Pak nuke security in focus again after naval base attack

[Jet Fire]

WASHINGTON: It's a subject Americans can't stop discussing and one Pakistan hates talking about. The terrorist attack on the Pakistani military facility in Karachi has once again focused world (and Washington's) attention on the security of the country's fast-growing nuclear arsenal.

The Obama administration on Monday did not publicly go beyond "strongly" condemning the attack on Pakistan Naval Station (PNS) Mehran and appreciating the "service and sacrifices of their brave Armed Forces," but the incident has re-ignited the simmering debate about vulnerability of its nuclear weapons. US analysts noted that Mehran is only 15 miles away from the Masroor Air Base, where Pakistan is believed have a large depot for nuclear weapons that can be delivered from the air.

While Pakistan insists that its "crown jewels" are under foolproof security, at the heart of the debate is worry that they are vulnerable to internal pilferage or attack by a "jihadized" military, judging by multiple attacks on military facilities by terrorists who seemingly have the inside track on security, including in the Mehran strike. A recent Wikileaks cable citing Pakistani military officials admitting sabotage of F-16s by "Islamists amongst the enlisted ranks" has added to the concern.

Pakistani militant attacks over the last five years include strikes against three nuclear facilities, in Wah, Sargodha, and Kamra, according to Prof Shaun Gregory, a security specialist at Bradford University. But each time, the Pakistan military establishment, which has itself suffered attacks at its General Headquarters and training and recruitment centers, insists that there was no danger to its nuclear assets.

But Gregory says the attacks illustrate "a clear set of weaknesses and vulnerabilities" in Pakistan's nuclear security regime, a danger brought home by the ease with which militants are now penetrating military installations. Concern is growing in the west about the internal dynamics in a military that was once thought to be "westernized and professional."

Washington is leery of expressing its views openly, but New Delhi, which has more proximate reasons to be troubled by a nuclear heist, isn't holding back. "We are concerned with the safety of Pakistan's nuclear installations," senior officials traveling with Prime Minister Manmohan Singh in Africa were quoted as saying on Monday. "The real risk is internal – who guards the guardians."

The US has forked out over $ 100 million to improve Pakistan's nuclear security but Washington now admits it has no idea how the money was spent. There is consternation in Washington about the speed with which Pakistan is ramping up its nuclear arsenal with some analysts predicting that it could soon have the world's fourth largest nuclear arsenal, behind US, Russia, and China, and ahead of France and UK.

Like Singh, President Obama is also currently out of the country on a six-day, four-country tour of Europe. But Pakistan is never far from his mind; he has held at least half-a-dozen White House Situation Room meetings with key principals where the sole topic of discussion has been the deteriorating situation in Pakistan.

Washington is thick with speculation about American contingency plans in the event of a nuclear heist in Pakistan, notwithstanding assurances (most notably by Senator John Kerry) that the US has no designs on Pakistani nukes. But every U.S statement is dissected in Pakistan for hidden meanings amid fears that Washington is planning to neutralize its nuclear arsenal.

On Monday, in the aftermath of the naval base attack, the Obama administration merely said it is "committed to working with Pakistan in our joint effort to combat violent extremism and bring to justice those behind this attack." The pledge came after Wikileaks cables revealed that US special forces have been embedded with Pakistani troops in joint operations since September 2009.


http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/world/us/Pak-nuke-security-in-focus-again-after-naval-base-attack/articleshow/8538305.cms

 

[Xeric]

Yeah!

Exactly in the same manner they were 'under focus' once an attack was made on a bus carrying engineers from Pak Aero Complex.

 

[Peregrine]

Pakistani militant attacks over the last five years include strikes against three nuclear facilities, in Wah, Sargodha, and Kamra, according to Prof Shaun Gregory, a security specialist at Bradford University

First off, no nuclear facilities have ever been attacked in Pakistan. Secondly there are no nuclear facilities in Wah or Kamra. This douche bag prof. has no idea what he is blabbering about.

