Dear
@jaibi
I would suggest you go through Indian Land Warfare Doctrine 2018....would give you some food for thought as well. I'm uploading it here.
My comments would follow in a short while.
The stated doctrine explicitly refers to the Sino-Pak economic cooperation as a collusive threat to the Indian security. The doctrine explicates “collusive threat from adversaries” as one of the major external challenge faced by India.
Land Warfare Doctrine -2018 lays down broad contours of Indian Army’s development strategy and focuses on innovative employment of envisaged capabilities. LWD is important for understanding India’s expansionist designs, its perception of regional and extra-regional environment and how it is going to use military instrument to assert the role of a regional hegemon. This doctrine clearly defines China-Pakistan partnership as collusive threat to Indian security. LWD strongly advocates adoption of disruptive technologies that include Directed Energy Weapons, hypersonic weapons, Lethal Autonomous Weapons System (LAWS) and micro satellites.
Cardinals of Indian LWD
Objectives. In comparison to the Cold Start Doctrine, the LWD - 2018 seems to have shifted the focus to non-contact operations besides battlefield engagements. The doctrine repeatedly stresses upon ‘No War No Peace Scenario’ in the region, which could have four objectives: To cater for domestic pressure to penalize Pakistan, to coerce Pakistan to induce cooperation and pliant behaviour, to initiate measured conflict with Pakistan without leading to full escalation and to disengage from the conflict as winner.
Response Options . The LWD states Indian policy makers’ concern regarding efforts by Pakistan to shrink space for conventional operations through nuclear deterrence. The doctrine puts blame on Pakistan to conduct cross border insurgency along LoC and asserts that all out efforts will be made to counter the threat. Along LoAC (China), any deliberate transgression to be resolved through minimum escalation as per existing protocols. Along LoC, the operational capabilities to be strengthen to enhance punitive response to greater depth, precision and effect.
Two-Front War. The doctrine lays down guidelines for formulating strategies of two-front war (Northern and Western Fronts) and Operational Directives. The LWD has officially affirmed that India faces a joint risk from China and Pakistan. This marks a change in policy towards a dual-front threat perception from a single-front threat perception that has so far underlined military methodology in India. In September 2018, Indian CAS ACM BS Dhanoa verified this by saying that India’s neighbours (Pakistan and China) are not sitting idle. They are replacing their 2nd and 3rd generation fleet fast with 4 plus generation fighter jets and developing 5th generation fighter jets. India needs 42 squadrons of fighter jet to deal with both the adversaries, Pakistan and China, to carry out full spectrum of operations”. This shows IA’s ambition to manage "deliberate transgressions" by China's People's Liberation Army (PLA) over the contested about 4,000 km long Line of Actual Control (LoAC) according to existing understandings and conventions. LWD states that in the scenario of a combined threat, western front will be considered as primary front and shall be handled with maximum available means whereas, on the secondary northern front, “strong strategic defensive balance” will be maintained. The future force posture of IA will be influenced by clear identification of this risk. This will require an effort to reduce manpower costs and develop a more responsive force to improve teeth to tail ratio.
COIN Operations. The doctrine expresses that the IA will guarantee deterrence through corrective means by carrying out counter-insurgency (COIN) tasks. Though the doctrine is a response against the two-front war, and the main threat is from the western front. The doctrine also lays emphasis upon dealing with insurgencies. IA will likewise refine its technique to manage threats exuding from unpredictable and dynamic border issues with both her western and northern neighbours and what it allegedly alludes to as "state-sponsored-terrorism from across the border."
Conventional Operations. As per the LWD, conventional operations will remain dominant in the conflict spectrum, even though the possibility of conventional operations is reducing in the Indo-Pak perspective.
Formulation of Integrated Battle Groups. The LWD states that the IA will keep on improving the capacity to keep up the momentum of operations, recommending that even after the nuclear threshold is reached, IBGs will continue conventional war-fighting . IBGs formed by IA will be a composite force comprising five to six battalions that will have better flexibility in the application of force to perform conventional battle tasks. The IBG would be a composite force of armour, infantry, air defence, artillery, and supporting units. It would be commanded by a two-star officer and would be supported by AHs.
Border Management. Deterrence to be maint along Northern Border through a force centric approach. The operations along western borders to be force and space centric with the aim of destroying center of gravity through sharp and swift actions by IBGs.
CAPFs/ RRs/ ARs. During conventional war, the Indian Army will synergize employment of Central Armed Police Forces (CAPFs) as per operational plans. Their integration, training and operational procedures to assist in their absorption into the war fighting effort. Rashtriya Rifles (RR) and Asam Rifles (AR) battalions, deployed to conduct Counter Insurgency/ Counter Terrorism operations will also be prepared, trained and suitably empowered, to be effectively employed for conventional operations.
Non Contact and Hybrid War. The doctrine slightly touches upon the Indian Army’s response against Non-Contact and Hybrid conflicts and declares it as “Grey Zone Warfare”. The threat will be dealt by formulation of a separate force that will have mandate to retaliate in Info Ops Domain in coordination with National agencies.
Enhance Domestic Defence Capabilities. The doctrine emphasis on the need to provide impetus to domestic defence production by integrating with defence research, public sector units and civil industries to develop systems, ideas and concepts, in fielding of latest weapons and equipment.
