Infantry Army including para military. Armor-Infantry ratio is miserable. Aviation has very gunships as well as UAV/UCAV to support half million troops. Some trainer aircraft in PAA can be fitted with weaponry but their survival will be questionable in presence of enemy AD and AF. Pakistan Artillery is the only firepower which is considered reliable.

4. Training doctrine allows infantry to conduct assault with or without supporting fire power. So it is expected that infantry will assault with or without fire support.

5. PAF has a history of not providing CAS until recently now in COIN war.

6. Navy is restricted to coastline only and doesn't operate assets for providing firepower in Punjab/KPK/AJK.

WARFARE PSYCHOLOGY

The use of T-59/AZ MBTs and AH-1 Gunships supporting infantry on front lines in COIN created psychological havoc on insurgents. The insurgents didnt fear LMG/RPG and took cover in dug outs and tunnels and caves during Artillery fire. In the face of heavy insurgent fire power, when the MBTs when rolled on the ground with infantry forcing the insurgents to retreat and who were then picked out by AH-1 and targeted to be be stopped in their tracks. Similarly, PAF jets gave no reaction time to insurgents to flee and take cover.

In conventional war with the enemy, the morale and motivation of Infantry rises up to the sky, when the MBT tracks are heard as their main guns look for targets as well as rotors of Gunships are seen hovering above them, loaded with different kinds of weaponry. Friendly Air force in the horizon is also a mark of victory since Infantry knows that bombs will be dropped on enemy positions to soften up enemy defences and command is hell bent for this Operation to succeed.

QUESTION for FUTURE

Should the MO (Military Ops) Directorate in its future planning, only sends infantry, if, the necessary support elements with their firepower are available and will take part to conduct an operation successfully ?

Best way forward for CAS would be a locally manufactured MALE UAV fitted with a rotary canon for fire support in addition to all the other goodies to blow shit up.

Unit cost for such a platform would be around 4-5 mil a pop.This low cost solution can see most of CAS needs of the Army taken care of without dragging the Airforce in.

60-70 such platforms can be manufactured in 500-700 mil, ensuring constant air support to units on the ground that need it. The long periods for which drones can stay in the sky would ensure instant air support, more rapid than any manned CAS aircraft can achieve.

With attack Helis and CAS aircraft, u loose valuable pilots and tens of millions of dollars in an event where even one such asset goes down, its a different ball game
with UAV's, no loss of personal coupled with comparatively meagre financial losses.

 

[Pakistani Fighter]

Armor-Infantry ratio is miserable

What about as compared to India?

 

[Sine Nomine]

What's done can't be undone,WoT and Kargil are text book case of infantry fighting against all odds without proper fire support.Here are few issues which i would like to highlight due to lack of FS.
-No fire support means higher number of casualties and rise in no of WIA leading to lose in troops moral.
-Wastage of ammo for achieving objective.
-Wastage of time,which may lead to achievement being invalidate due to delay.
Here are my few suggestions for increasing fire support in short term while keeping budget issue in mind.
-Laser guided ammo for mortars(60mm,81mm and 120mm).
-Getting precious guided and laser guided arty ammo for artillery guns.
-Indroduction of MBGL at sq level for COIN ops in every inf unit.
-Equipping inf battallions with Shmel type weapon for conventional and unconventional warfare,they help a lot in clearing fortifications.
-Developing a cost effective ATGM for usage by inf units.
-Fusing target designating elments(UAV,OP's) with assault elements.
-Each Brig having UAV element for recce and target designation,that can be either an independent unit or part of Arty.
-Precious strikes are surely going to help in objectives completion as compared to firing volly of shells.
Long term FS increase
-Induction of new gunships in numbers they help both in COIN and conventional war.
-Russian Ka-52 is a great weapon platform which can both act as a CAS aircraft and gunship.
-Dedicated CAS units of AF for provision of FS at tactical and strategic level.
-UCAV's for CAS and Recce armed with ATGM's and laser guided rockets having good on-station time.
-AD for troops protection, a mix of SAM and AC's fused togather.

