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Pakistan Using Heavy Shells - a First Since Ceasefire Agreement: Sources

Which brings us to the second part: the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan resolution dated 13 August 1948. Let me point out that there are several other UN resolutions in this regard, as well as the UN proposals that you have rightly mentioned. The reason I am dealing with this particular resolution is that a) India claims it is the most important resolution as it circumscribes what was vaguely stated in R47 in actual terms, and b) I am yet to find anything in the other resolutions that are responsible for the schism in positions that exist today.
I'm curious as to why one single resolution should be arbitrarily picked and flagged as 'the most important resolution'. As with any dispute, it takes time to investigate and understand the complexities and dynamics involved. Inter-State disputes can be exceedingly complex to understand, so the issuance of multiple UNSC Resolutions and reports is understandable. While I am not outright opposing this choice of the UNCIP Resolution of 13 August 1948, I would like to understand why subsequent and past resolutions and reports cannot be used as references for clarification of the ambiguities see within?
I will deal with the UN Commission resolution dated 13 August 1948 in chronological order. I hope you are able to appreciate my point. The chronological order is important because we cannot simply pick whatever part we feel like to suit our convenience. Each part is conditional upon the implementation of the part preceding it. I guess the UNSC understood us quite well, which is why it mentioned even this basic norm of interpretation within the resolution itself.
I have no major issue with looking at these issues in chronological order, however, you can't compartmentalize blindly because various sections of the resolution (or prior/subsequent resolutions and reports) can offer clarity and context for contentious sections that can be (and have been) interpreted differently by India and Pakistan.

Part I is the ceasefire order. Without that, none of the subsequent parts would apply. Both parties implemented that.

Part II deals with the framework within which a valid truce agreement was to be worked out. This is the most important part of the resolution, by the way.
Before we get into a debate over language of the resolution in Part and differing interpretations, I'd like to point out that the text of UNCIP Resolution on 08/13/48 makes clear that Ceasefire and Truce Agreement steps outlined in Part I and II are proposals - any commitment on the part of India and Pakistan would be part of an actual truce agreement that the 2 countries would negotiate with representatives of the UN. See excerpts below:

THE UNITED NATIONS COMMISSION FOR INDIA AND PAKISTAN
Having given careful consideration to the points of view expressed by the Representatives, of India and Pakistan regarding the situation in the State of Jammu and Kashmir, and Being of the opinion that the prompt cessation of hostilities and the correction of conditions the continuance of which is likely to endanger international peace and security are essential to implementation of its endeavours to assist the Governments of India and Pakistan in effecting a final settlement of the situation, Resolves to submit simultaneously to the Governments of India and Pakistan the following proposal:

PART II
TRUCE AGREEMENT
Simultaneously with the acceptance of the proposal for the immediate cessation of hostilities as outlined in Part I, both Governments accept the following principles as a basis for the

formulation of a truce agreement, the details of which shall be worked out in discussion between their Representatives and the Commission.

So this particular resolution is nothing more than a set of proposals that the UNCIP put forward for India and Pakistan to consider as part of broader negotiations on an actual agreement on demilitarization of J&K. There was no unilateral requirement for withdrawal of Pakistani military forces placed upon Pakistan here.

I'll respond next to the point that these proposals 'created basic requirements for Pakistan that had to be part of any subsequent Truce Agreement' next.
 
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I'm curious as to why one single resolution should be arbitrarily picked and flagged as 'the most important resolution'. As with any dispute, it takes time to investigate and understand the complexities and dynamics involved. Inter-State disputes can be exceedingly complex to understand, so the issuance of multiple UNSC Resolutions and reports is understandable. While I am not outright opposing this choice of the UNCIP Resolution of 13 August 1948, I would like to understand why subsequent and past resolutions and reports cannot be used as references for clarification of the ambiguities see within?

I have no major issue with looking at these issues in chronological order, however, you can't compartmentalize blindly because various sections of the resolution (or prior/subsequent resolutions and reports) can offer clarity and context for contentious sections that can be (and have been) interpreted differently by India and Pakistan.


Before we get into a debate over language of the resolution in Part and differing interpretations, I'd like to point out that the text of UNCIP Resolution on 08/13/48 makes clear that Ceasefire and Truce Agreement steps outlined in Part I and II are proposals - any commitment on the part of India and Pakistan would be part of an actual truce agreement that the 2 countries would negotiate with representatives of the UN. See excerpts below:

THE UNITED NATIONS COMMISSION FOR INDIA AND PAKISTAN
Having given careful consideration to the points of view expressed by the Representatives, of India and Pakistan regarding the situation in the State of Jammu and Kashmir, and Being of the opinion that the prompt cessation of hostilities and the correction of conditions the continuance of which is likely to endanger international peace and security are essential to implementation of its endeavours to assist the Governments of India and Pakistan in effecting a final settlement of the situation, Resolves to submit simultaneously to the Governments of India and Pakistan the following proposal:

PART II
TRUCE AGREEMENT
Simultaneously with the acceptance of the proposal for the immediate cessation of hostilities as outlined in Part I, both Governments accept the following principles as a basis for the

formulation of a truce agreement, the details of which shall be worked out in discussion between their Representatives and the Commission.

So this particular resolution is nothing more than a set of proposals that the UNCIP put forward for India and Pakistan to consider as part of broader negotiations on an actual agreement on demilitarization of J&K. There was no unilateral requirement for withdrawal of Pakistani military forces placed upon Pakistan here.

I'll respond next to the point that these proposals 'created basic requirements for Pakistan that had to be part of any subsequent Truce Agreement' next.

I think I will wait for your complete reply before addressing it. I would just like to point out one thing: It is not my contention that R47 or UNCIP 13/08/1948 are the only relevant documents. It just happens that the conflict in position draws from these two - Pakistanis cite the former and Indians cite the latter. If you can find another resolution or proposal or even observations from UN rapporteurs that add to our understanding please mention it as well.
 
The day you see an Indian flag in my post, you can be rest assured, that would be a lie and I might do so, if I totally lost my mind and turned as crazy as you. For whatever reason, India seems like a country with highly emotionally charged people.

And as far as my name you referred to in your post, you can call me Daddy from America. That's who we are to India. We built your Shiit!!! If you really want to go back to the hell hole you were in till 1995, please return all American tax payer's lost jobs and bring your funny head-shaking "IT" people who are abusing our H1B visas through human trafficking by your IT companies.

You interview Sham, Ram shows up. A few months later, you found out you hired Gopal, and Ram was his buddy who let him use his papers!!! This IT fire sale isn't going to last long. If Donald Trump gets elected,, he's going to put an end to all this H1B human trafficking by Indian companies. Exploitation of the American system to its last degree!!!


@Oscar @Horus @Jango @Irfan Baloch : gentlemen - will you please ban this idiot and save all of us some pain? People like this, shouldn't come to forums to debate if they've not finish their high schools and learned a proper way to address people with courtesy, and per the forum rules. Thank you

You must have lost your job to an Indian ...so I am sorry for this. If Donald Trump gets elected, he's going to put an end to all this H1B human trafficking by Indian companies, the way Obama wanted .. I agree. Your companies make more money from India than we do from yours. You ban Human Reosurce, which we have abundant and we ban Capital resource. You will loose more than us bro...so stop threatening this to us.

Of all Country in the world, You should not preach anything to us. Before reading our history, you should learn your history.

You could do a shit when we made your client state in two parts. The country you are cheering, had hosted your enemy no. 1 for long and has killed more americans than any other country in the world ....but looking at your sympathy, I doubt your patriotism for your so called country.

 
I think I will wait for your complete reply before addressing it. I would just like to point out one thing: It is not my contention that R47 or UNCIP 13/08/1948 are the only relevant documents. It just happens that the conflict in position draws from these two - Pakistanis cite the former and Indians cite the latter.
I disagree - Pakistan's position is in fact bolstered by reference to the entire gamut of UNSC Resolutions, UNCIP and UN Rapporteur reports. It is the Indian's who have the most to gain by arbitrarily selecting and focusing on one part of one UNCIP Resolution.
If you can find another resolution or proposal or even observations from UN rapporteurs that add to our understanding please mention it as well.
The UNCIP Resolution of 13 August itself has clear language that negates the Indian assertion of an 'unconditional unilateral withdrawal required of Pakistan'.

Part II-A (1) and Part II-A (2) of the UNCIP Resolution make a distinction between 'Pakistani Troops' and 'Tribesmen and Pakistani nationals' and the language uses 'Troops' specifically with the intent of representing Pakistani government forces and the term 'Forces' as representing all combatants, whether under the direct control of either government or not.

This deliberate distinction between 'Troops' and 'tribesmen and Pakistani nationals' is clear from how UNCIP expects the GoP to handle the withdrawals of each. In the case of 'troops' the UNCIP Resolution states that 'the government of Pakistan agrees to withdraw its troops', which is a clear commitment. This makes sense since these are government troops under government control, 'there is no try, just do' (to paraphrase Yoda). In the case of 'tribesmen and Pakistan nationals', however, UNCIP states that 'the GoP will use its best endeavour to secure the withdrawal'. This also makes sense since the reference is to 'fighting forces' that are not part of the military and possibly composed of independent volunteers, mercenaries etc that the government cannot be expected to completely control.

