Operation Rah-e-Rast (Swat)

[fatman17]

opinion: Border problems —Brian Cloughley

President Karzai will continue to oppose erection of even a modest length of international fencing that might possibly reduce the movement of militants — and drugs and other goods as might be important to people like his vice-presidential candidate

Last week I gave a talk at a meeting of the Pakistan Society in London. It was about the army and Pakistan’s security, and although all present hoped that the situation would improve, there was not a great deal of optimism. It appeared to be agreed that the chaotic violence in the NWFP was caused essentially by the invasion of Afghanistan by the United States and its allies in 2001-2002, and that there could only be gloomy predictions about the future in both Pakistan and Afghanistan.

This is not to say that conditions in the NWFP, and especially the Federally Administered Tribal Areas, resembled those of a tranquil garden before the beginning of the Afghanistan debacle in which so many soldiers are dying for nothing. For centuries, the tribes have resisted attempts to bring them into the mainstream of society. Successive administrations in Islamabad, Kabul and Peshawar have been unable to persuade tribal leaders that their way of life is not only a bizarre anachronism but is downright detrimental to the health and well-being of the vast majority of people.

But the majority do not matter to the dominant minority, save as puppets and cannon-fodder. Life expectancy in FATA and in Afghanistan as a whole is disgracefully, criminally low, and literacy rates are among the smallest in the world. But that is irrelevant to the people who now wield power over those who have been deliberately deprived of such benefits of modernity as might be available to the rest of the inhabitants of Pakistan and Afghanistan.

Which, alas, isn’t saying much.

Most tribals in both countries are locked in the eighteenth century. Their lives are basic, bleak and grim. Some few of their leaders seek the betterment of their peoples, but in the main the tribespeople are in thrall to vicious barbarians who are either semi-literate, bigoted, self-appointed clerics or amoral tyrants who exercise despotic power while enriching themselves at the expense of their vassals and the country at large.

The main economic occupation is smuggling and the rate of unemployment is staggeringly high. The attraction for young men of joining the Taliban or becoming involved in lucrative criminality is obvious — on both sides of the border.

And it is the border that is becoming an ever more critical cause of disagreement and chaos in the region.

The division between Afghanistan and what is now Pakistan was delineated in 1893. It has been claimed by many Afghans that in some way the original agreement lapsed after a century, but there is no legal basis for this argument. The border is well-established and physically evident for much of its 2640 kilometres.

And Kabul is utterly opposed to a border barrier.

In September 2005, President Musharraf proposed that the border be fenced to whatever degree might be practicable. The practical difficulties include the difficulty of policing the obstacle itself, because a fence can’t be left on its own. It must be covered, in military terms, “by observation and fire.” It isn’t much good having a barrier if the nasties can cut holes in it and pop through when you aren’t looking. (Unlike the concrete obscenities erected by the Israelis to make the lives of the Palestinian people even more hellish.) President Bush said he supported the proposal, but nothing happened. Surprise, surprise.

In 2006, Pakistan again suggested building a fence, but President Karzai objected strongly, declaring that “barbed wire is a symbol of hatred, not friendship and hence it cannot stop terrorism”, which is pretty funny when we consider that his palace and government offices are enclosed by miles of razor wire, erected, presumably, to deter terrorist attacks.

But the real reason for his opposition was evident in his nationalistic statement that “fencing is separation” of the “inseparable” peoples living on either side of the border. So everyone saw from where he was coming, even if nobody could determine where he was going.

In 2007, Karzai declared that fencing the “Frontier” (as he called it) would not prevent terrorism (nobody claimed that it would) but “will have deadly human consequences”.

He said, “Afghanistan is asking for other means [to prevent terrorism]. Let us work against places where training and funding for terrorism is taking place and where supplies are given... The fencing or mining of the border separates families, communities and people rather than ending terrorism.”

In other words, he wants to “work against” Pakistan where, indubitably, there are bases for militants who cross into Afghanistan to assist in the insurgency against the government.

Just as there are bases in Afghanistan for militants who cross into Pakistan to assist in the insurgency against the government.