 

[Jet Fire]

Until yesterday there was terror on paksitan's streets.

Today terror is on paksitan's military establishments.

Tomorrow there will be clouds of terror on pakistan's nuclear establishment.

Its like world's worst fears are being realized. Paksitan's nukes in terrorist's hands and some of paksitan's religiously brainwashed men in uniform are only making matters tough for them.

Lets see till how long pakistanis will live in denial mode over this issue coz every thing else has become true.

 

[AAtish]

Oh okay.. so they are concerned about our "increasing" arsenal of nukes.. well, we can get rid of couple dozen by throwing them east and west.. will that do?

 

[Jet Fire]

Oh okay.. so they are concerned about our "increasing" arsenal of nukes.. well, we can get rid of couple dozen by throwing them east and west.. will that do?

Any incident such as these will be commited only by those people who have sucidal tendencies considering the fact that there won't be anybody in pakistan left to celebrate the explosion of their nukes when they will be punitively nuked too in a disproportionate retaliatory manner.

 

[Xeric]

Pakistani militant attacks over the last five years include strikes against three nuclear facilities, in Wah, Sargodha, and Kamra, according to Prof Shaun Gregory, a security specialist at Bradford University.

Here's an epic face-palm both to Prof Shaun Gregor and the writer of this news:

(The following is an email written by Kasrkin to Gregory in response to his lame extrapolations as regards to Pak's Nuke Safety)

http://www.defence.pk/forums/general-defence/31546-pakistani-nuclear-safety-queries-4.html

Dear Mr. Gregory,

My colleagues and I represent an online forum dedicated to matters relating to Pakistani defense. We were interested in piece written by you, published by the CTC Sentinel in July of 2009, regarding the terrorist threat to Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal. Some of our members commented positively, while others were critically inquisitive. We would like to bring to you some of the issues raised and we would be thrilled if you could address them.

The extracts in bold is commentary that was analyzed.

“The vulnerabilities within Pakistan’s nuclear safety and security arrangements mean that the risks of terrorist groups gaining access to nuclear materials are real. Moreover, militants have recently attacked a number of Pakistan’s nuclear facilities, including an August 20, 2008 incident at the Wah cantonment, widely understood to be one of Pakistan’s main nuclear weapons assembly sites…”

And,

“Pakistani Taliban suicide bombers blew up several entry points to one of the armament complexes at the Wah cantonment, considered one of Pakistan’s main nuclear weapons assembly sites…”

On both these occasions it is claimed that the Wah cantonment is widely considered or understood to be a nuclear weapons assembly site. We, however, were unable to find references to this claim. The BBC article referred to as part of the second extract only notes that ‘Wah is a strategically important town normally under heavy security as it is home to a large industrial complex producing conventional arms and ammunition’ and ‘it is a sprawling complex manufacturing everything from tanks and small arms to artillery shells.’

The importance of the attack on Wah is stressed repeatedly, implying both the terrorists’ ability and inclination to strike at Pakistan’s nuclear infrastructure. And yet as per accounts from some of our members familiar with the site, and news reports at the time, the gates attacked were primarily used to access ordnance plants. The casualties too almost entirely consisted of low-clearance industrial workers leaving the premises during a shift change. The BBC article even talks about a local student on tour of the ordinance factories relating the event. Gaining access to the complex is not particularly hard, as can be attested by numerous civilians who’ve toured there, neither is the compound isolated or remote, thus further contrasting with Pakistan Army’s traditionally secluded strategic installations. All this seems to negate the possibility that a high level security breach was involved in regards to Pakistani nuclear assets, or that such was even the intention. Without evidence to the contrary, it is hard to see how the significance of the attack was anything more than a crude but effective attempt to inflict maximum casualties on menial workers under the payroll of the Pakistani government.