Second, if UNCIP considered 'Pakistani nationals' and 'troops' to be the same entity, it would not have mentioned them separately in 2 paragraphs committing the exact same 'withdrawal', nor would it have in one case expected a clear commitment of the GoP withdrawing 'troops' and in the other expecting the GoP to 'try its best to withdraw Pakistani nationals'. This distinction, and the addition of a fourth type of combatant, the Azad Kashmir Forces, is further established by the Indian government as part of the proposals she made to Frank Graham which can be seen in his Second Report to the UNSC:

(a) The Indian Government is ready to withdraw the bulk of its army when
(i) the tribesmen, Pakistan nationals not normally resident in the State of Jammu and Kashmir and the Pakistan troops have been withdrawn from the State;
(ii) large-scale disbandment and disarmament of the Azad Kashmir forces have taken place.

I have hopefully clearly explained how and why the terms 'troops' and 'Pakistan nationals' and 'tribesmen' used in the UNCIP Resolution are not the same. The underlined sections of the UNCIP Resolution supporting my argument are quoted below:

A. (1) As the presence of troops of Pakistan in the territory of the State of Jammu and Kashmir constitutes a material change in the situation since it was represented by the Government of Pakistan before the Security Council, the Government of Pakistan agrees to withdraw its troops from that State.

(2) The Government of Pakistan will use its best endeavour to secure the withdrawal from the State of Jammu and Kashmir of tribesmen and Pakistan nationals not normally resident therein who have entered the State for the purpose of fighting.

(3) Pending a final solution the territory evacuated by the Pakistan troops will be administered by the local authorities under the surveillance of the Commission.

Now we can proceed to Part II-B - please keep in mind the distinctions between 'troops, Pakistan nationals and tribesmen' that I pointed out above and note the syntax and grammar used in the following excerpt that Indians and their Western apologists, such as that lying hack Christine Fair, like to distort and dissemble in arguing for an unconditional Pakistani withdrawal:

B. (1) When the Commission shall have notified the Government of India that the tribesmen and Pakistan nationals referred to in Part II A2 hereof have withdrawn, thereby terminating the situation which was represented by the Government of India to the Security Council as having occasioned the presence of Indian forces in the State of Jammu and Kashmir, and further, that the Pakistan forces are being withdrawn from the State of Jammu and Kashmir, the Government of India agrees to begin to withdraw the bulk of their forces from the State in stages to be agreed upon with the Commission.

I've explained how the terms 'tribesmen and Pakistani nationals' are used to represent entities distinct from 'Pakistani troops' in this specific UNCIP resolutions. The section above highlighted in red therefore refers only to 'tribesmen and Pakistani nationals' and not to 'Pakistani troops' or 'government forces'.

The section highlighted in green is the section that refers to Pakistani troops/government forces withdrawal, and it describes said withdrawal in the 'present continuous tense' (being withdrawn) - an event that is 'ongoing and not complete'. And while the process of Pakistani troop/forces being withdrawn is 'ongoing and not complete', UNCIP requires India to 'begin to withdraw the bulk of their forces' (section in blue).

Now, I would expect you to argue that this still means that Pakistan is required to start withdrawing her troops first so India has no responsibilities placed upon her until Pakistan fulfills her commitment of 'starting the withdrawal'. The reason this argument is wrong is because of the last part of the blue highlighted text, "in stages to be agreed upon with the Commission". This is where the introductory paragraph of Part II is significant, and reinforced by Part II-C (1) - see highlighted sections below:

PART II TRUCE AGREEMENT Simultaneously with the acceptance of the proposal for the immediate cessation of hostilities as outlined in Part I, both Governments accept the following principles as a basis for the formulation of a truce agreement, the details of which shall be worked out in discussion between their Representatives and the Commission.

C. (1) Upon signature, the full text of the Truce Agreement or communique containing the principles thereof as agreed upon between the two Governments and the Commission, will be made public.

So the critical 'principle that was to be the basis for the formulation of a truce agreement' for India and Pakistan boils down to one line in Part II - B (1), which states that:

"and further, that the Pakistan forces are being withdrawn from the State of Jammu and Kashmir, the Government of India agrees to begin to withdraw the bulk of their forces from the State in stages to be agreed upon with the Commission."

India. Pakistan and UNCIP had to come to an agreement on the details of a Truce Agreement that defined the withdrawal plans of both Pakistan AND India, and it isn't as simple as you would think - the phrase 'Pakistani forces are being withdrawn' doesn't detail what percentage of Pakistani forces need to be withdrawn, and the withdrawal verified, before Indian forces started withdrawing. Technically, Pakistan could withdraw a single soldier, or merely load up a truck full of soldiers ready to drive away and be in compliance with the condition of 'Pakistani forces are being withdrawn', which would then require Indian forces to start their withdrawal.

So the withdrawal timelines, numbers and details had to be negotiated in detail, which is where the process fell apart, primarily because of unreasonable demands from the Indian side. Pakistan was willing to pursue almost every reasonable proposal put forward by UN mediators and representatives, even when Pakistan troops would be at a military disadvantage due to significantly lower troop levels compared to the Indians.

Pakistan's position on the UNCIP Resolution of 13 August 1948 is borne out by the McNaughton Report, which was one of the proposals for a truce Agreement based on Part II of the subject UNCIP Resolution:

DEMILITARISATION PREPARATORY TO THE PLEBISCITE 2. There should be an agreed programme of progressive demilitarisation, the basic principle of which should be the reduction of armed forces on either side of the Cease-Fire Line by withdrawal, disbandment and disarmament in such stages as not to cause fear at any point of time to the people on either side of the Cease-Fire Line. The aim should be to reduce the armed personnel in the State of Jammu and Kashmir on both side of the Cease-Fire Line to the minimum compatible with the maintenance of security and of local law and order, and to a level sufficiently low and with the forces so disposed that they will not constitute a restriction on the free expression of opinion for the purposes of the plebiscite. The programme of demilitarisation should include the withdrawal from the State of Jammu and Kashmir of the regular forces of Pakistan; and the withdrawal of the regular forces of India not required for purposes of security or for the maintenance of local law and order on the Indian side of the Cease-Fire Line; also the reduction, by disbanding and disarming, of local forces, including on the one side the Armed Forces and Militia of the State of Kashmir and on the other, the Azad Forces.
And:
(c) Agreement should be reached on the basic principles of demilitarisation outlined in paragraph 2 above.
(d) Agreement should be reached on the minimum forces required for the maintenance of security and of local law and order, and on their general disposition.

The McNaughton report was accepted and endorsed by the UNSC in Resolution 80, 1950:

1. Calls upon the Governments of India and Pakistan to make immediate arrangements, without prejudice to their rights or claims and with due regard to the requirements of law and order, to prepare and execute within a period of five months from the date of this resolution a programme of demilitarization on the basis of the principles of paragraph 2 of General McNaughton's proposal7 or of such modifications of those principles as may be mutually agreed;

In conclusion, the simple documented fact that the Indian government participated in every single UNCIP and UNSC appointed rapporteur's mission of negotiating a truce agreement over the process and details of a military withdrawal from J&K is an acceptance of the Pakistani position that the UNSC and UNCIP Resolutions do not require a unilateral and unconditional withdrawal by Pakistani military forces before a plebiscite can be conducted, because if that had even remotely been the case, the Indian Government would have refused to engage in a single UNCIP or UNSC Representatives process of negotiations over the details of a withdrawal.

@Horus @Irfan Baloch @Oscar @Developereo @fatman17 @MastanKhan @Syed.Ali.Haider @MilSpec @Jango@Areesh@genmirajborgza786 @Atanz @Solomon2 @RiazHaq

Please see above and, if you feel like it, offer corrections and/or suggestions to improve and make as complete as possible.
 
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You must have lost your job to an Indian ...so I am sorry for this. If Donald Trump gets elected, he's going to put an end to all this H1B human trafficking by Indian companies, the way Obama wanted .. I agree. Your companies make more money from India than we do from yours. You ban Human Reosurce, which we have abundant and we ban Capital resource. You will loose more than us bro...so stop threatening this to us.

Of all Country in the world, You should not preach anything to us. Before reading our history, you should learn your history.

You could do a shit when we made your client state in two parts. The country you are cheering, had hosted your enemy no. 1 for long and has killed more americans than any other country in the world ....but looking at your sympathy, I doubt your patriotism for your so called country.

Viper0011, how much more protection do you want? Global financial system which US control, dollar as default currency, trade regimes that make it easy for US to sell to other countries while raising tariff barriers and prohibitive regulatory regimes for all products except those you are simply not willing to make. And you grudge the loss of some IT jobs? Those IT jobs were lost due to the same process of demand and supply that you exploit by controlling the world's financial and intellectual property regime. You do not allow poor countries access to generic medicines claiming IP protection for Big Pharma, but will not allow the same profit motive to try and reduce wage costs by shipping out jobs?

Also, foreign investment has not made India, or for that matter any other country with a sizeable population. Any large country that has not been able to develop domestic demand for goods, services and capital will not prosper. The primary reason that India and many other countries escaped the full brunt of the Global Financial Crisis is because they did not allow your make believe, toxic derivative trading, making money from thin air financial institutions entry into their markets. That prevented a run on their banks and saved the real estate sector in these countries.

And please, Europe I can understand, but really, Americans complaining about immigration? Immigration built America; it is quite convenient for you to close the gates when the demographic starts changing.
 
I disagree - Pakistan's position is in fact bolstered by reference to the entire gamut of UNSC Resolutions, UNCIP and UN Rapporteur reports. It is the Indian's who have the most to gain by arbitrarily selecting and focusing on one part of one UNCIP Resolution.

