OP ED: Unpacking the thinking behind Indian defence strategy

[Joe Shearer]

The Indian defence strategy seems to echo the same strategy as that of the USA to keep shifting the balance of power in terms of their strength so as to cause to make the adversary’s system become exhausted in the end.

I don't think that this was articulated anywhere in the Indian system. That system is not designed to introspect and to seize on the ideas that emerge and to build on those ideas. However, as much as the model showed this behaviour on a daily, on-going basis, it may be assumed that the consensus was built tacitly and implemented without formal discussion. This is just that, an assumption.

The second part was to outreach culturally with advertising their point of view to gain moral support and international outreach and support but for our analysis this is not important so we shall ignore it for now but I do appreciate the aspect which this was also the focus.

True, that.

One thing that they did differently was to focus on keeping conventional pressure over their adversary by repeated build ups over zones of conflict such as the buildup over in Kashmir but there was always the notion where they justified the escalation via playing the card of having to contain China as well but on ground focusing its efforts against Pakistan.

The situation today is that XIV Corps covers the LAC with China, with 8 Division covering Dras-Kargil-Batalik and the Siachen Brigade covering the positions on the glacier; XV Corps covers the Vale of Kashmir; XVI Corps covers the Chicken's Neck, from Jammu down to Amritsar. Indian claims are not entirely untrue.

 

[jaibi]

Thank you, sir, I shall give my input there as well but you and the great Panzer have already covered so much.

Really thought-provoking. Although it anticipates some conclusions that should emerge from the thread on India -Pakistan conflicts, this is an interim reply based on the difference between the strategic and tactical positions that India faces vis-a-vis Pakistan and vis-a-vis China.

Sir, I've followed the opinions of both these figures and I would agree that C. Fair's view certainly have influence over the west; however, I think that since the current government has taken a hold then the credibility of the pro-Indian pov has really suffered. In terms of military affairs as well post the 27th Feb 2019 air engagement the same happened ever since Indian media became more lobby driven. So in the current environment I would say that there is a pro-Indian lobby and a pro-Pakistani lobby and that has trickled down to the cultural level as well.

Two points: first, India used the cultural conflict very effectively against one opponent; at this moment, what the world thinks about the situation can be defined in the opinions expressed by Hussain Haqqani and Christine Fair. I know that they and their views revolt most Pakistani commentators, but they have enormous influence over expert opinion, thence, over public opinion.

I think that this conflict has been drowned out by the BLM movement and protests along with Covid and China has considerably more influence in Hollywood than India does because it's a gigantic market where the government has a direct pull which is not so in India. Therefore, I would disagree that this would be such a case.

Second, India has not yet used this effectively against China, although the opportunities are clearly visible. At the moment, China is nobody's favourite country. On the other hand, actively running down China will lead to a backlash. So the bhakts, the Tweet crowd and the Internet Hindu have to be eliminated for the world to take notice of the differences between China and India, and to come to favour India's cause.

This second has not been done.

 

[Joe Shearer]

Thank you, sir, I shall give my input there as well but you and the great Panzer have already covered so much.


Sir, I've followed the opinions of both these figures and I would agree that C. Fair's view certainly have influence over the west; however, I think that since the current government has taken a hold then the credibility of the pro-Indian pov has really suffered. In terms of military affairs as well post the 27th Feb 2019 air engagement the same happened ever since Indian media became more lobby driven. So in the current environment I would say that there is a pro-Indian lobby and a pro-Pakistani lobby and that has trickled down to the cultural level as well.


I think that this conflict has been drowned out by the BLM movement and protests along with Covid and China has considerably more influence in Hollywood than India does because it's a gigantic market where the government has a direct pull which is not so in India. Therefore, I would disagree that this would be such a case.

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I will keep your points in mind when I re-write this note. Thanks much.

 

[jaibi]

Sir, there's no doubt that the Indian talent has accomplished quite a bit; however, I would content that the focus on technology without the traditional military teeth backing up the edge is not really useful here. Moreover, the Chinese talent is at par if not greater than Indian talent; for instance, take a look at their cold fusion projects. The Chinese military keeps its cutting edge under wraps but they have consistently been able to challenge the USA, Europe and Russia in terms of the defence market. Secondly, I would like you to read this article, I have it somewhere with me and I shall post it for you to review : https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/00856401.2010.520653?journalCode=csas20 the main contention here is how much of the top brass is coming over directly to the defence sector? It is reasonable to assume that it has taken a dent with the flourishing economy so it's not just bureaucratic interference but also the will of the populace which seems to gear more towards business rather than pure defence. In my humble opinion being an air force guy, I would interject that it's not just the industry but the mirroring of the talent in the actual force that counts as well. Whatever technological edge is gained it needs to be translated on ground as well and I think there is reason to think that the same trickle of talent may not come to the engineering/technical cadre of the armed forces.

...

What has been done in terms of scientific achievement has been nothing short of magnificent. Without descending into an alphabet soup, just using one example is sufficient - ISRO. That is what Indian STEM talent is capable of, on the professional front, leave aside for a moment their potential for harm on the social and the political front. What is more, generally Indian scientific and technical achievement has flourished in pockets in India, but has reached cult proportions in the west. In other words, there is a lot of headroom between what is visible already, and what can be targeted in the near future. What is the difference due to? Two words, bureaucracy and budgets. Where freed of bureaucratic interference (not of bureaucratic oversight), India has done extremely well, or would have done extremely well, if....

I would highlight, sir, that this problem is not easily tackled unless there is a major overhaul of the bureaucracy and the current top brass of the military. Take the example of the air force, getting Rafael systems in answer to 27th Feb seems to be a tactical and strategic miscalculation because, as you know, these systems require time to incorporate and master. Routine upgradation to Russian systems may have been a better choice here and the current requirements show that; however, it appears the actual personnel did not get their views across. Such impediments would continue to hamper the on ground (or air) ability to counter any potential or real threat.

That if is the budget if.

The sadhu on a bed of nails budgets of ISRO are an international joke, and that organisation has flourished in spite of that. That kind of mindless parsimony crippled the effort to build an Indian jet engine, and has crippled the effort in a number of other strategic areas as well.

Sir, I would argue that was not fully accomplished when it comes to the Indo-Pak dynamics because Pakistan has always been able to maintain its status as a challenger state against the policies of India. I would highlight that that's been the case in terms of technical edge as well because Pakistan has always been able to counter the shifting balance of power; via whatever means necessary.

Second, how has India done against others? taking one opponent, India has done extremely well. That is not to gainsay a certain knack for getting to grips with the situation displayed across our western borders, but in terms of fundamental research and development, India has done rather well.

Agreed, sir but that remains to be seen as of yet. Instead there seems to be a similar repeat of pro-govt propaganda instead of hardcore change. The recent attack which claimed the live of the CO needs to held to great scrutiny and once again, the claims of 'victories' are unsubstantiated.

Taking another opponent, we are absolutely swamped. Here, the issue is not merely bureaucracy and budget, but belief as well. For far too long, we have been fed with stories of the superiority of the other; these stories are all true, and all irrelevant. We need to work collectively to overtake that challenging mental overhang, and we need not expect tangible results on the second day of starting.

Agreed, sir but the Indian narrative has always incorporated a potential Chinese threat and that's been used to justify budget and military build ups. Therefore, being caught so unprepared seems to be a lapse of preparedness or error or worst, which is my opinion, that it was never the aim to counter China but just to utilize political/IR justifications to build pressure on India's natural rival.

