How people of Fata see Pakistan-TTP talks
ISLAMABAD: Confirmation by the prime minister on Saturday that talks with the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) are part of an ongoing process represents a delicate and potentially dangerous point in the militant insurgency.
If so chosen, a politically expedient pursuit of giving peace a chance could well prove the darkest entry yet in the collective diary of miseries of the residents of Fata. The probable conclusion of such a new chapter: about four million citizens could lose whatever little faith they have left in the State. They are only human, after all.
Any attempt to impose what, to the tribes collective mind, would be an external solution, is almost certain to prove counterproductive.
From Bajaur to South Waziristan, every Fata resident has a story to tell in which, disturbingly, the authorities pursuit of covert relationships with TTP players has come at the cost of the terrorists captive population.
It is impossible, given that the Fata is a no-mans land for mainstream national journalists, to substantiate the stories, so factual veracity should not be assumed.
Sitting in the comfort of an office in Islamabad, it would also be cynical to assume the worst of the authorities when the terrorists have murdered thousands of soldiers. But, considering the crucial role of public sentiment in such a national security crisis, generic examples of the most common complaints demand an open-minded audience if any credible effort to de-radicalize the Fata is to be undertaken.
By far the most common complaint is that such-and-such TTP commander and his fighters were stopped at a paramilitary check post, but allowed to proceed after they produced a pass supposedly issued by the security authorities. That such relationships exist is a fact acknowledged by the authorities as a necessity in any fluid security environment, as reflected by talks-about-talks over the last couple of years between the US and the Afghan Taliban.
In the interest of realism, it should be recognised here that gaining leverage over certain faction leaders is an obvious way of weakening the overall TTP command and control structure.
Indeed, that tactic was key to the success of the 2009 counter-terrorist operation in South Waziristan and this summers campaign in Kurram. However, the equally obvious downside is that it has nurtured suspicions within tribal communities of complicity between the authorities and the terrorists.
That leads to a second common complaint: innocent local people were rounded up - some never to return, others anonymously buried at midnight - in a security operation against such-and-such TTP commander, who went underground, only to resurface a few weeks later.
That is probably the most disturbing popular narrative in the Fata, because it takes the perception of complicity to a higher plane.
Unfortunately, it cannot be dismissed as mere tribesmens gossip: the most respected security analysts in Islamabad, particularly the Fata residents among them, say the same thing.
The subsequent gaping trust deficit between the tribes and the authorities has long-term implications for national security, as would the terms of any peace agreement with the TTP. Those implications have been accentuated by the Nato attack on the Mohmand border posts.
The US, as part of its 2014 military exit strategy for Afghanistan, is spending crazy amounts of money on the creation of an anti-terrorist bulwark along the Durand Line. Washingtons current annual spending on putting together a force of half-a-million Afghan troops, paramilitary police, tribal militia and armed private security contractors is easily more than double Pakistans $5 billion defence budget.
Potentially, that could leave Pakistan with a strategic cancer on its northwest flank.
From the big-picture perspective of national security policymaking, the motivation for seeking peace with a greatly weakened TTP, theoretically, would be three-fold.
First, there is an urgent need to stabilize Fata so that TTP players are less susceptible to manipulation by extremely well funded Afghan warlords who, in turn, are proxies of Pakistans strategic competitors.
Second, peace with TTP would free up many of the 140,000 troops currently deployed in the Fata and adjacent districts of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, and facilitate a reallocation of military resources in response to conventional external threats to national security.
Third, and perhaps of most importance to national security policymaking, it would give credence to Pakistans argument that the US should engage in meaningful negotiations with the Afghan Taliban without first requiring them to disarm.
The challenge facing the actual policymakers would be to secure the surrender and disarmament of the TTP on terms agreeable to the Fata general public. Much of it still lives in squalor, either as a mostly abandoned refugee population, or under the blade of the TTP.
But, so far, the TTP has shown little interest in a compromise, largely because its commanders are harvesting the profits of a massive covert war economy.
The terms reportedly put forth by the TTP Mahsud, reportedly after a shura meeting in September, echoed those of the failed 2004 Shakai and 2005 Sararogha peace agreements: enforce the shariah, pay compensation, and withdraw from the strategic partnership with the US.
The first condition also echoes the failed Swat agreement of 2009, because it implies the TTP would assume the role of shariah enforcer and, therefore, of the acknowledged political authority on the ground.
The subsequent demand for compensation would require the government of Pakistan to further acknowledge the terrorists right to supersede the Constitution.
The third condition would virtually require the authorities to allow the militants cross-border endeavours - and invite US diplomatic and military retaliation.
Every Fata security expert worth a pay cheque is convinced that anything short of an unconditional TTP surrender and collective toba (repentance) would increase the perception of complicity - and, thus, the sense of victimisation - within the tribal communities to the point of no return.
In an environment where the TTP does everything from paying salaries to charging taxes and executing alleged spies, any overt display of weakness by the government could easily push some tribes permanently into the insurgent camp.
A government willing to engage in direct peace talks would certainly be perceived as weak.
Already, through statements to the media, the disparate faction leaders of the TTP are sensing an opportunity and showing signs of reuniting, at least politically, to strengthen their collective bargaining position.
Again, from the broader national security policymaking perspective, that would make negotiations a lot simpler. But it would also reverse - partially, at least - the gains won after three years of counter-terrorism operations, and the loss of so many civilian and military lives.
The obvious solution, unanimously cited by Fata security experts, would be to re-empower the tribes, by making them the final arbiter in the conflict with the terrorists in Fata.
A pertinent example of that working in practice was the 2009 declaration by authorities in South Waziristan that any improvised explosive device (IED) attack on the security forces would result in punitive action against the clan living within a kilometre of the detonation. Instantly, two years of IED attacks on the Tank-Wana road ceased, permanently.
The tribes are certainly in a much better position than the government to persuade non-committed TTP fighters to lay down their arms and reintegrate with society.
The empowerment of the tribes would also facilitate the gradual introduction of democracy in the Fata, ahead of the 2013 general election. It would invariably encourage the reintegration of tribal society by giving voters there a desperately needed sense of participation in national affairs.
More to the point, it would restore some of the trust in the State. Any deal that empowered the TTP, however, would have the reverse effect, with ominous consequences.