The UNCIP Resolution of 13 August itself has clear language that negates the Indian assertion of an 'unconditional unilateral withdrawal required of Pakistan'.

Part II-A (1) and Part II-A (2) of the UNCIP Resolution make a distinction between 'Pakistani Troops' and 'Tribesmen and Pakistani nationals' and the language uses 'Troops' specifically with the intent of representing Pakistani government forces and the term 'Forces' as representing all combatants, whether under the direct control of either government or not.

This deliberate distinction between 'Troops' and 'tribesmen and Pakistani nationals' is clear from how UNCIP expects the GoP to handle the withdrawals of each. In the case of 'troops' the UNCIP Resolution states that 'the government of Pakistan agrees to withdraw its troops', which is a clear commitment. This makes sense since these are government troops under government control, 'there is no try, just do' (to paraphrase Yoda). In the case of 'tribesmen and Pakistan nationals', however, UNCIP states that 'the GoP will use its best endeavour to secure the withdrawal'. This also makes sense since the reference is to 'fighting forces' that are not part of the military and possibly composed of independent volunteers, mercenaries etc that the government cannot be expected to completely control.

Second, if UNCIP considered 'Pakistani nationals' and 'troops' to be the same entity, it would not have mentioned them separately in 2 paragraphs committing the exact same 'withdrawal', nor would it have in one case expected a clear commitment of the GoP withdrawing 'troops' and in the other expecting the GoP to 'try its best to withdraw Pakistani nationals'. This distinction, and the addition of a fourth type of combatant, the Azad Kashmir Forces, is further established by the Indian government as part of the proposals she made to Frank Graham which can be seen in his Second Report to the UNSC:

(a) The Indian Government is ready to withdraw the bulk of its army when
(i) the tribesmen, Pakistan nationals not normally resident in the State of Jammu and Kashmir and the Pakistan troops have been withdrawn from the State;
(ii) large-scale disbandment and disarmament of the Azad Kashmir forces have taken place.

I have hopefully clearly explained how and why the terms 'troops' and 'Pakistan nationals' and 'tribesmen' used in the UNCIP Resolution are not the same. The underlined sections of the UNCIP Resolution supporting my argument are quoted below:

A. (1) As the presence of troops of Pakistan in the territory of the State of Jammu and Kashmir constitutes a material change in the situation since it was represented by the Government of Pakistan before the Security Council, the Government of Pakistan agrees to withdraw its troops from that State.

(2) The Government of Pakistan will use its best endeavour to secure the withdrawal from the State of Jammu and Kashmir of tribesmen and Pakistan nationals not normally resident therein who have entered the State for the purpose of fighting.

(3) Pending a final solution the territory evacuated by the Pakistan troops will be administered by the local authorities under the surveillance of the Commission.

Now we can proceed to Part II-B - please keep in mind the distinctions between 'troops, Pakistan nationals and tribesmen' that I pointed out above and note the syntax and grammar used in the following excerpt that Indians and their Western apologists, such as that lying hack Christine Fair, like to distort and dissemble in arguing for an unconditional Pakistani withdrawal:

B. (1) When the Commission shall have notified the Government of India that the tribesmen and Pakistan nationals referred to in Part II A2 hereof have withdrawn, thereby terminating the situation which was represented by the Government of India to the Security Council as having occasioned the presence of Indian forces in the State of Jammu and Kashmir, and further, that the Pakistan forces are being withdrawn from the State of Jammu and Kashmir, the Government of India agrees to begin to withdraw the bulk of their forces from the State in stages to be agreed upon with the Commission.

I've explained how the terms 'tribesmen and Pakistani nationals' are used to represent entities distinct from 'Pakistani troops' in this specific UNCIP resolutions. The section above highlighted in red therefore refers only to 'tribesmen and Pakistani nationals' and not to 'Pakistani troops' or 'government forces'.

The section highlighted in green is the section that refers to Pakistani troops/government forces withdrawal, and it describes said withdrawal in the 'present continuous tense' (being withdrawn) - an event that is 'ongoing and not complete'. And while the process of Pakistani troop/forces being withdrawn is 'ongoing and not complete', UNCIP requires India to 'begin to withdraw the bulk of their forces' (section in blue).

Now, I would expect you to argue that this still means that Pakistan is required to start withdrawing her troops first so India has no responsibilities placed upon her until Pakistan fulfills her commitment of 'starting the withdrawal'. The reason this argument is wrong is because of the last part of the blue highlighted text, "in stages to be agreed upon with the Commission". This is where the introductory paragraph of Part II is significant, and reinforced by Part II-C (1) - see highlighted sections below:

PART II TRUCE AGREEMENT Simultaneously with the acceptance of the proposal for the immediate cessation of hostilities as outlined in Part I, both Governments accept the following principles as a basis for the formulation of a truce agreement, the details of which shall be worked out in discussion between their Representatives and the Commission.

C. (1) Upon signature, the full text of the Truce Agreement or communique containing the principles thereof as agreed upon between the two Governments and the Commission, will be made public.

So the critical 'principle that was to be the basis for the formulation of a truce agreement' for India and Pakistan boils down to one line in Part II - B (1), which states that:

"and further, that the Pakistan forces are being withdrawn from the State of Jammu and Kashmir, the Government of India agrees to begin to withdraw the bulk of their forces from the State in stages to be agreed upon with the Commission."

India. Pakistan and UNCIP had to come to an agreement on the details of a Truce Agreement that defined the withdrawal plans of both Pakistan AND India, and it isn't as simple as you would think - the phrase 'Pakistani forces are being withdrawn' doesn't detail what percentage of Pakistani forces need to be withdrawn, and the withdrawal verified, before Indian forces started withdrawing. Technically, Pakistan could withdraw a single soldier, or merely load up a truck full of soldiers ready to drive away and be in compliance with the condition of 'Pakistani forces are being withdrawn', which would then require Indian forces to start their withdrawal.

So the withdrawal timelines, numbers and details had to be negotiated in detail, which is where the process fell apart, primarily because of unreasonable demands from the Indian side. Pakistan was willing to pursue almost every reasonable proposal put forward by UN mediators and representatives, even when Pakistan troops would be at a military disadvantage due to significantly lower troop levels compared to the Indians.

Pakistan's position on the UNCIP Resolution of 13 August 1948 is borne out by the McNaughton Report, which was one of the proposals for a truce Agreement based on Part II of the subject UNCIP Resolution:

DEMILITARISATION PREPARATORY TO THE PLEBISCITE 2. There should be an agreed programme of progressive demilitarisation, the basic principle of which should be the reduction of armed forces on either side of the Cease-Fire Line by withdrawal, disbandment and disarmament in such stages as not to cause fear at any point of time to the people on either side of the Cease-Fire Line. The aim should be to reduce the armed personnel in the State of Jammu and Kashmir on both side of the Cease-Fire Line to the minimum compatible with the maintenance of security and of local law and order, and to a level sufficiently low and with the forces so disposed that they will not constitute a restriction on the free expression of opinion for the purposes of the plebiscite. The programme of demilitarisation should include the withdrawal from the State of Jammu and Kashmir of the regular forces of Pakistan; and the withdrawal of the regular forces of India not required for purposes of security or for the maintenance of local law and order on the Indian side of the Cease-Fire Line; also the reduction, by disbanding and disarming, of local forces, including on the one side the Armed Forces and Militia of the State of Kashmir and on the other, the Azad Forces.
And:
(c) Agreement should be reached on the basic principles of demilitarisation outlined in paragraph 2 above.
(d) Agreement should be reached on the minimum forces required for the maintenance of security and of local law and order, and on their general disposition.

The McNaughton report was accepted and endorsed by the UNSC in Resolution 80, 1950:

1. Calls upon the Governments of India and Pakistan to make immediate arrangements, without prejudice to their rights or claims and with due regard to the requirements of law and order, to prepare and execute within a period of five months from the date of this resolution a programme of demilitarization on the basis of the principles of paragraph 2 of General McNaughton's proposal7 or of such modifications of those principles as may be mutually agreed;

In conclusion, the simple documented fact that the Indian government participated in every single UNCIP and UNSC appointed rapporteur's mission of negotiating a truce agreement over the process and details of a military withdrawal from J&K is an acceptance of the Pakistani position that the UNSC and UNCIP Resolutions do not require a unilateral and unconditional withdrawal by Pakistani military forces before a plebiscite can be conducted, because if that had even remotely been the case, the Indian Government would have refused to engage in a single UNCIP or UNSC Representatives process of negotiations over the details of a withdrawal.

@Horus @Irfan Baloch @Oscar @Developereo @fatman17 @MastanKhan @Syed.Ali.Haider @MilSpec @Jango@Areesh@genmirajborgza786 @Atanz @Solomon2 @RiazHaq

Please see above and, if you feel like it, offer corrections and/or suggestions to improve and make as complete as possible.

I would like to start with certain preliminary observations:

- Our discussion on this subject is academic as for now, for the reason that ever since Kashmir was removed from the list of disputed territories under UN observation, Pakistan’s claims that it continues to be a disputed territory are based outside the UN framework. Of course, if and when the UN puts Kashmir back on the list, the UN resolutions would come back into the picture.

- You are right in stating that the 13 Aug 1948 resolution was a mere proposal, to be taken forward by both parties. At the same time, Parts A and B of Resolution 47 are also just recommendations, as clearly mentioned in the resolution.

