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Pakistan and the Nasr Missile :: Searching for a Method in the Madness

who says Pakistan developed this missile for Punjab side? This missile is specefically for That/Rajhastan desert areas. We have adequate measures to stop Indian advance in conventional terms at Punjab Kashmir border. Gap exists at Rajhstan/Thar desert borders

Not really,the thar desert area is mostly barren wasteland doesn't have any real strategic ground that can be taken and used as bargaining chip.It could be somewhat useful in rann of kutch region.
 
And with a range of mere 60 kms,do you really think this 'wonder weapon' will survive Indian artillery and air strikes for even a minute??The moment the Indian forces find these out,which they surely will,these Nasr batteries or whatever will be subjected to concentrated fire assaults by both IA and IAF and the missiles will be blown sky-high.Basically there ain't a single scenario,where PA can deploy these things within close proximity to the borders and hope to save them too.
You are now walking into "what if" scenarios. I told you as it is. I am not here to play a board game.
 
And with a range of mere 60 kms,do you really think this 'wonder weapon' will survive Indian artillery and air strikes for even a minute??The moment the Indian forces find these out,which they surely will,these Nasr batteries or whatever will be subjected to concentrated fire assaults by both IA and IAF and the missiles will be blown sky-high.Basically there ain't a single scenario,where PA can deploy these things within close proximity to the borders and hope to save them too.

Basically if u deploy them in kashmir,punjab and agricultural areas of sindh its suicide.
If u deploy them in barren rann of kutch region they are sitting ducks because of no natural terrain to conceal the firing units and easy pickings for surveillence assets and longer range standoff guided munitions/artillery assets due to poor range.
 
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You are now walking into "what if" scenarios. I told you as it is. I am not here to play a board game.

Nope,just trying to walk down the path of logical reasoning,that's all.Had the Nasr been a longer leged weapon,your arguments then would have made some sense,but right now,it simply doesn't.
 
What other types warheads can Nasr deliver? I reckon it can be more than a nuclear one.
 
Basically if u deploy hem in kashmir,punjab and agricultural areas of sindh its suicide.
If u deploy them in barren rann of kutch region they are sitting ducks because of no natural terrain to conceal the firing units and easy pickings for surveillence assets and longer range standoff guided munitions/artillery assets due to poor range.

I don't think Kashmir would be a viable candidate,cause the tactical nukes are there largely to stop the Indian Armored and Mechanized forces dead in their tracks.But these is hardly any area in Kashmir that is capable of handling such heavy vehicular movements.
The most likely place of their deployment would be the fertile regions of Sindh and Pakistani Punjab,because that's where the Indian offensives are expected to form.And even then,I doubt the Nasr batteries will ever be deployed anywhere near the IB.

What other types warheads can Nasr deliver? I reckon it can be more than a nuclear one.
Air bursting,FAE,HE etc etc.

Actually it is.Its to counter cold start.Cold start envisages fast limited push inside pak territory by IBGs to capture territory as bargaining chip.

By the way,do you have any idea about the possible size and composition of these so called IBGs??I mean whether they are of Brigade strength or division strength??And are you on fb??

Limited War

Inspired by the bellicose nature of his prime minister, the Indian army chief has threatened Pakistan with punitive action in the form of limited war for waging a so-called proxy war against India. Apart from his misplaced confidence in his army, the Pakistan Army’s commitment on the western front could also have encouraged him. The unprovoked firing and shelling across the Working Boundary and the Line of Control could well be the prelude to starting a limited war.

Limited war is a geographically confined conflict short of general war in which the political aim, space, time and the weapons used are limited. According to André Beaufre, a French strategist, “Limited wars are a sort of tough negotiations”.

Limited war can be categorised as insurrectional and non-insurrectional. The former, basically a guerilla war, was fought by the US in Vietnam, Iraq and Afghanistan, by the erstwhile Soviet Union in Afghanistan, is being fought by India in India-held Kashmir, its seven north–eastern states and 14 states dominated by Naxalites, by Pakistan in Fata and outside it, and by Afghanistan against the Afghan Taliban. Examples of the latter are the Indo-Pak wars and the Arab-Israel wars. However, if during the non-insurrectional war, the geographical limitation is lifted, limited war would be transformed into general war.

The other differences between the two categories are that the insurrectional war is not geographically confined, and is not conditioned by time for the guerillas. Therefore, unless the counter-guerilla forces crush the guerilla forces within a year, the war tends to drag on for years, which makes the soldiers vulnerable to Post Traumatic Stress Disorder.

India’s war directors must question their commanders’ ability.
In the aftermath of the 10-month standoff fiasco in 2001 the Indian army developed a limited war doctrine called Cold Start to respond to what it calls proxy war by Pakistan. The essence of this doctrine is transferring the army’s offensive power from the three strike corps to eight division-sized integrated battle groups (IBGs) who would be positioned close to the border so that three to five are launched within 72 to 96 hours after mobilisation is ordered.

