PAF ramping up Special Operation Capabilities

[544_delta]

226 personnel including 166 airmen and 5 female commandos of Pakistan Air Force (PAF) completed the basic anti-terrorist training course in Kallar Kahar on December 22. These men and women are part of the PAF’s erstwhile 312th Special Service Wing, now known just as Special Service Wing (SSW) which has somewhere around 1500 commandos for quick deployment as and when required.

It is a comparatively new special operations service component in Pakistan Armed Forces, after the prestigious army-led Special Services Group (SSG) and navy-led Special Services Group Navy (SSG-N). These forces are tactical deterrent against the threat of state and non-state actors which are engaged in irregular, asymmetric warfare against the state security apparatus. Such sub-conventional operations are undertaken when it is not possible for the aggressor to fight directly, risking the massive ire of the global community at a time when the world is already knee-deep in trying to contain the menace of Al Qaeda and Daesh.

From the Pakistani perspective, the list of enemies has been increasing dangerously. At first there was just one visible enemy in the form of India, now there are hundreds of religio-political and religio-ideological terrorist groups operating as international drug mafia cartels hiding behind the façade of “jihad”. These groups emerged from the Middle East and now infest the heartland of Central Asian Republics (CARs), including South Asia and South East Asia.

However, Pakistan’s traditional enemy continues to be India and its belligerent military forces for reasons well known. Since its creation, Pakistan’s large neighbor (geography and economy wise) has continued to threaten its comparatively weaker neighbor’s existence. It triggered an unwanted nuclear arms race in South Asia and the continuous modernization of conventional weaponry and defence equipment, thereby leaving many people penniless on both sides of the border.

On April 13, 1948, despite very poor health, Quaid-e-Azam Muhammad Ali Jinnah visited the erstwhile Royal Pakistan Air Force College in Risalpur with his sister, Madir-e-Millat Mohtarma Fatima Jinnah, to interact with young officers and their illustrious instructors to share his thoughts on what Pakistan should do to ensure protection of its airspace. He also reviewed a ceremonial parade comprising flight cadets of 2nd, 3rd, 4th and 5th GD(P) courses. Without naming India, the Quaid remarked, “I am well aware of air developments in other countries and my Government is determined that the Royal Pakistan Air Force will not lag behind.” Later he had remarked on another occasion at a PAF unit, “There is no doubt that a country without a strong Air Force is at the mercy of any aggressor. Pakistan must build up her air force as quickly as possible. It must be an efficient air force second to none and must take its right place with the Army and the Navy in securing Pakistan’s defence”.

The Basic Doctrine of Indian Air Force 2012 has a section of Offensive Counter Air Operations (OCAs) which are aimed at “destroying, disrupting or limiting the enemy air power as close to its source as possible“. A key component in OCAs is the “Suppression/Destruction of Enemy Air Defences (SEAD/DEAD)“. SEAD/DEAD is defined further as an activity which “neutralises, destroys or temporarily degrades enemy air defence systems in a specific area by physical attack (hard kill) and/or electronic warfare (soft kill)”.

We can recount the PNS Mehran attack in Karachi which took place on May 22, 2011 in which assailants specifically targeted criticalLockheed P-3C Orion surveillance aircraft. Later on August 16, 2012, militants attacked PAF Base Mushaf in Kamra, destroying a Saab 2000 Erieye radar plane. Attacking a naval aviation and later an air force facility revealed patterns of attacking airfields for maximum damage. This is also mentioned as part of OCAs in the Indian doctrine:

“Though the importance airfields as targets is on the decline, on account of rapid runway rehabilitation systems and the shift of focus on effects based operations, but even so airfields being static concentration centres would continue to contain densely packed high-value targets. Aircraft on the ground at airfields are more concentrated and vulnerable than they are in flight. Experience of the 1991 Gulf War has shown that even when aircraft on ground are protected by Hardened Aircraft Shelters (Blast Pens as the IAF terms it), they are not sufficiently protected; because of the precision attack and penetrative capability of PGMs. Apart from aircraft, the damage or destruction of critical base facilities can also prove to be decisive. When airfelds are unable to provide landing, take-off or critical support facilities (maintenance, fuel, ammunition), air forces are effectively grounded.”
Hence we can see that whether the attacks on these critical defence assets were executed by Al Qaeda or TTP, the ultimate beneficiary was India’s military. Millions of dollars in damages were not as damaging as the symbolic, psychological damage they inflicted during very sensitive times. We are talking about the era in which nationwide suicide attacks were at their peak and the integrity of our protective capabilities were being questioned by friends and foes alike.