Should the MO (Military Ops) Directorate in its future planning, only sends infantry, if, the necessary support elements with their firepower are available and will take part to conduct an operation successfully ?

It depends upon type of ops inf is engaged in;
-In COIN ops sending merely infantry can yield results depending upon type of geography,strength of opponents,weapon being used by them and tactics.
-In conventional warfare sending inf today without proper FS,CAS and AD is tantamount to sending them into slaughter house though they may have chance against an inf unit without any FS,CAS and AD.

 

[313ghazi]

Best way forward for CAS would be a locally manufactured MALE UAV fitted with a rotary canon for fire support in addition to all the other goodies to blow shit up.

Unit cost for such a platform would be around 4-5 mil a pop.This low cost solution can see most of CAS needs of the Army taken care of without dragging the Airforce in.

60-70 such platforms can be manufactured in 500-700 mil, ensuring constant air support to units on the ground that need it. The long periods for which drones can stay in the sky would ensure instant air support, more rapid than any manned CAS aircraft can achieve.

With attack Helis and CAS aircraft, u loose valuable pilots and tens of millions of dollars in an event where even one such asset goes down, its a different ball game
with UAV's, no loss of personal coupled with comparatively meagre financial losses.

I advocated the same approach.

Still think there is a role for dedicated CAS aircraft, including jets and helicopters. They provide the volume. But armed drones are defo the way fwd.

Also ground units, we need tanks, ifvs, mobile artillery integrated with infantry units

Maybe repurpose some of the older tanks and APCs for this purpose.

 

[Xestan]

Some thoughts
1. COIN losses in 71, Balochistan and WoT were also in part due to poor training and equipment for regulars. Even with support from gunships, poor patrolling formations and lack of situational awareness cost a lot of lives.

3. This is a big consideration in the southern(Desert) areas since lack of natural and constructed defenses will lead to most Infantry being overrun by the enemy’s overwhelming superiority in mechanized units.

5. This was pointed out even in the Hamood-ur-Rehman commission report but was implemented late due to traditional “superiority” of the Army in defense affairs leading to isolated thought processes. Until very recently most of the Army Cadre held unrealistic expectations of PAF capabilities.

Good points.

About WoT, countless lives were lost due to usage of Mitsubishi 4x4s in combat areas. A lot of people will jump to the conclusion that it was due to lack of funds, but that's not entirely the case. It is always possible to move funds here and there, when the priorities are right.

Soldiers started to call the front 4x4 "Sadqa Gaarhi" during the time leading to Op Raah-e-Nijaat.

Lack of air support during movement of convoys cost 7th Div a lot in and around Miranshah between the years 2009 and 2014.

And about PAF, how can one forget the expectations of Army from the Air Force during the Kargil conflict. PAF had to reluctantly start CAPs over LoC because according a high ranking General; "the soldiers were getting demotivated seeing IAF Jets patrol the area".

 

[Cookie Monster]

@Signalian I'm not very knowledgeable about this...but based on the general trend..wouldn't it be increasingly difficult to keep going forward with this "infantry stand alone" type of thing? It maybe doable to an extent in the past but I think it can end up as a severe disadvantage in the modern times if PA doesn't do something about it.

I'm not sure what the solution might be with the economy being where it's at...still though...with the enemy eager for war creating highly mobile IBG and acquiring stuff like Apaches...Pak infantry in that kind of stand alone mode would struggle against that.

 

[Tipu7]

Some western militaries constantly use fire power from other arms to support their infantry for every mission. Infantry goes in, finds a target, requests fire support from Armor, Artillery, Aviation (Gunships/UAV), Air Force (CAS Fighter/Fighter-Bomber/Strategic Bomber etc) or in some cases Navy (Naval sir support/Frigate/Destroyer etc) to take out the target. In Pakistan Army, Infantry, is considered to go in and complete the job even if the fire support is not available. 1948, 1965, 1971 wars have been fought with infantry having little or no supporting firepower from other arms.

This was also seen in 1999 kargil war, when only fire support was artillery. Gunships were not used. Armor and Navy couldn't operate in the mountains. PAF was not keep in the loop at the start of Ops and later conducted AD CAPs.