- In any form of negotiated settlement, the mere fact that a party agreed to sit for discussions cannot be held against them. Of course, if the parties have mutually agreed to a framework within which a final settlement is binding on both, then no doubt it is so. In all these negotiations, the fact that India has been a willing party cannot lead to an inference that they must be implicitly agreeable to Pakistan’s position. That is why, before each round of negotiations, it is made clear that the discussions are without prejudice to any other related issue. So, for instance, the fact that both parties agreed to a ceasefire line in 1949 is binding unless they totally abandon the framework, but cannot be held against either to say that means they have implicitly conceded anything to the other side.

- Finally, there is the issue of moral behaviour to be considered. It is an unfortunate precedence established by the US in the Nicaragua Case (ICJ, 1986), that international law is nothing but “might is right.” A country can simply ignore international law if it can afford to do so. Pakistan reserves the right to simply abandon the UN framework altogether if it sees nothing fruitful emerging from the process. Like every sovereign country, it has the right to do what it deems to be in its own self interest. But if it places so much emphasis on the UNSC resolutions, then it cannot place any less emphasis on the emerging UN consensus on the subject. Things have moved on from 1950. Today, Pakistan does not find much support when it raises the Kashmir issue at the UN. There is no realistic chance that it will be able to pressure India on the subject through the UN. Yet, Pakistan is claiming Kashmir is a disputed territory. So basically, Pakistan is pulling a US – harping on prior UNSC resolutions when it is convenient and ignoring the change in the UN position on the issue.

You write:

This deliberate distinction between'Troops'and'tribesmenandPakistani nationals'is clear from how UNCIP expects the GoP to handle the withdrawals of each. In the case of'troops'the UNCIP Resolution states that'the government of Pakistan agrees to withdraw its troops', which is a clear commitment. This makes sense since these are government troops under government control, 'there is no try, just do' (to paraphrase Yoda). In the case of 'tribesmenandPakistan nationals', however, UNCIP states that 'the GoP will use its best endeavour to secure the withdrawal'. This also makes sense since the reference is to 'fighting forces' that are not part of the military and possibly composed of independent volunteers, mercenaries etc that the government cannot be expected to completely control.

Let us look at why the situation came about. In the initial stages of the conflict, the UN was not privy to accurate information. When India initially took the matter to the UN, India itself was not aware of the extent of involvement of Pakistani troops. Reference India’s original complain dated 01.01.1948:

Indian Complaint to the Security Council, lst January 1948

As a response, our government dutifully lied to the whole world, as it often does, by denying any involvement in the matter. Reference UN Report Chapter VIII pg 344:

http://www.un.org/en/sc/repertoire/46-51/Chapter 8/46-51_08-16-The India-Pakistan question.pdf

This lie was challenged by India, and later exposed due to the very first UNCIP mission in July. Until then, the UN was not sure about the presence of Pakistani troops, just that tribesmen had entered. UN Report Chapter VIII pg 348:

http://www.un.org/en/sc/repertoire/46-51/Chapter 8/46-51_08-16-The India-Pakistan question.pdf

This explains the discrepancy between Resolution 47 and Resolution of Aug 13.

By the way, the distinction you drew about how the UN construed the difference between Pakistani troops and irregulars may be valid, but yet, what are its practical ramifications? You have gotten yourself into a logical bind. I will elaborate on that in the second point.

Pakistan has repeated several times that it has no control over what these irregulars do. In fact, that is the basis for the deadlock. That is the reason why regardless of what conclusion we ever arrive at, India will not de-militarize the Valley. I will come back to that point later.

However, this interesting aside only explains why the UN chose to stop believing anything we had to say, it does not go to the core of the matter. I only mentioned that to explain the discrepancy that you had initially pointed out between the two resolutions. Unfortunately, it’s a blind alley that I also entered despite the fact it has no relevance to the larger issue we are discussing. The dispute derives from the second point of your argument, so let us focus on that.

You write:

I've explained how the terms 'tribesmen and Pakistani nationals' are used to represent entities distinct from 'Pakistani troops' in this specific UNCIP resolutions. The section above highlighted in red therefore refers only to'tribesmen and Pakistani nationals'and not to'Pakistani troops'or'government forces'.

The section highlighted in green is the section that refers to Pakistani troops/government forces withdrawal, and it describes said withdrawal in the 'present continuous tense' (being withdrawn) - an event that is'ongoing and not complete'. And while the process of Pakistani troop/forces being withdrawn is'ongoing and not complete', UNCIP requires India to'begin to withdraw the bulk of their forces'(section in blue).


I am not quoting the rest of the text. Instead, let me paraphrase your contention. What you are trying to say is that the text shows that there was only an obligation to withdraw irregulars, whereas the withdrawal of troops was supposed to be ongoing. You are also contending that the entire process of de-escalation was to be decided as per the details of the Truce agreement that was yet to be drawn up. What you are also contending is that without the said agreement, the quantum of Pakistani/Indian withdrawal could not be ascertained in the first place, therefore, as per the text, it was for India to agree to initiation of withdrawal, thereby paving the way for plebiscite.

About the part that this was only to be the principle on the basis of which the truce agreement was to be formulated, I have no reason to disagree. You are obviously stating this because you know the flimsy nature of your argument that there was no binding obligation on Pakistan to withdraw troops, both on principles of Statutory interpretation and the interpretation of Treaties. There is this rule called nosciter a sociss in interpretation, which basically means that the meaning of a word is known from the accompanying words. Actually, since the issue is whether there is a unilateral pre-condition on Pakistan to withdraw, what we need to see is whether there are other words around which show otherwise. The words you chose to show the same are that the process be ongoing, etc. etc.

Now let me quote that text the way a lawyer would quote it:

B. (1) When the Commission shall have notified the Government of Indiathat the tribesmen and Pakistan nationals referred to in PartII A2 hereof have withdrawn,thereby terminating the situation which was represented by the Government of India to the Security Council as having occasioned the presence of Indian forces in the State of Jammu and Kashmir, and further,that the Pakistan forces are being withdrawnfrom the State of Jammu and Kashmir,the Government of India agrees to begin to withdraw the bulk of their forces from the State in stages to be agreed upon with the Commission.

The question is, when is the Indian government supposed to act? The answer is, When the Commission shall have notified the Government of India .......Now as for your claim that it is to be read separately from the part about troop withdrawal, there is the use of the words and further,that the Pakistan forces..... that creates havoc with your reasoning. Just trust me, documents are not interpreted that way. Also, 2A1 clearly states that:

A. (1) As the presence of troops of Pakistan in the territory of the State of Jammu and Kashmir constitutes a material change in the situation since it was represented by the Government of Pakistan before the Security Council,the Government of Pakistan agrees to withdraw its troops from that State.

What does that mean? That means that since the Pakistani troops were there, they needed to leave. Their presence was a material change that upset the premise of Resolution 47. Here again, Pakistan agrees to withdraw troops. Legal drafting does not follow the haphazard lines that you are suggesting. There is a further rule of interpretation that words cannot be interpreted so as to lead to an absurdity. If the security council had not intended the (ongoing) withdrawal of Pakistani troops, it would have not mentioned it to begin with, especially where the literal meaning includes it as part of what is to be notified by the Commission to India. To mention it in the manner I pointed out, only for it to be interpreted in the manner that you suggest, would be a legal absurdity.

Now coming to the logical bind that I mentioned earlier. Suppose, I accept your contention about Pakistan agrees to withdraw its troops vis-a-vis the GoP will use its best endeavour to secure the withdrawal (of irregulars). The first mention troops in Pakistan’s control and the second those that are not. So according to you, the resolution says that after it has reported the withdrawal of those irregulars that are not actually in Pakistan’s control, it may or may not do something about the Troops that are actually in its control, depending upon the outcome of the negotiations? How does such a truce agreement work in the real world, can you elaborate?

As far as requirement for a plebiscite is concerned, demilitarization was a must. That can be understood from the fact that the second, third and fourth UNCIP reports focussed heavily on that. At the 570th Meeting dated 17 January 1952, the UN representative opined:

“The United Nations Representative deems it necessary to emphasize that, from his experience, he believes that any negotiations that could be undertaken by the United Nations to obtain the demilitarization of the State of Jammu and Kashmir .... would find almost unsurmountable obstacles ..... unless in one way or another agreed solutions are found for the following: (1) a definite period for demilitarization; (2) the scope of demilitarization and quantum of forces that will remain at the end of the period of demilitarization; (3) the day for the formal induction into office of the Plebiscite Administrator.”

It can also be ascertained from the text that you quoted from the McNaughton Report. Mind you, I am not saying that there was any requirement of a complete Pakistani troop withdrawal. Nor was there any requirement for a unilateral Pakistani troop withdrawal. That can be understood from the above-quoted text, as well as the fact that the negotiations after UNSC Resolution 98 dated 23 December 1952 were deadlocked due to a disagreement on the question of the level of withdrawal (paragraph 7 of the 12-point proposals). India wanted to maintain more troops than was suggested. Again, UNCIP could have done one of two things – a) come up with a number acceptable to both parties, or, b) reported to the UNSC that India was messing around, so please force India’s hands and ensure demilitarization, which will serve the pre-condition for plebiscite. Now what did it do? It did neither. The talks were called off, and that was the end of that. Why did UNSC not move a resolution in favour of Pakistan at that point? And why did Pakistan not agree to the additional 5,000 troops, if it was so confident of its victory in the plebiscite?

