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Our Heroes need their identity back - Pakistan Army

Maj. MK Sagheer


Maj. MK Sagheer
retired from service in 1974. His Parent arm when he was commissioned in the Pakistan Army was Signals but latter joined the AirOP arm which he served till his retirement. He had the distinction of being one of the first non-Artillery officers selected for AirOP.

Maj (Retd) MK Sagheer received his Rotary Wing (RW) conversion training in 1963 at Fort Wolters, Texas, and subsequently went on to develop much of what Pakistan Army Aviation did with helicopters – he was one of the Pakistan Army Aviation RW pioneers. While stationed with Army Aviation School, he helped to set the RW syllabus by authoring the primary RW Aerodynamics manual, RW syllabus for OH-13s and Alouette III - short course (in emergencies) and long course (peace time). Standardized the OH-13s and Alouette-III instructors "patter" for all RW courses and served as Flight Commandant at Army Aviation School (precursor to today’s RW-CFI) - logging some 4000 hours of accident-free flying over his service in Pakistan. He trained helicopter pilots from PAF and PN, and pilots from Abu Dhabi for the first time ever during his tenure at Army Aviation School.

Other notable contributions were the crest design for Army Aviation School and 4th Squadron, and introduction of the Wreath and Crest indicating flying experience on the Army Aviation Brevet. He was one of the 1st pilots on the OH-13s, on the Alouette III, and UH-1H and did the recommendation for the Jet Ranger induction (but left the Army before it made it to service). He saw action in 1965 war (Kashmir and 11 division), 1971 war (in East Pakistan, escaping to Burma by flying out in broad daylight amidst enemy air action). Was part of the first team of OH-13s that went to Gilgit and Khunjerab Pass, under then Lt. Col NUK Babar, CO 3 Squadron and was the first to be posted to Gilgit with Maj. Aftab, flying OH-13s to support FWO Operations.

Maj (Retd) Sagheer was awarded distinct recognition by Sud-Aviation when he gave demonstrations to the senior GHQ Command of Alouette-III external load carrying capabilities at the inception of the Alouette-III in Pakistan Army. He also received various GHQ endorsements for his flight safety record and personal commendation from US Senator Charles Percy while acting as VVIP pilot during the Senator’s visits to Pakistan.


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Army Aviation School RW Basic Course OH-13S, November 1968. Sitting From Left – Maj. Sajjad, Maj. Patrick Teirney, Lt. Col Aslam (Comd), Maj Azgar Aziz, Maj, MK Sagheer, Students Standing from left – Flt. LT Sajid, Lt. Anwar, Capt Tahuhid, Maj. Nasseem Khan, Capt. Mukhtar, Capt. Sher – EME, Capt. Siddiqui (First Air Force officer to get RW training from Army Aviation School).


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High altitude training flight in Azad Kashmir with Alouette conversion course students – HajiPir Area. Stationed with Army Aviation School, Jan. 1969. Left to right, Maj. Asghar Aziz, Maj. MK Sagheer (CFI – RW), Maj. Farooq. HajiPir was a spur and as such provided excellent up-draft and down-draft simulation for students.


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LT COL N.A. KHAN SJ

Lt Col (now Brigadier (Retd)) Nisar Ahmed Khan SJ of 25th Cavalry, which was raised on 9 June 1962 with Lt Col Nisar Ahmed as its first CO. This regiment (25th cavalry) is now known as “Men of Steel”. (Source: Tank Aces, from Blitzkrieg to the Gulf War)



The Sitara-i-jurat is the Pakistani equivalent of the British Military Cross and the Tamgha-i-jurats at the equivalent of the Distinguished Conduct Medal. The former is a silver pentagonal figure with a large five-pointed star superimposed; the ribbon is white, dark green and white in equal proportions.

The latter is a circular metal in bronze, on the obverse of which there is a trophy of lances and pennons, swords and a field gun with in a wreath, with a small central disc bearing a crescent and a star. The ribbon is half dark green, half scarlet, with narrow white edges. 25th Cavalry won no fewer than five Sitara-i-jurats and nineteen Tamgha-i-jurats in the seventeen days of the 1965 war.