Early this month, Prime Minister Gilani met in Islamabad with the US Secretary for Homeland Security, Ms Janet Napolitano, who previously had been Governor of Arizona, abutting Mexico. Mr Gilani echoed past proposals in suggesting there be a Pakistan-Afghanistan “pattern of fencing” akin to that between America and Mexico.

Nobody has asked Mr Karzai what he thinks of this latest version of the original initiative, and of course no US official is going to put him on the spot. After Washington worked hard against Karzai in his initial efforts to be re-elected (using bizarrely devious tactics that showed dismal ignorance of Afghanistan and its peoples), it was eventually realised that alternatives to him would be even worse.

So Karzai will continue as president, courtesy of Washington, powerless in almost all spheres of governance in his country and at the mercy of such as the almost certain-to-be-”elected” next vice president, Mohammad Qasim Fahim — “a notorious warlord” as Associated Press had it on Monday.

President Karzai will continue to oppose erection of even a modest length of international fencing that might possibly reduce the movement of militants — and drugs and other goods as might be important to people like his vice-presidential candidate.

What a good result that will be for Afghan democracy: no more border problems.

The writer can be found on the web at Brian Cloughley

 

[courageneverdies]

Rawalpindi - July 28, 2009:

Update Operation (Rah e Rast) 28th July 2009

1. During last 24 hours, search and clearance operations were conducted in Swat, Malakand and Lakki.

2. Swat

a. Security forces conducted search operation at Karorai Kandao, Gidar Sar Banda and Tarogai near Shangla and apprehended local terrorist commander Liaqat.

b. Security forces conducted search operation at Malukabad area and killed two terrorists and apprehended one.

c. Security forces conducted search operation at a house in Dangram and defused 4 IEDs (3 pressure cookers and one steel water container).

3. Darra Adam Khel.

During routine search, Security Forces apprehended 7 terrorists alongwith arms and ammunition in area around Manda Khel.

4. Lakki.

During routine search operation at Hassan Khel near Lakki, Security forces apprehended 16 suspects and recovered 34 bombs of 82 mm mortar, 10 rockets of RPG-7, 3 rounds of artillery , 2 rounds of tank, 5 bombs of 81 mm mortar, 1760 rounds of rifles, 3620 rounds of machine gun, 3 rifles, 1 machine gun (Virkras) and also defused 5 IEDs.

5. Relief Activities.

So far 224,720 cash cards have been distributed amongst the IDPs of Malakand.

---

KIT Over n Out

 

[courageneverdies]

Rawalpindi - July 29, 2009:

Update Operation (Rah e Rast) 29th July 2009

1. Search and clearance operations continued by security forces in Swat and Malakand.

2. Swat

a. Security forces conducted search operation at Tal near Shah Dheri. During search 2 terrorists were apprehended and 10 terrorists hide outs were destroyed in area around Dhardial and Unra Sar. 2 security forces personnel were also injured.

b. Local Jirga handed over a suspected terrorist to security forces at Bahrain.

c. Security forces conducted search operation at Amankot, Ahingro Derai, Minar Qambar and Landikas near Mingora and killed 4 terrorists and apprehended 3 suspects.

d. Security forces conducted search operation at Sangota near Mingora and apprehended 9 suspects.

e. A terrorist voluntarily surrendered himself to security forces at Sakhra near Matta.

3. Buner.

Security forces during routine search at Dheri Village near Dewana Baba apprehended 6 suspects and demolished 8 terrorists houses.

4. Mohmand.

An important terrorist commander Umar Said alias Zarqawi of Asi kot Qandharo voluntarily surrendered before civil administration.

5. Relief Activities.

a. 228,364 cash cards have been distributed amongst the IDPs of Malakand.

b. 12 trucks of rations have been distributed amongst the IDPs of Malakand.

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KIT Over n Out

 

[fatman17]

ANALYSIS: The long, rocky road beyond Swat —Salman Tarik Kureshi

The key to a successful counter-insurgency is the winning-over of the populations of FATA, the NWFP, Balochistan and (probably) southern Punjab. If that can be achieved, then the rebellion will be deprived of its supplies, shelter and, more important, its claim to moral legitimacy

See, they return: ah, see the tentative
Movements, and the slow feet,
The trouble in the pace, and the uncertain
Wavering!
See, they return, one, and by one,
With fear, as half-awakened;
As if the snow should hesitate
And murmur in the wind.