As for the complexity you quoted, that since neither quantum nor methodology for Pakistani withdrawal was quoted, so it could be fulfilled by a token gesture, completely misses the point. In fact it only adds to the certainty that any truce agreement would mitigate against such a mischief. Just as you stated with regard to the irregulars (since they are not under direct control), the subject of Pakistani troop withdrawal was left open to the satisfaction of the Commission. You have accepted a convenient ambiguity while rejecting an inconvenient one as showing that the requirement for notifying India means nothing.

I will address the point you made about the McNaughton report. As we noted above, negotiations got stalled on the issue of demilitarization. Now the Pakistani government does contend that it wants resumption of dialogue. Look, there is no reason to believe that dialogue can resume under the UNSC resolutions; none whatsoever. Even if we assume that dialogue under the UNSC framework could resume, apart from Pakistan’s willingness to initiate dialogue, is there any concrete evidence that the Pakistani government was/is willing to commit to troop withdrawal from Azad Kashmir? Sure, Pakistan says that it wants a resolution, but has any official Pakistani spokesperson ever gone on record stating that Pakistan will withdraw troops from Azad Kashmir?

Assuming that Pakistan was even willing to do so, what is Pakistan’s track record? In ’48 we sent irregulars and troops dressed as tribals while denying the fact until caught. In ‘65 again we did the same. In ’99 we again denied that it was our Army men on the Kargil heights, till our lie was exposed. In the interim we have been funding, training and arming trouble-makers who do exactly the same things that UNSC resolution are meant to safeguard Kashmiris from. So even if, by some miracle, Pakistan were willing to withdraw troops, who would believe that Pakistan wouldn’t destabilize the Valley by using its age-old tactics? Because we won’t change our ways, the Indians can keep stating that conditions are not right for a plebiscite until the cows come home.

When UNCIP was dissolved in 1951, giving way to UNMOGIP, that was the last time the UN made a mention of the “will of the people” in its resolution. The Dixon Report was the last serious attempt at a plebiscite, but by then the wheels were already coming off. I assume you are aware of the “doubtful” region formula suggested by Dixon. Pakistan had a narrow window of opportunity in 1948-49, where it could have removed its military when the UNCIP was fully involved and forced India’s hand. By 1951, we had missed the boat.

To recap:

1) The distinction drawn between irregulars and Pakistani troops and discrepancy between the two positions in Resolution 47 and Aug 13 1948 is due to the Pakistani government’s deceit about the presence of its Army. Hence they are to be treated pari materia, and not a subject matter of clever revisions. No law allows anyone to cheat and then take advantage of the same.

2) The interpretation that irregulars were required to be withdrawn but not troops leads to a logical absurdity and violates all known canons of interpretation.

3) The resolutions were just the principles along which final resolution was to take place. A series of events was to take place, which was stalled initially by Pakistan, and then seized upon by India. It may always have been India’s devious plan to not conduct a plebiscite, but Pakistan misconstrued its own obligations under the resolutions.

4) Pakistan always had the option of accepting India’s contention on the 12-point proposals and force India’s hand on the subject – it chose not to, made demands of its own. Basically, Pakistan rejected the plebiscite on the issue of 5,000 additional troops. The fact that the UNSC allowed the talks to collapse instead of moving a resolution against India shows that the UNSC treated Pakistani withdrawal as a condition precedent.

5) Because India has not accepted ICJ jurisdiction on the issue, the UNSC is its own judge in the matter. The UN has now dropped Kashmir from the list of disputed territories, and has repeatedly asserted that Kashmir is a bilateral issue. So the UN has basically overturned its prior position and laid down a new one. We can no longer seek recourse to Resolution 47, unless the UN changes its position.

6) Since we are being overly legalistic about it and not realizing that ground realities have changed so much in the past six decades that a plebiscite today will have no meaning, we should also know that legal claims have a limitation. After which these claims expire. Or the changes in circumstances make the last position meaningless, necessitating a completely new framework. Even if we were to be able to achieve the impossible task of convincing the UN to intervene, rest assured that it will not be upon our terms where things will be picked up from the collapse of the 12-point proposal.
 
I would like to start with certain preliminary observations:

- Our discussion on this subject is academic as for now, for the reason that ever since Kashmir was removed from the list of disputed territories under UN observation,
That is false - please provide a link to the 2014/2015 'list of disputed territories' to validate your assertion.
Pakistan’s claims that it continues to be a disputed territory are based outside the UN framework.
Not unless you substantiate your claim above.
 
- You are right in stating that the 13 Aug 1948 resolution was a mere proposal, to be taken forward by both parties. At the same time, Parts A and B of Resolution 47 are also just recommendations, as clearly mentioned in the resolution.
Correct, they are recommendations and principles that India and Pakistan committed to, pending agreement on the details of both demilitarization and plebiscite. India has reneged on he international commitments made multiple times, and refuses to even engage in negotiations over those principles any longer, whereas Pakistan continues to adhere to her international commitments.
- In any form of negotiated settlement, the mere fact that a party agreed to sit for discussions cannot be held against them.
Multiple UNSC Resolutions made clear what the framework of these discussions was to be - primarily, negotiations towards an agreement on the details of a demilitarization plan. The Indian government's participation in such negotiations would only occur if they recognized that the UNSC Resolutions required a UN mediated agreement on demilitirization, acceptable to all sides, prior to any withdrawal. The argument here is over the claim that the UN Resolutions require Pakistan to withdraw all 'combatants' unconditionally. If that was the case, the UNSC had no reason to set up UN Commissions and send UN representatives to negotiate the details with India AND Pakistan, and India had no reason to accept or participate in UNSC sanctioned discussions that undermined the claim that 'Pakistan was required to withdraw unconditionally'.
Of course, if the parties have mutually agreed to a framework within which a final settlement is binding on both, then no doubt it is so. In all these negotiations, the fact that India has been a willing party cannot lead to an inference that they must be implicitly agreeable to Pakistan’s position. That is why, before each round of negotiations, it is made clear that the discussions are without prejudice to any other related issue. So, for instance, the fact that both parties agreed to a ceasefire line in 1949 is binding unless they totally abandon the framework, but cannot be held against either to say that means they have implicitly conceded anything to the other side.
You misunderstood my point completely - as I explained in the paragraph above, I'm arguing that the UNSC resolutions do not place any requirement of an unconditional and unilateral withdrawal upon Pakistan. The UNSC Resolutions and UNCIP Resolutions and Reports make clear that any withdrawal is subject to the details of withdrawal being agreed upon between India, Pakistan and UN Representatives. India's participation in the multiple negotiations established by the UNSC validate Pakistan's position (of not being under any requirement of withdrawing unilaterally and unconditionally) by virtue of explicitly accepting the principle (at the time) of 'agreeing to a framework withing which a final settlement is binding on both', as you said in your first sentence. If India hadn't agreed to the 'framework', it would not have participated in the multiple negotiations established by the framework, and it is the 'framework within which a final settlement is binding on both' that debunks the argument that the UNSC Resolutions require Pakistan to withdraw unilaterally and unconditionally.

In fact, even if India did not agree with the framework, the fact that the UNSC set up multiple rounds of UN Commissions and UN Representative led missions to develop agreement over the general principles of demilitirization and plebiscite, clearly establishes that the intent behind the UNSC Resolutions from the beginning was to 'establish a framework within which agreement over the details of demilitirization and plebiscite could be reached' - again, a vindication of the Pakistani position that no unconditional and unilateral withdrawal is required of her.
harping on prior UNSC resolutions when it is convenient and ignoring the change in the UN position on the issue.
This passage of yours is irrelevant to the specific point being discussed, of whether the UNSC Resolutions require Pakistan to withdraw unconditionally and unilaterally.
Let us look at why the situation came about. In the initial stages of the conflict, the UN was not privy to accurate information. When India initially took the matter to the UN, India itself was not aware of the extent of involvement of Pakistani troops. Reference India’s original complain dated 01.01.1948:

Indian Complaint to the Security Council, lst January 1948

As a response, our government dutifully lied to the whole world, as it often does, by denying any involvement in the matter. Reference UN Report Chapter VIII pg 344:

http://www.un.org/en/sc/repertoire/46-51/Chapter 8/46-51_08-16-The India-Pakistan question.pdf

This lie was challenged by India, and later exposed due to the very first UNCIP mission in July. Until then, the UN was not sure about the presence of Pakistani troops, just that tribesmen had entered. UN Report Chapter VIII pg 348:

http://www.un.org/en/sc/repertoire/46-51/Chapter 8/46-51_08-16-The India-Pakistan question.pdf

This explains the discrepancy between Resolution 47 and Resolution of Aug 13.
Lie or 'tactical omission', if the misrepresentation by Pakistan was indeed so grievous, the UNSC was free to strengthen the language in her subsequent resolutions against Pakistan, yet the subsequent resolutions only further establish and detail a framework within which agreement on the details of demilitarization and plebiscite need to be reached.