This time around for COIN war, PA has used Armor, Artillery, Aviation Gunships and PAF fighter-bombers to assist the infantry in clearing insurgent strongholds. On top of that PA has also raised specialized infantry formations to conduct warfare in urban theater of war- LCB (Light Commando Battalion) with secondary skill set as Air Assault qualified.

Opinion for Strategy in Planning

Coming to conventional war, should Pakistan Infantry assault an enemy position if it:

1. Always has support from Armor, Artillery, Aviation and Air Force? (all support assets ready to deploy)

2. Just has support from Armor or Artillery ? (either Tanks or Howitzers)

3. Just has support from UAV/UCAV/ Aviation Gunships ? (if other support assets cannot reach or do not have the range)

4. is led by SSG or LCB, after that the regular infantry regiments can assault ?

5. is on its own, since it has the necessary light weapons to accomplish the task ?

ISSUES

Issues without heavy firepower from supporting arms are:

1. Causality Rate increases . Un-necessary loss of life. Pakistan has lost thousands of soldiers in the recent COIN war as well as conventional wars in the past

2. Delay in time for capturing a position. Critical delays can cause failures in consolidating a position.

3. Pakistan is pre-dominantly an Infantry Army including para military. Armor-Infantry ratio is miserable. Aviation has very gunships as well as UAV/UCAV to support half million troops. Some trainer aircraft in PAA can be fitted with weaponry but their survival will be questionable in presence of enemy AD and AF. Pakistan Artillery is the only firepower which is considered reliable.

4. Training doctrine allows infantry to conduct assault with or without supporting fire power. So it is expected that infantry will assault with or without fire support.

5. PAF has a history of not providing CAS until recently now in COIN war.

6. Navy is restricted to coastline only and doesn't operate assets for providing firepower in Punjab/KPK/AJK.

WARFARE PSYCHOLOGY

The use of T-59/AZ MBTs and AH-1 Gunships supporting infantry on front lines in COIN created psychological havoc on insurgents. The insurgents didnt fear LMG/RPG and took cover in dug outs and tunnels and caves during Artillery fire. In the face of heavy insurgent fire power, when the MBTs when rolled on the ground with infantry forcing the insurgents to retreat and who were then picked out by AH-1 and targeted to be be stopped in their tracks. Similarly, PAF jets gave no reaction time to insurgents to flee and take cover.

In conventional war with the enemy, the morale and motivation of Infantry rises up to the sky, when the MBT tracks are heard as their main guns look for targets as well as rotors of Gunships are seen hovering above them, loaded with different kinds of weaponry. Friendly Air force in the horizon is also a mark of victory since Infantry knows that bombs will be dropped on enemy positions to soften up enemy defences and command is hell bent for this Operation to succeed.

QUESTION for FUTURE

Should the MO (Military Ops) Directorate in its future planning, only sends infantry, if, the necessary support elements with their firepower are available and will take part to conduct an operation successfully ?

Pal, the nature of warfare has changed and the role of armed forces, particularly ground forces, has reduced significantly in comparison. The next generation of warfare is amalgam of cyber warfare, electronic warfare, psychological warfare and information warfare. The element of "kinetic action" has been undermined due to introduction of less lethal yet more effective and flexible forms of power projection. Therefore, I don't see the "future warfare" as an "modernized" form of transitional warfare. Its the case with Modern World and will be the case of South Asia too in near future.

The case of Indo-Pak strategic environment is unique. Despite of advancement in warfare concept its likely to retain elements of traditional warfare; albeit in evolved form, one way or another. For example, the air combat now plays more crucial role in determining the scale and intensity of Indo-Pak conflict. The state which cannot dominate in skies is bound to lose on ground no matter how large ground forces are. Same conclusion can be drawn about cruise weapons and autonomous systems which can now undertake numerous tasks effectively which were not possible to achieve in near past by other conventional means.

