Operation Rah-e-Rast (Swat)

[Elmo]

PA Units stationed at Kashmir side are certainly not trained to fight in Plain Areas so i am sure they have considerable exp in Mountain Warfare.

But the point is that we are not moving troops from Kashmir to Malakand.

They are needed in Kashmir as it is.

 

[blain2]

Strictly speaking about mountain warfare, there is a deficiency on all four counts, which both the PA and FC face.

For instance, a significant basis of mountain warfare involves securing heights. You don't have enough aircraft to airlift troops (equipment), but before that you need intelligence (resources) which is not forthcoming either. Besides a sizeable number of strategic hilltops that need to be secured are populated and you can't carpet bomb them to secure them. You have to be careful about civilian casualties as well — Pakistan Army has significant experience in operating in plain areas but not in mountainous terrain (hence lack of training and resources). Indeed most of the army's focus is on defending its eastern borders, which is plain.

We did inherit a pamphlet the Frontier Mountain Warfare from the British and it has been amended and refined from time to time. According to it, mountain warfare involves high altitude, placing your machines and weapons on terrains, war of ambushes, fighting, blocking avenues so that the insurgent surrenders. It’s a totally different war that you would fight when you are fighting on ground.

Lastly, the insurgent is twice as skilled as a regular army man in such warfare. He is the first fighter on his own terrain, much better than anybody else. We saw this in Waziristan and we are seeing this in Malakand as well.

Comments such as "Pakistan Army has significant experience in operating in plain areas but not in mountainous terrain (hence lack of training and resources)" are factually incorrect.

As I have mentioned above, PA has just as much or more experience than most Armies of the world when it comes to Mountain and HA warfare. The issue here is that you are not arrayed against a conventional enemy. Its a local inhabitant who mixes well with the local population. So the problem is not one of PA not knowing how to conduct operations in mountains, rather that of running a CI campaign that weans the support away from the militants. For this you cannot just use military tactics. The tribal system, which has been destroyed over the past few years, has to be resurrected and power has to go back into the hands of the tribals instead of militant commanders in the area.

Lastly, the insurgent is twice as skilled as a regular army man in such warfare. He is the first fighter on his own terrain, much better than anybody else. We saw this in Waziristan and we are seeing this in Malakand as well.

Very true. Thus the fight has to be more public affairs, development oriented than just military action. I have spoken to officers who have served in the tribal areas in the past (80s and before) and the main problem is the vastness of the area and its remoteness. FATA needs to be brought closer to the rest of Pakistan and this means massive reconstruction, communication infrastructure, water, power etc. etc. This is something that has been promised to the poor of FATA for the past 60 years and to day there is nothing to show for it except some roads and wells that the Army put in for these people.

---------- Post added at 09:32 AM ---------- Previous post was at 09:31 AM ----------

But the point is that we are not moving troops from Kashmir to Malakand.

They are needed in Kashmir as it is.

So do you think units are not rotated?

 

[Zob]

this has been a fundamental problem since the invention of Guerrilla warfare be it JUNGLES,SWAMPS or MOUNTAINS

you just can't beat an enemy who comes out of nowhere ambushes you and runs away....!! you can still "CHARGE" at an enemy with bayonets but you can not defeat an enemy that attacks you in a time & place of there choosing!!

so yes regardless of the fact that PA knows or doesn't know mountain warfare....it is easier to fight INDIA then fight TALIBAN.....


i guess this is why the MONGOLS won so many battles because there style of fighting was just different...ORGANIZED CHAOS is better any day!!


the US NEVER LEARNS THAT even after VIETNAM...the RUSSIANS never learn it after the occupation of AFGHANISTAN...

 

[Elmo]

Comments such as "Pakistan Army has significant experience in operating in plain areas but not in mountainous terrain (hence lack of training and resources)" are factually incorrect. As I have mentioned above, PA has just as much or more experience than most Armies of the world when it comes to Mountain and HA warfare. The issue here is that you are not arrayed against a conventional enemy. Its a local inhabitant who mixes well with the local population. So the problem is not one of PA not knowing how to conduct operations in mountains, rather that of running a CI campaign that weans the support away from the militants. For this you cannot just use military tactics. The tribal system, which has been destroyed over the past few years, has to be resurrected and power has to go back into the hands of the tribals instead of militant commanders in the area.