The Wah cantonment is extensive, as is the industrial complex that was attacked. The complex contains many factories producing all kinds of munitions, however the gates and the crew that became the target of the attack were still at least 300 feet from the nearest factory, and the bomb in the market obviously more so[1]. What is more, the paramilitary troops from the DSG battalions manning the check points (not to be confused with ASFC or SPD personnel, responsible for guarding Pakistan’s nuclear military and civilian installations respectively) sustained no fatalities. Therefore, while the bombings were undoubtedly expensive in terms of human life, pictures taken on the site reveal that the security parameter around the complex was not breached, despite the bomber’s ability to mingle with the crowd[2]. If the attacks revealed the security measures taken by POF to be inadequate, then the author has not elaborated on the point. As it is, Wah is a heavily protected cantonment surrounded by defenses, including anti-tank barricades, and the roads in and out of the town are permanently manned by the army. This, along with a heavy army presence nearby at Taxila and Rawalpindi, makes the chances of terrorists mustering with significant numbers and weapons inside the cantonment to be able to fight through the defenses around the POF complex and seize a factory inside remote at best.

The facility itself is a sprawling complex with more than a dozen factories. Satellite imagery shows them to be sizable blocky units however we were unable to find indications of nuclear weapons assembly from any of our sources. The closest reference to nuclear activities was that of the Wah Group (not to be confused with the Wah Nobel Group of Companies, which operates in the complex, happens to be a subsidiary of POF and hosts foreigners in its board of directors and deals with civilian contracts) who’ve been previously tasked with manufacturing industrial components used in nuclear warheads, such as the trigger mechanism, high-speed electronics, high-explosive lenses and other ultra-high precision chemical and mechanical parts. This, however, is not the same as claims of the facility, whose present links to the Wah Group are obscure at best, being Pakistan’s main site for assembling entire nuclear weapon systems. While it is conceivable that warhead or missile related components are produced in any of the dozen plus factories, there is no evidence to suggest, or so we feel, that complete warheads and/or delivery systems are produced, stationed, assembled or distributed from there. Close proximity to a sizeable civilian population resident in the cantt is also likely to discourage any critical nuclear weapons presence, not only because of a radiological threat to the populace but also to avoid easy photo-reconnaissance, sabotage or infiltration. If the author has references substantiating Wah’s purported significance as a critical joint in the manufacturing of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons, then we’d be pleased to note it for academic purposes. However such intelligence is still unlikely to have been available to the terrorists.

Unless very particular information is available to the contrary, we’ll have no reason to believe that the 20th August attacks were intended to be anything but an attack on Pakistan’s much lauded, and internationally recognized, munitions producing installations at Wah. Facilities that are undoubtedly supplying conventional weapons and ammunition to Pakistani forces engaged in battle with the militants in Swat and FATA. Furthermore the terrorists did not display any particular motivation, resourcefulness, capacity or intelligence that implies a vulnerability or inadequacy of Pakistan’s nuclear security arrangements. Therefore, is it possible that the author’s references and their implied significance can be misleading in this context?

“With respect to personnel reliability, the Pakistan Army conducts a tight selection process drawing almost exclusively on officers from Punjab Province who are considered to have fewer links with religious extremism or with the Pashtun areas of Pakistan from which groups such as the Pakistani Taliban mainly garner their support…”

This claim was vigorously disputed, particularly by some of our Pashtun members with links to the armed forces. While there is no doubt that Pakistan’s PRP screens out potential militant-Islamist sympathizers, as has been officially acknowledged, the assertion of a bias in the PRP with regards to Pashtun officers is more questionable. This logic itself is dubious since it is widely acknowledged that the phenomenon of Islamist fundamentalism tends to transcend ethnic divisions. As it is the Punjabis and Pashtun share strong cultural and demographical links and Punjab hosts its significant share of Islamist militant activity and organizations. Punjabi political opinion too has been relatively empathetic to those Pashtuns opposed to military operations in their NWFP territories, as compared to the more insulated Pakistani ethnic groups down south who’ve been supportive in the WoT. The popular PML-N party that draws its support exclusively from Punjab, and has deep links in the Army, was vociferously opposed to Pakistan joining the war against terror.

