The problem with this line of argument is that the threat of use of this weapon is essentially one of posture. If India were to attack inspite of the existence of this threat, then the bluff has been called & military planners of Pakistan must take into consideration that India is prepared to take this to the next level effectively rendering this weapon useless. No Pakistani General is foolish enough to order a tactical nuke strike on Indian forces when he is confronted with the possibility that India may retaliate with a massive strike in response which has the possibility of seriously eroding Pakistani capabilities. Whether or not enough weapons remain after a massive strike from India to mount a successful second strike, Pakistan would have essentially been finished and the possibility remains that damage from second strikes to India may be largely ineffective. That reason alone would prohibit the use of a tactical nuke as a first strike & in keeping with the stated Pakistani position to maintain a first strike option which would only be feasible if it were a large, substantial one.