SSW commandos are initially trained at the SSG’s school in Cherat, after which they are given specialized training at PAF’s Ground Combatier School in Kallar Kahar. Exceptional commandos are sent for advanced training with the US Army’s 1st Special Forces Group and 75th Ranger Regiment. In the recent ceremony, Air Chief Marshal Sohail Aman made a very important announcement that the school facility at Kallar Kahar would be raised to that of a base. That such a special operations base is being raised reflects the significance given to counter terrorism efforts as part of Operation Zarb-e-Azb. After land forces, Pakistan’s air warriors have played a crucial operational role in eliminating enemy hideouts.

These and similar anti-terrorist trainings assume greater significance when viewed in context of attempted attacks on two PAF bases in Quetta (2014) and a proper attack at Camp Badaber attack, Peshawar (2015). Whoever the pawns are, it is evident enough who the actual player is.

Source:PAF’s Anti-Terrorist Training in Context of Indian Aggression | Pakistan Insider

 

[Irfan Baloch]

the handling of the foiled attack on Quetta airbase was great success for the defenders. fact that the only casualties were terrorists miles away from the base meant that both the intelligence and the armed response worked in unison and ideal way it should

apart from that all other attacks ended with tragic consequences. I see it as a failure when the terrorists breach the boundaries of the base.. that failure is the preventive failure after that the commandos have a uphill task of responding within minutes. there will be more attacks there is no doubt

the best way to deal with them will be in Quetta style where the intelligence is good enough to nab and raid the plotters at the planning stage or when they are on their way at the lastest

 

[Abingdonboy]

Why are Special Forces operators wearing pilot helmets?

 

[Imran Khan]

Why are Special Forces operators wearing pilot helmets?

very very high altitude para troopers

 

[nangyale]

Source:PAF’s Anti-Terrorist Training in Context of Indian Aggression | Pakistan Insider

It's good to see more SSW being trained. As the are the need of the hour.
Just a question though, is there a specific reason for inducting woman in Special Ops forces. Are woman trained and housed together with their male colleagues or is there special facilities for them to use in Pakistan?

 

[544_delta]

It's good to see more SSW being trained. As the are the need of the hour.
Just a question though, is there a specific reason for inducting woman in Special Ops forces. Are woman trained and housed together with their male colleagues or is there special facilities for them to use in Pakistan?

no specific reason...the job is open for males as well as females so its common to see women in our armed forces....they are trained alongside male cadets but the housing is separate for obvious reasons...

Why are Special Forces operators wearing pilot helmets?

HALO\HAHO jumpers need re breathers because they face just the same atmosphere (low air pressure) as the fighter pilots do..

 

[Zarvan]

the handling of the foiled attack on Quetta airbase was great success for the defenders. fact that the only casualties were terrorists miles away from the base meant that both the intelligence and the armed response worked in unison and ideal way it should

apart from that all other attacks ended with tragic consequences. I see it as a failure when the terrorists breach the boundaries of the base.. that failure is the preventive failure after that the commandos have a uphill task of responding within minutes. there will be more attacks there is no doubt

the best way to deal with them will be in Quetta style where the intelligence is good enough to nab and raid the plotters at the planning stage or when they are on their way at the lastest

We need Snipers with Good Guns and in large numbers also we should develop Sniper School just like Sri Lanka has done

By the way any idea what is the minimum size which PAF wants I mean How many SSW ? I think 5000 should be minimum

 

[Signalian]

There are already different Anti-terror forces in pakistan.

SSW is useful to PAF if :

1. 4 X platoons are dedicated towards and trained to take out enemy S400 units by going behind eneny lines during war

2. 6 X platoons are dedicated towards and trained to take out enemy major airfields and disrupt enemy Air Comand ops during war.

3. 4 X platoons are dedicated and trained to take out enemy command and control HQ, AWACS, senior officers etc during war.

Sitting inside pakistan and performing base perimeter security is wastage of SSW during war.

 

[untitled]

Sitting inside pakistan and performing base perimeter security is wastage of SSW during war.

In the last few years we have had suffered some of our worst peace time loses. We to be extra vigilant in defending our bases

 

[544_delta]

By the way any idea what is the minimum size which PAF wants I mean How many SSW ? I think 5000 should be minimum

no idea about the numbers but if they are dedicating a whole base then i think it'd be a considerable force...i'd say 2 to 3 brigades

 

[Irfan Baloch]

We need Snipers with Good Guns and in large numbers also we should develop Sniper School just like Sri Lanka has done