If this logic is applied with regards to the present political and demographical realities then Punjabi officers are more likely to sympathize with the Pashtun tribal-taliban rebellion in the west than say Muhajir or Sindhi officers who hail from communities that tend to host strong anti-Pashtun and anti-Islamist tendencies. Thus the notion of Pakistan’s nuclear assets being the domain of an ‘almost exclusively Punjabi’ club of officers cannot be credited without appropriately sourced statistics or accounts, particularly since the army has worked hard over the last decade to reduce the number of Punjabi members and increase Pashtun recruitment. A Punjabi majority in the army and the country in itself cannot be used to imply an institutional prejudice with regards to the Pashtuns.

“Pakistan, with a few exceptions, chose to locate much of its nuclear weapons infrastructure to the north and west of the country and to the region around Islamabad and Rawalpindi—sites such as Wah, Fatehjang, Golra Sharif, Kahuta, Sihala, Isa Khel Charma, Tarwanah, and Taxila. The concern, however, is that most of Pakistan’s nuclear sites are close to or even within areas dominated by Pakistani Taliban militants and home to al-Qa`ida…”

Our members were all too aware of the international concerns about Pakistan’s nuclear program. However from a rational viewpoint it was pointed out that none of the mentioned installations are particularly close to areas hosting a significant Taliban presence; and certainly none are dominated or controlled by any of the insurrectionist elements presently confronting the Pakistani state.

“A series of attacks on nuclear weapons facilities has also occurred. These have included an attack on the nuclear missile storage facility at Sargodha on November 1, 2007…”

The attack in Sargodha on November 1st was actually a suicide attack on a bus carrying Air Force personnel from the Mushaf airbase to the Kirana Central Depot. These special strategic facilities are guarded by the ASFC and they were not attacked.

BBC NEWS | South Asia | Suicide bomb hits Pakistani bus

“An attack on Pakistan’s nuclear airbase at Kamra by a suicide bomber on December 10, 2007…”

BBC NEWS | South Asia | Children survive Pakistan attack

Again, the target was a military school bus near the Kamra air base. The Bill Roggio source states ‘The Air Weapon Complex at Kamra is devoted to air-to-surface munitions, among other activities, and would probably have at least some connection with the development of air-delivered nuclear weapons…’ But is it reasonable to imply that an attack on a student bus in the proximity of an airbase should be considered an attack on or a threat to the hazy nuclear aspect of the weapons developmental complex in said airbase?

The school bus was carrying the children of PAC employees. The PAC deals with producing and refurnishing aircraft and is not to be confused with the AWC which makes strategic air to ground weapons. We were told by a source that the AWC is not based in Kamra. And even if nuclear-capable weapon systems are transferred to an active combat squadron for testing or active operations, then they’d most likely be kept in the hardened bunkers of the base, designed to withstand enemy air and artillery attacks, along with the rest of the air force’s conventional arsenal.

“The final risk, and one that is usually overlooked, is that the Pakistan Army could itself decide to transfer nuclear weapons to a terrorist group. One argument for this, described in Philip Bobbitt’s Terror and Consent, is that states can become pressurized or incentivized to transfer nuclear weapons to terrorist groups because they are responding to threats from an external power but fear the consequences of being identified as the origin of a nuclear strike…”

Identification cannot be avoided since nuclear weapons origins can be traced by the plutonium and uranium fuel used even after the thermonuclear detonation. The consequences for Pakistan’s national security would not be very different if Pakistan was to go for a direct nuclear strike and claim the terrorists did it. It is highly questionable if Pakistan would want to take the risk of nuking a foreign country, directly or indirectly, unless its territorial integrity was being threatened, in which case a direct and overwhelming nuclear strike would be the preferable option to negate the enemy’s nuclear retaliatory capacity.