To some extent, strategy dictates tactics. To some extent, equipment dictates tactics. Strategically, the PLA has of recent years concentrated itself on the eastern seaboard and on the Taiwanese shores; the build-up in Ladakh was very recent and part of what is emerging as a planned move to keep India off-balance, for a variety of reasons.

I would say that, sir, this is not just a mere border issue. The conflict goes further than that because in terms of international geopolitics there have been incidents of China and India competing. If it were solely for border then we may perhaps be seeing a similar development as Bangladesh and Indian situation. The rivalry has further implications and that's why there is much more serious than that.

This immediately gives India a tactical dividend. The countries have an asymmetric relationship on their borders; China is important for India, India is not important for China. That enables India to maintain larger troop concentrations on the boundaries compared to the Chinese. It also enables India to adopt the precise tactics adopted by a weaker opponent against her. That means India should be ready to attack at any time and at all times; being the weaker power, it is easier for it to offer challenges to the stronger power, and more appropriate as well, in full knowledge of the fact that the stronger power is busy elsewhere, and that there will be every opportunity to strengthen troop concentrations if troops movements are detected.

I would disagree here, sir because the location of the conflict is too precarious to be the case. This does directly impact the Indo-Pak dynamic as well. As far as semblance is concerned then no one is comparing the two situations but the implications of it.

Any resemblance to the India-Pakistan strategic and tactical situations is entirely imaginary.

Sir, this is my interpretation of the Indian strategy, yes; however, I have elaborated on that point of view and would love to write a detailed article on why I think this was the case. Ever since both nations were born the conflicts were played out in the IR environment of two superpowers of the time and then under MAD because of the nuclear armament of both nations. In that space, what was the option left? I accept that it is an assumption but not an uninformed one.

I don't think that this was articulated anywhere in the Indian system. That system is not designed to introspect and to seize on the ideas that emerge and to build on those ideas. However, as much as the model showed this behaviour on a daily, on-going basis, it may be assumed that the consensus was built tacitly and implemented without formal discussion. This is just that, an assumption.

Thank you, sir.

True, that.

Of course not, sir, that was never my point. The point was that there seemed be an operational readiness for this theater and that, I think, reflects upon the thinking of the military top brass.

The situation today is that XIV Corps covers the LAC with China, with 8 Division covering Dras-Kargil-Batalik and the Siachen Brigade covering the positions on the glacier; XV Corps covers the Vale of Kashmir; XVI Corps covers the Chicken's Neck, from Jammu down to Amritsar. Indian claims are not entirely untrue.

Of course, sir, looking forward to it

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I will keep your points in mind when I re-write this note. Thanks much.

I agree that India has not really faced a scenario where it had to pull its entire war machine into play, brother and your point that India has faced foes with severe disadvantages as of yet. Your views about the current nature of conflict world over is true to a large extent as well. I'm sorry but I try to refrain from political discussions on pure military things because I think that derails the full purpose of the topic at hand. Thank you for your input.

It has been a longtime since the world has seen a real war, as the conflicts dubbed as war by come are actually more of a simulation game where instead of coming face 2 face countries fight through proxies or fight an opponent thats far behind in terms of resources, strength and infrastructure.

Indians have thought for long that killing Kashmiris or Maoists with an overwhelming resource backing is a war and are conveying the same tactic on the ground which is faulty. Also the last time India was in war was in Kargil, where it was against a sanction ridden foe with a severe disadvantage of resources and India capitalized in it by pulling in all its weight in a tiny area of Kargil. But in current scenario it's force multipliers don't give her an upper hand causing her arrogant war tactics to fail miserably.

 

[Joe Shearer]

Invaluable points, @jaibi, but I will take a little time to respond directly, for the stark reason that I am just about to narrate the horrific battle of Dograi, then of Barki, then of Asal Uttar, interspersed with completing my model-building based on your OP. The mental visions brought up by Dograi are very disturbing, and I have had a couple of sleepless nights due to that; both sides suffered so hugely, the butcher's bill was so high. But I promise to complete the counter-narrative on your note, as I have some speculative steps regarding tactics at the ground level for the Indian Army and Air Force to place before you and @PanzerKiel, as long as he is accessible to us.

A quick aside: both the Indian Army and the Indian Air Force have actually more or less got what they wanted at the surface, shallow level, and the people drawing up QSRs or their equivalent have much to answer for.

In the Air Force, there has been more and more a tendency to look for multi-purpose aircraft for the simple reason that the service has no confidence that the politicians will react in time to fulfill their requirements of specialised aircraft, and will leave them with huge gaps in the line-up. You will see this in the astonishing saga of our procurement of AWACS aircraft, where the PAF actually has more than the IAF does. They have swung sharply away from separately considering air superiority, strike, and deep strike or strategic bombing, and electronic warfare including SEAD; sadly, also, there has been an element of over-confidence in their ability to multi-task, irrespective of the aircraft available and in service. There is a tendency to think of transferring the full weight of the entire force to one side or the other according to exigency. This addresses your point directly; what is good for operations against the PAF and in support of the IA against the PA is not necessarily so good for the equivalents on the Chinese side.

It is far worse on the Indian Army side. Instead of adopting the tolerance of the PLA GF, or of the PA, both willing to give indigenous technology a whirl, the IA has stuck to its guns and rejected that route. The saga of the Arjun MBT is a case in point. Their distrust of the politicians and the babus in the procurement loop, parallel to that of the IAF, has shown up in the high-powered committee recommending five different varieties of howitzer (different calibres, instead of standardising ammunition and insisting on their adaptability to different guns. So the ATAGS and the Vajra and the old Bofors are all 155 mm but apparently don't shoot the same shells. Just to make things interesting, there are two others in the running, and they are also different.

The Indian Navy has got things in better order, but are handicapped by the very low production rate of Indian shipyards. The pols won't permit Indian design to be built cheap and fast in South Korean shipyards, for reasons that you will not wish me to go into in a public forum.

Apart from the shallow route, there is a deep route, but I may be executed if I am indiscreet. That route would seriously and very effectively trump the level of equipment available to the PLA and the PLA AF; let us leave it at that.

More after Dograi and Barki and Asal Uttar.

Sir, there's no doubt that the Indian talent has accomplished quite a bit; however, I would content that the focus on technology without the traditional military teeth backing up the edge is not really useful here. Moreover, the Chinese talent is at par if not greater than Indian talent; for instance, take a look at their cold fusion projects. The Chinese military keeps its cutting edge under wraps but they have consistently been able to challenge the USA, Europe and Russia in terms of the defence market. Secondly, I would like you to read this article, I have it somewhere with me and I shall post it for you to review : https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/00856401.2010.520653?journalCode=csas20 the main contention here is how much of the top brass is coming over directly to the defence sector? It is reasonable to assume that it has taken a dent with the flourishing economy so it's not just bureaucratic interference but also the will of the populace which seems to gear more towards business rather than pure defence. In my humble opinion being an air force guy, I would interject that it's not just the industry but the mirroring of the talent in the actual force that counts as well. Whatever technological edge is gained it needs to be translated on ground as well and I think there is reason to think that the same trickle of talent may not come to the engineering/technical cadre of the armed forces.