LT Col Nisar Ahmed Khan, who had carefully prepared the regiment in three years of training, took the 25th Cavalry into action. He had been commissioned into the Indian Army in March 1942, serving in both Palestine and Aden during the Second World War. At the time of partition he was arrested and spent nine months in custody for being a Muslim. He was commissioned in the Pakistani Army in August 1948.

He took part in both the 1965 and 1971 wars, and retired in March 1972. In his regiment, two of his fighting squadrons were equipped with the 40-ton M-47 American-built Patton tank, which mounted a 90-mm gun and was crewed by five men. By the time the 25th Cavalry took over the tanks they had changed hands at least half a dozens times, most had run over 2,400 miles some 400 miles in excess of the normal engine life of the Continental AV 1790-5B 750-bhp petrol engine.

The third squadron had the more modern M-48 Patton, which had replaced the M-47. The 44-ton M-48s were in much better condition, but were still armed with the 90-mm main gun. The regiment was the integral armoured regiment of an infantry division, being grouped for operations with an infantry brigade, which comprised two infantry battalions and a regiment of field artillery.

The brigade group's task was to defend the area between Aik Nullah in the west and Deg Nadi in the east, with orders to expel and destroy any enemy entering Pakistani territory through this corridor. While it was preparing for the task, the brigade received clear indications that the enemy intended to attack in its area of responsibility; fortunately extensive reconnaissance of the area had been carried out and a plan of action carefully arranged.

The brigade commander's overall plan was to block the enemy advance with one tank squadron plus all the available anti-tank guns under command, while keeping the rest of the 25th Cavalry as a strike force, ready to swing round to the east of the blocking force and hit the enemy in the flank once it had been held up. By the morning of 7 September 1965, all was in position to accomplish the set task.

However, the best-laid schemes often go awry - especially on the battlefield! On the evening of 7 September fresh orders were received for the brigade to move with all speed to Jassar, some 30 miles away, to counter-attack an enemy bridgehead and then to stabilize the situation in that area.

The regiment was on the move all through the night, using up precious track mileage, only to discover that the enemy move was merely a diversionary attack. More orders were then received to move back and concentrate at Pasrur, some 15 miles away from the original carefully prepared battle positions; the Indian attack came in on the brigade on the night of 7/8 September.

The attack was in considerable strength - a complete armoured division and three infantry divisions and three infantry divisions being involved. Because of its abortive move to Jassar, the brigade's original area of responsibility had become vulnerable and all the carefully thought out plans went by the board. The enemy took full advantage of the situation and occupied their objective with little resistance.

The regiment's first news of the enemy's real attack came at 0630 hrs on 8 September. There was no organized resistance left north of Chawinda and the brigade commander, who knew no more about the situation than Col Nisar, sent for him and gave him the following order: 'Nisar! The enemy has come! Do something about it!' Thus on the morning of 8 September, the 25th Cavalry embarked on a fresh mission in which it would be engaged in its first major tank battle with a numerically superior enemy over ideal tank country.

Lt Col Khan's plan was to contact the enemy with one squadron as far forward as possible and, once halted, to strike the enemy from the flank with the remaining two squadrons.

Despite the fact that the regiment had been on the move throughout the previous night and that the tank crews had no rest at all, it went into action with true cavalry spirit of dash and courage, and achieved its initial objective - to halt the enemy and force them to withdraw, surrendering some of the ground which they had captured. Considerable losses were also inflicted on the Indian 1 Armd Div, particularly to the Poona Horse, which would lose its brave CO, Lt Col Adi Tarapore, just eight days later in the battle around Phillora.

Undoubtedly, the 25th Cavalry blunted the enemy onslaught and despite being under constant severe shelling and other intense fire from enemy weapons, it remained a cohesive, competent and effective armoured unit, destroying many enemy tanks in the process.