Firstly, can you provide examples of mountain warfare where the PA has been involved (besides Kashmir/Siachen territories). The units being moved to Malakand are from the eastern front rather than those already stationed in NWFP. Last I heard, they were involved in desert warfare primarily. Correct me if I am wrong here.

My reply was vis-a-vis Malakand division, not the tribal areas. There is no tribal system in Malaknd division, so the political approach has to be significantly different. We by now know what COIN involves but unfortunately the brunt of our strategy has been military rather than economic-political. What is being done to improve the socio-economic conditions of the people, change their political leanings etc etc. Sadly, zilch.

As for the tribal araes, reviving it is next to impossible now. Most maliks were murdered while the rest dare not support the government anymore. The political agent lost his sway a long time back.

And why do we need to revive the tribal system I ask. Only to let people suffer under the draconian FCR? We should rather take the tribal areas under the wings of the federation and apply the same laws we apply elsewhere in the country.

Power does not need to go back to the tribals — power needs to go back to the state. That is the cornerstone of any nation's existence.

Very true. Thus the fight has to be more public affairs, development oriented than just military action. I have spoken to officers who have served in the tribal areas in the past (80s and before) and the main problem is the vastness of the area and its remoteness. FATA needs to be brought closer to the rest of Pakistan and this means massive reconstruction, communication infrastructure, water, power etc. etc. This is something that has been promised to the poor of FATA for the past 60 years and to day there is nothing to show for it except some roads and wells that the Army put in for these people.

Right now public affairs has solely comprised of press briefings by the ISPR (no harm in that).

Just want to correct that development was not "consistently" promised to the poor of FATA for the last 60 years. It hasn't been because it was never part of the rest of the country in real terms. The power was vested in the tribal system and the basis of that was to conserve the tribal traditions and way of life . And lest we forget, the Durand Line was used by Pakistan to help US fight the Soviets in Afghanistan. It has been at the centre of conflict but always overlooked.

Also most of the infrastructure that is there (for instance, the main North-South Wazirstan Road) is courtesy the British. This is the first time I am hearing of any road being put there by the army for the people (googled it in fact, nothing came up). And I am also sure tribals know how to lay a well as well.


The main problems that the army encountered when they moved into Wazirstan or other tribal areas were not limited to the vastness or the remoteness of the area. One of that was the inability of the soldier to adapt itself to the kind of warfare required there. Paraphrasing columns by Brigadier Javed Hussain's here: "The soldiers were not used to the environment they were thrown. There were no flanks, no rear areas, they were trained to fight where the battlefield is well-defined and the enemy’s positions are known. Then they assemble their forces, they are taught to operate to operate as part of large forces, in accordance with the army’s strategic plan (which is implemented by the corps). So it is the corps battle that matters. The infantry man is fighting to promote the corps plan. So the structure of the army is inherently centralized command. All regular armies are structured like this. When the army went in, they moved from one point to another, they would be ambushed, they would set up a camp, they would be attacked. They weren’t trained to deal with ambushes, raid, sniping, surprise operations etc — these are associated with insurgents/guerillas and the SSG, who specialize in commando operations. The regular army does not think like that. The army moves in a battalion not as an individual."

In short, the terrain and the kind of warfare involved were not what the PA, or for that matter any other army, are involved in.

---------- Post added at 08:09 PM ---------- Previous post was at 08:07 PM ----------

@ Blain2: So do you think units are not rotated?

They are rotated but the entire army doesn't go through Kashmir and secondly all units rotated through Kashmir would not be deployed in Malakand.

 

[fatman17]

Fatman,

Do we only have SSG deployed along the LoC, Siachen and chasing insurgents in the mountains of Baluchistan?

If not then I would argue that there are plenty of non-SSG troops familiar with mountain warfare.

As far as FIBUA, yes I agree that it will take time to get a significant part of the Army trained, but the whole point of this discussion was the assumption that in Wazristan the Taliban were not going to be putting up any 'conventional military' defense, and would run to the mountains.

If so, then the debate comes back to why you think the PA lacks in mountain warfare 'proficiency'.

The whole discussion over COIN (in terms of all of the requirements - local trust, development, security etc.) is a different one - the US, for all its experience in Iraq, has been unable to translate that into success against the insurgency in Afghanistan, so one could argue that neither the US nor Pakistan are very 'proficient' in COIN.

But I am speaking more to the tactics and strategy required to win military victories in the mountains - is the lack of 'proficiency' here more a function of inadequate equipment and resources, or training and experience?

If the latter, what exactly are we looking at, and why, given our experience in Mountain warfare?