I would highlight, sir, that this problem is not easily tackled unless there is a major overhaul of the bureaucracy and the current top brass of the military. Take the example of the air force, getting Rafael systems in answer to 27th Feb seems to be a tactical and strategic miscalculation because, as you know, these systems require time to incorporate and master. Routine upgradation to Russian systems may have been a better choice here and the current requirements show that; however, it appears the actual personnel did not get their views across. Such impediments would continue to hamper the on ground (or air) ability to counter any potential or real threat.

Sir, I would argue that was not fully accomplished when it comes to the Indo-Pak dynamics because Pakistan has always been able to maintain its status as a challenger state against the policies of India. I would highlight that that's been the case in terms of technical edge as well because Pakistan has always been able to counter the shifting balance of power; via whatever means necessary.


Agreed, sir but that remains to be seen as of yet. Instead there seems to be a similar repeat of pro-govt propaganda instead of hardcore change. The recent attack which claimed the live of the CO needs to held to great scrutiny and once again, the claims of 'victories' are unsubstantiated.

Agreed, sir but the Indian narrative has always incorporated a potential Chinese threat and that's been used to justify budget and military build ups. Therefore, being caught so unprepared seems to be a lapse of preparedness or error or worst, which is my opinion, that it was never the aim to counter China but just to utilize political/IR justifications to build pressure on India's natural rival.

I would say that, sir, this is not just a mere border issue. The conflict goes further than that because in terms of international geopolitics there have been incidents of China and India competing. If it were solely for border then we may perhaps be seeing a similar development as Bangladesh and Indian situation. The rivalry has further implications and that's why there is much more serious than that.

I would disagree here, sir because the location of the conflict is too precarious to be the case. This does directly impact the Indo-Pak dynamic as well. As far as semblance is concerned then no one is comparing the two situations but the implications of it.

 

[Ace of Spades]

Sir, I've followed the opinions of both these figures and I would agree that C. Fair's view certainly have influence over the west; however, I think that since the current government has taken a hold then the credibility of the pro-Indian pov has really suffered. In terms of military affairs as well post the 27th Feb 2019 air engagement the same happened ever since Indian media became more lobby driven. So in the current environment I would say that there is a pro-Indian lobby and a pro-Pakistani lobby and that has trickled down to the cultural level as well.

I believe there is a significant flaw when looking at certain individual's narrative at face value and coupling it with their voice having influence; in this scenario in west. In my opinion it's other way around. Certain individuals are voiced to drive certain agendas. They are just idiots who are given the illusion of being important. Think tanks, policy mills all revolves around strategic interest of given countries. Different institutes have different narratives but same end goal with different means. Reason being, just to not put all eggs in one basket.

 

[Joe Shearer]

@T-123456

This is one of the threads I told you about.

 

[KhanBaba2]

For instance, the decision of the IAF to go for Rafael systems is, in my opinion, a tactical error because the new systems need to be incorporated into the air force before they can be useful. For the average reader I would like to inform that just getting equipment is not enough; every system of such nature with such high technical nature requires to orient the logistics system of the air force to cater to it because these machineries routinely breakdown and more importantly, the engineers need to learn how to fix and maintain it and lastly the pilots need to learn how to use the machinery to its capabilities. All of this takes time, quite a bit of time, actually; a decade is not an unreasonable estimate. To simplify, which weapon is the best? It’s not the one which is the most lethal on paper but the one you have practiced on the most.

At some time everyone has to go for something new even if it means a lowered effectiveness in the short term. It pays off in the long term.

 

[jaibi]

Sir, I'd anxiously await that exchange between us with the great @PanzerKiel

Invaluable points, @jaibi, but I will take a little time to respond directly, for the stark reason that I am just about to narrate the horrific battle of Dograi, then of Barki, then of Asal Uttar, interspersed with completing my model-building based on your OP. The mental visions brought up by Dograi are very disturbing, and I have had a couple of sleepless nights due to that; both sides suffered so hugely, the butcher's bill was so high. But I promise to complete the counter-narrative on your note, as I have some speculative steps regarding tactics at the ground level for the Indian Army and Air Force to place before you and @PanzerKiel, as long as he is accessible to us.

A quick aside: both the Indian Army and the Indian Air Force have actually more or less got what they wanted at the surface, shallow level, and the people drawing up QSRs or their equivalent have much to answer for.

In the Air Force, there has been more and more a tendency to look for multi-purpose aircraft for the simple reason that the service has no confidence that the politicians will react in time to fulfill their requirements of specialised aircraft, and will leave them with huge gaps in the line-up. You will see this in the astonishing saga of our procurement of AWACS aircraft, where the PAF actually has more than the IAF does. They have swung sharply away from separately considering air superiority, strike, and deep strike or strategic bombing, and electronic warfare including SEAD; sadly, also, there has been an element of over-confidence in their ability to multi-task, irrespective of the aircraft available and in service. There is a tendency to think of transferring the full weight of the entire force to one side or the other according to exigency. This addresses your point directly; what is good for operations against the PAF and in support of the IA against the PA is not necessarily so good for the equivalents on the Chinese side.

It is far worse on the Indian Army side. Instead of adopting the tolerance of the PLA GF, or of the PA, both willing to give indigenous technology a whirl, the IA has stuck to its guns and rejected that route. The saga of the Arjun MBT is a case in point. Their distrust of the politicians and the babus in the procurement loop, parallel to that of the IAF, has shown up in the high-powered committee recommending five different varieties of howitzer (different calibres, instead of standardising ammunition and insisting on their adaptability to different guns. So the ATAGS and the Vajra and the old Bofors are all 155 mm but apparently don't shoot the same shells. Just to make things interesting, there are two others in the running, and they are also different.

The Indian Navy has got things in better order, but are handicapped by the very low production rate of Indian shipyards. The pols won't permit Indian design to be built cheap and fast in South Korean shipyards, for reasons that you will not wish me to go into in a public forum.

Apart from the shallow route, there is a deep route, but I may be executed if I am indiscreet. That route would seriously and very effectively trump the level of equipment available to the PLA and the PLA AF; let us leave it at that.

More after Dograi and Barki and Asal Uttar.

I would argue that generally, yes but when there are active flashes of conflict; it may not be so.

At some time everyone has to go for something new even if it means a lowered effectiveness in the short term. It pays off in the long term.

 

[Joe Shearer]

I have just managed to cope with the gory Battle of Dograi and am composing myself to narrate the events of Barki and Asal Uttar; it agitated me greatly to think of those poor boys from either side charging into the jaws of death. It was deeply upsetting.

PanzerKiel - I am not tagging him to avoid embarrassing him - is like a kaleidoscope of military history. One has this vision or image of an event, then he twitches the instrument slightly, puts in some comments, and an astonishing transformation takes place! I cannot tell you how anxiously I have been reading my sources to try and spot what new angle he will bring out, and failed every time.

If you wish, I could finish my response to your insightful note before returning to the 65 narration. For one thing, it would give me time to recover objectivity and detachment. Do let me know; it is just that I feel guilty about my speed, since my general health and my specific problems with my eyes does not permit extended reading or sitting on the system. It would be unfortunate if people concluded that I was shirking, and avoiding the narration out of lethargy or disinclination.

Incidentally, I was assured on good authority that Asal Uttar is not the Hindi phrase that it has come to mean, but from Asal the there, udhar, as distinct from the here, idhar.

Sir, I'd anxiously await that exchange between us with the great @PanzerKiel


I would argue that generally, yes but when there are active flashes of conflict; it may not be so.