It is interesting to record what Maj Gen Gurcharn Singh Sandhu has to say about this battle in his history if the IAC, The Indian Armour: 'The Pakistani version of this battle is that "A" Squadron 25 Cavalry forced 16 Cavalry back to Gadgor. Then its "C" Squadron attacked the Poona Horse's leading elements as well as 16 Cavalry and forced them out of Tharoh, Gadgor and Chobara.

The Pakistani regiment claims to have destroyed 15 Centurion tanks this day. This regiments performance was certainly creditable because it alone stood between the Indian 1 Armd Div and its objective".

For this courage and exemplary command of his regiment and his skill in handling his tanks, Lt Col Nisar Ahmed Khan was awarded the Sitara-i-jurat. The entire regiment performed with extraordinary courage and dash under continuous heavy shelling and handled their tanks with great skill. Lt Col Khan's citation includes the words: It is because of his personal example, courage and inspiring leadership that his regiment fought as an excellent well-knit fighting machine and inflicted crippling losses on the enemy.'
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British Officers Searching The House Of Faqir Of Ipi For Documents In Waziristan, 1937.

Source - The Illustrated London News
Issue - Saturday April 17, 1937


Faqir of Ipi was a legend in his lifetime and after. Kept a large British Force (upto 2 Divs) for good 21 years, and didn’t give up.
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Mirzali Khan Wazir - ميرزاعلي خان وزیر فقير ايپي

Popularly Known As The Faqir Of Ipi - A Legendary Personality Belonging To Haibat Madi Khel, A Sub Tribe Of Tori Khel Wazir. A Valiant Soul Who Never Compromised On The Right Of Tribesmen. Faqir Of Ipi Waged A Prolonged War Against The British Raj From 1936 To 1947. The British Remained Haunted By Faqir Of Ipi Till Their Departure From The Subcontinent.
 
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December 18, the martyrdom anniversary of L NK: Muhammad Mahfuz Shaheed (Nishan e Haider)

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15 Punjab Regiment, Wagha Attari sector, 1971 war.


Born 25 October 1944 in Pind Malikan (now Mahfuzabad), Rawalpindi district.
Enlisted in the Army on 25 October 1962.


Muhammad Mahfuz,a strong built soldier was a furious boxer and won various honours for his unit,the 15th Punjab regt (HAIDERI).He also participated actively in 1965 war.After 1965 war he was very much impressed of the valour acts of Maj Raja Aziz Bhatti Shaheed Nishan e Haider and he always used to have a picture of him in his personal trunk.When asked why did he do so? he always replied Maj Bhatti is my ideal and one day ill also be remembered in the similar way by you all.....What he said,came true after 6 years........

He was Serving in 'A' Company of 15 Punjab Regiment when war broke out in 1971, Lance Naik Mohammad Mahfuz was deployed on the Wagha-Attari Sector in West Pakistan where his company was pinned down by unceasing frontal and crossfire from automatic weapons.

Pakistanis reorganized their troops and attacked again.During the attack although his machine gun was destroyed by an enemy shell, Mahfuz advanced towards an enemy bunker whose automatic fire had inflicted heavy casualties. Even though wounded in both legs by shell splinters,he crawled towards the enemy bunker,not giving up the fight....


his comrades asked him to go back to the headquarters as he was badly wounded but he rejected immediately and told them that he is a boxer and even though he is not carrying any weapon he will box the indians and knock them out......with such determination he kept crawling, when he reached the bunker he stood up and pounced on the enemy, but was hit again,,several bullets pierced through his body....but still Mahfuz did'nt give up....

Although unarmed, he caught hold of the neck of one enemy soldier inside the bunker and strangled him to death,meanwhile another enemy soldier bayoneted him to death during the night on 17 December 1971 and LNk Muhammad Mahfuz embraced shahadat.....


The Indian commander of that area got so impressed of L nk Muhammad Mahfuz that he returned his body to the Pakistani Officials with full honours and recommended Muhammad Mahuz for the highest millitary award of Pakistan.....Due to extreme determination,courage and bravery shown by Lnk Muhammad Mahfuz,he was awarded Nishan e Haider.
 