– Ezra Pound



The families displaced from Swat and Buner, first by fear of the Taliban and then by fear of warfare, stumble back to their ruined homes and businesses, their devastated fields, with gunfire sounding still at no great distance. It is easy to surmise that this return is premature. Clearly, Pakistan has not yet turned the decisive corner in its counter-insurgency campaigns. The terrorist insurgents have been driven back, but not eliminated. Their ferocious leaders (other than the diminutive Sufi Muhammed, under arrest yet again) are still at large.

In any case, so far we are only talking about the valleys of Bajaur, Swat and Buner, and bits of Shangla and Lower Dir. One can add to these the somewhat prolonged military blustering at the edges of the Waziristans. Otherwise, little has happened to alter the status quo bequeathed us by Generals Zia-ul Haq and Pervez Musharraf. And this is not to even mention Mullah Umar, Ghani Baradar and their fanatical legions, poorly concealed in and around Quetta and Pishin.

Those who may have thought this is all it would take were at least naïve. And, yes, the government and the army — who, for once, have stumbled into doing the right thing — will come under verbal fire for successes not yet achieved. But did anyone honestly think it could have been over so soon?

Let’s face it, major insurgencies can be exceedingly stubborn and prolonged. Think, for example, of Northern Ireland, the Tamil Tigers, the Basque separatists, the Palestinians, the Moros, the Nepali Maoists. Be ready for the long, rocky road through Swat and beyond.

And this refers only to the military aspect of counter insurgency operations, or ‘COIN’ in strategic parlance. The RAND Corporation’s study “Rethinking Counter-Insurgency” notes that few rebel groups in the last forty years have actually achieved victory and all insurgencies eventually end. But, according to this study, over eighty percent of armed rebellions have ended because their protagonists eventually laid down their arms and joined the political process and/or because local police and intelligence agencies arrested or liquidated their key leaders. Military force has rarely been the primary reason for the end of terrorist groups. However, the use of military force is obviously the first essential step, if seldom the last one.

The authors of the RAND study suggest that COIN operations are a contest for the allegiance of populations. Victory therefore consists not of merely winning a war against terrorists, but of persuading people to choose legitimate governments that follow constitutional principles and reject violent religious or political tyrannies. There are obvious implications for a failing state like Pakistan, where governments alternate between the pseudo-competence of unconstitutional military autocracies and the abject misgovernment of elected regimes.

To understand counter-insurgency, one must understand insurgency. The dynamics of revolutionary warfare stem from the insurgents’ ability to capitalise on societal problems, or ‘gaps’. To be viable, a state must be able to close three kinds of gaps.

First, and most important, the state must provide security to its citizens, protecting them “against internal and external threats, and preserving sovereignty over territory. If a government cannot ensure security, rebellious armed groups or criminal non-state actors may use violence to exploit this security gap — as in Haiti, Nepal, and Somalia.”

The extraordinary ‘innovation’ in Pakistan — where state actors themselves destroyed national sovereignty by arming and training terror legions, providing them with recruiting bases and a spurious ideological ‘legitimacy’ and even handing them over whole swathes of national territory — illustrates the uniquely moronic or satanic mentalities of those by whom it was conceived and executed. It belongs in the Theatre of the Absurd. But, well, such are the kinds of leaderships we have had!

Next, the state must have the capacity to provide at least the most basic survival needs of water, electrical power, food and public health, closely followed by education, communications and a working economic system. “Inability to do so creates a capacity gap, which can lead to a loss of public confidence and then political upheaval. In most environments, a capacity gap coexists with — or even grows out of — a security gap. In Afghanistan and the Democratic Republic of Congo, for example, segments of the population are cut off from their governments because of endemic insecurity. And in post-conflict Iraq, critical capacity gaps exist despite the country’s relative wealth and strategic importance.”