 

[PanzerKiel]

Sir, I'd anxiously await that exchange between us with the great @PanzerKiel


I would argue that generally, yes but when there are active flashes of conflict; it may not be so.

Dear @jaibi
I would suggest you go through Indian Land Warfare Doctrine 2018....would give you some food for thought as well. I'm uploading it here.

My comments would follow in a short while.

Dear @jaibi
I would suggest you go through Indian Land Warfare Doctrine 2018....would give you some food for thought as well. I'm uploading it here as well.

My comments would follow in a short while.

The stated doctrine explicitly refers to the Sino-Pak economic cooperation as a collusive threat to the Indian security. The doctrine explicates “collusive threat from adversaries” as one of the major external challenge faced by India.

Dear @jaibi
I would suggest you go through Indian Land Warfare Doctrine 2018....would give you some food for thought as well. I'm uploading it here.

My comments would follow in a short while.



The stated doctrine explicitly refers to the Sino-Pak economic cooperation as a collusive threat to the Indian security. The doctrine explicates “collusive threat from adversaries” as one of the major external challenge faced by India.

Land Warfare Doctrine -2018 lays down broad contours of Indian Army’s development strategy and focuses on innovative employment of envisaged capabilities. LWD is important for understanding India’s expansionist designs, its perception of regional and extra-regional environment and how it is going to use military instrument to assert the role of a regional hegemon. This doctrine clearly defines China-Pakistan partnership as collusive threat to Indian security. LWD strongly advocates adoption of disruptive technologies that include Directed Energy Weapons, hypersonic weapons, Lethal Autonomous Weapons System (LAWS) and micro satellites.

Cardinals of Indian LWD

Objectives. In comparison to the Cold Start Doctrine, the LWD - 2018 seems to have shifted the focus to non-contact operations besides battlefield engagements. The doctrine repeatedly stresses upon ‘No War No Peace Scenario’ in the region, which could have four objectives: To cater for domestic pressure to penalize Pakistan, to coerce Pakistan to induce cooperation and pliant behaviour, to initiate measured conflict with Pakistan without leading to full escalation and to disengage from the conflict as winner.

Response Options . The LWD states Indian policy makers’ concern regarding efforts by Pakistan to shrink space for conventional operations through nuclear deterrence. The doctrine puts blame on Pakistan to conduct cross border insurgency along LoC and asserts that all out efforts will be made to counter the threat. Along LoAC (China), any deliberate transgression to be resolved through minimum escalation as per existing protocols. Along LoC, the operational capabilities to be strengthen to enhance punitive response to greater depth, precision and effect.

Two-Front War. The doctrine lays down guidelines for formulating strategies of two-front war (Northern and Western Fronts) and Operational Directives. The LWD has officially affirmed that India faces a joint risk from China and Pakistan. This marks a change in policy towards a dual-front threat perception from a single-front threat perception that has so far underlined military methodology in India. In September 2018, Indian CAS ACM BS Dhanoa verified this by saying that India’s neighbours (Pakistan and China) are not sitting idle. They are replacing their 2nd and 3rd generation fleet fast with 4 plus generation fighter jets and developing 5th generation fighter jets. India needs 42 squadrons of fighter jet to deal with both the adversaries, Pakistan and China, to carry out full spectrum of operations”. This shows IA’s ambition to manage "deliberate transgressions" by China's People's Liberation Army (PLA) over the contested about 4,000 km long Line of Actual Control (LoAC) according to existing understandings and conventions. LWD states that in the scenario of a combined threat, western front will be considered as primary front and shall be handled with maximum available means whereas, on the secondary northern front, “strong strategic defensive balance” will be maintained. The future force posture of IA will be influenced by clear identification of this risk. This will require an effort to reduce manpower costs and develop a more responsive force to improve teeth to tail ratio.

COIN Operations. The doctrine expresses that the IA will guarantee deterrence through corrective means by carrying out counter-insurgency (COIN) tasks. Though the doctrine is a response against the two-front war, and the main threat is from the western front. The doctrine also lays emphasis upon dealing with insurgencies. IA will likewise refine its technique to manage threats exuding from unpredictable and dynamic border issues with both her western and northern neighbours and what it allegedly alludes to as "state-sponsored-terrorism from across the border."

Conventional Operations. As per the LWD, conventional operations will remain dominant in the conflict spectrum, even though the possibility of conventional operations is reducing in the Indo-Pak perspective.

Formulation of Integrated Battle Groups. The LWD states that the IA will keep on improving the capacity to keep up the momentum of operations, recommending that even after the nuclear threshold is reached, IBGs will continue conventional war-fighting . IBGs formed by IA will be a composite force comprising five to six battalions that will have better flexibility in the application of force to perform conventional battle tasks. The IBG would be a composite force of armour, infantry, air defence, artillery, and supporting units. It would be commanded by a two-star officer and would be supported by AHs.

Border Management. Deterrence to be maint along Northern Border through a force centric approach. The operations along western borders to be force and space centric with the aim of destroying center of gravity through sharp and swift actions by IBGs.

CAPFs/ RRs/ ARs. During conventional war, the Indian Army will synergize employment of Central Armed Police Forces (CAPFs) as per operational plans. Their integration, training and operational procedures to assist in their absorption into the war fighting effort. Rashtriya Rifles (RR) and Asam Rifles (AR) battalions, deployed to conduct Counter Insurgency/ Counter Terrorism operations will also be prepared, trained and suitably empowered, to be effectively employed for conventional operations.

Non Contact and Hybrid War. The doctrine slightly touches upon the Indian Army’s response against Non-Contact and Hybrid conflicts and declares it as “Grey Zone Warfare”. The threat will be dealt by formulation of a separate force that will have mandate to retaliate in Info Ops Domain in coordination with National agencies.

Enhance Domestic Defence Capabilities. The doctrine emphasis on the need to provide impetus to domestic defence production by integrating with defence research, public sector units and civil industries to develop systems, ideas and concepts, in fielding of latest weapons and equipment.

Enhancing Capabilities of Special Forces. The LWD proposes that the proficiency of Special Forces be enhanced as a “vital component of overall deterrence” specifically for surgical strikes and escalation dominance.

Tri Service Integration. As per the doctrine, IA will develop cross-domain capabilities, encourage better integration and reconciliation between Army, Navy, and Air Force, and streamline all the force and assets to articulate viable and vigorous military reactions in all future warfare.

Techno-Centric Approach. The doctrine encompasses the paradigm shift in warfare to achieve non-contact and stand-off proficiencies. In the future battlefield, cyber capabilities, Autonomous Weapon Systems (AWS), and electronic warfare will have a conclusive or destructive effect. LWD, for the first time, deals with the latest disruptive technologies and ascertains that Artificial Intelligence (AI) and robotics will be used in future wars. LWD also mentions the use of the latest technologies in warfare such as Hypersonic weapons, High Energy (HE) Lasers, Swarm attacks through Drones, Nanotechnology, Quantum Computing, Directed Energy weapons, Micro Satellites and Pulsed Microwave Weapon Systems.






Major challenges and vulnerabilities of this doctrine which can be identified out of LWD-18.....