You can tarnish Pakistan's actions as much as you want, but the facts are that the UNSC did not see things the way you do, as is clear from the language of the UNSC Resolutions and UNCIP reports subsequent to the first UNSCR on J&K.
Pakistan has repeated several times that it has no control over what these irregulars do. In fact, that is the basis for the deadlock. That is the reason why regardless of what conclusion we ever arrive at, India will not de-militarize the Valley.
Pakistan did not contest the need for a full withdrawal of irregular forces to be validated prior to an Indian demilitarization, so this argument is a straw man. Pakistan's disagreements with some proposals were over the massive superiority in conventional government controlled forces that India would be allowed to keep deployed in the valley compared to Pakistan's.
You write:

I've explained how the terms 'tribesmen and Pakistani nationals' are used to represent entities distinct from 'Pakistani troops' in this specific UNCIP resolutions. The section above highlighted in red therefore refers only to'tribesmen and Pakistani nationals'and not to'Pakistani troops'or'government forces'.

The section highlighted in green is the section that refers to Pakistani troops/government forces withdrawal, and it describes said withdrawal in the 'present continuous tense' (being withdrawn) - an event that is'ongoing and not complete'. And while the process of Pakistani troop/forces being withdrawn is'ongoing and not complete', UNCIP requires India to'begin to withdraw the bulk of their forces'(section in blue).


I am not quoting the rest of the text. Instead, let me paraphrase your contention. What you are trying to say is that the text shows that there was only an obligation to withdraw irregulars, whereas the withdrawal of troops was supposed to be ongoing. You are also contending that the entire process of de-escalation was to be decided as per the details of the Truce agreement that was yet to be drawn up. What you are also contending is that without the said agreement, the quantum of Pakistani/Indian withdrawal could not be ascertained in the first place, therefore, as per the text, it was for India to agree to initiation of withdrawal, thereby paving the way for plebiscite.

About the part that this was only to be the principle on the basis of which the truce agreement was to be formulated, I have no reason to disagree. You are obviously stating this because you know the flimsy nature of your argument that there was no binding obligation on Pakistan to withdraw troops, both on principles of Statutory interpretation and the interpretation of Treaties. There is this rule called nosciter a sociss in interpretation, which basically means that the meaning of a word is known from the accompanying words. Actually, since the issue is whether there is a unilateral pre-condition on Pakistan to withdraw, what we need to see is whether there are other words around which show otherwise. The words you chose to show the same are that the process be ongoing, etc. etc.

Now let me quote that text the way a lawyer would quote it:

B. (1) When the Commission shall have notified the Government of Indiathat the tribesmen and Pakistan nationals referred to in PartII A2 hereof have withdrawn,thereby terminating the situation which was represented by the Government of India to the Security Council as having occasioned the presence of Indian forces in the State of Jammu and Kashmir, and further,that the Pakistan forces are being withdrawnfrom the State of Jammu and Kashmir,the Government of India agrees to begin to withdraw the bulk of their forces from the State in stages to be agreed upon with the Commission.

The question is, when is the Indian government supposed to act? The answer is, When the Commission shall have notified the Government of India .......Now as for your claim that it is to be read separately from the part about troop withdrawal, there is the use of the words and further,that the Pakistan forces..... that creates havoc with your reasoning. Just trust me, documents are not interpreted that way.
I'm not going to trust you - you did an excellent job of restating my arguments, but you've offered nothing in the way of a rebuttal of those arguments other than saying 'this is how a lawyer would quote it' - I see no 'havoc' being created here by my reasoning, certainly none that you've pointed out so far.
Also, 2A1 clearly states that:

A. (1) As the presence of troops of Pakistan in the territory of the State of Jammu and Kashmir constitutes a material change in the situation since it was represented by the Government of Pakistan before the Security Council,the Government of Pakistan agrees to withdraw its troops from that State.

What does that mean? That means that since the Pakistani troops were there, they needed to leave. Their presence was a material change that upset the premise of Resolution 47. Here again, Pakistan agrees to withdraw troops. Legal drafting does not follow the haphazard lines that you are suggesting. There is a further rule of interpretation that words cannot be interpreted so as to lead to an absurdity. If the security council had not intended the (ongoing) withdrawal of Pakistani troops, it would have not mentioned it to begin with, especially where the literal meaning includes it as part of what is to be notified by the Commission to India. To mention it in the manner I pointed out, only for it to be interpreted in the manner that you suggest, would be a legal absurdity.
There is no 'legal absurdity' here, just a desire on your part to read the text out of context, chopped up into pieces that support the Indian point of view on your part. The statement in 2.A(1) was the acceptance in principle of Pakistan withdrawing her troops - it did not specify when or how that withdrawal were to take place, and the context and conditions applicable to the statement in 2.A(1) was very clearly established in the opening lines of Part II, "both the Governments accept the following principles as a basis for the formulation of a truce agreement, the details of which shall be worked out in discussion between their representatives and the Commission."

The introduction to Part II set up the framework for negotiations, and provided clear context that everything stated in Part II of the UNCIPR was subject to a final agreement on the details, and therefore my interpretation of Part II.B(1) clearly flows within the context established by the opening lines of Part II. What would be absurd would be to cling solely to the language of 2.A.(1), ignoring what came before and after.
Now coming to the logical bind that I mentioned earlier. Suppose, I accept your contention about Pakistan agrees to withdraw its troops vis-a-vis the GoP will use its best endeavour to secure the withdrawal (of irregulars). The first mention troops in Pakistan’s control and the second those that are not. So according to you, the resolution says that after it has reported the withdrawal of those irregulars that are not actually in Pakistan’s control, it may or may not do something about the Troops that are actually in its control, depending upon the outcome of the negotiations? How does such a truce agreement work in the real world, can you elaborate?
What exactly about the above do you not understand? Pakistan confirms that it has managed (by force, dialog or both) to secure the withdrawal of irregular forces, which the UN Commission would confirm (and was free to introduce proposals on how best to confirm the withdrawal prior to reporting it to India), after which the withdrawal of regular forces, on both sides, begins in accordance with the details of the Truce Agreement settled upon by all sides.
As far as requirement for a plebiscite is concerned, demilitarization was a must.
I never questioned that.
It can also be ascertained from the text that you quoted from the McNaughton Report. Mind you, I am not saying that there was any requirement of a complete Pakistani troop withdrawal. Nor was there any requirement for a unilateral Pakistani troop withdrawal. That can be understood from the above-quoted text, as well as the fact that the negotiations after UNSC Resolution 98 dated 23 December 1952 were deadlocked due to a disagreement on the question of the level of withdrawal (paragraph 7 of the 12-point proposals).
Then what exactly are you arguing with me for - you yourself claimed earlier that, "Actually, since the issue is whether there is a unilateral pre-condition on Pakistan to withdraw, what we need to see is whether there are other words around which show otherwise", and now you've essentially accepted my position.
India wanted to maintain more troops than was suggested. Again, UNCIP could have done one of two things – a) come up with a number acceptable to both parties, or, b) reported to the UNSC that India was messing around, so please force India’s hands and ensure demilitarization, which will serve the pre-condition for plebiscite. Now what did it do? It did neither. The talks were called off, and that was the end of that. Why did UNSC not move a resolution in favour of Pakistan at that point?
Because the framework the UNSC had set up required agreement by both parties - it did not consider the possibility of one party's obstructionism as a means of delaying resolution until such time as the status quo could be argued to be the most feasible option, and it probably didn't have the votes to push through a resolution censuring India.
And why did Pakistan not agree to the additional 5,000 troops, if it was so confident of its victory in the plebiscite?
Pakistan's disagreement over troop levels that gave India more than a significant advantage were based on military rationale, and Indian tactics of illegally sparking communal violence, invasion and occupation of the territory of sovereign States such as the Pakistani territory of Junagadh and the State of Hyderabad. India's demands during negotiations that she be recognized as solely having the legal ability to deploy forces throughout disputed J&K in case of violence and threats of instability.To any rationale individual this was clearly a setup to replicate the events of Junagadh and Hyderabad and have Indian forces step into the Vacuum left by withdrawing Pakistani forces, hence the need to maintain, at least, a defensible posture with limited Indian military troop superiority.
As for the complexity you quoted, that since neither quantum nor methodology for Pakistani withdrawal was quoted, so it could be fulfilled by a token gesture, completely misses the point. In fact it only adds to the certainty that any truce agreement would mitigate against such a mischief.
I didn't miss anything - I I clearly stated in my earlier post that without a truce agreement interpretations of 'ongoing withdrawal' could be interpreted to mean anything, and the examples I gave were to further establish the fact that the withdrawal was subject to an agreement on the details. You're attributing arguments to me that I did not make.
Just as you stated with regard to the irregulars (since they are not under direct control), the subject of Pakistani troop withdrawal was left open to the satisfaction of the Commission. You have accepted a convenient ambiguity while rejecting an inconvenient one as showing that the requirement for notifying India means nothing.
I have accepted no ambiguity and you have established no such thing.
I will address the point you made about the McNaughton report. As we noted above, negotiations got stalled on the issue of demilitarization. Now the Pakistani government does contend that it wants resumption of dialogue. Look, there is no reason to believe that dialogue can resume under the UNSC resolutions; none whatsoever. Even if we assume that dialogue under the UNSC framework could resume, apart from Pakistan’s willingness to initiate dialogue, is there any concrete evidence that the Pakistani government was/is willing to commit to troop withdrawal from Azad Kashmir? Sure, Pakistan says that it wants a resolution, but has any official Pakistani spokesperson ever gone on record stating that Pakistan will withdraw troops from Azad Kashmir?
The Pakistani government is on record committing to a withdrawal in the UNSC, in accordance with the UNSC framework that calls for an agreement on the details of the withdrawal negotiated under said UNSC framework - it doesn't get any more 'officially on record' than that.
To recap:

1) The distinction drawn between irregulars and Pakistani troops and discrepancy between the two positions in Resolution 47 and Aug 13 1948 is due to the Pakistani government’s deceit about the presence of its Army. Hence they are to be treated pari materia, and not a subject matter of clever revisions. No law allows anyone to cheat and then take advantage of the same.
As explained earlier, the UNSC, if it considered Pakistan's 'misrepresentation' regarding the presence of her troops in J&K to be unacceptable, have addressed the issue in subsequent UNSC Resolutions in a manner that outright demanded an unconditional and unilateral withdrawal from Pakistan, period. Instead, it chose to create a framework under which India, Pakistan and the UN were to negotiate a agreement on the details of a verifiable demilitirization leading to a plebiscite, a framework that was accepted by all sides at the time.
2) The interpretation that irregulars were required to be withdrawn but not troops leads to a logical absurdity and violates all known canons of interpretation.
It does not, as explained earlier. Again, since a government cannot be expected to have control over all irregulars, it stands to reason that the State may have to resort to both non-violent and violent means to ensure compliance. The use of violence by the State to ensure that irregulars comply with the requirement to withdraw requires the use of government armed forces. Therefore the logical absurdity is to argue that a government 'use its best endeavors to ensure withdrawal of an irregular force', when the government does not have a military that would give it's 'best endeavors' the teeth to ensure said compliance by irregulars. The UNSC and UNCIP knew exactly what it was proposing because a staged withdrawal, with government troops the last to leave, would be the only way to ensure that the GoP had the ability to influence irregulars.
3) The resolutions were just the principles along which final resolution was to take place. A series of events was to take place, which was stalled initially by Pakistan, and then seized upon by India. It may always have been India’s devious plan to not conduct a plebiscite, but Pakistan misconstrued its own obligations under the resolutions.
The series of events were negotiations and agreement on the details of demilitirization, that India sabotaged and obstructed by placing unreasonable demands, as detailed earlier.
4) Pakistan always had the option of accepting India’s contention on the 12-point proposals and force India’s hand on the subject – it chose not to, made demands of its own. Basically, Pakistan rejected the plebiscite on the issue of 5,000 additional troops. The fact that the UNSC allowed the talks to collapse instead of moving a resolution against India shows that the UNSC treated Pakistani withdrawal as a condition precedent.
Actually, Indian rejected the earlier proposal of 5000 fewer troops on her side, even though that would have still left her with a significant numerical advantage over Pakistan. Pakistan compromised on several occasions, with the troop discrepancy continuing to increase in favor of India each time India rejected a proposal and a new one was presented. At some point Pakistan had to draw the line and it justifiable did so. The obstructionism was on the Indian side - why did India reject the earlier proposal with 5000 fewer troops on the Indian side, even though India would have still had a significant numerical advantage?
6) Since we are being overly legalistic about it and not realizing that ground realities have changed so much in the past six decades that a plebiscite today will have no meaning, we should also know that legal claims have a limitation. After which these claims expire. Or the changes in circumstances make the last position meaningless, necessitating a completely new framework. Even if we were to be able to achieve the impossible task of convincing the UN to intervene, rest assured that it will not be upon our terms where things will be picked up from the collapse of the 12-point proposal.
Irrelevant to the point being argued, on whether Pakistan was required to unilaterally and unconditionally withdraw from J&K by the UNSC Resolutions, which I have clearly explained to not be the case, as Pakistan has argued.

I see a bunch of articles and a reference in some books to this alleged 'removal from the list of the UN disputes', but there is absolutely no reference to a UN published list of disputes that Kashmir was allegedly 'removed from'. One can't 'remove a dispute from a list' if said list doesn't even exist to begin with.

Please provide a reference to a UN site/source that provides a list of disputed territories, as recognized by the UN.
 
@AgNoStiC MuSliM

You are taking a LOT of time and effort for debating the LEGAL aspects of Kashmir dispute

But all these points have lost their relevance due to the
TIME that has lapsed

@AgNoStiC MuSliM

The UN resolutions on Kashmir are under CHAPTER SIX

They are NOT enforceable unlike Chapter SEVEN resolutions

Basically they are just advisories which we have rejected
 
Correct, they are recommendations and principles that India and Pakistan committed to, pending agreement on the details of both demilitarization and plebiscite. India has reneged on he international commitments made multiple times, and refuses to even engage in negotiations over those principles any longer, whereas Pakistan continues to adhere to her international commitments.

Multiple UNSC Resolutions made clear what the framework of these discussions was to be - primarily, negotiations towards an agreement on the details of a demilitarization plan. The Indian government's participation in such negotiations would only occur if they recognized that the UNSC Resolutions required a UN mediated agreement on demilitirization, acceptable to all sides, prior to any withdrawal. The argument here is over the claim that the UN Resolutions require Pakistan to withdraw all 'combatants' unconditionally. If that was the case, the UNSC had no reason to set up UN Commissions and send UN representatives to negotiate the details with India AND Pakistan, and India had no reason to accept or participate in UNSC sanctioned discussions that undermined the claim that 'Pakistan was required to withdraw unconditionally'.

You misunderstood my point completely - as I explained in the paragraph above, I'm arguing that the UNSC resolutions do not place any requirement of an unconditional and unilateral withdrawal upon Pakistan. The UNSC Resolutions and UNCIP Resolutions and Reports make clear that any withdrawal is subject to the details of withdrawal being agreed upon between India, Pakistan and UN Representatives. India's participation in the multiple negotiations established by the UNSC validate Pakistan's position (of not being under any requirement of withdrawing unilaterally and unconditionally) by virtue of explicitly accepting the principle (at the time) of 'agreeing to a framework withing which a final settlement is binding on both', as you said in your first sentence. If India hadn't agreed to the 'framework', it would not have participated in the multiple negotiations established by the framework, and it is the 'framework within which a final settlement is binding on both' that debunks the argument that the UNSC Resolutions require Pakistan to withdraw unilaterally and unconditionally.

In fact, even if India did not agree with the framework, the fact that the UNSC set up multiple rounds of UN Commissions and UN Representative led missions to develop agreement over the general principles of demilitirization and plebiscite, clearly establishes that the intent behind the UNSC Resolutions from the beginning was to 'establish a framework within which agreement over the details of demilitirization and plebiscite could be reached' - again, a vindication of the Pakistani position that no unconditional and unilateral withdrawal is required of her.

This passage of yours is irrelevant to the specific point being discussed, of whether the UNSC Resolutions require Pakistan to withdraw unconditionally and unilaterally.

Lie or 'tactical omission', if the misrepresentation by Pakistan was indeed so grievous, the UNSC was free to strengthen the language in her subsequent resolutions against Pakistan, yet the subsequent resolutions only further establish and detail a framework within which agreement on the details of demilitarization and plebiscite need to be reached.

You can tarnish Pakistan's actions as much as you want, but the facts are that the UNSC did not see things the way you do, as is clear from the language of the UNSC Resolutions and UNCIP reports subsequent to the first UNSCR on J&K.

Pakistan did not contest the need for a full withdrawal of irregular forces to be validated prior to an Indian demilitarization, so this argument is a straw man. Pakistan's disagreements with some proposals were over the massive superiority in conventional government controlled forces that India would be allowed to keep deployed in the valley compared to Pakistan's.

I'm not going to trust you - you did an excellent job of restating my arguments, but you've offered nothing in the way of a rebuttal of those arguments other than saying 'this is how a lawyer would quote it' - I see no 'havoc' being created here by my reasoning, certainly none that you've pointed out so far.

There is no 'legal absurdity' here, just a desire on your part to read the text out of context, chopped up into pieces that support the Indian point of view on your part. The statement in 2.A(1) was the acceptance in principle of Pakistan withdrawing her troops - it did not specify when or how that withdrawal were to take place, and the context and conditions applicable to the statement in 2.A(1) was very clearly established in the opening lines of Part II, "both the Governments accept the following principles as a basis for the formulation of a truce agreement, the details of which shall be worked out in discussion between their representatives and the Commission."

The introduction to Part II set up the framework for negotiations, and provided clear context that everything stated in Part II of the UNCIPR was subject to a final agreement on the details, and therefore my interpretation of Part II.B(1) clearly flows within the context established by the opening lines of Part II. What would be absurd would be to cling solely to the language of 2.A.(1), ignoring what came before and after.

What exactly about the above do you not understand? Pakistan confirms that it has managed (by force, dialog or both) to secure the withdrawal of irregular forces, which the UN Commission would confirm (and was free to introduce proposals on how best to confirm the withdrawal prior to reporting it to India), after which the withdrawal of regular forces, on both sides, begins in accordance with the details of the Truce Agreement settled upon by all sides.

I never questioned that.

Then what exactly are you arguing with me for - you yourself claimed earlier that, "Actually, since the issue is whether there is a unilateral pre-condition on Pakistan to withdraw, what we need to see is whether there are other words around which show otherwise", and now you've essentially accepted my position.

Because the framework the UNSC had set up required agreement by both parties - it did not consider the possibility of one party's obstructionism as a means of delaying resolution until such time as the status quo could be argued to be the most feasible option, and it probably didn't have the votes to push through a resolution censuring India.