I hope my (no doubt amateurish) deliberations were worth your time. I await your reply with excitement and will be posting it on the forum.

[1] http://img149.imageshack.us/img149/7636/1reference.jpg
[2] DSC_0284 | Flickr - Photo Sharing!


Kasrkin
Moderation team defence.pk

 

[gaurish]

This is a non sense ... its very difficult to attack and take out nuclear weapons from pakistan nuclear wearhouses .... were the terrosists able to take a single piece of grenade home after yest night attack .... how can they steal a nuke ?????

This can only happen if there is some inside co operation by pak adminstration otherwise there is no security worry to any pak nukes

 

[harpoon]

Oh okay.. so they are concerned about our "increasing" arsenal of nukes.. well, we can get rid of couple dozen by throwing them east and west.. will that do?

There is no need for this type of nonsensical statements. The world have every right to inquire about the safety of Pakistani nukes. What do you think..you will develop nuclear weapons and just get away with it. With great powers comes great responsibilities. Either you rise up to take the responsibility or give up the power.

 

[kawaraj]

mind your own nuclear facility, we will guard ours.

 

[trident2010]

Pak nuke security in focus again after naval base attack


WASHINGTON: It's a subject Americans can't stop discussing and one Pakistan hates talking about. The terrorist attack on the Pakistani military facility in Karachi has once again focused world (and Washington's) attention on the security of the country's fast-growing nuclear arsenal.

The Obama administration on Monday did not publicly go beyond "strongly" condemning the attack on Pakistan Naval Station (PNS) Mehran and appreciating the "service and sacrifices of their brave Armed Forces," but the incident has re-ignited the simmering debate about vulnerability of its nuclear weapons. US analysts noted that Mehran is only 15 miles away from the Masroor Air Base, where Pakistan is believed have a large depot for nuclear weapons that can be delivered from the air.

While Pakistan insists that its "crown jewels" are under foolproof security, at the heart of the debate is worry that they are vulnerable to internal pilferage or attack by a "jihadized" military, judging by multiple attacks on military facilities by terrorists who seemingly have the inside track on security, including in the Mehran strike. A recent Wikileaks cable citing Pakistani military officials admitting sabotage of F-16s by "Islamists amongst the enlisted ranks" has added to the concern.

Pakistani militant attacks over the last five years include strikes against three nuclear facilities, in Wah, Sargodha, and Kamra, according to Prof Shaun Gregory, a security specialist at Bradford University. But each time, the Pakistan military establishment, which has itself suffered attacks at its General Headquarters and training and recruitment centers, insists that there was no danger to its nuclear assets.

But Gregory says the attacks illustrate "a clear set of weaknesses and vulnerabilities" in Pakistan's nuclear security regime, a danger brought home by the ease with which militants are now penetrating military installations. Concern is growing in the west about the internal dynamics in a military that was once thought to be "westernized and professional."

Washington is leery of expressing its views openly, but New Delhi, which has more proximate reasons to be troubled by a nuclear heist, isn't holding back. "We are concerned with the safety of Pakistan's nuclear installations," senior officials traveling with Prime Minister Manmohan Singh in Africa were quoted as saying on Monday. "The real risk is internal – who guards the guardians."

The US has forked out over $ 100 million to improve Pakistan's nuclear security but Washington now admits it has no idea how the money was spent. There is consternation in Washington about the speed with which Pakistan is ramping up its nuclear arsenal with some analysts predicting that it could soon have the world's fourth largest nuclear arsenal, behind US, Russia, and China, and ahead of France and UK.

Like Singh, President Obama is also currently out of the country on a six-day, four-country tour of Europe. But Pakistan is never far from his mind; he has held at least half-a-dozen White House Situation Room meetings with key principals where the sole topic of discussion has been the deteriorating situation in Pakistan.