Capability Vs Claim Gap. In LWD-2018, IA aims at achieving deterrence by punishment to retain escalation dominance through “surgical strikes.” However, recent Indian attempt to achieve dominance through such actions like in Balakot met failure after the response from PAF. Deterrence by punishment concept is flawed based on overwhelming asymmetry which does not exist. Gunship Helicopters, Air Force, and Special Forces will be required to conduct surgical strikes. In all fields, Pakistan has sufficient response options. As, it is definitely known to Indian military leadership that Pakistan will strike back in a befitting manner if they conduct a surgical strike or any intrusion across the LOC, international border or the working boundary, this concept seems to be flawed.

Ambiguity in Minimal Escalatory Actions. As the diplomatic channels are exhausted and there is a requirement of some physical actions, “minimal actions” to be used. However, there is a very thin red line between the minimal and non- minimal actions. The LWD is unable to explain how the minimal type of activities will help to dominate the escalation ladder. IA also gives a lot of importance to the Line of Actual Contact (LoAC) in addition to the LOC. A complete paragraph is meant for LoAC with China, and the doctrine stresses the necessity to be ready for any escalation that seems to be driven by the actions at Doklam. The doctrine states that minimal actions as per existing rules will be taken against ‘deliberate transgressions’ along the LoAC. However, the doctrine does not specify nature and scale of these operations.

Ambiguity in Domain of Counter-Insurgency/ Counter-Terrorism. The doctrine mentions counter insurgency and terrorism very briefly, under the heading “Current Dynamics/ No War No Peace”. IA has been continuously involved in COIN operations since 1991, and only a paragraph in generic terms briefly lays IA policy.
Over Ambitious Technological Approach. IA formulated LTTIPP (Long Term Integrated Perspective Plan), which did not materialize as per the desires of Indian policymakers. The doctrine has a wish-list to evolve future warfare based on the latest technology, but a large budget is required for technology. The current budget share of IA is limited and it is difficult to upgrade the Army with these technologies. In addition to Indian army’s vagueness about threats, its capability improvement strategy is equally ambiguous.

Formulation of IBGs and Division Size Forces. Formation of IBGs entails consistent preparation and requires attachments and detachments of formations before and during the war. Until now, the idea of IBGs has not been practically implemented as it involves complete regrouping and different sets of equipment for each IBG based on terrain and threat. There will be severe restrictions for the Army to transform her formations into IBGs due to deficiencies of equipment, ammunition, and spares. Moreover, further challenges will be faced as the Indian Defence industry is not capable of developing equipment, and most of it would be imported.

Disparity between Army and Air Force. The strategy requires an assured air cover to succeed. Nothing less than air superiority by the Indian Air Force (IAF) will be essential for the army to conduct operations successfully. This means the IAF has to become the lead service in order to create a favourable air situation. This, however, is unacceptable to the army. The greater worry within Indian Army is that its primary role may be reduced to mere border management.

Foreign Dependency for Defence Equipment. From the year 2014, India is ranked as the worlds’ second-biggest importer of defence equipment behind only Saudi Arabia. India imports about twice as much as China. It is reliant on foreign sources for most of the major weapon systems, particularly hi-tech equipment such as; frigates and attack submarines; combat, transport, and reconnaissance aircraft; howitzers and anti-aircraft systems; etc.

Requirement of Regular and Intense Training. This strategy requires regular and intense training, as it involves attachments and detachments of formations before and during war. Moreover, the army would be required to fight with whatever capabilities it has. Given the known shortages of equipment, spares and ammunition would pose severe limitations on the army’s capabilities and aspirations.

Budgetary Constraints. Since the Indian military, unlike major powers, is not a global force, its plan should either be threat or capability-based. With a limited annual defence budget, an uninspiring research base and force development would be difficult and challenging.

Limitations of the Indian Defence Industry. Though, India has a vast defence industrial base with an extensive history of defence production. However, India is mainly dependent on defence imports, and its own exports are extremely less. India has tried to resolve this issue through several high-level committees, but no breakthrough has yet been achieved. India is currently facing a range of problems in order to bring change to its defence industry.

Am also uploading Joint Doctrine of Indian Armed Forces.....again, food for thought.

 

[Joe Shearer]

@jaibi @PanzerKiel @jbgt90

I was a little taken aback to find these documents with our friends, but then, given the thorough knowledge of our systems, processes and structures that we have already seen, it should not have come as a surprise.

• THE DOCTRINES ARE REASONABLY THOUGHT THROUGH AND WELL STRUCTURED TAKING INTO ACCOUNT THE REAL LIFE CIRCUMSTANCES THAT PREVAIL

There is nothing that I wish to add to PanzerKiel's comments, except to say that a doctrine typically outlines the thought processes behind a nation's status of the moment, and does not necessarily dwell on its shortcomings or disabilities, not to the extent of allowing those to form the concepts and the ideation involved. That the Indian military cannot rely completely on the Indian political system, whichever variety is in power at that moment is a truism that is so widely known as not to require separate mention. What has been stated in its analysis represents the consensus within our country; while portions might seem disproportionately sized to others, including those directly affected, this forms the best view that we have.

• TAKEN SEPARATELY, EACH SET OF DIFFICULTIES, OBSTACLES AND CHALLENGES HAS BEEN DEALT WITH KEEPING IN MIND THE DIFFERENCES INVOLVED

Again, the responses are reasonably outlined, as paraphrased by PanzerKiel; on one side, we have faced a consistent pattern of behaviour that results in irregular warfare turning into armed conflict, the latest occasion being one where armed conflict took place against a nuclear backdrop that was not exactly neutral nor put out of bounds; on the other, we have faced efforts at domination beginning at the state level, and continuing down to the level of border patrols, and a careful avoidance of gunfire since the incidents of 1967, at Nathu La, and our response against this generic status is reasonable and logical. India does not seek war in either case, but while there are precedents suggesting that armed conflict is thrust on us in one case, there are precedents as strong suggesting that all kinds of pressure short of armed conflict is brought to bear in the other case.

Under the circumstances, the articulation of the response in each case seems to be fair and reasonable on the theoretical plane.

• FAILURES AT NATIONAL LEVEL ARE NOT ORGANIC AND CAN BE RECTIFIED; HISTORY TELLS US THAT NO NATION EMERGED INTO REAL LIFE AS A PALLAS ATHENA READY AND ARMED FOR BATTLE FROM INCEPTION

As far as practical shortcomings are concerned, it is true that there have been assumptions of achievement of overwhelming superiority on the western front that does not exist at the moment; the gaps are such that they can be overcome by aligning the politicians with national security needs in a tighter fashion, and forcing a separation between state leadership and policy making on the one hand with the long term administration of the state's security environment on the other hand. That is to say, in simple language, the politicians should not be allowed to deflect the long term planning and implementation of security goals by the military, except in very carefully defined conditions of assured consensual interventions.

• THE ARMY WILL NO LONGER BE A SUPREMO, AS PC LAL DESCRIBED ITS ATTITUDE TOWARDS THE AIR FORCE IN 1965, BUT WILL NEED TO ACCEPT THE PRIMACY OF THE AIR FORCE IN DETERMINING THE RULES OF ENGAGEMENT AND THE SCOPE OF THE ENGAGEMENT

A number of inter-service issues have been mentioned. The overwhelming numbers and importance of the Army is an artificial construct, caused entirely by the nature of conflict that has taken place. It is entirely correct to define the relationship over the management of land frontiers as necessarily to be dominated by the air force in India, with whatever is required to be done to harmonise inter-services relations, with even some necessary acceptance on the part of the greater staffed service to accept these changes in position. This cannot be achieved overnight, and will also see major changes in the nature of the Army's organisation and future development, not merely in the direction of battle groups but in other fundamental areas as well.