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“I have come to stay”. This was the sentence written by Second Lieutenant Shabir Sharif in the visitors’ log of the Unit 6 FF.


“All has been written and sent to the commanding officer and I can do nothing about it. However, if war breaks out ever; this officer is either going to be a martyr or a highly decorated soldier”, this was the reply of Major Abdullah Saeed to the group of officers who came to talk to him about one of their comrades Lieutenant Shabir Sharif, who was In hot waters because of his daredevil act.

April 1965

It all started when about a week ago, an air shoot exercise was announced to be conducted. Along with 6 Frontier Force and a unit of Punjab Regiment was also taking part in it. To act as GLO (Ground Liaison Officer), Lieutenant Shabir Sharif was assigned to take part in it. In his Jeep, he took along an officer of Punjab Regiment and left for the exercise area.

As per his usual routine, he was driving the jeep at top speed. While cutting through a sharp edge of the road, the jeep was misbalanced and turned turtle. Shabir was not injured much but the officer from Punjab Regiment was badly injured and sent to hospital. An inquiry was ordered and Major Abdullah Saeed was ordered to make the summary of evidence.
24 June 1965

Lieutenant Shabir Sharif was presented before GOC Major General Altaf Qadir, who read all the charges against him. Shabir Admitted that all was his fault.

“What do you want, a court martial or what should I sentence you?”, General Altaf Qadir asked.
“Sir whatever you say, but I would like to make a request”, Shabir said.

“Yes what do you ask for”?, General Altaf Asked.

“Sir please don’t post me out of the unit”, Shabir requested.

Under the army Act 33 Clause 1, Article 55, six months service of Shabir was to be reverted.Shabir had proved his words.


September 05, 1965
Chamb Sector

After passing through the thickest of war, 6FF had some moments to rest. All the company was about to have a few moments of relaxation when the Adjutant Major Anwar ul Haq saw Lieutenant Shabir Sharif walking around his men. Having a pale face and walking around lazily and having a field dressing around his arm, Shabir was looking strange.

Major Anwar called him and opened his dressing. It was a strange sight to see that he had a splinter of bomb pierced in his arm. Major Anwar was told that he had received this splinter two days ago while advancing towards the enemy positions. Since then, it was present in his arm. Shabir was forcefully sent to the ADS (Advance Dressing Section), then MDS (Main Dressing Section) and later CMH (Combined Military Hospital).

September 09, 1965

Colonel Iqbal was arranging his men for a raid when he saw Shabir Sharif reporting to him. It was surprise to him because he was told that Shabir is seriously injured and admitted in hospital for a couple of weeks.
“Where is the discharge slip?,” Colonel Iqbal asked. Shabir remained silent.

“Your wound is still bleeding, why have you come?”, Colonel Iqbal again asked, but Shabir remained silent.
“Your arm will have to be amputated if the wound goes bad, I advise you to go”, Colonel Iqbal advised again.

“Sir I have come to stay”, Shabir replied this time.

Colonel Iqbal knew that Shabir is such a stubborn person and won’t go back.

“OK go to your men and boost up their morale”, Colonel Iqbal permitted.

Till the end of war, Shabir stayed with his unit and kept his word. But at the end of the war, Shabir kept the words of Major Abdullah Saeed as well. Seeing the series of his gallantry actions, Lieutenant Shabir Sharif was awarded Sitara e Jurat.




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On 49th Martyrdom anniversary of Major Shabir Sharif Nishan e Haider we are re-sharing this post
"Do not lose the bridge", were his last words.

December 06, 1971

Sabuna Sector
1100 HRS

It was the first attack laid by Indians in the broad day light. Countless men with the support of tanks and artillery were attacking wave after wave. For the last three days, this position was the center of attention for the Indians. On December 03, a small company of Pakistan Army, under the command of Major Shabbir Sharif captured the heavily fortified Indian position.