Underlying both of these is the issue of governmental legitimacy in the eyes of the people. This is particularly significant in the case of Pakistan, where arrogant ‘saviours’ have illegitimately seized power at the cost of constitutional rule and even the superior courts sought fit to contrive something called ‘the Law of Necessity’. While closing the legitimacy gap is clearly more than just an incantation of “elections” and “democracy is the best revenge” (sic), it remains true that a government that exists by the consent of the governed has inherent advantages in terms of stability and legitimacy. Consider the disintegration of the once all-powerful, but undemocratic, USSR. Contrast this with the vitality of ragged, chaotic, poverty-afflicted India, the world’s largest democracy.

When these gaps are wide, they stir up a sea of discontent, of which Mao Zedong wrote “the guerrilla must swim in the people as the fish swims in the sea”. COIN, then, has more than one dimension and must address the closing of all these gaps — security, capacity and legitimacy.

It is possible to combat an insurgency by making the presence of troops so pervasive that there is simply no place left for insurgents to hide. Examples are General Franco’s conquest of Republican Spain during the 1936 Spanish Civil War, the US occupation of the southern States following the American Civil War, the present-day massive Russian troop concentrations in their breakaway region of Chechnya and India’s continuing occupation of Kashmir.

For such a strategy to succeed, enormous amounts of manpower and firepower are needed for an extended period of time to quell resistance over virtually every square kilometre of territory. For Pakistan, given the angularities of our relations with our immensely larger and more powerful eastern neighbour, this option is probably precluded.

The point to remember is that the goal of the insurgent is not to defeat the military force. That is almost always an impossible task, given the disparity in resources between a national army and guerrilla bands. Rather, the insurgents seek through a constant campaign of sneak attacks to inflict continuous casualties upon superior forces and thereby over time demoralise COIN forces and erode political support for the operations. It is a simple strategy of repeated pin-pricks and bleedings that, notwithstanding the army’s successes in Swat, Buner, etc., is still an option open to the insurgents. That their primary leadership personalities are intact only highlights the probability of continuing guerrilla campaigns.

According to Sir Basil Liddell Hart, that great authority on modern warfare, there are few effective counter-measures to this kind of rebel strategy. If the insurgency maintains popular support, it will retain all of its strategic advantages of mobility, invisibility, and legitimacy in the eyes of the people. So long as this remains the situation, an insurgency essentially cannot be defeated by regular forces. However, when the insurgents have rendered themselves unpopular by their conduct, the advantage falls to the COIN actors. The Philippines, Peru, Nicaragua and Malaya have been examples of failed insurgencies. This analyst believes that the Swat and Buner, to which the IDPs are returning, will also prove to be such examples.

Essentially, then, only one viable option remains. The key to a successful counter-insurgency is the winning-over of the populations of FATA, the NWFP, Balochistan and (probably) southern Punjab. If that can be achieved, then the rebellion will be deprived of its supplies, shelter and, more important, its claim to moral legitimacy.

The writer is a marketing consultant based in Karachi. He is also a poet

 

[H2O3C4Nitrogen]

US unsure of Swat offensive success, says Holbrooke

WASHINGTON: It is still unclear if Pakistan’s offensive in Swat has killed off the Taliban or simply scattered them, US special envoy to Pakistan and Afghanistan Richard Holbrooke said on Wednesday.

“We don’t know exactly to what extent the Pakistani army dispersed or destroyed the enemy,” the Reuters news agency quoted him as saying. “The test of this operation is, of course, when the refugees return. Can they go home? Are they safe? And we’re just going to have to wait and see,” he told a State Department press conference.

He said that Karl Eikenberry, the US ambassador in Kabul, and his military counterpart, General Stanley McChrystal, have consulted “fairly regularly” with Pakistani officials. They want to keep in touch with Pakistan’s government and army so “this time around, as the [NATO] offensive picks up steam, the Pakistanis are ready for it, so the Pakistanis know where the military operations are happening - and they can prepare for any spillover effects,” he added. Likewise, the US officials wanted to be fully apprised of Pakistani army offensives, he said.