Enhancing Capabilities of Special Forces. The LWD proposes that the proficiency of Special Forces be enhanced as a “vital component of overall deterrence” specifically for surgical strikes and escalation dominance.
Tri Service Integration. As per the doctrine, IA will develop cross-domain capabilities, encourage better integration and reconciliation between Army, Navy, and Air Force, and streamline all the force and assets to articulate viable and vigorous military reactions in all future warfare.
Techno-Centric Approach. The doctrine encompasses the paradigm shift in warfare to achieve non-contact and stand-off proficiencies. In the future battlefield, cyber capabilities, Autonomous Weapon Systems (AWS), and electronic warfare will have a conclusive or destructive effect. LWD, for the first time, deals with the latest disruptive technologies and ascertains that Artificial Intelligence (AI) and robotics will be used in future wars. LWD also mentions the use of the latest technologies in warfare such as Hypersonic weapons, High Energy (HE) Lasers, Swarm attacks through Drones, Nanotechnology, Quantum Computing, Directed Energy weapons, Micro Satellites and Pulsed Microwave Weapon Systems.
Major challenges and vulnerabilities of this doctrine which can be identified out of LWD-18.....
Capability Vs Claim Gap. In LWD-2018, IA aims at achieving deterrence by punishment to retain escalation dominance through “surgical strikes.” However, recent Indian attempt to achieve dominance through such actions like in Balakot met failure after the response from PAF. Deterrence by punishment concept is flawed based on overwhelming asymmetry which does not exist. Gunship Helicopters, Air Force, and Special Forces will be required to conduct surgical strikes. In all fields, Pakistan has sufficient response options. As, it is definitely known to Indian military leadership that Pakistan will strike back in a befitting manner if they conduct a surgical strike or any intrusion across the LOC, international border or the working boundary, this concept seems to be flawed.
Ambiguity in Minimal Escalatory Actions. As the diplomatic channels are exhausted and there is a requirement of some physical actions, “minimal actions” to be used. However, there is a very thin red line between the minimal and non- minimal actions. The LWD is unable to explain how the minimal type of activities will help to dominate the escalation ladder. IA also gives a lot of importance to the Line of Actual Contact (LoAC) in addition to the LOC. A complete paragraph is meant for LoAC with China, and the doctrine stresses the necessity to be ready for any escalation that seems to be driven by the actions at Doklam. The doctrine states that minimal actions as per existing rules will be taken against ‘deliberate transgressions’ along the LoAC. However, the doctrine does not specify nature and scale of these operations.
Ambiguity in Domain of Counter-Insurgency/ Counter-Terrorism. The doctrine mentions counter insurgency and terrorism very briefly, under the heading “Current Dynamics/ No War No Peace”. IA has been continuously involved in COIN operations since 1991, and only a paragraph in generic terms briefly lays IA policy.
Over Ambitious Technological Approach. IA formulated LTTIPP (Long Term Integrated Perspective Plan), which did not materialize as per the desires of Indian policymakers. The doctrine has a wish-list to evolve future warfare based on the latest technology, but a large budget is required for technology. The current budget share of IA is limited and it is difficult to upgrade the Army with these technologies. In addition to Indian army’s vagueness about threats, its capability improvement strategy is equally ambiguous.
Formulation of IBGs and Division Size Forces. Formation of IBGs entails consistent preparation and requires attachments and detachments of formations before and during the war. Until now, the idea of IBGs has not been practically implemented as it involves complete regrouping and different sets of equipment for each IBG based on terrain and threat. There will be severe restrictions for the Army to transform her formations into IBGs due to deficiencies of equipment, ammunition, and spares. Moreover, further challenges will be faced as the Indian Defence industry is not capable of developing equipment, and most of it would be imported.
Disparity between Army and Air Force. The strategy requires an assured air cover to succeed. Nothing less than air superiority by the Indian Air Force (IAF) will be essential for the army to conduct operations successfully. This means the IAF has to become the lead service in order to create a favourable air situation. This, however, is unacceptable to the army. The greater worry within Indian Army is that its primary role may be reduced to mere border management.
Foreign Dependency for Defence Equipment. From the year 2014, India is ranked as the worlds’ second-biggest importer of defence equipment behind only Saudi Arabia. India imports about twice as much as China. It is reliant on foreign sources for most of the major weapon systems, particularly hi-tech equipment such as; frigates and attack submarines; combat, transport, and reconnaissance aircraft; howitzers and anti-aircraft systems; etc.
Requirement of Regular and Intense Training. This strategy requires regular and intense training, as it involves attachments and detachments of formations before and during war. Moreover, the army would be required to fight with whatever capabilities it has. Given the known shortages of equipment, spares and ammunition would pose severe limitations on the army’s capabilities and aspirations.
Budgetary Constraints. Since the Indian military, unlike major powers, is not a global force, its plan should either be threat or capability-based. With a limited annual defence budget, an uninspiring research base and force development would be difficult and challenging.
Limitations of the Indian Defence Industry. Though, India has a vast defence industrial base with an extensive history of defence production. However, India is mainly dependent on defence imports, and its own exports are extremely less. India has tried to resolve this issue through several high-level committees, but no breakthrough has yet been achieved. India is currently facing a range of problems in order to bring change to its defence industry.
Am also uploading Joint Doctrine of Indian Armed Forces.....again, food for thought.