Verily it was a surprise for the Indians and they were in a constant struggle to take back the bridge from Pakistanis. In spite of various attempts, after sacrificing countless men, including company commander of 4 Jat regiment (Major Narayan Singh) and loosing many tanks; enemy was still unable to take the bridge back.

All the attacks were made in the dark, but this attack was made in day light. On a small concentration of Bravo Company of 6FF, the strength of a full brigade with the help of cavalry and artillery. Every single person of 6 FF was engaged on various positions that time. Major Shabbir was also manning an anti tank gun at that time. A night before, he was injured when Major Narayan threw a phosphorus grenade on him. In response, Major Shabbir killed him with Narayan's own gun after a hand to hand combat and dragged his body to the Pakistani area.

Enemy weaved a net of fire on the Pakistani concentration. Being their former position, enemy was well aware of the grid references and was directing artillery fire with pinpoint accuracy. IAF Migs were flying in the area and enemy soldiers were laying intense fire as well.

Major Shabbir spotted two tanks coming towards his position. He fired first shell and the tank exploded like a hydrogen balloon. He loaded the second shell and fired on the other tank, but this was missed. Enemy noticed his position, so the other tank took the aim at him. Instead of leaving the position, he ordered his man to load the third shell. But before his fire, enemy tank fired and the shell launched by enemy tank landed inches near him.

The bursting shell tossed him many feet above the ground. Before landing on the ground, his soul left his earthly abode. His last words were, “Do not lose the bridge".
His men kept his words and the bridge was under Pakistani Control till the end. Major Hidayat Ullah was the person who took over the company after Major Shabbir Sharif.



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Major Muhammad Akram Shaheed Nishan e Haider

Standing Middle Row in the Middle


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Major Saqib Zaman (12 Punjab) embraced martyrdom on 18 March 2004 at Shin Watsik, Wana. He was son of a Ghazi of 1965 & 1971 wars Major Khan Zaman Khan.



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EAST PAKISTAN: Pakistani troops fire a mortar in a defensive emplacement 2,000 yards from the Indian troops occupying the village of Dangapara,




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29 Nov 1971, Bangladesh --- General Niazi, head of the east Pakistan army, accompanies soldiers wounded at the front in a plane during the war.


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Hav Lalak Jan Shaheed N.H.


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July 07 2020, marks 21st martyrdom Anniversary of Hav Lalak Jan Shaheed N.H. On this day we are re-sharing the account of his Martyrdom for our viewers

Making History: Hav.Lalak Jan was born in Hundur,a beautiful village of Yasin Valley in Gilgit Baltistan of Pakistan.

Hav.Lalak Jan was a brave soldier of Northern Light Infantry (NLI) who inflicted heavy casualties to the enemy during the Kargil Conflict and repulsed many Indian attacks on his post.

On May 1999, when it was informed that the enemy is preparing for a decisive attack on the soil of his country, Hav.Lalak Jan was performing his duties at the Company Head Quarters expressed his zeal to perform on the forward positions of the battle field to fight with the enemy.He was sent to the post which has a prime importance to both the arch rivals India and Pakistan.


Background

In 1984, India occupied the Pakistani posts at Siachen glacier. These posts had been vacated due to winters and snowing in the northern areas of Pakistan. India had in fact violated the Line of Control (LOC) in order to capture these posts. Pakistan’s efforts to take these areas back from Indian possession turned out to be futile, and a war was fought in the worst possible circumstances for 15 years without any significant reward to either side.

The Indians posted an entire Division at Siachen Glacier. The ammunition and food was supplied to this division through the Srinagar-Leh Highway, the road joining the area of Leh (Siachen) with the capital of Jammu and Kashmir, Srinagar. The area surrounding the road was mountainous, with Tiger Hill being the peak that offered the best view of the entire northern area, providing those who were on it with a terrific aerial advantage. The Indian had previously used this peak to attack some defensive positions of Pakistan from time to time. Tiger Hill, located in the associated sectors of Batalik, Kargil and Drass, provided and aerial view of the Srinagar-Leh Highway. In September 1998, the posts had been vacated by India as part of a routine winter exercise, they were to reoccupy them in the summers.