The army knows the strategy,knows the tactics, what it needs to do is to replicate the same over a larger element of the army - CI trg, FIBUA trg is being ramped up (albeit slowly but there is no other way).

now why Waziristan is different and difficult and poses a huge challenge and I would go further to say that Kashmir/LoC is a cake-walk in comparison. the LoC has infrastructure (built over 60 years), short lines of comm/supply, detailed maps of the terrain - everything required to conduct mil-ops.
OTOH, there is nothing in the Waziristan area - it is likened to a "black-hole" by some officers I have talked to. NO infrastructure, NO FOBS, an over-stretched line of comm/supply, and dig this, NO detailed mapping of the terrain as it was never en-visioned by the state that the army would ever operate in this area - everything which will indicate to a commander that this place is bad news.! and finally the history.
please kindly read the book review "Tribal Warfare in the NWFP". I can send you the book - PM me your address! it will be worth your while! written 100 years ago and still valid today, only the equipment has changed - APCs for horses, G3s for Lee Enfields, Howitzers for Mortars but the enemy remains the same!
and finally I am probably the staunchest supporter of the army (barring its politics) and it has done a "fantastic job" under very difficult circumstances in Swat/Buner and will have to succeed in the Waziristan - there is no choice!
......but it has to increase its capacity and capability and Proficiency!

 

[fatman17]

Elmo - good research on WAB and SWJ !!!

 

[blain2]

Firstly, can you provide examples of mountain warfare where the PA has been involved (besides Kashmir/Siachen territories). The units being moved to Malakand are from the eastern front rather than those already stationed in NWFP. Last I heard, they were involved in desert warfare primarily. Correct me if I am wrong here.

The entire FCNA theater of operations is essentially a mountain warfare exercise. Siachen would fall under high altitude operations so I am not bringing that into the discussion. Without going into the disposition of the exact units (the details of which are not available to me), I can tell you that rotation involves units from all over to be brought in. The current operations are essentially Corps + level effort and would require units from other formations to be inducted. Pakistani infantry units are although trained in environs where they would typically be deployed, but are rotated as and when needed. There simply aren't enough troops in a single Corps to sustain such long term operations at this large scale.

My reply was vis-a-vis Malakand division, not the tribal areas. There is no tribal system in Malaknd division, so the political approach has to be significantly different. We by now know what COIN involves but unfortunately the brunt of our strategy has been military rather than economic-political. What is being done to improve the socio-economic conditions of the people, change their political leanings etc etc. Sadly, zilch.

I am not sure if I saw the Malakand div. reference earlier. I think there is nothing "unfortunate" about the current operations. Things go on in phases. We have discussed Kinetic and non-Kinetic operations. Initially the military has to push in, build its presence and along with it public affairs and economic uplift happens. Currently what we see is that PA is right in the middle of this transition in most of Swat and adjoining areas and we will see the developmental activity pick up pace as well.

As for the tribal araes, reviving it is next to impossible now. Most maliks were murdered while the rest dare not support the government anymore. The political agent lost his sway a long time back.

I do not think so. The tribal framework exists as it was before. Surely tribal leaders have been martyred, however there are others willing to take over the leadership. The tribal culture has existed there for centuries. It cannot just disappear because some leaders have been murdered over the past few years. Secondly, currently no one may want to challenge the militants in the absence of the military. However once the pressure builds on the militants, you can and will find allies in the tribes willing to get this militancy problem sorted out as their tribes are losing out.

The PA system has to be done away with. With what has to be seen.

And why do we need to revive the tribal system I ask. Only to let people suffer under the draconian FCR? We should rather take the tribal areas under the wings of the federation and apply the same laws we apply elsewhere in the country.

You have to revive it because you do not have anything better currently (eventually the FATA has to be integrated into the federation, but that cannot be done overnight). Also while this term "Draconian" is always used with FCR, you should realize that its the tribes that agree to the punishment. They do the same to each other within the tribes to keep things straight. FCR is not something that has been "imposed" on them without their input. Its a regulation that is enforced by the tribes on their own first and if not then Khassadars/FC etc. take action.

Power does not need to go back to the tribals — power needs to go back to the state. That is the cornerstone of any nation's existence.

Agreed. However lets be practical instead of idealistic. It takes time to do such things. This will require the tribes to agree, the parliament to pass a bill, constitution amended etc. etc., garrisoning of law enforcement agencies etc. (issues which may not be palatable to the locals).