• IT IS NOT THE AIR FORCE OR THE ARMY THAT WILL DRIVE THE RESISTANCE TO NORTHERN CHALLENGES

Even more than that, considering India's greater threat from the north, I submit respectfully an individual opinion to observers from another nation whose strategic objectives may not be perfectly aligned with our own. This is that what has been outlined in the documents forwarded is exactly correct. It is not a Thebes against Sparta that is desirable from India's point of view; we need to consider Athens against Sparta, and that is a missing area and a wide open gap that will inevitably be filled, not necessarily by the Indian Army, most certainly in part in the joint doctrine. Such a separate addressing of the gaps in the doctrinal schemes will also recognise the asymmetry that prevails in the real world, and will seek to convert that into working principles and doctrines, into force organisation and command structures, into adoption of technology and promotion of some and discarding of others after careful evaluation, and into the principles that guided a weaker power in its opposition to a stronger power on numerous occasions in the past.

• BEYOND A POINT, ONE MUST REGARD ONE'S OWN ROLE AS THAT OF A MEMBER OF A GREEK CHORUS, NOT AS A PARTICIPANT IN AN ON-GOING DRAMA

Since we have got right to the heart of the matter, I suppose that continued analysis of your OP may not be relevant any longer.

 

[jaibi]

Sir, excellent points; I did read the doctrine a while back but thank you for posting them here again because I'd like to add to my knowledge with full engagement this time . Your posts wonderfully highlight the same point I was making but in a more subtle manner. I really think that your post should be an independent article, I'd help edit it, if you so deem fit. My point was to higlight the thinking behind the various doctrines that the nation seems to have been making based on the central theme of circumventing the balance of power in the region. Absolutely loved your post, sir.
On a side note, @Joe Shearer sir as well, I think the three of us should make articles to help PDF members understand the military aspects beyond the usual vitriol that is spewed over here because of a lack of understanding. I would appreciate your thoughts on this aim too, esteemed ones!
Sir, this is what I find a little surprising from the other side as well; when their doctrines, their narratives clearly show what their aims are I get that the discousive narrative needed to gain international support would be made in a way that gives them the higher poisition but the level of unpreparedness to act upon those aims is a little surprising; especially when it comes to getting the practical execution of those designs such as defence procurements that you highlighted. This disconnect is interesting and I think it warrants a deeper look.
Thank you, sir, it's always a pleasure reading your thoughts!

Dear @jaibi
I would suggest you go through Indian Land Warfare Doctrine 2018....would give you some food for thought as well. I'm uploading it here.

My comments would follow in a short while.



The stated doctrine explicitly refers to the Sino-Pak economic cooperation as a collusive threat to the Indian security. The doctrine explicates “collusive threat from adversaries” as one of the major external challenge faced by India.



Land Warfare Doctrine -2018 lays down broad contours of Indian Army’s development strategy and focuses on innovative employment of envisaged capabilities. LWD is important for understanding India’s expansionist designs, its perception of regional and extra-regional environment and how it is going to use military instrument to assert the role of a regional hegemon. This doctrine clearly defines China-Pakistan partnership as collusive threat to Indian security. LWD strongly advocates adoption of disruptive technologies that include Directed Energy Weapons, hypersonic weapons, Lethal Autonomous Weapons System (LAWS) and micro satellites.

Cardinals of Indian LWD

Objectives. In comparison to the Cold Start Doctrine, the LWD - 2018 seems to have shifted the focus to non-contact operations besides battlefield engagements. The doctrine repeatedly stresses upon ‘No War No Peace Scenario’ in the region, which could have four objectives: To cater for domestic pressure to penalize Pakistan, to coerce Pakistan to induce cooperation and pliant behaviour, to initiate measured conflict with Pakistan without leading to full escalation and to disengage from the conflict as winner.

Response Options . The LWD states Indian policy makers’ concern regarding efforts by Pakistan to shrink space for conventional operations through nuclear deterrence. The doctrine puts blame on Pakistan to conduct cross border insurgency along LoC and asserts that all out efforts will be made to counter the threat. Along LoAC (China), any deliberate transgression to be resolved through minimum escalation as per existing protocols. Along LoC, the operational capabilities to be strengthen to enhance punitive response to greater depth, precision and effect.

Two-Front War. The doctrine lays down guidelines for formulating strategies of two-front war (Northern and Western Fronts) and Operational Directives. The LWD has officially affirmed that India faces a joint risk from China and Pakistan. This marks a change in policy towards a dual-front threat perception from a single-front threat perception that has so far underlined military methodology in India. In September 2018, Indian CAS ACM BS Dhanoa verified this by saying that India’s neighbours (Pakistan and China) are not sitting idle. They are replacing their 2nd and 3rd generation fleet fast with 4 plus generation fighter jets and developing 5th generation fighter jets. India needs 42 squadrons of fighter jet to deal with both the adversaries, Pakistan and China, to carry out full spectrum of operations”. This shows IA’s ambition to manage "deliberate transgressions" by China's People's Liberation Army (PLA) over the contested about 4,000 km long Line of Actual Control (LoAC) according to existing understandings and conventions. LWD states that in the scenario of a combined threat, western front will be considered as primary front and shall be handled with maximum available means whereas, on the secondary northern front, “strong strategic defensive balance” will be maintained. The future force posture of IA will be influenced by clear identification of this risk. This will require an effort to reduce manpower costs and develop a more responsive force to improve teeth to tail ratio.

COIN Operations. The doctrine expresses that the IA will guarantee deterrence through corrective means by carrying out counter-insurgency (COIN) tasks. Though the doctrine is a response against the two-front war, and the main threat is from the western front. The doctrine also lays emphasis upon dealing with insurgencies. IA will likewise refine its technique to manage threats exuding from unpredictable and dynamic border issues with both her western and northern neighbours and what it allegedly alludes to as "state-sponsored-terrorism from across the border."

Conventional Operations. As per the LWD, conventional operations will remain dominant in the conflict spectrum, even though the possibility of conventional operations is reducing in the Indo-Pak perspective.

Formulation of Integrated Battle Groups. The LWD states that the IA will keep on improving the capacity to keep up the momentum of operations, recommending that even after the nuclear threshold is reached, IBGs will continue conventional war-fighting . IBGs formed by IA will be a composite force comprising five to six battalions that will have better flexibility in the application of force to perform conventional battle tasks. The IBG would be a composite force of armour, infantry, air defence, artillery, and supporting units. It would be commanded by a two-star officer and would be supported by AHs.

Border Management. Deterrence to be maint along Northern Border through a force centric approach. The operations along western borders to be force and space centric with the aim of destroying center of gravity through sharp and swift actions by IBGs.

CAPFs/ RRs/ ARs. During conventional war, the Indian Army will synergize employment of Central Armed Police Forces (CAPFs) as per operational plans. Their integration, training and operational procedures to assist in their absorption into the war fighting effort. Rashtriya Rifles (RR) and Asam Rifles (AR) battalions, deployed to conduct Counter Insurgency/ Counter Terrorism operations will also be prepared, trained and suitably empowered, to be effectively employed for conventional operations.

Non Contact and Hybrid War. The doctrine slightly touches upon the Indian Army’s response against Non-Contact and Hybrid conflicts and declares it as “Grey Zone Warfare”. The threat will be dealt by formulation of a separate force that will have mandate to retaliate in Info Ops Domain in coordination with National agencies.