Since both India and Pakistan are "over populated" nations, therefore their armed forces will be dominated by numerical strength of men thus keeping a "infantry based armies" tag over both forces. For increased mechanization or for equipping forces with robust fire support elements in sufficient quantities, both armies have to reduce their overall numerical strength. With current manpower and economic apparatus, both armies can raise only fraction of amount of fire support assets needed for their size. Compare US and Indian army for example, their combat manpower size is roughly same but US army is far far superior than Indian army that's because its relying on technological means instead of manpower to achieve its power projection objectives. And it can do that as it has huge defense budget to support, which Indian armed forces don't have. An example of approach shift is People Liberation Army which is consistently reducing the size of its combat troops yet due to increased mechanization it is increasing its power projection capabilities with every passing year.

But despite of this, both India and Pakistan will maintain their "infantry dominant" army posture for decades to come. Primary reasons being limited affordability and presence of huge manpower. Yes, in case of conflict, the causalities will be very high, but at the same time both states have capability to absorb and even overcome those life losses as more men will be always available to replace the lost ones. Therefore, I consider further size expansion of Pakistan army as a bad idea. No matter how many infantry we will add up, we will remain in disadvantage as we are smaller in size and cannot win against India in attrition. At the same time, we don't have economic means to raise sufficient support assets to back up our existing massive ground forces. Thus a compromise is bound to exists, i.e. large size forces with little mechanical support. However, if we reduce our size, and increase the mechanization and quality of equipment, then its possible to outclass Indian armed forces by utilizing the idea of mass fire power instead of mass manpower.

Still, the presence of nuclear weapons, both at strategic and tactical level, undermines the possibility of major conflict between India and Pakistan; one which will demand mobilization of all divisions into combat. The dilemma is eminent. More mechanization means more economic expenditure in terms of training and maintenance, and for what purposes? For war that will probably never happen?

 

[Invicta]

Pal, the nature of warfare has changed and the role of armed forces, particularly ground forces, has reduced significantly in comparison. The next generation of warfare is amalgam of cyber warfare, electronic warfare, psychological warfare and information warfare. The element of "kinetic action" has been undermined due to introduction of less lethal yet more effective and flexible forms of power projection. Therefore, I don't see the "future warfare" as an "modernized" form of transitional warfare. Its the case with Modern World and will be the case of South Asia too in near future.

The case of Indo-Pak strategic environment is unique. Despite of advancement in warfare concept its likely to retain elements of traditional warfare; albeit in evolved form, one way or another. For example, the air combat now plays more crucial role in determining the scale and intensity of Indo-Pak conflict. The state which cannot dominate in skies is bound to lose on ground no matter how large ground forces are. Same conclusion can be drawn about cruise weapons and autonomous systems which can now undertake numerous tasks effectively which were not possible to achieve in near past by other conventional means.

Since both India and Pakistan are "over populated" nations, therefore their armed forces will be dominated by numerical strength of men thus keeping a "infantry based armies" tag over both forces. For increased mechanization or for equipping forces with robust fire support elements in sufficient quantities, both armies have to reduce their overall numerical strength. With current manpower and economic apparatus, both armies can raise only fraction of amount of fire support assets needed for their size. Compare US and Indian army for example, their combat manpower size is roughly same but US army is far far superior than Indian army that's because its relying on technological means instead of manpower to achieve its power projection objectives. And it can do that as it has huge defense budget to support, which Indian armed forces don't have. An example of approach shift is People Liberation Army which is consistently reducing the size of its combat troops yet due to increased mechanization it is increasing its power projection capabilities with every passing year.

But despite of this, both India and Pakistan will maintain their "infantry dominant" army posture for decades to come. Primary reasons being limited affordability and presence of huge manpower. Yes, in case of conflict, the causalities will be very high, but at the same time both states have capability to absorb and even overcome those life losses as more men will be always available to replace the lost ones. Therefore, I consider further size expansion of Pakistan army as a bad idea. No matter how many infantry we will add up, we will remain in disadvantage as we are smaller in size and cannot win against India in attrition. At the same time, we don't have economic means to raise sufficient support assets to back up our existing massive ground forces. Thus a compromise is bound to exists, i.e. large size forces with little mechanical support. However, if we reduce our size, and increase the mechanization and quality of equipment, then its possible to outclass Indian armed forces by utilizing the idea of mass fire power instead of mass manpower.