In May 1999, a small sized Indian force of 4 men going along the Srinagar-Leh Highway lost contact with the rest of the army. A section, comprising 12 men was sent on the same road to locate the MIAs (Missing In Action). These 12 men also became MIA. A small force (1200 men) of the Pakistan Army had occupied the vacated Indian posts, and were planning to hold on for sometime so that the Division at Siachen would have no other option but to retreat, due to the lack of ammunition and food supplies. The Indians launched a full fledged attack on the small band of Pakistan Army soldiers.


Main Achievement


Tiger Hill had been occupied by 11 men of 12 NLI (Northern Light Infantry) unit of the Pakistan Army. One of these men was Subedar Sikander, the person who was responsible, with 10 other men, to hold back India’s offensive long enough to force the Division at Siachen to retreat. His 2IC (Second in Command) was Havaldar Major Lalak “Blizzard” Jan (Blizzard = Dohat in local language). Lalak Jan was one of the best in the NLI as far as mountain navigation was concerned, in addition to being one of the best, if not the best, rifleman.

The 10 men of 12 NLI were told by Subedar Sikander to change their positions while firing back at the attacking Indian forces. As the men followed the orders, the managed to bluff the Indians into believing that the size of the force was much more than 11. On 1st of July, 1999, the 18 Grenadiers Battalion (India) launched a fierce attack on Tiger Hill by virtue of artillery shelling of the occupied bunkers. Subedar Sikandar placed his men in such positions that they managed to repulse the attack without any loss of life on their own part. It is not known how many men were lost by the 18 Grenadiers Battalion.

On the morning of 2nd July 1999, amidst the mist, the 18 Grenadiers launched another attack on Tiger Hills. Subedar Sikandar ordered his men to retreat to a secret bunker. Once the men were safe, he ordered Lalak Jan to descend Tiger Hill, and amidst the Indian Artillery shelling plant the landmines in the area in front of the Indians. The impossibility of the task was realized by all, but the Subedar insisted that the army has sent them down to fight, and that they would have to complete this task if they were to make a dent in the Indian offensive. Planting the landmines was the only way for them to damage the Indian armor and artillery, as none of the 11 men of 12 NLI had any heavy weaponry. The Subedar insisted that the mist would help Lalak Jan as well, and the Indians would not be expecting it either.

Accepting the daunting task, Lalak Jan descended Tiger Hills amidst the mist. The remaining men gave him as fierce a cover as possible to distract the Indians. Lalak Jan used his natural mountaineering ability to the fullest in the snow clad area and planted the landmines in such a manner that the Indians would encounter them in case they tried to move forward towards the hill.
Lalak Jan returned, having successfully planted the mines as ordered.


The trap was now set. All that the men required to do now was to lure the Indians into it. Subedar Sikandar told his men to gradually reduce the firing to a standstill. About two hours after firing ceased from the Pakistan side, the Indians thought that they had managed to clear the area of the insurgents. Hence they began to move forward. The landmines reeked havoc with their initial forward movements. The Indians suffered heavy casualties, however, as they have not publicized this incident, the exact amount of damage is not known. The damage was in any case, severe enough that 18 Grenadiers did not attack Tiger Hills for at least 3 to 4 more days, until they were supported by another Indian Unit, 8 Sikh.

On 6th July, both 18 Grenadiers and 8 Sikh attacked Tiger Hills in the fiercest of Tiger Hill battles or the Kargil Operation. This time Chemical weapons were also used. Some of the Indian soldiers launched an attack from the steeper side of the hill. The NLI was not expecting an attack from this side. The NLI fought this battle at a heavy cost. 7 of the 11 men were killed, including Subedar Sikander. The Indians had managed to destroy a number of the Tiger Hill bunkers by either a hand to hand fight or by dropping a grenade into it.

Only Lalak Jan and 3 other men remained. The onslaught of the Indians was continuing and they were rapidly advancing towards capturing the hill. Lalak Jan, who was now the senior most person around, placed his men in strategic positions, at least two to three per person, and told them to fire without staying in one position. These four men, pitted against an enemy much superior in number and weaponry, managed to repulse the Indian onslaught by sheer courage and determination.