Right now public affairs has solely comprised of press briefings by the ISPR (no harm in that).

Not really. There is quite a bit of other work being done which is under the category of Public affairs works. There is road work going on, the Army is facilitating the return of refugees, the Army is providing security to the homes of the people, helping with crops, bringing medical relief and food supplies to the locals etc. etc.

Just want to correct that development was not "consistently" promised to the poor of FATA for the last 60 years. It hasn't been because it was never part of the rest of the country in real terms. The power was vested in the tribal system and the basis of that was to conserve the tribal traditions and way of life . And lest we forget, the Durand Line was used by Pakistan to help US fight the Soviets in Afghanistan. It has been at the centre of conflict but always overlooked.

Although I have no idea about your age, but given the statement you make, I think you need to simply look at some of the older archives of Pakistani newspapers. From the time of Ayub Khan, promises have been made by the government to uplift the areas that comprise FATA. The Political Agent's sole ace card used to be the federal funding which he would use at his discretion to reward certain tribes and build wells or kacchi road, or a dispensary near by. The fact that we want to preserves the tribal traditions does not mean the GoP has no responsibility. The FATA are Federally Administered Tribal Areas. The question is what sort of administration has been provided to the FATA in the past by the various administrations in Islamabad?

Also most of the infrastructure that is there (for instance, the main North-South Wazirstan Road) is courtesy the British. This is the first time I am hearing of any road being put there by the army for the people (googled it in fact, nothing came up). And I am also sure tribals know how to lay a well as well.

You are hearing this for the first time because you may be getting all of your information from the western media or may have never been to the area. I was there in 94 (last time I visited) and the FWO and Army were working overtime to put in roads and basic infrastructure in. The only problem is the scale. That area requires a much bigger effort.

The main problems that the army encountered when they moved into Wazirstan or other tribal areas were not limited to the vastness or the remoteness of the area. One of that was the inability of the soldier to adapt itself to the kind of warfare required there. Paraphrasing columns by Brigadier Javed Hussain's here: "The soldiers were not used to the environment they were thrown. There were no flanks, no rear areas, they were trained to fight where the battlefield is well-defined and the enemy’s positions are known. Then they assemble their forces, they are taught to operate to operate as part of large forces, in accordance with the army’s strategic plan (which is implemented by the corps). So it is the corps battle that matters. The infantry man is fighting to promote the corps plan. So the structure of the army is inherently centralized command. All regular armies are structured like this. When the army went in, they moved from one point to another, they would be ambushed, they would set up a camp, they would be attacked. They weren’t trained to deal with ambushes, raid, sniping, surprise operations etc — these are associated with insurgents/guerillas and the SSG, who specialize in commando operations. The regular army does not think like that. The army moves in a battalion not as an individual."

Yes but the Brig is talking about when we first went into Waziristan back in 2002. Quite a lot has changed in terms of tactics and even the training being provided to the regular infantry now. Secondly, SF like the SSG cannot maintain presence in these areas. You have to put regular infantry and local constabulary to do this job. Even now the SSG is operating at the spears edge being pushed out to Peochar valley etc. so the militants can be paid back in coin. Eventually the regular infantry will be deployed to maintain presence in the area which eventually will become FC responsibility in the tribal areas.

In short, the terrain and the kind of warfare involved were not what the PA, or for that matter any other army, are involved in.

I would agree with the point about the "kind" of warfare. However the hard terrain is nothing unusual for the Army and especially for the SSG.

 

[blain2]

[/COLOR]@ Blain2: So do you think units are not rotated?

They are rotated but the entire army doesn't go through Kashmir and secondly all units rotated through Kashmir would not be deployed in Malakand.

I never said the entire Army. All I said was that the operation is large enough to require infantry bns from other formations which would potentially include those that are part of the FCNA. I know for a fact that NLI elements have been active in these operations.

 

[ajpirzada]

last 7 seconds show a body of taliban hanging upside down

 

[ajpirzada]

Return of IDPs to Swat, Buner gathers pace
Dawn Report
Wednesday, 15 Jul, 2009 | 04:37 AM PST |


Trucks park outside a camp for IDPs, prior to their returning home from the Swabi Camp.—AFP
Provinces
Centre turns down request for relief
CASHING IN
Entrepreneurial begging in ‘IDP industry’

MARDAN / SWABI: Another 589 displaced families went back to their hometowns in Swat and Buner districts on Tuesday under the government’s repatriation plan.