Patterned on Israeli army’s concept of task forces, Cold Start envisages high-speed operations to achieve the objectives in the desired time and space framework. Therefore, since a non-insurrectional limited war is conditioned by time, the matching of physical means of mobility with the mobility of mind assumes critical importance, for, commanders whose minds are characterised by lack of enterprise, imagination, flexibility and initiative, can reduce the value of a highly mobile force to zero.

In the 1965 war, despite its overwhelming numerical superiority, the Indian strike corps (1 Corps) penetrated some 11 kilometres only in Sialkot sector in 21 days, while in 1971 the same corps, though reinforced, penetrated approximately 13 km in 14 days, that too when it was opposed by light covering troops. In both wars the Indian army was schematic in its operations. Changes in dispositions, reassigning of objectives, switching of forces not in accordance with their original plans took time.

The following comments by Indian generals also highlight the weaknesses of their army: Lt Gen Harbaksh Singh, Commander Western Command in 1965, in his book War Despatches wrote “In XI Corps there was a sickening repetition of command failures”. “In 1 Corps the guiding hand of the corps commander was conspicuously absent…. leading to a dismal failure at lower levels.” Maj Gen Niranjan Prasad, GOC 15 Division in 1965, sacked on Sep 7, in his captured war diary said: “There is no deep thinking in the Indian army…. there is a cheap attitude to underestimate the enemy and to show off one’s own toughness to his superiors.” Maj Gen Sukhwant Singh, DDMO in 1971, in his book Defence of the Western Border wrote: “The generals who led the Indian army [in 1971] on the western front had no concept of conducting a short war”.

The Indian war directors must question the ability of their commanders at all levels to conduct high-speed operations with flexibility, rapidity and less military routine.

Despite the weaknesses demonstrated by the Indian army in 1965 and 1971, the Pakistan Army does not underestimate their war potential. They could launch an operation in southern Pakistan to split Pakistan in two, and another operation in Ravi-Chenab corridor to acquire depth for their vulnerable line of communication that connects the Indian mainland with Jammu and Kashmir.

However, the fact is that the army here can occupy its wartime locations much earlier than the Indian army confers on it the ability to pre-empt any Indian effort. Suffice it to say that the reorganised force has multiplied its capability to devastate the Indian army’s IBGs or strike corps in their assembly areas by powerful massed fires.

If the Indian army chief still decides to start a limited war, his country would have to pay dearly for his error of judgement.

The writer is a former armour and SSG officer.

Published in Dawn, September 21st, 2015

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Just gas talk,nothing more and nothing less.

The concept of force multipliers goes above your head it seems. Allow me to educate you:

1. Nasr doesn't need to completely destroy intruding forces, it just needs to soften them up enough to let the Pak Fauj wipe them out. In all your assumptions, you are thinking there are no Pakistani ground forces on the ground. Mind you, the ratio of Indian army to Pakistani army is 2:1, which is not a huge advantage. Fighting the 6th largest military in the world while under fire from tactical nukes is no kids play.

2. Cold Start's objective is to make fast thrusts and capture territory. If the Indians fear the Nasr, and spread their forces to lessen its impact, they are effectively eroding their numerical advantage on the ground, since a smaller number of tanks, soldiers will be directly facing the Pak Fauj. In essence, by spreading their forces out over a very large area, they are literally negating the objective they set out to achieve. That is to gain territory through fast mobilization and overwhelming numbers.

Either way, its a win-win situation for Pakistan.

All these talks of softening up the Indian Forces and then destroying them in detail is totally void,because as soon as Pakistan decides to pound the IBGs with tactical nukes,all bets will be off...............it will be MAD for both of our nations and there will be no one winner,only two losers.
 
I don't think Kashmir would be a viable candidate,cause the tactical nukes are there largely to stop the Indian Armored and Mechanized forces dead in their tracks.But these is hardly any area in Kashmir that is capable of handling such heavy vehicular movements.
The most likely place of their deployment would be the fertile regions of Sindh and Pakistani Punjab,because that's where the Indian offensives are expected to form.And even then,I doubt the Nasr batteries will ever be deployed anywhere near the IB.


Air bursting,FAE,HE etc etc.



By the way,do you have any idea about the possible size and composition of these so called IBGs??I mean whether they are of Brigade strength or division strength??And are you on fb??



Just gas talk,nothing more and nothing less.



All these talks of softening up the Indian Forces and then destroying them in detail is totally void,because as soon as Pakistan decides to pound the IBGs with tactical nukes,all bets will be off...............it will be MAD for both of our nations and there will be no one winner,only two losers.


And this is your comeback ? :lol:

A former armour and SSG officer vs a one liner internet troll warrior from india.. I believe ya.
 
And this is your comeback ? :lol:

A former armour and SSG officer vs a one liner internet troll warrior from india.. I believe ya.

You misunderstood me,I mean gas talk on part of the Indian generals. :D By the way,what's with this starting India with an 'i'??
 
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By the way,do you have any idea about the possible size and composition of these so called IBGs??I mean whether they are of Brigade strength or division strength??And are you on fb??