By the way any idea what is the minimum size which PAF wants I mean How many SSW ? I think 5000 should be minimum

we can come to the mechanics, structure and procedures later but

without the prior knowledge which is strictly need to know we cant be sure about numbers. thats a first

but for simplicity and argument sake lets set up a premise and parameters,. this way our debates and posts will look smarter, informed and above average too. so think and research. a

for a start lets hypothesis that
there are 100 bases and unspecified funds are allocated

you are saying 5000 as a starting point,. that is 5000 special forces personnel trained for combat.
do you have the idea of how many support personnel will be needed to help raise and maintain that force?
admin, catering, house keeping, storage, medical, housing and equipment and then security of that all staff and equipment and storage of the equipment and the, vehicles,m armored, transport, their fuel their mechanics, the armory, its maintenance and security and the security of the entire setup. this is just a Birdseye view of the requirements for raising and maintaining a 5K "minimum" force for base security. (with the premise that funds have been already allocated from somewhere else for this).

now the second part regarding vague statement, need of snipers with "good" guns and "large" numbers. explain why we need snipers, what is a good gun? and what is a large number in respect of 5,000 total personnel and why?
base security? infiltration/ extraction missions? retrieving downed pilots? the statement itself is so broad and vague that I cant decide where to start. please look up the composition of a typical special services team belonging to the air forces, how many are they, what equipment they got, what is their mission and how they differ from the special forces of other arms of the military. we need to be clear how similar or different we want them to be to SSG.

finally. there are always tiers among the military forces with the "special" tag . they are all better equipped, trained, funded and experienced than the regular troops for a start.
they are physically more fit and mentally prepared for more challenging tasks for a start and then.. they have their own grades and some of them are just a handful that are specialists and best among the already best bunch.
or regular forces now have platoons trained for urban and Close quarter combat, then there are FC and Light commando brigades that are trained at a higher level and then there are the commandos belonging to all 3 forces that form the top tier. the bulk of the routine security and routine operations should be taken by the middle tier of the special forces, leaving the top tier operatives for hardest assignments.

 

[544_delta]

In the last few years we have had suffered some of our worst peace time loses. We to he extra vigilant in defending our bases

isn't parameter defence role dedicated to Military police? Airforce's own ground combatiers and Army's DSG should be enough too..especially the GCs they got some pretty awesome gear and are supported by APC's....(i have seen them in PAC kamra with the gear and the vehicles)

We need Snipers with Good Guns and in large numbers also we should develop Sniper School just like Sri Lanka has done

i once saw a GC with a sniper qualification badge, i think it AF's own school....Airforce is putting serious effort in their GCs

 

[Zarvan]

we can come to the mechanics, structure and procedures later but

without the prior knowledge which is strictly need to know we cant be sure about numbers. thats a first

but for simplicity and argument sake lets set up a premise and parameters,. this way our debates and posts will look smarter, informed and above average too. so think and research. a

for a start lets hypothesis that
there are 100 bases and unspecified funds are allocated

you are saying 5000 as a starting point,. that is 5000 special forces personnel trained for combat.
do you have the idea of how many support personnel will be needed to help raise and maintain that force?
admin, catering, house keeping, storage, medical, housing and equipment and then security of that all staff and equipment and storage of the equipment and the, vehicles,m armored, transport, their fuel their mechanics, the armory, its maintenance and security and the security of the entire setup. this is just a Birdseye view of the requirements for raising and maintaining a 5K "minimum" force for base security. (with the premise that funds have been already allocated from somewhere else for this).

now the second part regarding vague statement, need of snipers with "good" guns and "large" numbers. explain why we need snipers, what is a good gun? and what is a large number in respect of 5,000 total personnel and why?
base security? infiltration/ extraction missions? retrieving downed pilots? the statement itself is so broad and vague that I cant decide where to start. please look up the composition of a typical special services team belonging to the air forces, how many are they, what equipment they got, what is their mission and how they differ from the special forces of other arms of the military. we need to be clear how similar or different we want them to be to SSG.

finally. there are always tiers among the military forces with the "special" tag . they are all better equipped, trained, funded and experienced than the regular troops for a start.
they are physically more fit and mentally prepared for more challenging tasks for a start and then.. they have their own grades and some of them are just a handful that are specialists and best among the already best bunch.
or regular forces now have platoons trained for urban and Close quarter combat, then there are FC and Light commando brigades that are trained at a higher level and then there are the commandos belonging to all 3 forces that form the top tier. the bulk of the routine security and routine operations should be taken by the middle tier of the special forces, leaving the top tier operatives for hardest assignments.

Within few years you have raised number to 1500 and last batch was of 266 people so if we calculate I think PAF is definitely going for 5000 in fact more than that.

no idea about the numbers but if they are dedicating a whole base then i think it'd be a considerable force...i'd say 2 to 3 brigades

Brigade size differs by country so what is your idea of Brigade I mean How many in one brigade ?

 

[Irfan Baloch]

Brigade size differs by country so what is your idea of Brigade I mean How many in one brigade ?

averages 5K.

excluding independent brigades that have more

 

[untitled]

isn't parameter defence role dedicated to Military police?....

From what I understand the role of MPs is to keep the jawani of jawans in check