Some 379 families left for Barikot, in Swat, and 106 for Buner on the second day of the first phase of the plan.

Families living with host families in Mardan had also started returning to their villages, Mardan Commissioner Khalid Khan Umarzai said. A total of 104 families left camps in Swabi district.

Officials said the process was going smoothly and the displaced people reached their homes safely.

However, mismanagement and non-availability of transport marred the return of the IDPs from Swabi.

Sources said that about 600 families from the Shah Mansoor camp and 100 families from the Chota Lahor camp were ready to leave, but the camp management could not arrange transport.

The head of the Special Support Group, Lt-Gen Nadeem Ahmed, who was present at the Jalala IDPs camp, said that Swat had been cleared of militants.

Commissioner Umarzai, who supervised the return of IDPs from the Sheikh Shehzad camp, said that in the first phase 485 displaced families from Swat and Buner districts had been sent back, adding that complete security had been provided to the returning families.

Asad Ali, in charge of the Shah Mansoor camp in Swabi, said that 64 families comprising 280 people had left the camp in 12 buses and four trucks.

The departure of IDPs from the Shah Mansoor camp was delayed for six hours and elders and children kept waiting in the scorching heat for want of transport.

The situation in the Chota Lahor camp was more serious. The camp management failed to finalise arrangements. According to an official, the record of IDPs was lost during a demonstration and attack on the office of the camp in charge.

The displaced people were eager to see their home towns again.

Ibrar Khan, 25, from Barikot said: ‘I am really delighted to go back to my village. The people and the government helped us a lot. But despite all that life was not less than hell for us because we had never experienced such heat before.’

Forty-year-old Fida Hussain said: ‘I am very thankful to the local people for their hospitality. The government has tried its level best to provide us facilities and food.’

Twelve-year-old Ayyan said: ‘When I reach home, I will see my toys. I was in the camp but I always missed them. My heart was there. I am very happy to return home.’
http://www.dawn.com/wps/wcm/connect...idps+to+swat%2C+buner+gathers+pace--bi-14

 

[ajpirzada]

Pakistan: Disaster averted

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* Editorial
* The Guardian, Wednesday 15 July 2009
* Article history

Careers have been made out of predicting the imminent breakup of Pakistan. But even for the resolute, the events of March and May were hard to take. Militants appeared to strike any target in the country with impunity, be it the visiting Sri Lankan cricket team or the offices of the Inter-Services Intelligence agency in Lahore. Many, too, doubted whether the army would have the political will - let alone the military resolve - to take the Taliban on in Buner and Swat. But it did, triggering the exodus of nearly 2 million refugees in the process. Now that the first refugees are starting to return after two months of sporadic fighting, it is time to assess the outcome.

The worst has not happened. The army has avoided causing heavy civilian casualties, which were a feature of previous forays such as the one in Bajaur, and concentrated its fire on the militants themselves. Some civilians have been caught in the crossfire, but according to the International Committee of the Red Cross and Human Rights Watch there have been no large-scale violations of international law. Nor are army chiefs exaggerating the effect that their campaign has had on the Taliban. Military intelligence gave a sober assessment yesterday, admitting that a sizeable militant contingent was still left in the valley, about 40% of their original estimate of up to 5,000 fighters. But fighters have been ejected from the major population centres like Mingora. The army claims it has killed 1,700 fighters, but it has yet to reach their leaders, like Baitullah Mehsud, who remains at large.

This is a mixed picture, which could change if a convoy of returning refugees was bombed, or the Taliban infiltrated town centres once again. But it is not the doomsday scenario being predicted two months ago. Swat is no longer a Taliban fortress and if resettlement is done with patience and care, and if civil militias weed the militants out, it will not be again. For this, credit is due to the army, which has restored the writ of the Pakistani state in Swat. What now has to happen here, as in Afghanistan, is that the provincial government has to re-emerge from its bunkers and fill the space liberated by combat.

But they are not the only ones. With the exception of the US, the international community has yet to deliver on the $543m aid appeal the UN made in May. This aid is needed today even more than it was when the refugee exodus was on. Farmers who return to find their crops destroyed or shopkeepers who find their businesses looted will need food aid to survive. International donors need to keep alive to the fact that previous sweeps of this territory have all foundered at this very point.
Pakistan: Disaster averted | Editorial | Comment is free | The Guardian

 

[ajpirzada]

Troops kill nine more terrorists in Swat PDF Print E-mail

PESHAWAR, July 14 (APP): The security forces have killed nine more terrorists and apprehended several others during search and clearance operation during last 24 hours in parts of restive Swat district. According to an ISPR update here Tuesday, during last 24 hours, search and clearance operations were conducted in Swat and Malakand.