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Possible 8 axis of attack by a retired pak officer's analysis.
IBG's themselves would be division sized consisting of armor/mechanized brigade supported by infantry/artillery assets and airpower.Anything over division level too unwieldy as it requires attack within 96 hrs.They would be supported by the regional pivot corps.Thing to note is none of these attacks need to succeed,they only need to take some modest territory along the way and then use it at negotiations ,basically return the territory in exchange of terrorists.
The 8 different attack routes are to confuse PA as to main point and stretch it thin,u can't defend all land everywhere when outnumbered -so some land somewhere is certain to be seized.Then defend it and negotiate.
But don't get too hyped about it.As far as i know the doctrine hasn't been anywhere near fully implemented on the ground .
Mainly because critical equipment required necessary for such a strategy are missing - requires modern artillery,lots of helicopters both airlift and gunships plus latest ground strike aircraft.As well as special forces,modern armor and precision munitions.
Artillery upgrade drama is still ongoing.
Helicopters deals are just signed now.
Rafale drama still ongoing.
So right now we don't have equipment to carry out this doctrine to the full due to lack of artillery primarily and enough squadrons of latest ground strike aircraft.But part has been implemented with brahmos regiments for precision strike,special forces getting new equipment,we have sufficient numbers of t-90s and BMP-2s.
I'm not on Fb.
 
Not really,the thar desert area is mostly barren wasteland doesn't have any real strategic ground that can be taken and used as bargaining chip.It could be somewhat useful in rann of kutch region.

If you following Indian Army training exercises for last 3-4 years. You may know which corps of IA are training for perfecting cold start strategy. We developed NASR for those Corps who will attack suddenly through Rajhastan area i.e I corps
 
Well NASR is like suicide bomber,who only think about causing damage without looking at repercussion because he/she will not be there for this.My only doubt is how you going to defend this kinda asserts ,as am sure Indian extensive SIGINT, HUMINT ,IMINT and even upcoming MASINT will easily detect this.

Just Imagine If a NASR Launcher loaded with TAC NUKEZ hit by concentrated Guided Artillery Fire or MBRL or drones. Aint this affect the whole region within 20km radius :o:
 
This missile is a suicide weapon,firing a nuke inside pakistani territory in the heart of pakistan's agricultural bread basket of punjab and irradiating the soil/water =catastrophe.Even taking out the question of indian nuclear response.
Please read about the fallout generated by air-bursts, it is minimum because the fireball hardly touches the ground and doesn't kicks up much dirt.
Actually it is.Its to counter cold start. Cold start envisages fast limited push inside pak territory by IBGs to capture territory as bargaining chip.
Food for thought: What if the intention is to vaporize the bargaining chip instead of the armored columns?
 
Please read about the fallout generated by air-bursts, it is minimum because the fireball hardly touches the ground and doesn't kicks up much dirt.

Food for thought: What if the intention is to vaporize the bargaining chip instead of the armored columns?

The bargaining chip if in the agricultural belt of punjab and sindh will irradiate the area with devastating results .Are you saying a nuclear blast won't spread radiation throughout the area?
 
The bargaining chip if in the agricultural belt of punjab and sindh will irradiate the area with devastating results .Are you saying a nuclear blast won't spread radiation throughout the area?
I believe I just said that in the first reply. Airbursts are not only "cleaner", but they are also more devastating to buildings and vehicles because the shockwave hits close targets directly and adds up after reflecting from ground. Why do you think Tsar-Bomba didn't irradiate a continent?

Pakistan Wants 'Battlefield' Nukes, against Indian Troops | Page 17
 
ZKW5wuB.png


Possible 8 axis of attack by a retired pak officer's analysis.
IBG's themselves would be division sized consisting of armor/mechanized brigade supported by infantry/artillery assets and airpower.Anything over division level too unwieldy as it requires attack within 96 hrs.They would be supported by the regional pivot corps.Thing to note is none of these attacks need to succeed,they only need to take some modest territory along the way and then use it at negotiations ,basically return the territory in exchange of terrorists.
The 8 different attack routes are to confuse PA as to main point and stretch it thin,u can't defend all land everywhere when outnumbered -so some land somewhere is certain to be seized.Then defend it and negotiate.
But don't get too hyped about it.As far as i know the doctrine hasn't been anywhere near fully implemented on the ground .
Mainly because critical equipment required necessary for such a strategy are missing - requires modern artillery,lots of helicopters both airlift and gunships plus latest ground strike aircraft.As well as special forces,modern armor and precision munitions.
Artillery upgrade drama is still ongoing.
Helicopters deals are just signed now.
Rafale drama still ongoing.
So right now we don't have equipment to carry out this doctrine to the full due to lack of artillery primarily and enough squadrons of latest ground strike aircraft.But part has been implemented with brahmos regiments for precision strike,special forces getting new equipment,we have sufficient numbers of t-90s and BMP-2s.
I'm not on Fb.

Thanks for this elaborate reply.Only one more question , where will the IBGs be drawn from - the pivot corps or strike corps??
 

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