Holbrooke said Afghanistan needed to expand the size and capabilities of its own security forces. Meanwhile, after a meeting with Foreign Minister Shah Mehmood Qureshi in Phuket, Thailand, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton praised Pakistan’s efforts in the war against the Taliban. agencies

Daily Times - Leading News Resource of Pakistan

 

[H2O3C4Nitrogen]

WTF. Man you give lives for a cause even still these Neocons cannnot clear up their heads. Facists

 

[courageneverdies]

Rawalpindi - July 30, 2009:

Update Operation (Rah e Rast) 30th July 2009

1. Search and clearance operations continued by security forces in Swat and Malakand.

2. Swat

a. Terrorist commander Bakthe e Jehan voluntarily surrender to security forces at Charbagh.

b. Security forces conducted search operation at Qadar Kandao, Chate Kale and apprehended 4 terrorists alongwith 2 communication sets.

c. Terrorists raided the house of tehsil Nazim Muhammad Ali at Choga near Aloch resultantly his brother was killed and his nephew alongwith a neighbor was injured.

d. A Jirga of locals from villages villages Alamganj, Waliabad, Bararai, Langer, Gashkore, Takrai, Asala, Janu, Kotnai, Bandai, Chaliar, Farhatabad, Babu, Chinkulai was held at Khawzakhela and all notables assured undeterred cooperation with security forces.

e. Security forces conducted search operation at Kuza Banda and apprehended 11 suspects.

3. Lakki Marwat.

Security forces during routine search at Godiwala mountains recovered 6 suicide Jackets, 2 drums filled with explosives, 6 bags filled with explosives, 24 time bombs, 24 toy bombs, 5 bundles, Police uniforms, IED wire and huge cache of arms and ammunition.

4. Relief Activities.

a. 231,601 cash cards have been distributed amongst the IDPs of Malakand.

b. So far 5 billion rupees have been withdrawn by the IDPs of Malakand.

---

KIT Over n Out

 

[courageneverdies]

Rawalpindi - July 31, 2009:

Update Operation (Rah e Rast) 31st July 2009

1. Backed by local Lashkars and people of the area, search and clearance operations are successfully being conducted by security forces in Swat and Malakand.

2. Swat

a. Security forces conducted search operation at Khog Bacha and apprehended Ibn-e-Aqil (younger brother of Ibn-e-Amin).

b. A number of local terrorists commanders have decided to voluntarily surrender and denounce terrorism. As a sequel two local terrorists commanders voluntarily surrendered at Shalpalam and 3 terrorists voluntarily surrendered before security forces at village Jheel near BB Ziarat.

c. The notable of village Alamganj, Chinkulai, Janu and Bandai in Khawazakhela have expressed their commitment to support security forces and resolve not to allow any terrorist in their respective areas.

d. Security forces conducted search operation at Charbagh and Allahabad and killed 6 terrorists and also recovered cache of arms and ammunition alongwith material for preparation of IEDs.

3. Buner.

Security forces alongwith 30 persons of Sultanwas Lashkar conducted area clearance operation from Pir Baba to Dukhada.

4. Relief Activities.

234,635 cash cards have been distributed amongst the IDPs of Malakand.

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KIT Over n Out

 

[fatman17]

‘Returning IDPs providing intel about Taliban’

* SSG chief says forces would soon clear Matta, Kanju and Kabal, allowing displaced families to return

Staff Report

PESHAWAR: The internally displaced persons (IDPs) returning to their homes in Swat and Buner are proving “more helpful” to security forces as it allows them to get actionable intelligence against the Taliban, a top army general said on Friday.

“The people who have returned to their areas are providing the security forces with information about the Taliban and their hideouts, which is why intelligence-based operations have been stepped up,” Special Support Group Lt Gen Nadeem Ahmed said at a news conference.

The SSG chief said he did not believe media reports that the Taliban were present in some areas near Malam Jabba, Manglawar, Chagharzai and some villages of Buner.

Nadeem said Taliban commander Mullah Shah Dauran had been killed and Swat Taliban’s chief Fazlullah was seriously injured. “They are no longer capable of running their activities in the area,” the SSG chief added.

He said security forces would soon clear Matta, Kanju and Kabal, adding that the displaced families from the three areas would soon be allowed to return.

He said that approximately 162,000 families had so far returned to their areas in Buner and Swat under the government’s voluntary repatriation programme.

The SSG chief dispelled the impression that the IDPs were being forced to return, saying the process was completely voluntary.

He said 81 percent of the people had returned using public transport while only 19 percent had used the government-provided transport facilities. Nadeem said that markets, hospitals and other governmental offices had reopened, adding that life in Swat and Buner was returning to normalcy.