Enhance Domestic Defence Capabilities. The doctrine emphasis on the need to provide impetus to domestic defence production by integrating with defence research, public sector units and civil industries to develop systems, ideas and concepts, in fielding of latest weapons and equipment.

Enhancing Capabilities of Special Forces. The LWD proposes that the proficiency of Special Forces be enhanced as a “vital component of overall deterrence” specifically for surgical strikes and escalation dominance.

Tri Service Integration. As per the doctrine, IA will develop cross-domain capabilities, encourage better integration and reconciliation between Army, Navy, and Air Force, and streamline all the force and assets to articulate viable and vigorous military reactions in all future warfare.

Techno-Centric Approach. The doctrine encompasses the paradigm shift in warfare to achieve non-contact and stand-off proficiencies. In the future battlefield, cyber capabilities, Autonomous Weapon Systems (AWS), and electronic warfare will have a conclusive or destructive effect. LWD, for the first time, deals with the latest disruptive technologies and ascertains that Artificial Intelligence (AI) and robotics will be used in future wars. LWD also mentions the use of the latest technologies in warfare such as Hypersonic weapons, High Energy (HE) Lasers, Swarm attacks through Drones, Nanotechnology, Quantum Computing, Directed Energy weapons, Micro Satellites and Pulsed Microwave Weapon Systems.






Major challenges and vulnerabilities of this doctrine which can be identified out of LWD-18.....

Capability Vs Claim Gap. In LWD-2018, IA aims at achieving deterrence by punishment to retain escalation dominance through “surgical strikes.” However, recent Indian attempt to achieve dominance through such actions like in Balakot met failure after the response from PAF. Deterrence by punishment concept is flawed based on overwhelming asymmetry which does not exist. Gunship Helicopters, Air Force, and Special Forces will be required to conduct surgical strikes. In all fields, Pakistan has sufficient response options. As, it is definitely known to Indian military leadership that Pakistan will strike back in a befitting manner if they conduct a surgical strike or any intrusion across the LOC, international border or the working boundary, this concept seems to be flawed.

Ambiguity in Minimal Escalatory Actions. As the diplomatic channels are exhausted and there is a requirement of some physical actions, “minimal actions” to be used. However, there is a very thin red line between the minimal and non- minimal actions. The LWD is unable to explain how the minimal type of activities will help to dominate the escalation ladder. IA also gives a lot of importance to the Line of Actual Contact (LoAC) in addition to the LOC. A complete paragraph is meant for LoAC with China, and the doctrine stresses the necessity to be ready for any escalation that seems to be driven by the actions at Doklam. The doctrine states that minimal actions as per existing rules will be taken against ‘deliberate transgressions’ along the LoAC. However, the doctrine does not specify nature and scale of these operations.

Ambiguity in Domain of Counter-Insurgency/ Counter-Terrorism. The doctrine mentions counter insurgency and terrorism very briefly, under the heading “Current Dynamics/ No War No Peace”. IA has been continuously involved in COIN operations since 1991, and only a paragraph in generic terms briefly lays IA policy.
Over Ambitious Technological Approach. IA formulated LTTIPP (Long Term Integrated Perspective Plan), which did not materialize as per the desires of Indian policymakers. The doctrine has a wish-list to evolve future warfare based on the latest technology, but a large budget is required for technology. The current budget share of IA is limited and it is difficult to upgrade the Army with these technologies. In addition to Indian army’s vagueness about threats, its capability improvement strategy is equally ambiguous.

Formulation of IBGs and Division Size Forces. Formation of IBGs entails consistent preparation and requires attachments and detachments of formations before and during the war. Until now, the idea of IBGs has not been practically implemented as it involves complete regrouping and different sets of equipment for each IBG based on terrain and threat. There will be severe restrictions for the Army to transform her formations into IBGs due to deficiencies of equipment, ammunition, and spares. Moreover, further challenges will be faced as the Indian Defence industry is not capable of developing equipment, and most of it would be imported.

Disparity between Army and Air Force. The strategy requires an assured air cover to succeed. Nothing less than air superiority by the Indian Air Force (IAF) will be essential for the army to conduct operations successfully. This means the IAF has to become the lead service in order to create a favourable air situation. This, however, is unacceptable to the army. The greater worry within Indian Army is that its primary role may be reduced to mere border management.

Foreign Dependency for Defence Equipment. From the year 2014, India is ranked as the worlds’ second-biggest importer of defence equipment behind only Saudi Arabia. India imports about twice as much as China. It is reliant on foreign sources for most of the major weapon systems, particularly hi-tech equipment such as; frigates and attack submarines; combat, transport, and reconnaissance aircraft; howitzers and anti-aircraft systems; etc.

Requirement of Regular and Intense Training. This strategy requires regular and intense training, as it involves attachments and detachments of formations before and during war. Moreover, the army would be required to fight with whatever capabilities it has. Given the known shortages of equipment, spares and ammunition would pose severe limitations on the army’s capabilities and aspirations.

Budgetary Constraints. Since the Indian military, unlike major powers, is not a global force, its plan should either be threat or capability-based. With a limited annual defence budget, an uninspiring research base and force development would be difficult and challenging.

Limitations of the Indian Defence Industry. Though, India has a vast defence industrial base with an extensive history of defence production. However, India is mainly dependent on defence imports, and its own exports are extremely less. India has tried to resolve this issue through several high-level committees, but no breakthrough has yet been achieved. India is currently facing a range of problems in order to bring change to its defence industry.

Am also uploading Joint Doctrine of Indian Armed Forces.....again, food for thought.

Sir, I agree that we've gotten to a synthesis and understanding of our points; the heart of the matter. I think a comparative analysis of the Chinese doctrine, Indian doctrine and Pakistani doctrine may be our next step? I agree with the overall assertion of your post that we have a clearer picture as to why the doctine takes the shape it does; however, any disparities seen on-ground and in thought are an interesting focus, wouldn't you say so? My aim was to try to get to the thinking behind the various directions that seem to be taken by India, pardon me because I'm a psychologist and tend to decipher things from my element
Absolute jewel, your post as well.

@jaibi @PanzerKiel @jbgt90

I was a little taken aback to find these documents with our friends, but then, given the thorough knowledge of our systems, processes and structures that we have already seen, it should not have come as a surprise.

• THE DOCTRINES ARE REASONABLY THOUGHT THROUGH AND WELL STRUCTURED TAKING INTO ACCOUNT THE REAL LIFE CIRCUMSTANCES THAT PREVAIL

There is nothing that I wish to add to PanzerKiel's comments, except to say that a doctrine typically outlines the thought processes behind a nation's status of the moment, and does not necessarily dwell on its shortcomings or disabilities, not to the extent of allowing those to form the concepts and the ideation involved. That the Indian military cannot rely completely on the Indian political system, whichever variety is in power at that moment is a truism that is so widely known as not to require separate mention. What has been stated in its analysis represents the consensus within our country; while portions might seem disproportionately sized to others, including those directly affected, this forms the best view that we have.