Still, the presence of nuclear weapons, both at strategic and tactical level, undermines the possibility of major conflict between India and Pakistan; one which will demand mobilization of all divisions into combat. The dilemma is eminent. More mechanization means more economic expenditure in terms of training and maintenance, and for what purposes? For war that will probably never happen?

Good analysis, just look at the UK's defence cuts, the warfare has changed dramatically in the last 10-20 years. Gone are the days where you had defined battle lines and enemies. You need highly trained specialised soldiers. In this day and age you can occupy a country without firing a single shot thanks to social media and cyber technologies.

That's the future but in the sub-continent there will be a greater emphasis on numbers in the armed forces due to the population level and threat level. Truly dominated by infantry.

 

[Bilal Khan (Quwa)]

Some western militaries constantly use fire power from other arms to support their infantry for every mission. Infantry goes in, finds a target, requests fire support from Armor, Artillery, Aviation (Gunships/UAV), Air Force (CAS Fighter/Fighter-Bomber/Strategic Bomber etc) or in some cases Navy (Naval sir support/Frigate/Destroyer etc) to take out the target. In Pakistan Army, Infantry, is considered to go in and complete the job even if the fire support is not available. 1948, 1965, 1971 wars have been fought with infantry having little or no supporting firepower from other arms.

This was also seen in 1999 kargil war, when only fire support was artillery. Gunships were not used. Armor and Navy couldn't operate in the mountains. PAF was not keep in the loop at the start of Ops and later conducted AD CAPs.

This time around for COIN war, PA has used Armor, Artillery, Aviation Gunships and PAF fighter-bombers to assist the infantry in clearing insurgent strongholds. On top of that PA has also raised specialized infantry formations to conduct warfare in urban theater of war- LCB (Light Commando Battalion) with secondary skill set as Air Assault qualified.

Opinion for Strategy in Planning

Coming to conventional war, should Pakistan Infantry assault an enemy position if it:

1. Always has support from Armor, Artillery, Aviation and Air Force? (all support assets ready to deploy)

2. Just has support from Armor or Artillery ? (either Tanks or Howitzers)

3. Just has support from UAV/UCAV/ Aviation Gunships ? (if other support assets cannot reach or do not have the range)

4. is led by SSG or LCB, after that the regular infantry regiments can assault ?

5. is on its own, since it has the necessary light weapons to accomplish the task ?

ISSUES

Issues without heavy firepower from supporting arms are:

1. Causality Rate increases . Un-necessary loss of life. Pakistan has lost thousands of soldiers in the recent COIN war as well as conventional wars in the past

2. Delay in time for capturing a position. Critical delays can cause failures in consolidating a position.

3. Pakistan is pre-dominantly an Infantry Army including para military. Armor-Infantry ratio is miserable. Aviation has very gunships as well as UAV/UCAV to support half million troops. Some trainer aircraft in PAA can be fitted with weaponry but their survival will be questionable in presence of enemy AD and AF. Pakistan Artillery is the only firepower which is considered reliable.

4. Training doctrine allows infantry to conduct assault with or without supporting fire power. So it is expected that infantry will assault with or without fire support.

5. PAF has a history of not providing CAS until recently now in COIN war.

6. Navy is restricted to coastline only and doesn't operate assets for providing firepower in Punjab/KPK/AJK.

WARFARE PSYCHOLOGY

The use of T-59/AZ MBTs and AH-1 Gunships supporting infantry on front lines in COIN created psychological havoc on insurgents. The insurgents didnt fear LMG/RPG and took cover in dug outs and tunnels and caves during Artillery fire. In the face of heavy insurgent fire power, when the MBTs when rolled on the ground with infantry forcing the insurgents to retreat and who were then picked out by AH-1 and targeted to be be stopped in their tracks. Similarly, PAF jets gave no reaction time to insurgents to flee and take cover.

In conventional war with the enemy, the morale and motivation of Infantry rises up to the sky, when the MBT tracks are heard as their main guns look for targets as well as rotors of Gunships are seen hovering above them, loaded with different kinds of weaponry. Friendly Air force in the horizon is also a mark of victory since Infantry knows that bombs will be dropped on enemy positions to soften up enemy defences and command is hell bent for this Operation to succeed.