In Swat, security forces conducted a snap operation at Syed Parinda Ziarat near Rangeela and apprehended five suspects and also recovered four small machine guns, 11 pistols, two rifles, three grenades and one motorola set.

Security forces conducted a search operation at Kuza Banda and during exchange of fire five terrorists were killed. Fire exchange took place between terrorists and security forces at Tahirabad and Billogram and four terrorists were killed.

Security forces conducted a search operation and apprehended three suspected terrorists reportedly close associate of Momin Khan (Kala Dhaka) at Kuz Bandal by Batagram Police.

Search operation was conducted at Bar, Kuz Drushkhela and the security forces destroyed two caves and recovered one small machine gun.

A Jirga was held at Sakhra in which locals assured their cooperation to security forces for clearance operation.

Regarding relief activities, as many as 144,495 cash cards have been distributed amongst the IDPs of Malakand.
Associated Press Of Pakistan ( Pakistan's Premier NEWS Agency )

 

[courageneverdies]

Rawalpindi - July 13, 2009:

ISPR Daily Update 13 July 2009

1. During last 24 hours, search and clearance operations were conducted in Swat and Malakand.

2. Swat.

a. Security forces conducted search operation near Matta and Shahdono Sar. Five major villages were searched besides clearing small hamlets. 3 small machine guns, 2 pistols, one rifle including ammunition and 2 IEDs were recovered.

b. Security forces carried out search operation at village Kandla in Utror valley near Kalam. 2 terrorists were apprehended alongwith 2 machine guns including ammunition.

c. Security forces conducted search operation at village Mankial, where local Jirga handed over a suspected terrorist namely Iqbal to security forces.

d. Security forces carried out search operation at Tangbanr, Giga and recovered 1 machine gun, 3 pistols and 1 rifle including ammunition.

e. Security forces conducted search operation at Kalagai- District Shangla and apprehended a known terrorist Khanzada from his house.

f. Security forces conducted search operation at Bashkhela near Matta, destroyed 2 tunnels, 5 IEDs and recovered 2 machine guns.

3. Relief Activities.

a. 12, 8687 cash cards have been distributed amongst the IDPs of Malakand.

b. Return of IDPs of Malakand have commenced smoothly according to an envisaged programme by provincial government in coordination with Special Support Group. The in camps and off camps IDPs today were escorted by security forces to Barikot, Landakai, Kota and Guratai in Swat.

---

KIT Over n Out

 

[courageneverdies]

Rawalpindi - July 14, 2009:

1. During last 24 hours, search and clearance operations were conducted in Swat and Malakand.

2. Swat.

a. Security forces conducted a snap operation at Syed Parinda Ziarat near Rangeela and apprehended 5 suspects and also recovered 4 small machine guns, 11 pistols, 2 rifles, 3 grenades and 1 motorola set.

b. Security forces conducted a search operation at Kuza Banda. During exchange of fire 5 terrorists were killed.

c. Fire exchange took place between terrorists and security forces at Tahirabad and Billogram and security forces killed 4 terrorists.

d. Security forces conducted a search operation and apprehended 3 suspected terrorists reportedly close associate of Momin Khan (Kala Dhaka) at Kuz Bandal by Batagram Police.

e. Security forces conducted a search operation at Bar, Kuz Drushkhela and destroyed 2 caves and recovered 1 small machine gun.

f. A Jirga was held at Sakhra in which locals assured their cooperation to security forces for clearance operation.

3. Relief Activities.

144,495 cash cards have been distributed amongst the IDPs of Malakand.

A security forces personnel giving first aid to a wounded child at a remount Malakand Division.

---

KIT Over n Out

 

[fatman17]

This is a mixed picture, which could change if a convoy of returning refugees was bombed, or the Taliban infiltrated town centres once again. But it is not the doomsday scenario being predicted two months ago. Swat is no longer a Taliban fortress and if resettlement is done with patience and care, and if civil militias weed the militants out, it will not be again. For this, credit is due to the army, which has restored the writ of the Pakistani state in Swat. What now has to happen here, as in Afghanistan, is that the provincial government has to re-emerge from its bunkers and fill the space liberated by combat.


and they better do a bloody good job or all is lost !!!