• TAKEN SEPARATELY, EACH SET OF DIFFICULTIES, OBSTACLES AND CHALLENGES HAS BEEN DEALT WITH KEEPING IN MIND THE DIFFERENCES INVOLVED

Again, the responses are reasonably outlined, as paraphrased by PanzerKiel; on one side, we have faced a consistent pattern of behaviour that results in irregular warfare turning into armed conflict, the latest occasion being one where armed conflict took place against a nuclear backdrop that was not exactly neutral nor put out of bounds; on the other, we have faced efforts at domination beginning at the state level, and continuing down to the level of border patrols, and a careful avoidance of gunfire since the incidents of 1967, at Nathu La, and our response against this generic status is reasonable and logical. India does not seek war in either case, but while there are precedents suggesting that armed conflict is thrust on us in one case, there are precedents as strong suggesting that all kinds of pressure short of armed conflict is brought to bear in the other case.

Under the circumstances, the articulation of the response in each case seems to be fair and reasonable on the theoretical plane.

• FAILURES AT NATIONAL LEVEL ARE NOT ORGANIC AND CAN BE RECTIFIED; HISTORY TELLS US THAT NO NATION EMERGED INTO REAL LIFE AS A PALLAS ATHENA READY AND ARMED FOR BATTLE FROM INCEPTION

As far as practical shortcomings are concerned, it is true that there have been assumptions of achievement of overwhelming superiority on the western front that does not exist at the moment; the gaps are such that they can be overcome by aligning the politicians with national security needs in a tighter fashion, and forcing a separation between state leadership and policy making on the one hand with the long term administration of the state's security environment on the other hand. That is to say, in simple language, the politicians should not be allowed to deflect the long term planning and implementation of security goals by the military, except in very carefully defined conditions of assured consensual interventions.

• THE ARMY WILL NO LONGER BE A SUPREMO, AS PC LAL DESCRIBED ITS ATTITUDE TOWARDS THE AIR FORCE IN 1965, BUT WILL NEED TO ACCEPT THE PRIMACY OF THE AIR FORCE IN DETERMINING THE RULES OF ENGAGEMENT AND THE SCOPE OF THE ENGAGEMENT

A number of inter-service issues have been mentioned. The overwhelming numbers and importance of the Army is an artificial construct, caused entirely by the nature of conflict that has taken place. It is entirely correct to define the relationship over the management of land frontiers as necessarily to be dominated by the air force in India, with whatever is required to be done to harmonise inter-services relations, with even some necessary acceptance on the part of the greater staffed service to accept these changes in position. This cannot be achieved overnight, and will also see major changes in the nature of the Army's organisation and future development, not merely in the direction of battle groups but in other fundamental areas as well.

• IT IS NOT THE AIR FORCE OR THE ARMY THAT WILL DRIVE THE RESISTANCE TO NORTHERN CHALLENGES

Even more than that, considering India's greater threat from the north, I submit respectfully an individual opinion to observers from another nation whose strategic objectives may not be perfectly aligned with our own. This is that what has been outlined in the documents forwarded is exactly correct. It is not a Thebes against Sparta that is desirable from India's point of view; we need to consider Athens against Sparta, and that is a missing area and a wide open gap that will inevitably be filled, not necessarily by the Indian Army, most certainly in part in the joint doctrine. Such a separate addressing of the gaps in the doctrinal schemes will also recognise the asymmetry that prevails in the real world, and will seek to convert that into working principles and doctrines, into force organisation and command structures, into adoption of technology and promotion of some and discarding of others after careful evaluation, and into the principles that guided a weaker power in its opposition to a stronger power on numerous occasions in the past.

• BEYOND A POINT, ONE MUST REGARD ONE'S OWN ROLE AS THAT OF A MEMBER OF A GREEK CHORUS, NOT AS A PARTICIPANT IN AN ON-GOING DRAMA

Since we have got right to the heart of the matter, I suppose that continued analysis of your OP may not be relevant any longer.

Sir, I would wish for a day the people of our region assimilate the business end of warfare one day. I feel what you are saying but thank you for your efforts; I shall come over there and add my measly two cents too.

I have just managed to cope with the gory Battle of Dograi and am composing myself to narrate the events of Barki and Asal Uttar; it agitated me greatly to think of those poor boys from either side charging into the jaws of death. It was deeply upsetting.

PanzerKiel - I am not tagging him to avoid embarrassing him - is like a kaleidoscope of military history. One has this vision or image of an event, then he twitches the instrument slightly, puts in some comments, and an astonishing transformation takes place! I cannot tell you how anxiously I have been reading my sources to try and spot what new angle he will bring out, and failed every time.

If you wish, I could finish my response to your insightful note before returning to the 65 narration. For one thing, it would give me time to recover objectivity and detachment. Do let me know; it is just that I feel guilty about my speed, since my general health and my specific problems with my eyes does not permit extended reading or sitting on the system. It would be unfortunate if people concluded that I was shirking, and avoiding the narration out of lethargy or disinclination.

Incidentally, I was assured on good authority that Asal Uttar is not the Hindi phrase that it has come to mean, but from Asal the there, udhar, as distinct from the here, idhar.

 

[Joe Shearer]

Sir, excellent points; I did read the doctrine a while back but thank you for posting them here again because I'd like to add to my knowledge with full engagement this time . Your posts wonderfully highlight the same point I was making but in a more subtle manner. I really think that your post should be an independent article, I'd help edit it, if you so deem fit. My point was to higlight the thinking behind the various doctrines that the nation seems to have been making based on the central theme of circumventing the balance of power in the region. Absolutely loved your post, sir.
On a side note, @Joe Shearer sir as well, I think the three of us should make articles to help PDF members understand the military aspects beyond the usual vitriol that is spewed over here because of a lack of understanding. I would appreciate your thoughts on this aim too, esteemed ones!
Sir, this is what I find a little surprising from the other side as well; when their doctrines, their narratives clearly show what their aims are I get that the discousive narrative needed to gain international support would be made in a way that gives them the higher poisition but the level of unpreparedness to act upon those aims is a little surprising; especially when it comes to getting the practical execution of those designs such as defence procurements that you highlighted. This disconnect is interesting and I think it warrants a deeper look.
Thank you, sir, it's always a pleasure reading your thoughts!

I would be delighted to support this aim. This is a defence journal after all. If you were to read some of the vile abuse that we are subjected to - that I am personally subjected to - you will understand why I am keen to drive the journal into a more thoughtful direction. The direction that you and @PanzerKiel have latterly oriented it towards.

If you can persuade the administration to make such an effort proof from the filthy abuse that prevails elsewhere, it would make matters easier. I have been told, for instance, that my mother is raped daily by RSS ruffians, and that my sister and wife are common whores for the taking. This should not come into the effort that you have mentioned.

@jaibi

I could not agree more strongly with your post #28.

@PanzerKiel

 

[jaibi]

Sir, I'm terribly sorry for such comments; I hope the moderation system is working better now. I would make a thread to get some feedback as well but the management is with me on this angle that this is the direction that we're moving towards! We are a defence journal! And I would do my best to move it into a direction that makes PDF a place of savage ideas but gentle words where it can be productive for all. I hope to live up to the expectations

I would be delighted to support this aim. This is a defence journal after all. If you were to read some of the vile abuse that we are subjected to - that I am personally subjected to - you will understand why I am keen to drive the journal into a more thoughtful direction. The direction that you and @PanzerKiel have latterly oriented it towards.

If you can persuade the administration to make such an effort proof from the filthy abuse that prevails elsewhere, it would make matters easier. I have been told, for instance, that my mother is raped daily by RSS ruffians, and that my sister and wife are common whores for the taking. This should not come into the effort that you have mentioned.