Pakistan's disagreement over troop levels that gave India more than a significant advantage were based on military rationale, and Indian tactics of illegally sparking communal violence, invasion and occupation of the territory of sovereign States such as the Pakistani territory of Junagadh and the State of Hyderabad. India's demands during negotiations that she be recognized as solely having the legal ability to deploy forces throughout disputed J&K in case of violence and threats of instability.To any rationale individual this was clearly a setup to replicate the events of Junagadh and Hyderabad and have Indian forces step into the Vacuum left by withdrawing Pakistani forces, hence the need to maintain, at least, a defensible posture with limited Indian military troop superiority.

I didn't miss anything - I I clearly stated in my earlier post that without a truce agreement interpretations of 'ongoing withdrawal' could be interpreted to mean anything, and the examples I gave were to further establish the fact that the withdrawal was subject to an agreement on the details. You're attributing arguments to me that I did not make.

I have accepted no ambiguity and you have established no such thing.

The Pakistani government is on record committing to a withdrawal in the UNSC, in accordance with the UNSC framework that calls for an agreement on the details of the withdrawal negotiated under said UNSC framework - it doesn't get any more 'officially on record' than that.

As explained earlier, the UNSC, if it considered Pakistan's 'misrepresentation' regarding the presence of her troops in J&K to be unacceptable, have addressed the issue in subsequent UNSC Resolutions in a manner that outright demanded an unconditional and unilateral withdrawal from Pakistan, period. Instead, it chose to create a framework under which India, Pakistan and the UN were to negotiate a agreement on the details of a verifiable demilitirization leading to a plebiscite, a framework that was accepted by all sides at the time.

It does not, as explained earlier. Again, since a government cannot be expected to have control over all irregulars, it stands to reason that the State may have to resort to both non-violent and violent means to ensure compliance. The use of violence by the State to ensure that irregulars comply with the requirement to withdraw requires the use of government armed forces. Therefore the logical absurdity is to argue that a government 'use its best endeavors to ensure withdrawal of an irregular force', when the government does not have a military that would give it's 'best endeavors' the teeth to ensure said compliance by irregulars. The UNSC and UNCIP knew exactly what it was proposing because a staged withdrawal, with government troops the last to leave, would be the only way to ensure that the GoP had the ability to influence irregulars.

The series of events were negotiations and agreement on the details of demilitirization, that India sabotaged and obstructed by placing unreasonable demands, as detailed earlier.

Actually, Indian rejected the earlier proposal of 5000 fewer troops on her side, even though that would have still left her with a significant numerical advantage over Pakistan. Pakistan compromised on several occasions, with the troop discrepancy continuing to increase in favor of India each time India rejected a proposal and a new one was presented. At some point Pakistan had to draw the line and it justifiable did so. The obstructionism was on the Indian side - why did India reject the earlier proposal with 5000 fewer troops on the Indian side, even though India would have still had a significant numerical advantage?

Irrelevant to the point being argued, on whether Pakistan was required to unilaterally and unconditionally withdraw from J&K by the UNSC Resolutions, which I have clearly explained to not be the case, as Pakistan has argued.


I see a bunch of articles and a reference in some books to this alleged 'removal from the list of the UN disputes', but there is absolutely no reference to a UN published list of disputes that Kashmir was allegedly 'removed from'. One can't 'remove a dispute from a list' if said list doesn't even exist to begin with.

Please provide a reference to a UN site/source that provides a list of disputed territories, as recognized by the UN.

Look, I will reply to each of your points if you so wish. But there are two basic things you should be clear on:

1) When I tell you how legal documents are interpreted, either disprove me by showing me law, or take my word for it. In law, there is something called first-principle arguments, and then there are arguments from authority (could be primary or secondary sources). I am arguing both on first principle as well as on authority, like rules of statutory interpretation. What you are doing is arguing entirely based upon first principle, and then saying "prove this, show me that, I am not convinced" etc. The point is, since you are either not consulting the secondary sources, or ignoring them altogether, how will you even know when I have been able to prove my point?

2) And about Junagarh, man, are you real? Here we are having a discussion upon the very subject of democratic enfranchisement, and you are questioning the accession of the only princely state that even had a plebiscite? Then why are we even arguing if you don't believe in plebiscites?
 
@AgNoStiC MuSliM

You are taking a LOT of time and effort for debating the LEGAL aspects of Kashmir dispute
I am refuting an oft repeated canard that 'the UNSC Resolutions require Pakistan to unilaterally and unconditionally withdraw'. If Indians and various Indian apologists stop making this claim, then I won't have to point out how it's wrong.
@AgNoStiC MuSliM

The UN resolutions on Kashmir are under CHAPTER SIX

They are NOT enforceable unlike Chapter SEVEN resolutions

Basically they are just advisories which we have rejected
Very few treaties and agreements between States are 'enforceable'. There is no enforcement mechanism in the IWT is there?

The lack of an enforcement mechanism doesn't change the fact that India made repeated official commitments to settle the Kashmir Dispute in accordance with the UNSC Resolutions. Her reneging on that commitment is really no different, for all practical purposes, from any other treaty that lacks enforcement mechanisms.
 
@AgNoStiC MuSliM

You are taking a LOT of time and effort for debating the LEGAL aspects of Kashmir dispute

But all these points have lost their relevance due to the
TIME that has lapsed

@AgNoStiC MuSliM

The UN resolutions on Kashmir are under CHAPTER SIX

They are NOT enforceable unlike Chapter SEVEN resolutions

Basically they are just advisories which we have rejected

That is one way of looking at it, but nonetheless it is an interesting exercise. I think everyone who is capable of so doing should study and make up their own mind on the issue. Ultimately, in any democracy, it is always good if people know.
 
Look, I will reply to each of your points if you so wish. But there are two basic things you should be clear on:

1) When I tell you how legal documents are interpreted, either disprove me by showing me law, or take my word for it. In law, there is something called first-principle arguments, and then there are arguments from authority (could be primary or secondary sources). I am arguing both on first principle as well as on authority, like rules of statutory interpretation. What you are doing is arguing entirely based upon first principle, and then saying "prove this, show me that, I am not convinced" etc. The point is, since you are either not consulting the secondary sources, or ignoring them altogether, how will you even know when I have been able to prove my point?
On the contrary, I have clearly and explicitly explained to you how the the language of the resolutions supports my position, and explained to you why your criticism is invalid. What specific 'secondary sources' contradict my argument? The language of the UNSC Resolutions, the UNCIP Reports and Resolutions, all of them taken together only further substantiate my argument. So I dont really see where these 'secondary sources' of yours that contradict me are coming from.

On the subject next of 'trusting you' and 'rules of statutory interpretation', it isn't enough to just throw out Latin terms and claim that they contradict my arguments - you need to explain specifically which rule you believe is applicable and why and how that rule undermines my argument.

I reviewed the 'principles of statutory interpretation' you referenced to ensure I was recalling some of them correctly, and I don't see where they contradict my argument as you claim they do.
2) And about Junagarh, man, are you real? Here we are having a discussion upon the very subject of democratic enfranchisement, and you are questioning the accession of the only princely state that even had a plebiscite? Then why are we even arguing if you don't believe in plebiscites?
First, all actions undertaken by the Indian government after invading and occupying Junagadh are illegal. The point behind bringing up Junagadh is not to question the plebiscite, but to point out how India undertook an illegal and unprovoked invasion and occupation of Pakistani territory after stoking communal conflict within it.

This is an important consideration because of the Indian demands during UNCIP negotiations that India be considered the sole authority to deploy forces across J&K in case of 'unrest and instability', which was the pretext used by India to illegally invade and occupy Junagadh and Hyderabad.
 
On the contrary, I have clearly and explicitly explained to you how the the language of the resolutions supports my position, and explained to you why your criticism is invalid. What specific 'secondary sources' contradict my argument? The language of the UNSC Resolutions, the UNCIP Reports and Resolutions, all of them taken together only further substantiate my argument. So I dont really see where these 'secondary sources' of yours that contradict me are coming from.

On the subject next of 'trusting you' and 'rules of statutory interpretation', it isn't enough to just throw out Latin terms and claim that they contradict my arguments - you need to explain specifically which rule you believe is applicable and why and how that rule undermines my argument.

I reviewed the 'principles of statutory interpretation' you referenced to ensure I was recalling some of them correctly, and I don't see where they contradict my argument as you claim they do.

First, all actions undertaken by the Indian government after invading and occupying Junagadh are illegal. The point behind bringing up Junagadh is not to question the plebiscite, but to point out how India undertook an illegal and unprovoked invasion and occupation of Pakistani territory after stoking communal conflict within it.

This is an important consideration because of the Indian demands during UNCIP negotiations that India be considered the sole authority to deploy forces across J&K in case of 'unrest and instability', which was the pretext used by India to illegally invade and occupy Junagadh and Hyderabad.

No, you are not following any rules of interpretation, the language of Part II from the quoted text is interpreted in that very manner as I state. I am not preparing a brief to convince you, I am simply putting forth arguments and reasoning so that an unbiased third person reading it can make up their mind. You are not an unbiased third person. An otherwise intelligent person (you are that, no doubt), who construes a very simple provision written in plain English in the manner that you have interpreted it is clearly biased and has an agenda.

The fact that you are not unbiased can be made out by the double-standards of advocating a plebiscite in Kashmir while attempting to discredit a similar exercise somewhere else. People do notice these things. I will make a detailed reply to your last detailed response. But after that, let us not waste each other's time any more on something that you intend to argue about like an amateur provocateur, secure in the knowledge that you will not be called out for absurdities and double-standards on a rigged forum.
 

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