 

[fatman17]

600,000 IDPs have returned home, says UN

UNITED NATIONS: More than 600,000 people – who were forced to leave their homes due to the military operation launched against the Taliban – have now returned home, leaving some 1.6 million displaced people in need of aid, the United Nations announced on Friday. The Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs said that even as the internally displaced persons (IDPs) were beginning to leave the relief camps, around 1,500 IDP families arrived at camps in Jalozai and Familo in July. The UN International Children's Emergency Fund has distributed 8,600 hygiene kits and 270,000 Aqua tabs to assist the displaced families returning to their homes.

app

 

[IceCold]

WTF. Man you give lives for a cause even still these Neocons cannnot clear up their heads. Facists

Who gives a squat what holbrooke has to say. We dont need a certificate of quality assurance from them and neither should we expect one. What matters is that we remain on course and that is to eliminate terrorists like fazalullah, BM. That should remain our priority.

 

[TaimiKhan]

ISLAMABAD: Police lodged criminal charges against TNSM chief Sufi Mohammad, a cleric who helped negotiate a peace deal with the Swat valley Taliban, accusing Sunday him of aiding terrorism, sedition and conspiring against the government, a police said.

Sajid Mohmand, the Swat police chief, said the case against Sufi Mohammad was lodged in a police station in the valley, where troops still skirmish with militants even though they are winding down an offensive launched three months ago.

Mohammad is to be formally charged by a court, a move expected in the coming days.

The peace deal the cleric helped negotiate imposed Islamic law in the valley, but the pact collapsed in mid-April after Taliban militants infiltrated a district south of Swat, and the military moved back in.

Mohammad, who is also the father-in-law of Swat’s notorious Swat Taliban leader Maulana Fazlullah, was detained last Sunday near Peshawar.

The case against him could indicate Pakistan is moving away from its past willingness to negotiate with militants, but it also could be a way to pressure Mohammad to reveal any information he has about the location of the Swat Valley Taliban’s leaders, who have evaded capture despite the military offensive.

The charges in the complaint against Mohammad stem from comments he made during an April speech in which he condemned democracy and elections and said Pakistan’s constitution was un-Islamic.

The speech sparked controversy in Pakistan and was considered to be an important factor in shifting public opinion against the Taliban.

The government had relied heavily on Mohammad’s contacts with the Taliban in the Swat area to try to achieve a peace agreement earlier this year.

Mohammad, himself, does not control the armed militants in Swat, and its unclear how much impact his detention will have on the insurgents fighting in the scenic valley.

But he mobilized thousands of volunteers to fight in Afghanistan after the US-led invasion in 2001. He was jailed in 2002 but was freed last year after renouncing violence.

The Swat Taliban’s ability to re-emerge will depend more on their leaders, including Fazlullah. The army says Fazlullah has been wounded, although the Taliban reportedly deny it. None of the commanders is definitively known to have been captured or killed.

Some two million people fled the region in the early weeks of the offensive, and although hundreds of thousands have returned in the past two weeks as the military operation winds down, sporadic fighting continues. — AP

 

[iPhone]

About fencing Pak-Afghan border, can someone explain to me why we can't fence the border ourselves? Why do we need karzai's permission and involvement? Do international laws prohibit one country from fencing it's side of the border without the country's aproval? It's our land we should be able fence it if we feel a threat from the other side. I fail to see the logic of having the other side agree to it.

 

[fatman17]

About fencing Pak-Afghan border, can someone explain to me why we can't fence the border ourselves? Why do we need karzai's permission and involvement? Do international laws prohibit one country from fencing it's side of the border without the country's aproval? It's our land we should be able fence it if we feel a threat from the other side. I fail to see the logic of having the other side agree to it.

we can put up a fence but that wont be enough - you need patrolling of the 2,400 km border - for that you need infrastructure - for that u need money - and therein lies the problem - US/UK are un-willing to help in this regard as they are supporting Karzai's POV.

 

[muse]

So Karzai, US/UK control Pakistan's border with Afghanistan?


Whereas patrolling the border is definely required - mining the border along with the fencing of it will go a long way - why Pakistan are unwilling to make this point to the international media is beyond me.