QUESTION for FUTURE

Should the MO (Military Ops) Directorate in its future planning, only sends infantry, if, the necessary support elements with their firepower are available and will take part to conduct an operation successfully ?

One of the main bottlenecks to building sufficient fire support capabilities is the high cost of assets.

In a way, I think the PAF found a solution to this problem through the JF-17. Basically, it got a low-cost multi-role fighter that can deploy all of the modern capabilities you need today and in the future. It isn't the best looking nor the best aircraft in absolute terms, but it gets the job done as affordably as any out there.

Barring an insanely crippling economic situation (which is basically what we're going through today), you should be able to deploy enough JF-17s (thanks to low cost) to offer sufficient fire support spread. So, one example is CAS -- once more, the JF-17 isn't the most specialized asset, but it can at least deploy the munitions you need to pull it off at an accessible cost. One way or another, the JF-17 is something you can count on to offer a baseline capability.

Likewise, it would be ideal if the Army can think along those lines and develop/acquire 'good enough' fire support assets in sufficient numbers. The Army certainly isn't blowing cash on a few expensive toys, but at the same time, I don't think it's taking the developmental approach of acquiring such solutions as seriously as the PAF.

I think the Army tried something along those lines with the AK, but it hit a snag, likely due to a mix of factors -- i.e., incredibly tight finances (esp. due to CT/COIN Ops in 2000s and 2010s), technical hurdles, and perhaps a bit of inertia. I wonder if, at this stage, the Army has hung its hat and will simply opt to procure off-the-shelf across most if not all areas, especially artillery, armour and aviation.

In short, my suspicion now is that moving forward, the Army will get the "good enough" solutions from China in as large a quantity as possible -- i.e., Z-10ME, SH-15, VT4, VN1, and so on.

While the PAF and to an extent the PN will benefit from in-house development (due to the paucity of affordable off-the-shelf platforms), the Army is flush with off-the-shelf options from China. For the Army, the development route has been a failure, one where it sunk money into overhead, but with relatively little pay-off.

It could have simply put the R&D overhead towards acquiring more of a modern solution (i.e., piggybacking on China's overhead and economies-of-scale instead). If it acquires enough in quantity, it can ensure that at least its wartime effort is sustained through sufficient parts and in-house repair/servicing. @Socra

 

[Armchair]

Firstly, excellent thread. Thanks Signalian.

PA unfortunately does not have a "JF-17 Doctrine" - a doctrine that deals with the seething problems of a third world force. Rather, it is a typical third world military that is a former colony of a gora army. It acts out of those old habits not out of rational military thought.

This is why there are glaring irregularities with its doctrine and ideology.

Regarding supporting infantry with enough firepower from CAS and artillery, the lessons from WWI, WWII and later wars all indicate their critical importance. PA unfortunately never learned anything meaningfully as the military education it imparts is route learned parroting of textbooks to pass grades, and then go to Sandhurst to get a pat in the back from their real masters.

Had they two brain cells to think with, they would have long ago realized the importance of mass production and providing simple (even crude) armor and artillery to the 500,000 troops.

This is not possible if all the critical infrastructure is controlled by generals who don't know the first thing about managing heavy engineering. Heavy Industries Texila is a prime example of mismanagement. This should have been churning out large quantities of armour and artillery, even if they were simple solutions.

But sadly, even a simple fire arm needs to be imported from abroad. And most issues related to arms imports line the pockets of the good dogs who send this ill gotten money back to their masters land - to a London haveli or a Swiss bank account.

Then there is the basic issue about how a country facing a much larger enemy keeps an all professional force and stops any attempt to have a conscript / volunteer force to support it. One wonders why virtually no thinking army in the world that faces a David vs Goliath situation does this.

But everything is possible in the land of the mentally retarded peacocks that strut about like they own Pakistan. Pakistan was meant to have an armed forces. It seems the British Indian Army instead got a country.