Washington is thick with speculation about American contingency plans in the event of a nuclear heist in Pakistan, notwithstanding assurances (most notably by Senator John Kerry) that the US has no designs on Pakistani nukes. But every U.S statement is dissected in Pakistan for hidden meanings amid fears that Washington is planning to neutralize its nuclear arsenal.

On Monday, in the aftermath of the naval base attack, the Obama administration merely said it is "committed to working with Pakistan in our joint effort to combat violent extremism and bring to justice those behind this attack." The pledge came after Wikileaks cables revealed that US special forces have been embedded with Pakistani troops in joint operations since September 2009.



Pak nuke security in focus again after naval base attack - The Times of India

 

[Frank Martin]

Its still remains as an impossible task to steal a fully assembled/activated Nuke warhead by terrorists without the help of a powerful inside hands in a facility or while transporting. Let us hope it will never happen.

 

[jahangeer yousaf]

Game Has Just Started
Game has just started.PNS Attack just start of movie..i listened it from somewhere or may be i read this on forum that USA has planned to take over Pakistan's Nukes and raid will be started by taking over pakistani bases............ and this was the check what will be the reaction of pakistani army ............ i am not here to analyze pakistani army did great or couldn't do anything ....... i am here just to put you guys on alarming note ............ we have been in deneil state and even most of the members do agree that pakistani nukes cannot be taken over .............. our army needs to be very much on high alert and i am afraid to say next target will be sargodha air base ..................... if our army done there then we are done in either case ...........but it will be held on very rapidly stages ................. now it depends 50% on pakistani nation that how we gonna react ........................ lets pray first of all to ALLAH and then act whatever we have in our mind to save this country

 

[bc040400065]

Pak nuke security in focus again after naval base attack




Pakistani militant attacks over the last five years include strikes against three nuclear facilities, in Wah, Sargodha, and Kamra, according to Prof Shaun Gregory, a security specialist at Bradford University. But each time, the Pakistan military establishment, which has itself suffered attacks at its General Headquarters and training and recruitment centers, insists that there was no danger to its nuclear assets.

But Gregory says the attacks illustrate "a clear set of weaknesses and vulnerabilities" in Pakistan's nuclear security regime, a danger brought home by the ease with which militants are now penetrating military installations. Concern is growing in the west about the internal dynamics in a military that was once thought to be "westernized and professional."






Pak nuke security in focus again after naval base attack - The Times of India

The bolded parts show how much knowlegde this article's writer and the "security expert" quoted in the article have about pakistan and its nukes.

 

[bc040400065]

Attack on naval base precursor of threats to nukes: Imran

Submitted 2 hrs 39 mins ago

Chairman Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf Imran Khan Monday said that the attacks on the key naval base could be a precursor to further such attacks on our strategic assets including Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal.He stated this on Monday, while reacting to Sunday’s night Karachi tragedy in which 11 personnel of Pakistan Navy and four of the terrorists perished besides destruction of two high-tech aircraft in PNS.
“At a time when our internal security stands compromised due to hundreds of Raymond Davises roaming the streets of Pakistan with an international agenda to declare Pakistan a failed state, the Mir Jaffars and Mir Sadiqs ruling Pakistan are bending over backwards to destroy the country to remain in power on foreign crutches,” he observed.The PTI chairman said that the massive participation of people from all walks of life in the PTI sit-in (Dharna) at Karachi is proof of the fact that the people of Pakistan are united in their efforts to regain the lost national sovereignty. They want to bring an end to the murderous drone attacks, and stop the double-faced politics practiced by the ruling party and the so-called opposition in parliament, he added.
The Karachi Dharna condemns the continuing drone attacks in the face of the Joint Resolution of the Parliament which was yet another attempt to hoodwink the people by the incumbent rulers, fully aided and abetted by a complicit opposition.


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