On 7th July 1999, 18 Grenadiers and 8 Sikh launched yet another offensive. This was a successful attack. 2 of Lalak Jan’s men were killed. Lalak Jan and his only other remaining comrade in arms, Bakhmal Jan were both seriously injured. Not giving up, Lalak Jan got hold of an LMG and while Bakhmal Jan provided him with the ammunition, the two men kept trying to repulse the Indian attack. Lalak jan’s left arm had been rendered useless as he had received a bullet in it. Bakhmal Jan, unable to sustain his injuries, died while supplying the ammunition to Lalak Jan.

From there on, in one of the most stunning demonstrations of determination, Lalak Jan held up the two units of the Indian Army for four complete hours. The Indian offensive finally slowed down and they descended Tiger Hills. The reason for this is not known, perhaps they thought that they could shell the bunker in which Lalak Jan was positioned.

After the Indian offensive had subsided, reinforcements (5 to 6 men) were sent to Tiger Hill under Captain Amer. When he saw the condition of Lalak Jan he told him to go back to the base camp as his arm was in no condition to be used. Lalak Jan told the captain that he did not want to die on a hospital bed, but would rather die in the battlefield. He told his Captain that he should not worry about the arm.

While this was going on at the hill, the Indians started shelling from a secret bunker in an adjacent hill. By that time the command of the handful of troops at Tiger Hill had been taken up by Captain Amer. He realized that the fire was coming from a secret bunker and also directed fire towards it, but the effort was in vain. The exact reason for the failure of this fire by the Pakistanis is not known. It could have been because of one of three reasons 1) The secret bunker was very well designed and protected by the Indians 2) the fire was not directed properly or 3) the bunker was not in the range of the light weaponry possessed by the Pakistanis atop Tiger Hill.

There was only one way left to counter the secret Indian bunker; it had to be blown up from a closer range.
When the injured Lalak Jan volunteered for the mission, his plea was immediately rejected by the captain, who was of the opinion that he would do it himself. However, Lalak Jan persuaded him, giving him his previous landmine installation experience coupled with his mountaineering skills as the explanation.
The Captain agreed.

Lalak Jan put a bag of explosives on his back, and while shouldering an AK-47 descended Tiger Hills for the second time amidst heavy Indian shelling. Managing to avoid being seen by the Indian forces, and utilising his knowledge of the hills to take cover, he located the secret bunker and threw the explosives inside the bunker.

The bunker, which was also an ammunition dump, blew up in what was probably the biggest blast of the entire Kargil Operation. Lalak Jan managed to take cover, but the Indian Army lost 19 to 20 men inside and nearby the bunker. The other Indian soldiers saw Lalk Jan and opened fire on him. Surrounded from all sides by Indian fire, Lalak Jan tried to resist and returned fire.

This effort was in vain, and Lalak Jan was killed when a number of bullets burst through his chest.
Contrary to what most writers have said on the topic in Pakistan, it is my own knowledge that the Indians did manage to capture Tiger Hills in the next attack. The loss of Tiger Hills was perhaps the biggest setback in the entire Kargil Operation, as after that other victories came for the Indians and they managed to get hold of perhaps the strategically most important peak from whether they could keep an eye on most of the offensives in the region.


On 15th of September 1999, the commanding officer of 12 NLI sent 2 commando forces to Tiger Hills to recover the body of Lalak Jan. The two forces were called ‘Ababeel’ and ‘Uqaab’. Ababeel provided the fire cover while Uqaab went into the destroyed enemy bunker to retrieve the body of Lalak Jan. When his body was found, Lalak Jan had his AK-47 clinched to his chest. The Government of Pakistan awarded him Nishan-e-Haider, the country’s highest award for extraordinary gallantry.
 
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EAST PAKISTAN. Saidpur. December 1971. Pakistani troops planning the battle against the Indian Army.

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