With 70-75 percent of the budget going to salaries and basic upkeep and the little money left wasted by incompetent generals running Heavy Industries Texila, POF, etc. One ends up with an army that will face off against India, 3x times its size, with a giant disparity in armour, artillery and air support.

How simple would it have been to build a modern equivalent of a T-34 and mass produce it? Or simply buy tons of T-59s and upgrade them to Zarrar?

How simple would have been a simple, rugged CAS aircraft. Could have been a propeller driven plane, would have bombed Indian armour just the same. Does one imagine that in a peer vs peer conflict CAS aircraft or attack helicopters won't get shot down? They will, but they will take giant chunks of the enemy with them you dumb fools!

A simple CAS aircraft locally built would have cost about 5 million dollars a piece. For 500 million USD one could have had about 100 to 150 (based on economies of scale). If you exported 50 of those you could have recouped a good amount of the investment itself.

Suddenly with a little smart investment, India would have been facing 100-150 CAS aircraft that would decimate Indian concentrations, making any assault on Pakistan near impossible. They could have faced 5000 additional tanks, at the cost of about 1 million dollars each.

As far as artillery is concerned, PA has made some reasonable choices. More would have been better but I can't find a serious flaw with their Artillery strategy.

Some other elements are less discussed but reasonably important. Heavy mortars and heavy machine guns. The latter provides effective suppression during assault. The former provides a massive advantage prior to an assault.

PA for some odd reason has a weakness in their heavy mortar department. I am puzzled why this is so as the impact of heavy mortars are well known by their gora masters.

One of the main bottlenecks to building sufficient fire support capabilities is the high cost of assets.

In a way, I think the PAF found a solution to this problem through the JF-17. Basically, it got a low-cost multi-role fighter that can deploy all of the modern capabilities you need today and in the future. It isn't the best looking nor the best aircraft in absolute terms, but it gets the job done as affordably as any out there.

Barring an insanely crippling economic situation (which is basically what we're going through today), you should be able to deploy enough JF-17s (thanks to low cost) to offer sufficient fire support spread. So, one example is CAS -- once more, the JF-17 isn't the most specialized asset, but it can at least deploy the munitions you need to pull it off at an accessible cost. One way or another, the JF-17 is something you can count on to offer a baseline capability.

Likewise, it would be ideal if the Army can think along those lines and develop/acquire 'good enough' fire support assets in sufficient numbers. The Army certainly isn't blowing cash on a few expensive toys, but at the same time, I don't think it's taking the developmental approach of acquiring such solutions as seriously as the PAF.

I think the Army tried something along those lines with the AK, but it hit a snag, likely due to a mix of factors -- i.e., incredibly tight finances (esp. due to CT/COIN Ops in 2000s and 2010s), technical hurdles, and perhaps a bit of inertia. I wonder if, at this stage, the Army has hung its hat and will simply opt to procure off-the-shelf across most if not all areas, especially artillery, armour and aviation.

In short, my suspicion now is that moving forward, the Army will get the "good enough" solutions from China in as large a quantity as possible -- i.e., Z-10ME, SH-15, VT4, VN1, and so on.

While the PAF and to an extent the PN will benefit from in-house development (due to the paucity of affordable off-the-shelf platforms), the Army is flush with off-the-shelf options from China. For the Army, the development route has been a failure, one where it sunk money into overhead, but with relatively little pay-off.

It could have simply put the R&D overhead towards acquiring more of a modern solution (i.e., piggybacking on China's overhead and economies-of-scale instead). If it acquires enough in quantity, it can ensure that at least its wartime effort is sustained through sufficient parts and in-house repair/servicing. @Socra

Excellent analysis, and mirrors my own but much more positively worded. Just want to say that China offers much mainly from NORINCO but NORINCO sells rubbish. The MBT-2000s Bangladesh bought - they leak when it rains. The rifles they sold, they jamm. Norinco sells garbage, and will not last very long, and will become ultimately a burden for PA. However, they do line pockets very well.

PA has to do better than go to the Chinese to buy junk. PAF has Chengdu. Unfortunately the PA only has Norinco to deal with, which is nothing like CAC.